Jeff Duquette
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Posts posted by Jeff Duquette
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Couple other things I wanted to speculate on (unless of course we’re done with this topic):
The practicality of Hand Held Range Finders in Tanks I suspect in the defense...when initially checking reference points...i.e. expected avenues of advance...this instrument would have been very useful. In the attack, and once a defensive engagement was joined I cant imagine a TC fiddling about with such an awkward tool. Once buttoned up...forget it.
Likely Engagement Ranges I think the tendency of flesh and blood tank and anti-tank crews (who unlike wargamers have but one life to give for their "virtual" battlefield) would be reluctant in the defense to engage targets until they felt a reasonable chance existed of scoring a first round hit. The reasons being: Once you have commenced firing the probability that your position will be revealed rises dramatically. And once you begin firing on an unsuspecting enemy attacker they are likely to scatter like roaches when the kitchen light is turned on.
Elite Tiger Crews Regarding Tiger Crews being held to a higher standard…I don’t know weather this is true or not, I’m sure we all recall reading the particulars behind the British capture of the Tunisian Tiger...less than a stellar moment for Tiger crews. However, the survivability of the Tiger on late 42 – early 44 Battlefields would certainly have given crews a greater ability to work through the ins and outs of their equipment while on the job. A green T34 crew learning its job makes a mistake on the battlefield and it’s likely their dead as a result of their mistake. A Tiger crew makes a battlefield recruit mistake…and there is a good chance that the thick armor on their Tiger saved their asses, and allowed them to learn from their mistakes. They live to fight another day. If your lucky enough to survive through enough mistakes...well...you become elite. Most folks learn more from mistakes than anything else. However, if your killed as a result of your mistake you can hardly become elite
German Precision Engineering There was a discussion regarding German Engineering precision and how it should somehow result in an accuracy bonus to German tank fire. Both the Panther and Tiger were notable for various mechanical problems throughout their respective service histories.
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Interesting Illo. I found this in Jentz’s work on the Stug III regarding the short 75mmL24. His write-up – with a few notable exceptions -- is remarkably similar to his write-up for the 88mmL56.
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: Doyle, Jentz & Sarson’s “Stug III Assault Gun 1940-42”
Due to the high arcing flight of low velocity rounds fired from the 75 mm Stu.K. L/24, it could only be expected to hit vertical point targets such as tanks at fairly short ranges. The estimated accuracy is given as the probability (in percentage) of hitting a target measuring 2 x 2 m, representing the target presented by the front of an opposing tank.
These accuracy tables assume that the actual range to the target has been correctly determined and that the distribution of hits centered on the point of aim. The first column shows the accuracy obtained during controlled test firing of the gun to determine the pattern of dispersion. The second column includes the variation expected during practice firing due to differences between guns, ammunition, and gunners. As shown in Table 3, both columns were reported in the accuracy tables extracted from an original manual on the 75 mm Stu.K. L/24. These accuracy tables do not reflect the actual probability of hitting a target under battlefield conditions. Due to errors in estimating the range, the probability of any hit beyond 800 m was slight when firing these low velocity rounds with their associated high arcing trajectories.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
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My Glantz collection is limited to his recent "Battle of Kursk".
An interesting book to take a look at -- considering the subject matter of CM2 -- might be "Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks" by Dmitriy Loza (Translated by James Gebhardt). A lot of interesting insights into M4's of the Russian Front.
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machineman:
Did it look something like either of these
EmR.1.5 m
Entfermungsmesser 14 and 34
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
BTS Said:
Was there more to the Jenz discussion than what Jeff posted? What was posted said nothing about hitting a moving target at 1200-2000m. The reference about hitting at this range with 4 shots was against a stationary target, unless of course there is more than what Jeff quoted.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Jeeze BTS...you mean to tell me you don’t own a copy of Jentz’s Tiger I & II Combat Tactics? Oh my...I’m not sure what to think now
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Out of the Clear Blue again
aka
This is that info I was talking about regarding the Panzerfaust misfires. It’s from a series of pamphlets similar to the Osprey Military Pamphlets. This series appears to be somewhat lower tech with respect to printing\publishing gloss (relative to Osprey). But real nice booklets…and relatively inexpensive. A lot of great photos on glossy paper. Some interesting facts and figures. Anyway enough with the review. Here’s the stuff you were asking about (plus some additional fluff).
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In 1943,350,000 of the Panzerfaust were produced. Production of the Panzerfaust klein was halted. The HASAG made suggestions to improve the performance and utility of the new weapon. Warheads with shrapnel and incendiary effects were tested. Wa. Prw. 11 examined salvo firing devices with ten or sixteen Panzerfaust units.
Despite the deficiencies that were still present, the Panzerfaust established itself as the main close-combat anti-tank weapon. Production of the Panzerfaust 60 m began in August. The stipulated monthly production of 400,000 units could be attained only in October 1944. Handling had been simplified further and reliability improved. An increase of the black-powder charge to 140 grams necessitated a thicker firing barrel, but brought an increase in the effective range to 75 meters. In November of 1944 the Panzerfaust 100 m came out. The introduction of the hollow-charge cartridge allowed an increase of the effective range to 100 meters while using the old firing barrel. With its trajectory at its greatest height of 3.5 meters, a maximum range of 280 meters could be attained. In December 1944, production reached the striking figure of 1,295,000 units. The misfiring quota, though, was 5.5%!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Here are a couple of great ways to win the Cross of Iron...Posthumously
The above image and write are courtesy of: Wolfgang Fleischer
[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-27-2000).]
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aka
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The high muzzle velocity meant that the gunner did not have adjust for the shot drop to the same extend as for the slow muzzle velocity rounds which dropped more. The research we are refering to suggests that the shot drop of the high velocity 88's was so minimal at long ranges that if the gunner targeted the center mass of the tank or the turret the shot was VERY likely to fall somewhere on the upper hull or lower hull, as the deviation was less due to the flatter trajectory of the high velocity round, this is also why the Allied gunners liked their high velocity ammo too when they could get it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Interesting…is this verifiable. The reason I ask is that I just read something about the 17 pounder which would suggest otherwise. Muzzle velocities are comparable. See WO291/324. APCBC at 1000 yrds could routinely have a plus or minus 6.3 minutes arc error. That equates to approximately +/- 5.5 vertical feet.
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>We have shown the German war effort produced<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Who is we? You and the frog in your pocket…or you and the lynch mob
We’re all big boys here and I think we can each speak for our selves. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I would say modeled a good deal higher in the second and third shot at long range as this weapon should be able to brackett quickly and accruately as the crews attempting to train and qualify to aim this weapon were required to get a round on target by the 4th shot at long range.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
How quickly, and how accurately? If you were king describe the model you would use for simulating gun accuracy. Specifics are nice. You’re the designer now…and you seem to have an audience. Do you have a specific algorithm in mind?
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In the game the Germans do not have enough long range chance to hit advantage that they were believed to have exploited at EVERY opportunity in WW II tank combat. (examples and ARR's have been presented here we are not talking about the "uncommon" or fluke 3000 meter hits, but we are suggesting that German tankers ROUTINELY used the advantage of LONG range to engage Allied armour ANY time they could<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Presumably you can site a fair number of AAR’s detailing Tigers engaging targets accurately at ranges in excess of 3,000 meters.
Machineman:
I am still curious about your findings regarding Tiger crews use of flak range finders. I have yet to find a photo of this being used by a Tiger TC. I have seen STUG TC’s using scissor type range finders. Is the thing physically inserted into the cupola or does the TC hold it by hand while he checks range to target? Do you have access to a photo?
[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-25-2000).]
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>NOW by the same token, I still think there are too many misses, in Tank combat, especially at long range by Crack Veteran and Elite crews, firing any form of high velocity round that had a largely predictable flight path.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
The following table has been bated around a bit on this thread…and was previously posted by some else I think? Anyway Jentz’s qualifiers for these numbers should be looked at fully before we say Tigers should be assured of first round hits at ranges out to 2000 meters.
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Both the 8.8 cm Kw.K.36 L/56 and the 8.8 cm Kw.K.43 U71 were very accurate guns capable of first round hits at ranges exceeding 1000 meters. The estimated accuracy is given as the probability (in percentage) of hitting a target 2 meters high and 2.5 meters wide, representing the target presented by the front of an opposing tank. These accuracy tables are based on the assumptions that the actual range to the target has been correctly determined and that the distribution of hits is centered on the aiming point. The first column shows the accuracy obtained during controlled test firing of the gun to determine the pattern of dispersion. The figures in the second column in parentheses includes the variation expected during practice firing due to differences between guns, ammunition, and gunners. Both columns were reported in the accuracy tables from original fire tables as shown in Table 7.1.2.
These accuracy tables do not reflect the actual probability of hitting a target under battlefield conditions. Due to errors in estimating the range and many other factors, the probability of a first-round hit was much lower than shown in these tables. However, the average, calm gunner, after sensing the tracer from the first round, could achieve the accuracy shown in the second column.
The Tiger I could immediately open fire for effect at enemy tanks at ranges of up to 1200 meters. At ranges greater than 1200 meters, bracketing was to be employed with jumps of 200 or 400 meters, switching to fire for effect when within 100 meters of a tank target. The expected performance from a Tiger I on a practice range was that the gunner would hit the target by the fourth round at ranges between 1200 and 2000 meters. In exceptional cases individual Tiger I could fire at stationary enemy tanks at ranges up to 2500 meters. Concentrated fire from the platoon could be used to engage stationary tanks out to 3000 meters.
The same rules applied for firing against moving targets: immediate fire for effect up to 1200 meters, and bracketing to 2000 meters.
But the Tiger I was not to fire at moving targets at ranges greater than 2000 meters. The expected performance of a Tiger I gunner on a practice range was one hit out of three rounds fired within 30 seconds at a tank traveling 20 kilometers per hour across the front at ranges from 800 to 1200 meters.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
When someone starts talking about bracketing...I instantly think of low hit probability. So the magic number seems to be 1200 meters although I previously provided a quote indicating that flak 88’s used during the battle of Gazala were rarely hitting targets beyond 1000 meters (flak88’s which no doubt would have had crews equipped with relatively sophisticated range finders as standard issue equipment). So perhaps there is some gray area here.
Then again there are the odd accounts of crack Tiger gunners knocking off targets in excess of 3000 meters. The question is how much fudge is too much fudge. Pretty subjective question.
The other question...as has already been pointed out...how much credence do we place on the extraordinary. In a world at war with litteraly millions of men under arms, tank gunners will tend to be average folk...not Kurt Knispel Ace gunner...but J. Duquette average guy. A simulation of such an event should place an emphasis on the average. However, the rare wolves amongst the sheep should also occasionally appear.
[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-24-2000).]
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I have often thought that wargamers over emphasize the importance of equipment specifications on their personal success or failure on their virtual battlefields. The fact is flesh and blood Germans fighting defensively through the majority of 44 – 45 were very adapt at taking advantage of localized terrain. This combined with their seeming superiority in small unit tactics is what – IMO – resulted in much of the real world German Success during this period. The fact is an inept wargamer will do poorly weather he is playing as the Germans, Allies, Soviets, or as the Neapolitans. The average gamer when subjected to a trouncing while playing the Germans will often cry “the game models German tank optics incorrectly, or German Armour is inferior to Allied Armour…etc. etc. ad nauseum.
I think we tend to breeze over the large number of contemporary photos depicting knocked-out Sherman tanks with flank and or rear armor penetrations. I personally associate some correlation to German small unit tactics in these photos of side and rear armor penetrations rather than thinking their cause is simply some battlefield quirk. I also think we often read through the information like following and don’t associate its relevance to game play.
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: “Changing An Army” An Oral History of General William E Depuy.
INTERVIEWER: You mentioned that the Germans were pretty good at using all of their vehicles but that they really didn't employ big tank assaults like we might visualize. Was there anything you learned during this period that you could apply today in fighting armor, things that would he meaningful?
GEN DEPUY: Well. I think the first thing that impressed everybody at the time was how a handful of Germans could hold up a regiment by sighting their weapons properly. If they had two assault guns and 25 men, they put one assault gun on one side of the road, perhaps on the reverse slope firing through a saddle, and put another one behind a stone house, firing across the road. They protected them with some infantry and had a couple of guys with Panzerfausts up on the road itself, or just off the road in pits or behind houses. Now, here comes the point of an American unit roaring down the road, a couple of jeeps or maybe a tank, and bang, you lost a tank or two. The company commander then decides to maneuver a platoon around and boom, he loses another tank. So, the commander decides to wait for the battalion commander to come up. And, the battalion commander, if he is very imaginative, might say, "All right, while I'm trying to solve this thing, "C" Company go wide around to the right and come up behind this town." Those were the tactics, which kept the thing moving. But, sometimes a unit would stay there and fight all day against 25 men and two assault guns. And, that happened all too often. Commanders would too often attack the enemy head-on, whereas if they could just screen that position, just block it with something and find another way around, then they could keep going. Eventually, that is what almost always happened. They found their way around. Some units would find their way around in a matter of minutes and hours; other units couldn't find their way around except after having lost a whole day fiddling with one of these little things. Now, what one learned from fighting a lot of these things, is an understanding of tactics. The big lesson is not to take him head-on. Anything is better than that. And, you get an understanding of sighting weapons. The Germans were just superior at that. And, to this day, they are very good at it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
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Regarding Sandbags (and I’m at a loss as to how this thread turned from accuracy of the 88 to a duel between Easy 8’s and MkIVh’s…be that as it may).
I disagree that sandbags play no part physically (or an insignificant part) in reducing the kinetic energy of an Armored Piercing round. I’m not sure what physicist you’ve been chatting with, but the fact is sand can be modeled as an elastic-plastic material in the same way steel is modeled. Obviously steel has a much higher modulus of elasticity than sand will have. But a foot of sand will reduce the kinetic energy of an AP round. This should be intuitive to anyone with even a very basic background in materials or physics. One really only needs to turn to Combat Engineering Field Manuals and look at the effect varying levels of overhead soil cover have on the reduction of casulties due to indirect fire. Analogy: shrapnel is an AP round to the human body. Slow its kinetic energy sufficently and its no longer a threat to the body.
In addition, I suspect the effect of sand bags would have a considerable effect on the penetrating capabilities of shaped charge munitions. The blast from a shaped charge impacting sandbags would be focused some 8 to 12 inches from the exterior face of Armour plate, ala Shurzen.
Totally out of the blue...I just read an interesting statistic indicating that over 5% of Panzerfausts fired had miss-fires.
[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-24-2000).]
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PzKpfw 1:
Here are some links to Zalogas pages of concern. I scanned in the actual page, as well as the page before and after the table and posted them on one of my web pages. There is reference to table 6-1 (also an interesting table on Soviet tank losses relative to type of weapon inflicting loss) but nothing for the T34 loss relative to range of engagment table. I didn’t want to post them as images directly onto this thread because there width makes forum thread a pain to pan across.
http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Crap/Zaloga1.jpg
http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Crap/Zaloga2.jpg
http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Crap/Zaloga3.jpg
http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Crap/Zaloga4.jpg
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Of course, Steve is very thorough in his research, as is Jentz. That still doesn't help us establish the table parameters and how the results were tabulated, was their anymore text on the table itself Jeff?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Unfortunately there is no other text in "Red Army Handbook" associated with this rather fascinating table. I posted the thing over on the Russian Military Zone to see if any of those folks had seen the statistics associated with Zaloga’s table. Nothing. Not even a polite “sorry never seen the table before”.
I searched around the net for a possible email address or web page for either Zaloga or Ness and came up with zilch. If you succed in contacting Zaloga on this I hope you will share what ever info he passes on. I think I will try Scott Cunningham to see if he has come across this table. Hell of a nice fellow and great web site:
http://www.wargamer.org/GvA/index.html
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My goodness. The Indirect Artillery model is wrong. Tank main gun accuracy is messed up. Now penetration ratings are screwy as well. Did CM get anything right?
The casual reader might get the impression from this forum that CM is just another “souped-up” NINTENDO game. -
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Dan Said
What does he mean? The Tiger had a system to determine range to a target -> See Tigerfibel. But of course with some guessing still in (Not a laser of course).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
I just quotes um the ways I see's um
I thought Franz Kurowski is pretty well respected in this field of expertise. He has something like forty or fifty published works dealing with the German Armed Forces in WWII. He has two published titles dealing with German Panzer Aces of WWII. I see his work quoted a lot. He just published another work on German Infantry Aces of WWII. I just picked up Panzer Aces II...beautiful book. Photos are a tad bit grainy for my tastes. But it’s an interesting read. $52.00 (US) for the hardback…I suppose that puts it out of the price range for the casual WWII reader. Is his book wrong in this regard?The same is true of Steve J. Zaloga with respect to published works dealing with Soviet WWII armor, and other published works on the Soviet Army in WWII (i.e. Red Army Handbook...the table I posted on T34's destroyed relative to range). Dare I compare Zaloga with Jentz (Zaloga being the Russian armor guru commonly seen on book covers dealing with that type of subject matter).
I recall from my days in the service -- and granted I had pretty average (or below avg) gunnery skills -- but I had a real tough time tracking my rounds as they proceeded down range. I did time in M48A5's and M60A1's back in the early to mid eighties. The tank had a "gun computer" to adjust for super elevation of the gun (I think that’s what it was called). Anyway the M48 and M60 had real range finders on board. I don’t know if WWII tanks had such an instrument.
Engaging a target went something like this: The TC would announce type of ammo to fire and type target being engaged. He would also do an initial gun lay in the vicinity of the target using his TC over ride. The gunner dials in the type of ammo and range into the gun computer which results in a slight tweaking of the gun elevation to account for the path of the round relative to path of LOS (i.e. arc as opposed to nearly straight line). Once the gunner sees the target through his own optics he yells “Identified” and takes over "fine tuning" of the gun lay on the target. The loader in the mean time has popped into the breech the type of round the TC has called out, released the gun safety and yells "UP". This tells the gunner the gun is ready to fire. The loader should be pulling a second round out from the ready racks and have it ready to pop into the breach.
When the gunner is satisfied with his aim he yells “On the Way” KA-BOOM! Now in theory the TC and Gunner are supposed to track the fall of the round…short line…over…and adjust fire accordingly. There is a tracer element on the back of SABOT and HEAT rounds (I think HEAP rounds as well), to make this process easier. In addition there should be a certain amount of “splash” as soil is kicked up from rounds that missed their mark. However, in practice when a 105 goes off there is a lot of flash and dust etc. generated. In addition the gunner and TC (as well as the rest of the crew) get jostled about from the gun going off…making their task that much more challenging to keep there eye on the round as it rockets its way down range at 1,500 ft\sec (or whatever the velocity is). I had a hard time keeping track…it takes only a second or two for a round to be down range 3,000 meters…guess that’s why I was a marginal gunner.
I do recall during one live firing exercise at NTC (before it was NTC and just plain old Ft Irwin...2 miles south of no where) we got to fire at old tank hulks…several M26’s, the turret of an old Sherman and some M47’s. When our practice rounds actually hit these hulks...metal on metal...there was a rather dramatic flash making your process of tracking rounds considerably easier. Firing at plywood targets doesn’t give you that dramatic flash when the target is hit.
[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-23-2000).]
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Presumably its firing shaped charge ammo
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Did WWII AP munitions typically have tracer elements attached?
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I think the information Runes brings up would be interesting to take a look at. I think it would also be of interest to note accounts in which caliber, ammunition expenditure, is as well as range of engagement are discussed.
Some additional food for thought on the subject…
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Franz Kurowski’s Panzer Aces II (pg 207)
As there was no range-measuring device in the Tiger (nor in any German tanks) the distance to the target always had to be estimated. A shot could only be on target if the range was estimated precisely.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Major Kenneth Macksey MC Tank vs Tank The story of Armoured Battlefield Conflict in the 20th Century. (pg 94)
The clash of armored masses to the southeast of Tobruk erupted as a turmoil of
formations and units seeking combat in dust clouds and battle smoke. Shooting might
open from the 88s at 2000m, but hits were rarely scored above 1000m (where the L60 50mm guns came into their own) and at 300m, if their luck held, the British with their 40mm guns might begin to take a toll, Notably on the vital ground of the Sidi Rezegh feature, with its airfield, the losses to the British, fanning out to seek their quarry, mounted alarmingly as they fell into ambush after ambush.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Major Kenneth Macksey MC Tank vs Tank The story of Armoured Battlefield Conflict in the 20th Century. (pg 107)
Pieces of such high velocity brought with them, however, additional problems for commanders and gunners. No longer was it possible satisfactorily to base corrections of aim upon spotting the fall of shot, because the shot usually landed before the dust and
Smoke from the gun's discharge had cleared away. Field anti-tank gunners often overcame the spotting problem by employing a flank observer: However (sic) tank commanders in a turret, jolted by the discharge, were in trouble. Moreover, although at the shorter (and more common) ranges of engagement, where line of sight virtually coincided with trajectory of projectile over the initial 800 meters and made it necessary only to lay at the center mass of target, the judging of distance at potentially effective ranges out to 2000 meters now became critical. In desert and steppes these difficulties faced the Germans as their Tigers, Panthers, Elefants and several more kinds of heavy Jagdpanzer came into service throughout 1943. The Russians, too, would have to consider it when the greatly improved T34/85 with its three-man turret, thicker armor and 85mm gun appeared in August 1943.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Major Kenneth Macksey MC Tank vs Tank The story of Armoured Battlefield Conflict in the 20th Century. (pg 129)
This new method worked on the principle of firing a shot of smaller caliber dense material encased in a lightweight, carrier through a standard gun barrel: increasing
velocity was obtained because the full-caliber projectile had a greater base area for the charge to act upon than the normal AP, APC or APCBC round. The new projectile was also lighter in weight. With a German round of this kind, known as Armor Piercing Composite Rigid (APCR), both shot and carrier traveled to the target, but generated higher air resistance and a rapid falling-off in accuracy beyond 600 meters. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
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BTS:
Uhh…That wasn’t Danielle that posted the SLA Marshall quote…that was me. And I posted it to give credence to the difference between target range firing and combat firing, and to support the CM accuracy model.
As far as the difference between the 500 meter effective range and SLA Marshall's findings...yes you have a point...which is the same point I was trying to make
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Very Cool Paul thanks much. I will shot off an email this evening. You will need to send me your return address so I can mail a check.
Back to the subject at hand, it is relatively easy to find after action reports of what – by gunnery range stats – should be “sure” hits, but infact misses often seem to be occuring in this "sure hit zone". Perhaps this weekend I will make a list of tank vs. ATG and tank vs. tank in which close range misses are occurring.
I think gunnery range results tell us optimum capabilities of weapon accuracy. I also think gunnery range test results should not be ignored in a wargames accuracy model, but they should be taken with a grain of salt.
The following is perhaps a weak analogy, but maybe some additional food for thought for an open mind. Since BTS brought small arms into the discussion I figured I too could plod down that trail. Bare in mind the weapons in the following quote include M1 Garands with an effective range of about 500 yards...and max range of what...1000yds or 2000 yds? BAR effective range is about 600 yds...and max of maybe 1500 yds or 2500 yds. I suspect an average US MARINE Rifleman in WWII and Korea was quite proficient on a rifle range, and could regularly put all 8 rounds from an M1 clip into a paper targets bull’s eye at 500 or 600 yds.
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From: SLA Marshall’s Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea
The average effective infantry fire with weapons lighter than the machine gun was consistently less than 200 yards. In no instance was it established, in the operations brought under survey, that any significant move by enemy forces had been stopped and turned by rifle and carbine fire alone at ranges in excess of that figure.
This, perforce, limits the significance of the evaluation. It rarely happens in the Korean fighting or elsewhere that a tactical situation of large order arises which tests the effectiveness of the rifle alone as a stopping and killing agent. By the nature of engagement, the infantry contest between opposing groups of riflemen is pretty much confined to strong patrol actions, fire exchanges between small group" within a larger skirmish, or last-ditch stands by companies which have emptied the ammunition from header weapons in the earlier stages of the fight. In the latter situation, the contending sides almost invariably close to within less than 150 yards before the climax is reached in which the position is held or lost according to rifle effectiveness.
During the winter fighting, in both Army and Marine operations, there were manifold incidents of this exclusive type. On the Marine side these were marginal encounters of one type or the other. Within the Army operations, there are numerous examples of company fights in which all of the heavier weapons ran dry, leaving onlv the rifle. But in interrogating the witnesses to these various encounters, in no case could it be established that a decisive fire from rifle and carbine was delivered at a range in excess of 200 yards. There is only this type of exception to be noted: enemy patrols were frequently engaged at slightly beyond 200 yards range: the first fire might knock down one or two of their number; the others then scampered away. However, when an enemy patrol or larger body is walking into a concealed position under such conditions that the defenders feel their advantage, they customarily hold fire until it is within the 200-yard zone. When the action is more precipitate, and they open at longer ranges with rifles only, the results are not killing. The Marines who were under siege at Koto-ri through the early days of December told of their effort to pick off Chinese riflemen who in broad daylight would stroll to within 300-350 yards of the armed camp or walk in-the open to a stream, bed to draw water. They found the targets far more elusive than they had expected.
The equation alters radically as soon as automatic fire, either from the BAR or the LMG, is added to the rifle volume. The killing-stopping zone then lengthens anywhere from 200 to 400 yards, depending upon the number of automatic weapons, the ability of the gunners, the governing terrain conditions, the weather, visibility, and general situation. There is nothing unusual or unexpected about this; the one point which seems deserving of particular emphasis is that the BAR greatly compounds the stopping effect of rifle fire at ranges considerably m excess of those at which unaided rifle fire is potent. It has long been prized as a mop-op agent, for depressing final resistance in a conquered area, or liquidating tenacious elements infesting the rear. There is perhaps need to emphasize that it adds body to the rifle volume at any range.
What is said here is meant to reflect in no degree whatever on the accuracy of the standard rifle; the men who use it in battle swear by it. Junior officers frequently said that they had seen it do decisive work in excess of 250 yards range. When the question was raised whether this was in combination with heavier fires from other weapons, the answer was invariably yes. The evaluation therefore points up mainly the conditions under which rifle fire is likely to play its part in battle. The great killing zone for the rifle is at less than 200 yards. But an arm which was not reasonably accurate at ranges well in excess." of that would shift too large a part of the burden to the heavier weapons of the infantry during the enemy approach and withdrawal. No change in doctrine is indicated: no change in the weapon is indicated: no radical shift in training technique is indicated. Rifle practice at the longer ranges is still desirable. But the rifleman needs about five times the- mount of practice now given him with live ammunition if the weapon's potential is to be fully exploited in combat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-20-2000).]
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Not that this has anything to do with anything…but as I recall from basic training…and mind you this was back in 83…the grenades we were throwing were supposed to be fragmentation grenades. They were smooth surfaced…non-pineapple type grenades. Almost shaped like a slightly squashed baseball.
Perhaps the serrations on the old pineapple was some kind of grip "thingie".
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L.Tankersley
Oh sorry…by your wording…or at least how I read your post, I had thought you had some additional info on the subject. As far as elaborating on information included on the table I reckon I would have to refer your question to the books authors. I agree that the table doesn't necessarily address weapon accuracy, but it does bring to light intangibles that don't fall out from cut and dry gunnery tests in which outside stimuli plays no part in results. The table - I would contend - rolls marksmanship, battlefield terrain, battlefield tactics, training, visibility, etc etc into a large smorgasbord of what might be going with the numbers presented.
Couple points of speculation:
[*]The table dates are inclusive of some pretty heavy tank combat on the steepes of southern Russia. The steepes were seemingly flat and or rolling terrain by most historical accounts. Perhaps topography with long unobstructed fields of fire (dunno for sure not having been their…but various accounts describe the steepes as a flat grassy desert). This terrain profile should have been well suited to the long range killing abilities of the Panthers long 75 or Tigers 88mm.
[*]Russian tank tactics would presumably have been heavily weighted toward close in ambush against the heavier German Panther and Tigers of that period. Perhaps the table is telling this tale? Long-range engagements with the 76mm would have been a no win situation against the long 75mm or 88mm. If this is part of the tale being told by this table it could certainly lead one to believe that the Soviets were pretty effective at getting into close range before shooting it out with German tanks and ATG's.
[*]The later dates included in the table mid-44 would imply a lions share of T34 casualties occurring in western Russia, Baltic's, Poland, etc. Areas with a typical terrain profile consisting of wooded rolling hills, wooded swamps and marshes (the key word being wooded)...in other words terrain with relatively short lines of sight.
I have yet to run across a similar set of numbers for the Western Desert. This would be an ideal case study for examining the effects of relatively unobstructed LOS on gunnery and accuracy.
[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 10-18-2000).]
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It does appear, however, to contradict those who would claim that a majority (or even a significant minority) of kills were scored beyond 1,200 meters (on the East Front, in 43-44, by these weapons sytems)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
On what basis are you making this supposition. Can you provide references? I have been collecting information on this subject matter for a while now and am always interested in additional hard facts.
Again with regards to the table I presented, it is available for review in "Hand Book of the Red Army" 1939-1945" by S.J. Zaloga and L.S. Ness (page 179).
Regarding the other references they include: "Breakout and Pursuit" by Martin Blumenson
And
"Applied Operations Research" (Plenum Press, New York, 1988) by Shephard, Hartley, Haysman, Thorpe and Bathe.
The Normandy engagement ranges should not be much of a mystery to anyone. ETO in general, as elaborated upon in "Applied Operations Research" indicates 50% of engagements occur at less than 650 yards. Presumably this would be a function of battlefield terrain, smoke, poor marksmanship etc etc
The intent is to cast doubt on the validity of comparing gunnery range statistics with actual combat conditions. That is what is at crux of this thread - at least in my mind. I think this is the approach that BTS is trying to model in CM. Systematic errors in gunnery can often be overcome with training and understanding the limitations of weapon systems ala inclusion of gunnery computers in modern MBT's. Human error and human battlefield psychology and their potential impact on gunnery are too nebulas to attach hard numbers too.
Gun accuracy and lethality has increased remarkably since WWII. It's often said that an M1a1 had 40 stowed kills onboard. Actual RPK is about 1.7 in practice, but the bottom line is that an M1 can hit and kill just about anything that it can see and shoot at, out to about 4000m. After that hit and kill percentage drop off drastically.
This goes for both Sabot and HEAT ammo, which are the two primary rounds.
This is considerably better than a WW II tank (German tanks included) that usually needed approximately 10 rounds to get a kill. A modern 120mm is probably 5x more powerful than a 88mmL71 in penetration, and is far more accurate with modern fire control systems.
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Uedel:
Read through your test results. Great work. We probably should have run something similar at the very start of this thread.
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Hey Gorilla:
Sounds good...send me a letter when your are comfortable with game play and feel like starting a play by email game.
Actual U.S. Army Employment of Tank Destroyers in WWII
in Combat Mission Archive #2 (2000)
Posted
Scouts right from what I have read. Although US Army Infantry and Armored divisions in ETO had organic towed anti-tank assets (mostly 57mm’s), SPTD’s and many towed TD’s (mostly the towed 3 inch or towed 76mm) were formed into independent battalions. In many cases, for reasons of cohesion and inter unit corporation (i.e. corporation between divisional maneuver battalions and independent TD and Tank battalions) independent SPTD, TD, and tank battalions became kind of pseudo-organic in that they tended to be attached and remain with the same division for long periods of time.
As far as the indirect artillery employment of SPTD’s I recall from “Seek, Strike, and Destroy” that M10's were relatively effective in this role in North Africa. After there battlefield success apparently the Tank Destroyer School set-up formal indirect artillery fire training as part of advanced individual training for TD crews. The problem with the indirect fire role of M10's was apparently the excessive barrel ware resultant from firing in an indirect mode. This may account for some of the less than stellar Armour penetration characteristics of M10’s in ETO. Seems to me I read something regarding barrel ware and reduction in muzzle velocity.