Jeff Duquette
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Posts posted by Jeff Duquette
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I think it is interesting to note that this habit of over killing a target may not have been restricted to high firing rate smaller-bore main-guns.John Said If there are sources indicating that the Soviet 45mm consistently had trouble getting through the _side_ plates of Pz IIIs or IVs, then that might indicate that amn quality is a problem. On the other hand, small-calibre (under 57mm, say) weapons are likely to have poor behind-armour effects after penetration, and the 2-pounder had a habit of shedding its tracer element, which gave the erroneous impression that successful penetrations had "bounced off". One might also suspect that with a fairly rapid-firing weapon, a gunner might put several shots into a target before it is seen to brew up or the crew bail-out, and so think that (say) it had taken three shots to get a penetration when in fact the first hit had been successful.There is a rather famous bit of film footage of an M-26 Pershing engaging a Panther in the streets of Cologne, 1945. If one slows the video down it is apparent that the Pershing fires 4 or 5 armored piercing rounds into the side of the Panther at ranges of less than 100 yards. The Panther clearly brews-up after the second hit…the hole in the upper side hull from the first penetration is quite evident in the film and flames within the tank can be seen through the penetration…smoke is also billowing up through the open hatches. The Panther's Turret commander, driver and co-driver are all seen trying to bail out after the first 90mm round penetrates. The second or third round apparently severs the Tank Commanders legs and he dies while trying to escape from his turret hatch. It is a very telling piece of film regarding the nature of tank combat as it quickly becomes evident during the very harsh brew-up that the TC is burning while half his body remains positioned in his turret hatch. The Pershing fires one or two more rounds into the Panther…difficult to tell the exact number at this point as the camera is shaking wildly from the concussion of the 90mm firing.
The co-driver was apparently killed by MG fire while scrambling from his hatch. The driver clearly escapes and is seen running from the burning Panther. Presumably the gunner and loader were consumed in the brew-up as there was no evidence in the film of either making an escape.
Soviet APBC was indeed armored piercing with ballistic cap. The penetrator is actually blunt nosed. If you examine a cutway of APBC it looks very much like APCBC, with the exception that the position normally occupied by a seperate penetration cap actually gives the impression of a penetration cap cast monolithic with the penetrator.John Said By the way, is "APBC" an accepted abbreviation or a repeated typo? I've never seen it before, but I would assume that it indicates an AP round with a ballistic cap but no piercing cap. I'm not quite sure why one would need a ballistic cap alone unless the shape of the round was pretty odd.Of interest is a Soviet design feature of APBC where by circumferential groves were scribed around the upper portion of the penetrator to promote breakaway of the flat nose portion of the penetrator during perforation. Penetrative caps per say, were not apparently used, but the Russians favored machining these circumferential grooves, generally two, onto the ogive. The head would in theory break away leaving the remainder of the projectile undamaged during perforation. I beleive this was supposed to give APBC a pseudo-penetration cap action and was added to reduce shattering potential of the projectile at the higher velocities. One would think that the use of breakaway points\grooves might actually encourage shatter by providing weak zones in the penetrator.
[ March 02, 2002, 01:41 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]
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Bamse:
Very cool idea, and I hope you push forward with it. Some of us would like to see the game add some strategic\operational context. Have you tried contacting BTS directly?
Regards
Jeff Duquette
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P.S. Grisha…be sure to incorporate QJM multipliers for German Unit Combat Effectiveness vs. Soviet units.
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Bill:
I recall Glantz discussing this topic in:
"The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 Jun - August 1941". Frank Cass Collection.
The Red Army apparently launched numerous armored counterattacks in the initial days/weeks of the war with armored divisions and mechanized divisions equipped with KV's and T34's in the operating areas of Army Group North as well as Army Group Center. Anyway I would recommend taking a look at Glantz'z book for a little more precise information than what I am presenting here.
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Interesting information John. Thanks for posting it.
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Lorrin:Lorrin Said: As I noted to Jeff on the Tankers site, the ranges quoted by Zaloga for Panther vs IS-2 combat appear to take into account accuracy as well as penetration. Zaloga's quotes do not state ranges were limits of expected penetration, they state that those were the ranges for effective combat (which I interpret as hit and kill combination).Again I would suggest reading the passage in question (Pages 12 - 13, S. Zaloga & P. Sarson's "IS-2, Heavy Tank, 1944 - 1973"). It is obvious you have not looked at Zaloga's work, or you wouldn't persist with this insistence that Zaloga is talking about accuracy. He does in fact say "penetration" in all cases…not accuracy restraints, nor crew training problems, nor optics or gunnery constraints. You are in fact inferring a large amount of information into a passage that you have obviously not even read. I have already indicated as much on the Tankers Forum. Since it is apparent you do not own Zaloga's booklet on the JS-II, might I suggest you either open up your wallet and buy the thing, or once again try scrounging the information from Robert Livingston or Miles K..
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The adoption of the D-25T to the IS-2 appears to have been ultimately a case of simple wartime expedience. Ammunition and the facilities to produce ammunition were readily available for the A-19/D-25T.Lorrin Said If one goes to the following page on Russian Battlefield, and reads the three correspondence letter on IS tank use of 100mm gun, they will see interesting reasons why 100mm gun not chosen for IS tanks:100mm gun out penetrated 122mm at normal combat ranges but came with many drawbacks, including longer rounds to load into gun, increased fumes in turret, insignificant increase in ammo storage, etc. See letter 3.
More than penetration went into decision to stick with 122mm, which may have also considered HE capability. 122mm HE projectile is 15.2% HE filler by weight, 100mm HE is 9.3%, based on figures contained on Russian Battlefield.
From: Zaloga & Sarson's "IS-2 Heavy Tank, 1944 - 1973"
The obvious solution was to mount a long-barreled 85mm gun or 100mm gun which offered the anti-tank performance of the D-25T, but which would permit a larger ammunition load. The original IS-1 carried double the ammunition load of the IS-2, 59 rounds against 28, due to the smaller volume of the 85mm ammunition. The 85mm gun was reconsidered on the izd-244 prototype, using the improved S-53 gun. However, the anti-armour performance of this weapon was not adequate. The izd-245 and izd-248 were fitted with new 100mm guns. Although the ballistic performance of the new D-10 100mm gun was superior to the 122mm D-25T in the anti-armour role, the problem still remained that there was a surplus of 122mm gun tubes and 122mm ammunition production capacity, and an inadequate supply for the 100mm gun alternative. This approach was therefore rejected in spite of its technical merits.
Zaloga also indicates that based upon combat experience the Panther needed to engage IS-2 frontally at combat ranges of 600 meters or less to insure a decent chance of success. Conversely the IS-2 had to close to 1000m or less to insure a decent chance of success. Seems inconsistent with the 1972 AMMRC penetrations stats for the BR-471B. I think you will be hard pressed to find more than a handful (if that) of useful AAR's detailing actual tank vs. tank engagements of IS-2 vs. Panther. So much of what you have been suggesting appears to be speculation at this point.Lorrin Said U.S. firing tests with 122mm APBC predict that 122mm APBC will defeat excellent quality Panther glacis at 1450m against 85mm plate thickness, and 1850m against 80mm plate thickness. -
Sort of tough to find:
Baily, Charles, M. "Faint Praise"
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I think this study should be taken with a grain of salt as the bibliography contains works by the notorious Von Mellenthin and Paul Karl Schmidt (alias ex-Nazi uber Storm trooper Paul Carrell). I was also taken aback when I noticed Albert Kesserling's writings on "Night Combat" were relied upon heavily. To top this list of unreliable authors off both H. Guderian and Blumentritt are cited. For shame Greg! What is it your trying to pull over on us?
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Amen to that bro. I think Close Combat just began scratching the surface with CCIV and CCV with the enjoyment\immersion possible with a combined tactical and operational level wargame. I would love to see a more elaborate operations layer added to CM at some point.Kip Said: The two most popular scales for wargames, that is real wargames and not shooters, has for twenty-five years been individual squads and AFVs, i.e. CM and ASL on the one hand, and battalion/operational on the other. One day, someone will put the two together. A quality operational game, the standard manoeuvre units being battalions, the scale one inch to the mile/km. With the option to zoom down to the CM scale to fight any individual engagement, a program very like the Quick Battle generator taking the parameters for the CM battle from the operational map/game. Instead of being input manually by the players, as is the case in QBs now. However, the entire operational game could be played at the operational level in the standard way, if people wished -
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The results of a British and a different US test vs. 4 previously unscathed vehicles showed that 17 pdr AP, 17 pdr APCBC, and 90mm APCBC managed to cause cracks, spring welds and cause some complete penetrations which in theory they should not have been able to do.<hr></blockquote>
Are you referring to the Isigny and Balleroy firing trial reports? Three test Panthers at Isigny and one at Balleroy.
[ 01-25-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>
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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Steve Said: IIRC he now has 2:1 qualified studies that document declines in German armor quality vs. the BIOS report.<hr></blockquote>
I suspect we are talking about two different things here. BIOS is based upon captured German documents detailing war time armor plate manufacture. I am not sure what you mean by two qualified studies that refute BIOS as there is nothing really to refute, at least nothing relative to the particulars of this discussion.
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Steve:
As usual, my interest in seeing sweeping overnight changes being implemented in Combat Mission are relatively close to nil (with the exception that I would like to see a comprehensive campaign system incorporated into the game at some point in the future).
Regarding the constant 85% flawed armor factor used in CMBO it is my understanding that BTS's use of 85% is based upon discussions with Robert Livingston. I am assuming that Robert and Lorrin's "Armor Flaw Model" was not in such an advanced stage at the time CMBO was originally released. So I am guessing you folks used the best information available to you at the time.
I am simply elaborating a little on what has been put forth in "WW-II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery". Lorrin's discussion on flawed Panther glacis plates does not mean the Panther wasn't a very difficult tank to destroy when engaged frontally. Even Lorrin will not argue that. In addition cracked welds manifesting themselves along the Panthers glacis contact with the side hull plates or lower hull plate are by no means a disaster. The interlocked connection between plates was the real strength of the system. Welding was redundency...engineers love redundency...plus the welds kept out the rain.
Part of the challenge associated with reading through the present iteration of "WW-II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery" is that Lorrin is continuously posting errata to his work based upon some new bit of information that is fed to him. He will also discard errata in favor of new information. It is difficult to know what is current within the manual and what has been subjected to errata. This is not to say I don't highly recommend armor buffs opening their wallets and getting a copy of the thing and leafing through it. It is very thought provoking. I suppose there is a method to Lorrin's madness and his "living document" approach to "WW-II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery". Perhaps this is analogous to the patching process for computer games?
Regarding the various models of Panthers and relative glacis flaws, this level of detail is not discussed in "WW-II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery". Or if it is it is not elaborated upon in the books Section on "Armor Flaws". However, I have seen Lorrin going on a bit about glacis quality relative to model type on various web sites. I would agree that the tendency toward reduced ballistic quality might be more of a trait in latter war models, although ballistic quality testing standards -- according the British Ministry of Supply Study "BIOS" -- remaind the same throughout the war. Presumably Lorrin has covered this in another errata posted somewhere on the Internet?
I presently
disagree with some of the correlations Lorrin is drawing between glacis plate quality and the various firing trial reports he references. To reiterate it is important to understand the state of vehicles being subjected to ballistic testing. This is a relatively important boundary condition when trying to draw conclusions from firing trial results. Did the tank brew-up during combat? A relatively routine reason for the Germans to abandon a Panzer was because it had burned.
Had the tanks armor has been penetrated during combat and subsequently patched? It was relatively common to patch penetrations in a tanks armor plate. Weld a plug into the hole. Grind it down and paint it. Throw in a new bright-eyed crew and send the vehicle back to war.
Did the Germans set-off demolition charges in the tank before abandoning it? The Germans would routinely blow up Tigers and Panthers they felt could not be recovered and repaired.
The above scenarios were relatively common and will affect the ballistic quality of a tanks armor plate. Long before ordnance folks get there hands on a tank and shoot it full of holes, the tanks armor may have already been subjected to a fair bit of battering on the battlefield.
[ 01-24-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>
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Rune:
I think you are misconstruing what Rexford (aka Lorrin Bird) has been preaching regarding flawed armor on the Panther. What Lorrin and Robert Livingston have clearly indicated in there booklet "World War II: Armor and Gunnery" is that only about 50% of Panthers were constructed with flawed glacis plates.
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>For wargaming and research purposes, it might be reasonable to assume that 50% of Panther Glacis armor is good quality, with [the] rest varying from low to high severity flaws. <hr></blockquote>
In addition Lorrin and Robert indicate that the impacts of flawed armor on penetration are a function of T/D ratio (thickness of armor relative to the diameter of the impacting round).
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Panther glacis flaws would have most impact when projectiles overmatch armor thickness. When a 17-pounder APCBC hits 85mm at 55 degrees armor, medium flaws would reduce armor resistance by 5% (0.95 armor quality multiplier), whereas 152mm APCBC hits would overmatch 85mm armor to the point where effectiveness would decrease by 17.5% due to medium flaws (82.5% of good quality armor resistance). <hr></blockquote>
It is also implied within "World War II: Armor and Gunnery" that flawed armor plate was restricted to the big glacis plate on the Panther. Other armor on the Panther - again according to "World War II: Armor and Gunnery" -- was apparently "good quality plate".
Lorrin and Robert indicate that flaws are a function of both quenching errors and reduction in critical alloys. Although we might assume that there was a uniform reduction in alloys between plate manufactures, how can we assume quenching errors would be uniform? In my humble opinion it is unrealistic to assume a uniform loss in ballistic protection would occur - i.e. the across the board 85% quality figure should really be variable.
There are also added variables to ballistic protection that make a uniform 85% quality figure less likely. "World War II: Armor and Gunnery" indicates that uniformity in plate thickness was not a reality. This makes a great deal of since as plate thickness specifications indicate production tolerances of 0 to +5% of nominal plate thickness for the Panthers glacis. Manufacturing flaws might degrade ballistic resistance, but allowable thickness tolerances might add several millimeters of additional material to a glacis. It was noted in a rather voluminous study conducted under the auspices of the British Supply Ministry following the war that German plate manufactures were probably sneaking on extra millimeters of armor in order to pass the rather stringent Germany ballistic quality control standards. The quality control standards included ballistic testing of randomly picked plates from every melt. And although alloys were being reduced as the war progressed, the ballistic test specifications remanded unchanged. Plate manufactures apparently began pushing plate thickness tolerance to insure plates would remain capable of passing ballistic test standards.
It is important to note that even a flawed Panther Glacis was very potent in its protection abilities against Allied weapons up to and including the 17-pounder. Evidence of the Panthers resilience against frontal attacks is fairly evident based upon interviews with Allied Tankers. In addition these same firing trials that Lorrin often refers to (Isigny, Aberdeen etc) also suggest that the Panthers glacis could be a very tough nut to crack.
When examining these firing trials is the effect of metal fatigue resultant from successive high velocity impacts can't be ignored. Steel that is pushed from elastic deformation to plastic deformation (permanent deformation) will exhibit far less resistance to additional imparted energy before complete failure. Firing trials conducted during the war often took the form of shooting the daylights out of a captured tank (see the RMZ photos of King Tiger 503 following the Red Army's Kubinka firing trials). One should be wary of accepting all results of firing trials without knowing the following:
- Whether the tank being subjected to the firing trial had brewed-up prior to being hauled to testing grounds.
- Had the tank received impacts or even penetrations from high velocity ordnance during normal combat prior to being captured and hauled off to testing grounds
- Once on the testing grounds was the tank shot into Swiss cheese (i.e. each test round that hits a target plate results in an incremental decrease in the plates ability to absorb additional punishment).
So if we accept the theories of Lorrin and Robert we are left with:
50% of all Panthers had good quality armor
Some portion of the remaining Panthers have small flaws
Some portion of the remaining Panthers have moderate flaws
Some portion of the remaining Panthers have large flaws
Some proportion of Panthers with either unflawed or flawed armor may have had thicker armor as a result of manufactures pushing thickness tolerance specs. Ballistic resistance creeps up.
The ballistic resistance of Panthers with flaws is a function of T/D ratio. Impacts by Allied calibers ranging from 6-pdr through 17-pdr…57mm through 85mm results in only limited reduction of ballistic resistance.
Consulting "World War II: Armor and Gunnery" a US Army 76mm firing APCBC at a Panthers glacis results in a T/D = 1.12. Assuming worst case…large flaw @ an angle of attack of 55 degrees we are left with a flaw multiplier of about 0.9. Assuming minor flaws for the above example we get about a 0.98 flaw multiplier.
[ 01-24-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>
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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>I also suspect that the sort of vehicle an OP recieved, depended upon availability and function - as in when and where within the OrBat he was meant to function. If he was attached to an Armoured Squadron, he'd have been more likely to be given a "low" tank with a gun, than if he was attached to an Armed Regt's HQ.<hr></blockquote>
Agreed.
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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Lorrin Said: The Americans in Europe did tests during August 1944 that showed previously undamaged Panther plate to be brittle and crack in two of three cases after a few non-penetrating hits.<hr></blockquote>
Lorrin:
It is still unclear to me how you are arriving at the conclusion that the three Panthers subjected to firing trials at Isigny in Aug 1944 were all in an undamaged condition prior to conducting the trials. I have the entire text of the report and there is no verbiage that elaborates upon the condition of the three Panthers at the time of their capture. I can only assume that you are confusing the July 10, 1944 Balleroy report with the Aug 30, 1944 Isigny test report. Some form of firing trial dyslexia? The Balleroy firing trials report actually does contain a snippet indicating:
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF OFFICERS
Organization: Headquarters, First U.S. Army.
Place: APO 230, U.S. Army.
1a. Firing was conducted on terrain permitting 1500 yards maximum range with zero angle of site. All guns and types of ammunition, suitable for anti-tank purposes, available to First U.S. Army were defeated on targets whose armour plate was slightly burned. Upon determination of critical ranges , all penetrations were proven against the armor plate of a German Mk V "Panther" Tank with armor undamaged and in excellent condition. All firing was conducted normal(2) to the target. No firing was conducted against the German Mk VI "Tiger" Tank as there were none available.<hr></blockquote>
Is the quote above what you keep referring to?
I would be more than happy to forward to you a complete copy of the Balleroy and Isigny Reports...in exchange for complete copies of the Shoeburyness and Aberdeen firing trial reports for the Panther
. Has Miles K. given you the actual firing trial reference information for the Aberdeen and Shoeburyness Reports...Or is that still a military secreat? The Shoeburyness firing trial report for the Panther is not amongst the numerous firing trial reports at the PRO. Perhaps Bovington archives has the document?[ 01-23-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>
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This is something I found on the web after a quick search. Seems relatively consistent with what Enoch has been saying….but also consistent with Graves account of the South Albertas FOO folks. Apparently none of the 2-pdr or 6-pdr RAMs made it into actual combat, but there seems to have been various mods of the RAM-II that saw combat in northwest Europe. There is a picture of a OP\Command RAM-II serving in Normandy at the bottom of the page. Note the two antenna on the back of the tank.
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> The prototype Ram rolled off the assembly line in June 1941, and general production of the Ram I began that November. Within three months the line had been changed to Ram II production, which continued until July 1943, at which point the decision had been taken to re-equip British and Canadian units with the abundant and better-armed U.S. Sherman. A total of 1948 Rams of all marques were produced, the last 84 of which were the O.P. variant carrying a dummy gun and two No. 19 Wireless sets for use by the FOOs (Forward Observation Officers) of the Sexton-mounted artillery regiments then being formed.
In its cruiser configuration, and limited by its small turret ring and 6 pdr gun, the Ram never saw combat, but was used instead for the training of armour crews in Great Britain. By late-summer 1944, with the war raging in Northern Europe, even that function had all but ceased, but the Ram found new life, and went on to do yeoman service, in a number of variants including the Kangaroo armoured personnel carrier, Badger flame tank, Wallaby ammunition tank, armoured gun tower (for the 17 pdr towed AT gun) and ARV. Sadly, most of the Rams which survived the European war ended their time as hard targets on a variety of tank ranges, and few examples remain.<hr></blockquote>
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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Enoch Said: Note my post above, 84 of the Ram II OP tanks were built. I am kind of surprised that these were ever employed as I thought none of the Ram tanks were ever shipped overseas.<hr></blockquote>
Graves is pretty clear about this point. Graves also relays a South Albertas account of an OP RAM-II getting knocked out in Normandy during an ambush…sometime in August 1944 I believe. I will scan\OCR and post the exact story this evening.
It is not uncommon for military historians\authors getting the facts mixed up. If you have a reference -- or references -- suggesting RAM-II OP tanks were not shipped to Europe it certainly would be interesting to take a look at this information. Perhaps the Command\OP vehicles Graves is refereeing to were actually Sherman OP tanks?
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Thanks for the radio information JonS. Good stuff.
Just a bit of clarification to my previous post. Capt Victory's Cromwell was actually knocked out soon after Maj. Wells OP Sherman was KO'd. Victory's tank apparently became immobilized while backing up. Victory and crew bailed out. Wittmann's Tiger put an 88mm round through it shortly after. There is a photo on page 29 of Taylor's book depicting Victory's brewed-up Cromwell. It appears to be a standard 6-pdr armed Cromwell. The front of the tank is covered with soot from the brew-up so I can't tell if the "76" was painted on the upper hull.
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While digging through Donald Grave's "South Albertas, A Canadian Regiment at War" it is indicated that FOOs routinely used a modified RAM-II tank. Douglas indicates the RAM-II would have its main gun removed to make room for additional artillery staff folks, map tables etc (nothing about an extra radio?). It is possible that these modified RAM-IIs actually represented OP\Command tanks for BCO's. But than again there does seem to be room for additional research regarding armed, non-armed, or whether a hodge-podge of both types of tanks were being employed by Commonwealth OPO/FOOs. See pages 359-360 of "South Albertas".
An interesting snippet from "South Albertas" is another incidence of Canadian Army armored officers calling for, and adjusting indirect fire. See page 134 in which the battalion CO Swatty Wotherspoon orders an artillery shoot from his RHQ\Command tank. The adjustments to this indirect fire mission were apparently conducted by ?Maj.? Dave Currie commanding C Squadron (Shermans). Amongst Commonwealth Armies was this peculiar to the Canadians? I had thought I read a thread here at the CMBO Forum indicating the British Army never used non-FOO's for ordering shoots?
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Stacheldraht Said: Perhaps there's some info on Soviet practices in this matter at The Russian Battlefield?<hr></blockquote>
Actually I did post some information dealing with what appears to have been budding doctrine for the Red Army regarding armored FO's. See page one of this thread…"PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE ORDER No. 325, Dated 16 October 1942, Moscow"
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The photo depicted in Daniel Taylor's "Villers-Bocage Through the Lens" is indeed a battery commanders OP tank. This would seemingly corroborate the information sent to me by Nigel Evens. Specialized OP\Command tanks (i.e. Sherman's and the like with main-guns removed for map tables, extra radio sets, and other command paraphernalia) were employed by battery commanders (BCOs). FOOs\OPOs employed standard tanks.
Daniel Taylor in "Villers-Bocage Through the Lens" indicates 3 tanks with artillery officer crewmembers were present with the Sharpshooters (4th County of London Yeomanry) around Villers-Bocage during Wittmann's attack. One of the tanks was Major Dennis Well's OP\Command tank. This is the infamous Sherman with the dummy main-gun barrel that JonS has brought to our attention. Maj. Wells was apparently the BCO of K-Battery, 5RHA, 7th Armored Division.
Although I don't wish to digress again on main-guns and no main guns, Taylor indicates that the other two tanks employed by OPOs\FOOs were standard Cromwell's. One Cromwell FOO tank was TC'd by Capt. Roy Dunlop, 5RHA. Dunlop's tank was KO'd near point 213 during the battle around Villers-Boccage. The second OPO\FOO Cromwell was apparently TC'd by Captain Paddy Victory, 5RHA. He was fortunate enough to have had some sort of mechanical difficulty and was somewhere near the rear of the Sharpshooters road march column when Wittmann struck. Curiously the photo depicting Capt. Dunlop's Cromwell has the same distinct "76" painted on the front upper hull plate. Makes me wonder if at least the Royal Horse Artillery had its own organic FOO and BCO tanks.
This practice of using standard tanks for FOOs\OPOs seems consistent with the US Army practice of popping FO's into Standard Shermans. When I say standard I mean company commander, platoon leader, or platoon sergeant type vehicles equipped with the more powerful command radios sets…SRC-508. I am assuming the approximate British equivalent was the Wireless Set No.19? But again gunless or not my main point is that forward observers attached to armored units operated from armored vehicles.
I went to the trouble of scanning and posting several photos from Taylor's excellent book "Villers-Bocage Through the Lens" on my web page. I have also included the captions to each of the photos as I felt Talyor's commentary and attention to detail are quite good. URL for photos:
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An excerpt from several questions I emailed Nigel Evans:
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Dear Mr. Evans:
Firstly I wanted to thank you for your very informative web page on British Artillery in World War II. Your internet site provides a great deal of information not readily available to the casual military historian like myself. After reading through much of the information on your site, I was hoping you could clear up a few things for me.
1) I am not sure I understand the subtle difference between Observation Post Officers (OPO's) and Forward Observation Officers (FOO's).
2) Did Out Posts (OPs) function in a manner similar to US Army FDC's? In other words did FOO's call in fire orders to OP's and the OP's arranged all barrages and artillery plans, and relayed orders for shoots from its FOOs to batterys?
3) With respect to artillery observation for Armored Divisions; Would both OPOs and FOOs typically occupy armored vehicles during an advance? If so who provided these vehicles? In other words did the artillery unit have armored observation vehicles organic to there units or would OPOs and FOOs occupy vehicles provided to them by the armored unit to which they were attached?
4) Were OPO and FOO vehicles specialized AFV's or were common troop tanks employed by FOOs? I have read somewhere the British Army would remove the main-gun from tanks employed by OPOs to make room for additional radio gear.
Thank you for your time and consideration, and I hope to hear from you soon.
Sincerely
Jeff Duquette<hr></blockquote>
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Nigel's reply
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Jeff
Taking your questions in turn, and noting that I may need to do some more editing to clarify.
OPO and FOO were different roles rather than different individuals. OPO manned an Observation Post, implying that it was static. An FOO moved with the infantry or armour when they were advancing (or withdrawing). Basically an OP party changed between roles as the tactical situation required. Obviously an FOO was limited to basic equipment whereas an OPO would probably set up tripod mounted binoculars, prepare a panorama and so forth. In an attack there would sometimes be a mix of 'anchor OPs' and FOOs, in some cases these might be by splitting the OP party. This would also be done to relay orders from an FOO with a low power manpack radio.
A US Army FDC was responsible for the technical work for the entire battalion of 3 batteries. The equivalent technical work in a British type regiment was done by each battery or troop command posts. An OPO, and perhaps less frequently a FOO, could produce minimal data and send it straight to his troop CP, who just had to select a charge and order the data to the guns. Because of gun rules there was no need for a CP to convert the range in yards to an elevation in degrees and minutes for each gun. However, for predicted and/or multi-battery shoots the battery CP would calculate data using the battery and target map references as their starting point, and troop CPs would do so for a troop target if the OPO/FOO identified it by map reference or target number. It was up to the OPO/FOO to decide how he would engage the target, but their 'calculations' were limited to measuring the range and switch from their map, they went nowhere near all the other calculations done by a CP of FDC.
SP field regiments were equipped with tanks for their OP parties instead of having armoured carriers, basically these were standard tanks of the same type as used by the supported armoured brigade. During the mid war period as far as I can currently ascertain both regiments in an armoured div had their OPs and BCs in tanks, there were also some other towed field regiments who had tank OPs. However, in 1944 it was decided that regiments outside armd divs would not hold tanks for their OPs, there would a be pool held in each independent armd or tank bde. In practice in some of these bdes had a field regiment with them for the duration so in effect were permanently equipped, although these tanks were supposed to have RAC crews less for the OPO and his assistant. Whether this was really how it worked is another matter, the problem would have been the training of signallers in artillery fire orders procedures.
Modifications were minor, basically to carry sufficient radios and external stowage for their tripod mounted binoculars, I suspect they carried their manpack set externally. I've not come across the use of dummy barrels because the radio fit was basically the same as that for a normal command and control tank (eg as used by sqn and regtl HQs). There was also policy established about responsibilities for ammo resupply of OP tanks, which implies they had a functioning gun. That said I've found some sources implying that BCs got yet another radio towards the end of the war (so they could be on bty, regt and supported arm 'radio groups' (nets)) and this might well have caused a space problem and it's possible that some types of tank did not have adequate space. It might also be that someone has mixed WW2 with current practice where the Warrior OPVs have dummy barrels to give space for optronics without looking different to the enemy.
Regards
Nigel<hr></blockquote>
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I will say this again as it seemed to have gotten lost in translation. Ultimately the point is that FOs\FOOs operating from in support of armored units opperated from armored vehicles.
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Lorrin:
The RMZ article on the development of the JS-II which is seemingly the keystone reference to your degradation of German armor steel argument also indicates the following regarding the JS-2:
" In the beginning of 1944, an attempt was made to improve the protection of the JS-2 by tempering the front armour to very high hardness."
Tempering does not harden steel. Tempering toughens steel and results in decreased tendency toward cracking or spalling under impact loading. Tempering typically results in slightly reduced hardness as a trade off for increasing toughness.
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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Lorrin Said: The Russians were looking into improvements to the 122mm AP ammo when 122mm AP started to improve against Panther glacis during the summer of 1944 (due to more brittle glacis armor as a result of alloy rationing, according to Russian speculation on the subject).<hr></blockquote>
Vasiliy on the Tankers forum has already indicated a very plausible explanation to the "decrease" in quality of the Panther's glacis to which you are alluding. I am curious why you choose to ignore this information?
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Vasiliy Said (brought from tankers forum) …with respect to disappearance of the problems with 122mm AP, but you are ignoring the fact that at the same time full-body Br-471 started being replaced with Br-471b, which would defeat the Panther's glacis regardless of its quality. How much influence did the appearance of new round have on disappearance of the problems?
Best regards,
Vasiliy
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Again I personally do not doubt German armor quality declined as the war progressed, however the correlation you are attempting to draw between this sudden decline in Panther Glacis quality as a function of the Soviet D-25T's increased killing ability - post summer 1944 -- seems to ignore the introduction of improved ammunition on the part of the Soviets during this same time period.
<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Lorrin Said: The Russians spent alot of time and effort deciding which gun goes in the IS-1 and IS-2. The IS-1 with its 85mm was a failure, and the Russians noted that the 122mm gun was the most effective weapon at Kursk against Tigers and Panthers.<hr></blockquote>
This is inconsistent with my references that indicate the D-25T was developed from the A-19 during a crash program by the Petrov artillery design team. The motivation for rapid adoption of the A-19 and the subsequent crash design program was apparently motivated chiefly by ammunition availability for the A-19 and thus the IS-2's D-25T. 122mm corps gun ammunition was already readily available in the Red Army's supply network (see Zaloga's "IS-2, Heavy Tank").
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Stacheldraht:
Regarding your quote from Ian Hogg…OPs function as the Commonwealth equivalent of an FDC?
"mobile observation parties, known as forward observation officers (FOOs) were available as offshoots of the troop OPs [observation posts] in order to accompany the front infantry on foot or in armored vehicles [emphasis mine] while advancing. These FOOs were in radio contact with the OPs, who could relay their messages back to the gun troops."
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<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Splinty Said: He says he was in a Sherman with "a bloody big radio"<hr></blockquote>
This is actually an excellent bit of information...It begs the question; Why is it do you suppose that "leg" FOO's did the job with back portable radios, yet armored FOO's needed a special observer tank chalk full of "bloody big radio" gear?
Stacheldraht:
Good information….you beat me to the draw with the German Army Handbook references. I was preparing to scan\OCR\post this additional information.
disagree with some of the correlations Lorrin is drawing between glacis plate quality and the various firing trial reports he references. To reiterate it is important to understand the state of vehicles being subjected to ballistic testing. This is a relatively important boundary condition when trying to draw conclusions from firing trial results.
What's wrong with S. Ambrose's books?
in Combat Mission Archive #4 (2002)
Posted
I agree with just about everything in Croda's post as well as Barkhorn1x and lassner's posting. Just to add my own two cents.
I consider myself a relatively serious "armchair" student of military history. I enjoy Ambrose's books, and find that they can be informative. Ambrose is a bit of a flag waiver\patriot at times. But I see nothing inherently wrong with that, nor is it a trait peculiar to Ambrose, or American Military Historians. I see the same level of pride exhibited in many German Unit Histories from WWII (see Rudolf Lehmann's "The Leibstandarte"). This same prideful approach is exhibited by British Historians as well. Read "Charlie Company" by Peter Cochrane.