Jeff Duquette
-
Posts
1,389 -
Joined
-
Last visited
Posts posted by Jeff Duquette
-
-
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>My point here is three NON-KILLING PENETRATIONS on one vehicle in one battle. On your thread someone speculates that non-killing penetrations amount to 1% or 2% of all penetrations. That estimate may or may not be accurate, but if it is we're looking at a 1-in-125,000 to 1-in-1,000,000 event.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
I’m not sure where the speculation regarding non-killing penetrations amounting to only 1% or 2% of all penetrations is coming from or what it is based on (if anything). I can’t find the thread you are referring to either (not that I looked that hard). The British Army Operational Research Section No. 2 conducted studies on just this subject in Normandy. They concluded that the average number of penetrations to knock out a Sherman was 1.55. Number of penetration required to KO a MkV was 1.9. KT (based upon a limited sample) was 2.6. This would seemingly suggest something much higher 1 in 1,000,000.
I think if you do a tad bit of digging on this subject for North African Tank battles you will also be surprised by the number of penetrations German AFV were able to shrug off and remain operational. In my opinion much of this was attributable to British armored piercing ammunition. Brits employed solid shot throughout the war, and seemed to have an aversion to APCBC.
-
ropey:
Did some diggin through my stuff...sorry cant seem to find any arials of the area you are talking about.
-
You need to flank those fellers...side or grill door shots are what are required. I lost 4 Shermans to a Jagdpanzer IV, hull down behind a stone wall. Their tough. Good sloping armour, low profile, and powerful main gun.
Smoke and manuver for flank and rear shots...otherwise your gonna take a pounding.
-
go for it. i have numerous contemporary air recon photos of the Normandy area...including St. Mere Eglise. I also have several of Pt du Hoc...I alway thought Du Hoc would make a nice infantry fight for CM.
St Mere Eglise July 1944
Historical
http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/StMereEglise.html
-
http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/phtNORM2.html
[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 12-06-2000).]
-
Superior German Optics
-
Trained close air support observers with specialized radio equipment were required for calling in TAC air support. Joe Company Commander couldn't necessarily get on his PRC and call for air support during WWII. The whole process was somewhat more random, thus the lack of intelligence provided to you.
This is From: "Changing an Army, An Oral History" US ARMY interview of General William DePuy. DePuy served as an infantry officer with the 90th ID from Normandy to the German surrender. He rose to the rank of battalion commander by the end of the war. He also commanded the 1st ID in Vietnam (1966-67?)
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>INTERVIEWER: Another aspect of tactical operations is close air support. Was there anything unusual or noteworthy about how you coordinated the close air or marked your positions?
GEN DEPUY: You mean in World War II?
INTERVIEWER: Yes, sir.
GEN DEPUY: Well, generally, we didn't have any close air support. They didn't have a system back then like we have now. There was no tactical air control system. When we first went to Mayenne and to Le Mans, they had Air Force officers in trucks with radios with our two lead battalions. That was the only time in the war that I saw that - the only time! They talked to the fighters, the P-47s and P-51s, and got them to attack the German tanks and troops that the column ran into. It worked pretty well. In fact, it worked very well. I think flights were rotated over the head of the column, more or less, as a result of preplanning, and when they got there the Air Force officers on the ground would pick them up by radio and direct them in on the target. This was Task Force Weaver. We had priority because this was the breakout from Normandy. Another story. Across the Saar, I needed some emergency resupply. In order to do that J had to call back to my regiment on the other side of the river and have them go to division. Division went all the way back to the XIX TAC, which was a part of the Ninth Air Force working with Third Army. They launched fighters that had ammo and medicine packed in the wing tanks. They flew up to where we were and found the comer of the woods where we had put out a couple of fluorescent panels in the form of a cross. We had asked that they drop it in the corner of the woods, northwest of the panel, and they did. So that was sort of remote control. But, other than that, I don't remember any close air support. The first real use of close air support was in Korea. The Air Force made its money in WWII by armed reconnaissance. It just went out and killed everything it saw.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
-
I noticed the tanks firing smoke thing as well. Panthers firing at US Infantry...the Panthers began shotting smoke like crazy. When I moved the Panthers one Tank had its target line remain fixed on its original infantry target. The grey/white smoke target line stayed fixed on the infantry team even after the tank moved out of direct LOS with the infantry team. I thought it was odd behavior, but didnt think too much of it till I read this thread.
-
Andrew Hedges said:
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Do you mean the reference to the TZF 1 should be to the TSR 1? That may be right, although if there really were a TZF 1, it might be four feet long; the Panther's TZF 12 looks to be about 4 feet long. But, regardless, you're right about it not being a rangefinder, whatever it is.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Yes this is what I am implying.
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Also, it's helpful to keep in mind (as Green may not have) that TZR stands for Turmzielfernrohr (i.e., turret targeting telescope); I assume that TSR stands for something like Turmsehrohr).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Yes again. It is difficult to find references to the TZF1, but since it has the standard nomenclature for a monocular main-gun sight, I suspect that it was perhaps a pre-war gunsight used in 1930’ish ersatz armoured cars or the like.
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>WRT rangefinders and StuGs: it occurs to me that rangefinders were commonly used, even in WWI, by artillery units, and that StuGs, due to the constant military infighting that made the 3d Reich so charming, were actually part of the artillery branch and thus wore different uniforms and had a different chain of command. But I wonder if these relatively sophisticated rangefinders were commonly issued to StuG units, and made their way to certain tank units after they had been used by StuGs.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
That probably has a great deal of merit. I have found at least one photo of a Panther TC using this type of instrument (couple pages back in this thread). Numerous German Tiger Aces after all started out in STUG III’s. It was probably an unauthorized practice on the part of these old stug tankers to obtain the SF09 or SF14 scissors (or “donkey ear”) range finders. An SF range finder would no doubt have been handy in preparing relatively detailed range cards and for engaging targets from ambush positions at long range, or when firing HE at extended ranges.
However, the ergonomics of employing such an instrument, or an EM type range finder during a tank battle seem far-fetched at best. I would tend to believe that German TC’s relied on their rather infamous binoculars for initial range estimation during say movement to contact type engagments or when attacking. Upon further digging it is apparent that most WWII German Military issued Bino’s were equipped with stadia lines…so range estimation was possible via a quick mil relationship. The gunner would also be able to adjust the TC initial range estimation according to his own estimation via stadia triangle thingies in his TZF gunsight.
-
For anyone still remotely interested in this topic.
I suspect Michael Green in “Tiger Tanks” has gotten off track some how. He refers to the TZR1 as having a 55 inch length, and six degree FOV and refers to it as an optical rangefinder. 55inches equals 4.5833 feet…and….4.5833 feet equals 1.4 meters. TSF1 length is 1.4 meters and has a FOV of 6 degrees. Therefore Green's reference to the TZF1 should be TSF1. I know this may all seem like minutia (and it probably is in the grand scheme of things).
However the rub is that that thing is really a simple monocular observation periscope. Range finding characteristics would simply be stadia lines and a mil relationship. No more efficient or accurate than the Tigers TZF9b gunsight.
A picture of the TSR1 sticking out of a Panther Copula (from: Jentz’s ”Germany’s Panther Tank”).
-
An interesting anecdote regarding US ARMY gunnery training in North Africa. The number of bracket rounds required in this example would imply the Sherman’s 75mm was capable of bracketing and hitting a target at approx 1,600 meters by the 3rd or 4th round. Recall past postings on Jentz’s write-up on Tiger training accuracy in which a Tiger I gunner was expected hit a stationary target at 1200 to 2000 meters by the 4th round.
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
From: George Forty, “Tank Warfare In the Second World War, An Oral History” (Pg 51)
In some cases, this training did not finish even while they were in progress to, or when they had reached, their overseas theatre. For example, Norris Perkins was a member of the American element of the Operation 'Torch' Task Force which landed in North Africa in November/December 1942. He recalled: 'Training on the high seas, December 1942. We constructed out of trash and cardboard, dummy traversing and elevating wheels, mounted on boxes, simulating tank cannon controls. A target scene was painted on canvas. The instructors drilled gunners in speedy adjustments of fire for pretended high or low shots, teaching rapid bracketing of targets. . . . Further training in Morocco. After the successful three-day campaign against the French in November, and further landings in December, intensive training was continued in the Cork Forest of Mamora north of Rabat, the capital of French Morocco. We found that the 75mm tank cannon was extremely accurate because of its excellent controls and heavy stability of the gun platform (the tank). As an example, we hit the trunk of a tree a mile away and knocked it down on the third or fourth bracketing round. Even the .30-calibre ball-mounted bow gunner's machine gun, without any gunsight, was accurately controlled by watching the tracer through the periscope. We could roll a burst of fire into a hat at a couple of hundred yards.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
-
Interesting write-up from a member of the 704th SPTD Battalion
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Dear Sirs:
Reading in the May-June issue about the increased "lethality and tightability" of the enhanced M1A2, with its extensive use of digital electronics for target acquisition and target tracking, made me wonder if any younger readers knew how target acquisition and target tracking was done fifty-odd years ago. I would like to quote a paragraph from the combat history of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Fourth Armored Division, of General Patton's Third Army.
The time was September, 1944, the weapon was the 76mm, high-velocity antitank rifle that armed the M-18 "Hellcat." The gunner was SSG Phillip Hosey. I quote from Phil Hosey.
"Near Nancy, France, between Luneville and Arracourt, we faced a group of German tanks that had taken a position one mile away, across a shallow open valley. Our M-18s were in defilade, facing out over a small hill. Infantry led the way across the valley with three M-4s intermingled. The Krauts let them get halfway across, then opened up with anti-tank fire from woods on the right. They immediately KO'd two M-4s and drove the infantry to the ground. Two Panthers, a Mark IV, and an assault gun came out of the woods and moved across our line of fire at the distance of about a mile. In his position in our open turret, the tank commander, SSG Hicklin, watched their progression through his glasses and called out the range: "Two thousand yards, moving at about ten mph." Our rifle, with AP, had a muzzle velocity of 2,700 fps, so it would take two seconds to arrive on target. The Krauts were moving at fifteen feet per second, which let them travel thirty feet in two seconds. Their lead tank was twenty feet long (from the book), so we led him a good length for a center shot. We laid on and fired. Voila, a hit! It struck two feet in front of his rear drive idler. We then picked the last tank and scored — he began to bum. The two intervening tanks were destroyed by two fast AP shots. So we got two Panthers, a Mark 4, and an assault gun. Our 76mm rifle packed a good punch, even at two thousand yards. We felt that we had the best self-propelled antitank gun in the ETO."
In spite of his Purple Hearts and continued combat-related disabilities, Phil Hosey has provided many important first-hand accounts of his experiences for our combat history of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
CPT Richard R. Buchanan, 704th Tank Destroyer Bn. Secretary/Historian, 704 TD Bn Assn. Wilmington, Ohio<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
-
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I think you are underestimating how many things are going on inside a tank during combat, and the stress that comes with it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
The wacky **** that can occur inside a tank turret during the adrenaline generated from merely a live fire exercise can be amazing. I can't imagine the errors that might occur when you mix in live fire being directed your way.
-
Machineman:
Excellent article. Elaborates on the US ARMY's change in official doctrinal philosophy regarding the Tank being the best weapon for killing other tanks. In addition it details the emphasis the ARMY began placing on long-range gunnery, and long-range accuracy during the 50's. The design of post war MBT's fire control systems all apparently were built around stereoscopic range finders, and at least in the case of the M48, the inclusion of ballistic computers. The stereoscopic range finders were apparently not universally embraced by ARMY gunners (presumably those folks not blessed with acute stereoscopic vision). However, I would contend that the dramatic boost in accuracy at long range between WWII and the 1950's (FM 100-5 reference again) was this focus on both long-range gunnery training and the migration of tank designer away from range estimation via "Kentucky Windage" toward instrumented determination of range.
-
Jurdis:
Check the following URL. The German Army Handbook is online in Acrobat\Adobe format. Look in chapter III...cover combat unit TO&E(down to platoon level in some cases).
Handbook on German Forces (TM 30-410), May 1945, Chaps I-III
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/DL/chron.htm#AWorldWarII19391945
-
it seems that way. I havent recieved your turn yet. resend to my hotmail address:
-
Agree with Tom. Hunker down and look at the terrain from ground level.
-
machineman:
Take a gander at Chamberlain "Encyclopedia of German Tanks of WWII". Pg 255 details Optical Equipment. TSR1 is found about half way down the chart.
1.4 meter height
mx6.0
fov=6 degrees
monocular observation telescope found on: Tigers, Panthers Pz art Beob Wg IV, and Pz Bef Wg IV
-
where are the copula mounted range finders???
-
Very interesting work John...thanks for sharing it.
-
Conall:
Brazil! Sounds rather exotic. Thanks for taking some time and replying. Perhaps when you get back and things are a little less hectic we continue on with this interesting subject matter.
-
Simon Fox:
Gracias…a couple of similar examples are Panzer Lehr’s ill-fated counter attacks on the 9th ID in front of St. Lo. Wolverines very effectively combated MkV's and MkIV’s via close in, cat and mouse engagements. Fritz Bayerlain eventually relented and later blamed the closed in nature of the terrain and close range engagements by American SPTD’s for his divisions failure.
Another example off the top of my head was the second phase of Villers-Boccage often ignored because of Whittman’s outstanding day. However, small force of British tanks and infantry were able to open a can of whop-ass on German Tigers and MkIV’s (again misfortunate from Panzer Lehr) in the close quarters of Villers.
-
Steve:
The more I dig the more I’m convinced German Tigers and Panthers had an edge in long range gunnery over both the Anglo\Americans and Soviets. It's all anecdotal...but thats my gut feel. How that factors into the elements that make up the design philosophy behind CM I have no idea.
John:
My source regarding the US ARMY adoption of stereoscopic range finders in the early 50’s was the infamous Michael Green. “Bringer” of the Tiger I’s TZR1(TSR1) range finder. Further digging indicates that the TZR1 was not in fact a range finder at all, it was actually a simple monocular observation periscope. Perhaps outfitted with stadia lines for range estimate via a mil relationship (dunno fer certain on the stadia). I can’t imagine how this thing could be any more effective at range estimation than the gunners TZF9b. So the mythical Tiger I coincidence range finder remains aloof…at least for me. Can you give me a hint here? Maybe this was some kind-of grab-um if you can get-um thing. I know you didnt originally bring up Tigers with range finders, but I thought maybe you have some additional clues.
On the other hand it is pretty well documented that just about every German assault gun is equipped with an honest to god set of coincidence range finders. Binocular Sf14Z scissors range finders. How effective was say the Jagdpanzer IV at first or second round hits at ranges beyond 1500 meters? Were Sf14Z's even employed for shotting at tanks...or was it used only for HE fire.
Anyway I digress. I am not personally aware of M48’s being employed during the Korean War. But than again I was convinced at one time that the 3.5 inch Bazooka had never been employed in combat till Korea. Somebody somewhere told me limited numbers of the M20’s were in fact employed during by the 13th Airborne during Operation Varsity, 1945. Go figure. The Pershing was apparently remodeled (wall paper, a marble sink, new drywall) before Korea. Any possibility it was somehow provided with a range finding instrument?
Be that as it may…if the M48 represented the ARMY’s MBT of the 50’s it could still account somewhat for the seeming uplift in US Tanker gunnery skills during this period as a result of the stereoscopic range finder add. Vague perhaps. But presumably the vast majority of M48’s were busily being shipped to Europe in preparation for the “real” Commie push waitin to happin in Germany. Once the Chi-Coms had sucked all our reserves into Korea…boom…the Soviet 1st Guards Tank Army comes rumblin through Fulda.
-
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Ari said:
However currently in CM Panther is compromised for short range combat by slowing turret speed but not rewarded by better sights for longer ranges.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
I guess I’m not sure I share all the sentiments regarding the Panther being a weakling in CM. I have played several scenarios via PBEM in which I have managed with a hand full of Panthers to subdue a considerably larger force of Shermans. The "Sgt Berkman" Scenario is an excellent test. An up-close in your face engagement…typical tank on tank duels are occuring at ranges of less than 300 meters. I knocked out all Shermans (8 or 10 seemed like) and 2 Wolverines for the loss of 1 Panther and 1 Panther immobilized.
No one will argue that the Germans had superior tank fighting machines mid to late war relative to Anglo\Americans. The Tiger and Panther were after all built from the ground up with the forethought that these beasts would be employed in tank killing roles. This is a somewhat different philosophy to the design\doctrinal philosophy behind the Sherman or T34/76.
However, experienced German Panzer Truppen admit to a tendency of the unenlightened "uber-mench" to employ Tigers and Panthers in situations and circumstances which were ill suited to their intended strengths. Experienced panzer officers suggest that the best employment of Tigers and Panthers was not to assume that their "uber-panzers" were indestructible.
Maneuver under cover whenever possible, seek hull down positions to engage from. Stick and than displace to alternate firing positions. Pick your places of engagement (somewhat easier for an army standing primarily on the defense). In other words -- they argued -- pretend your vehicle is a somewhat more fragile MkIV and adapt your tactics accordingly.
I think the Germans had numerous equipment advantages, but I also think the following were equally important in creating this indestructible aura surrounding the Panther and Tiger:
1) Veteran Tank Crews in Normandy. Men used to looking at terrain and the best way of adapting their defensive positions to that terrain.
2) German Army perpetually standing in a defensive posture throughout much of 43-45. Some ability at a tactical level to pick and choose where to engage. Easier to ambush when your sittin quite within the edge of a woods, camo-net drapped, binos in hand, than if you’re a company of tanks kickin up dust and noisily rumbling toward Hill 122. The defense has always been the far more powerful form of combat.
3) Closed nature of Norman Terrain resulted in limited avenues of advance for attacking Armour. Choke Points. Fairly easy to slaughter an attacking force en-masse if combat power can be concentrated at choke points. Limited ability of an Attacking force to employ maneuver.
So I would argue that the mythical\factual success of German "uber-Armour" in WWII was as much or more a function of: the average German soldiers past combat experience, his tactical savvy, eye for terrain, and ability to rely on his initiative to adapt to changing situations in battles, rather than relying on a notion that his machines were indestructible or his traverse speed was quicker.
===Steel Panthers=== Good/BadComparisons to CM
in Combat Mission Archive #2 (2000)
Posted
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As for the optics thing... frustrates the Hell out of you when you can't present a case other than "well, he said it is better so make it +10", doesn't it?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Hey! Are you talking about German "Uber Optics" again. Point…Counter Point.
I couldn't help but get a little smirk on my face when I read the following:
From: "Montgomery's Scientists, Operational Research in Northwest Europe, The Work of No.2 Operational Research Section with 21st Army Group" edited by T. Copp.
Solandt's initial ORG report analysed crew casualties in the Mark III Matilda Infantry Tank during the first El Alamein battle, July 1942. Other work focussed on methods of ranging, firing on the move and the German all-around vision Cupola. Studies comparing the gunsights used in German and British tanks led to important results and an object lesson in OR methods. Solandt recalled this investigation as one of the highlights of his time at Lulworth. The problem presented to Solandt was that "the Germans had introduced a new tank gunsight which was vastly superior to the British sight." Tank crews in the desert were sure that it was the new sight that made it possible for the Germans to knock out British tanks at long range before they were themselves in danger. However, careful measurements showed the British gunsight was accurate. The German sight was similarly tested and found to be inferior. "We were therefore forced," Solandt wrote, "to treat it as an operations research rather than a technical problem...