Tero

>Wrong Robin.. Oh ? I thought he meant Sir Robin of Locksley AKA Robin Hood.

>Usually, such administrative reorganizations >would not occur at the climax of a melee of >a 30-turn CM battle. I think one possible scenario would be when a fresh platoon comes across a suppressed squad. As things stand now that squad will not get any benefits from other HQ units than its own platoon HQ and Company HQ. I see no reason for a platoon HQ not wanting to rally and take command of a unit which has been cut off from its parent HQ. >But seriously, I think such reorganizations >are definitely outside of CM's time scope. Not entirely. In the heat of the battle a squad falling outside the CC radius of its parent HQ is not uncommon. I think it is not unreasonable for a HQ unit other than Company level to take command of a "lost" squad until it can reach its parent unit. I think this kind of occurance can be corraborated by a number of sources. >Not saying I am against your idea, would be >nice, I would welcome it, but as far as I >can see it is considered too much >micromanaging by the powers that be. I think that would not be micromanagement. It would be normal management of battlefield assets. What would have to be decided if there is a time limit to be imposed before the lost squad becomes ellidgible for aquiring new HQ benefits from other HQ's in the same level as its parent HQ. I would say it could be something in the order of 5-10 minutes. That would allow for normal breaks in CC due to terrain and battle field evenst other than the loss of the parent HQ due to enemy action.

>I think you'd best be prepared to describe >in what exact ways the Allied tanks are >ahistorically given "handicaps," just for >the sake of play balance. Here are some: Are there any vehicles present in CM now that are listed as having a gyrostabilizer when in reality they never had one ? How often did the Allied tanks in fact fire on the move and hit their target ? Is there a reload time penalty imposed for the vehicles equipped with the stabilizer to represent the actual operations of the stabilizer ? How accurately is the cross section targeting represented in the game now ? Was there really no difference between the optics of the Allied tanks and the German tanks ? Were the more common non-turreted German AFV's, ie. Stug and Marder, really as impotent against the Allied armour as they are represented now in the game ? (The Stug gets penalized for not having a fast turret but not benefits for being lower and more easily concealeable.) >(And yes, I am aware of many Allied tanks >given a gyrostabilizer capability, but here >again, what is the quantifiable impact on >play balance?) That one I can not answer because there is no way for the player to turn the stabilizer off and see what happens. Perhaps some of the original playtesters can shed some light on that ? >I pose this question because I recall the >repeated declarations in the past, by Steve >et al, that ahistorical "fudges" are NOT >supposed to be applied in CM just for the >sake of "play balance." BTS allowed the >gyrostabilizers to apply to CM, by example, >because there was a historical basis to do >so, AND that Aberdeen test records did >quantify the relative benefit of these >devices for moving-vehicle fire. Test records are one thing, combat reports another. How often have you seen a recount from an Allied tanker saying "we fired on the move and hit the tank and killed it with the first shot" ? The "partial benefit" the Allied armour gets for having been equipped with a stabilizer is just not historically accurate, when you take into account its succesful use has not been verified (to my knowledge) by any combat report source. All I have read it was disconnected so as not to make reloading more difficult.

>Tero I think you have proven beyond a shadow >of a doubt that you believe the Finns are >heroes and supermen. Where did you pick that one up ? >1.) There is no scientific way to quantify >an individual (or even squad) action. How so ? They are already scientifically quantified with the arms the squads carry. What makes it impossible to quantify other aspects of their performance ? All we need is a set of fact which are used to determine the parameters. One set is given by Dupuy. >B.) Due to programming choices, they will >not be giving ANY national biases. They ARE already giving national biases in CM when they among other things denied the Germans the rifle grenades and when they decided most Allied tanks get various handicaps to help them survive in the battle field. They were given in the name of play balance but they are still biases non the less. >Has there been any mention of including ski >troops? I know the Finns and Soviets, and I >believe even the Italians had ski troops in >the East. I believe they have been mentioned to be in the in-list.

>Hang on... do you mean to say they >continually buggered off when the fighting >got tough, much like "brave Sir Robin"? > Who won in the end, the Merry Men or the Sherifs Men ? And which of the two teams suffered more casualties ?

>LOL! Who's propagandizing here? Of course >stuff like this was done by all sides to >some extent or another, but if you actually >think the SS were no more likely to shoot >prisoners than the Americans, I'm afraid >there is little more I can say to you. The SS were mostly rough, oppinionated bastards but that does not diminish their tactical effectivness in any way. It was the SA which was seen as amateur bullies, not the SS. They were professinal hench men. >I have no idea what this has to do with >anything. It could be any number. The >distance is irrelavent. The fact is that that 50km gap most likely means that the two incidents are unrelated tactically. >? If bodies are found, they are counted as >KIA, not MIA. That is totally dependant on the timeframe. They were most likely deglared MIA (presumed dead or captured) when they went missing. When their bodies are found, even years later, they become officially KIA. There are still Finnish service men who are officaly MIA but they are deglared legally dead. There are several expeditions each summer to former battle grounds to bring these guys remains back to be buried in their home cemeteries. >I think there are not many US servicemen >still listed as MIA from the ETO. Those who >are can be reasonably assumed to be KIA. So are the Finnish servicemen. But they were listed as MIA until a court ruled them legally dead after some years. >So the whole MIA thing is a red herring. It most certainly is not. >The "laws of war" have nothing to do with >it. In your example these laws do have everything to do with it. >At the end of the day, who is still on >the front lines ready to fight and who is >not is all that matters for our purposes. Yes. But should the number of capture LW ground crew reflect on the effectivness of the ground forces ? >Everything I have said is reasoning for my >figure. Not really. In combat an experienced typist is as valuable as an experienced gunner ? >And just how did they get so deep in the >first place? Think about it. By bypassing the strong points. They left the defenders alone and force them to widraw by making their strategic situation unbearable. How does that diminish their short term (tactical) combat effectiness ? >How good do you think I think they were? Not as good as the history book lead on. >For the record, I think they were about as >good as Kip's Dupuy numbers suggest. Last I >looked, Kip was not a Western historian. >Dupuy might qualify as such, but you seem to >accept him. Actually I see potential in his (Dupuy that is ) formula. But I am in disagreement with the criteria he with which he chooses the variables.

>An American company surrounds a German 10 >man platoon and the Germans surrender. The >Americans lose 5 men in the action. 50 km >away, a German SS company surrounds an >American 10 man platoon. The Americans >surrender, and are later executed. The >Germans also lose 5 men in the action. The >American loses are counted as KIA, the >German as POW. This sort of thing did >happen, Geneva Convention be damned. Under >your logic, the German company performed >better in combat than the American. Hmm... Nononononono. You are propagandizing the story to provoke emotional responses. The story should go: An American company surrounds a German 10 man platoon and the Germans surrender. The Americans lose 5 men in the action. Two of the German captives die later in unclear circumstances but the men guarding them are cleared of all charges. 50 km away, a German SS company surrounds an American 10 man platoon. The Americans lose 10 men as MIA, presumed dead. When the Americans capture area later they find the MIA dead with their hands tied behind their backs and a gunshot wound in the back of their heads. The Germans also lose 5 men in the action. The American loses are counted as MIA, the German as POW. BTW, as you well know that 50km gap between the two places does not fit inside the CM scope. See, I'm starting to learn the lingo. >This sort of thing did happen, Geneva >Convention be damned. Yes. But how often did it happen to be statistically significant ? Did the Americans shoot their German captives, ever ? You are trying to lead this debate into a bog. >Under your logic, the German company >performed better in combat than the >American. Hmm... Hmmmm... my ass. They performed better in combat if they inflicted more combat casualties. which they did not in your example, unless they inflicted more KIA and WIA on the American troops they were fighting in addition to those 10 MIA. In your example what they did not do was act according to the laws of war. Lets keep that one a separate subject. >>How many KIA would you say equals ,lets >>say, 1 000 POW's ? > >1000 Please give some reasoning for your figure. >>The POW's captured might be rear echelon >>troops. > >The KIAs might be rear echelon troops as >well. If the front line troops are still >alive and kicking how is it the rear echelon >guys are getting captured anyway? Deep penetration attack to capture a vital bridge for example. >Sorry, Tero. Any way you slice it, the >Germans just weren't as good as you'ld like >to believe. Nor were the Western Allies as good as you'd like to believe. It is just that the popular histories are written by Anglo-American writers who are not impartial or unbiased. The halos of both the CAS and the strategic bombing effort have been stripped. I think there will be more to follow along those lines.

>I.O.W. you mean the tactical AI, no? Well, any- and everything the player has no control over. >Steve is right in that many of the >"differences" between armies are usually >actually common to both sides, like picking >of the bodies. You just cannot truly know, >how unequalled some "national >characteristic" was, unless you served in >both armies at the time. How many nations transported their dead back home to be buried to their home cemeteries ? To my knowledge only Finland and Japan. >I have this notion that Finns were more >likely to retreat when they thought they >would be surrounded, while Soviets more >often just dug in and fought to death. Your notion is correct. That is why there were no major Finnish forces that would up surrounded. We were only 3,5 million at the time. The Soviets lost almost twice that many (I think) men in the great encirclements during the war. >But what am I basing it on? No real >evidences, really. Oh ye, of little faith ! Actually there is real evidence to support your notion. Look up the Winter War battles up North. There you will find that the Soviet troops did dig in. And they died rather than become POW's. There is evidence of Finnish troops slipping away to fight another day when facing encirlement. Not as widely in English language as it is available in Finnish language. But the evidence is there. >But what I can tell, is that I expect not to >see too many Finnish tanks in the game. There was only one armoured division in the Finnish OB from 1941-45. >For example, Finns had only 2 (two, dos, >två, kaksi, zwei) KV's, 7 T-34/85's etc. It is not how many you have, it is how you use them that counts. >T-26's & StuG's were the only weapon that >there was some more of. By 1944 the T-26's were useful against infantry only. There were around 100 of them so why throw them away ? The Stugs racked up a 10-1 kill ratio (80+ killed - 8 lost). >But hopefully the rarity factor eliminates >the possibility of having such forces in >QB's as in Steel Panthers... Winter War QB, AI selcting the forces. Finns attack with around 30 FT-17's. That was the highlight of historically accurate game play. >and if that is going to be well implemented, >then maybe Finns could also have PzIV G's at >the end of the war (although they never saw >use, but hey, neither did JS-III). You mean the PzKw-IVH, right ? ;p >Oh, and just one more thing comes to my >head: how are Axis troops going to be >"bought" in CM2? In CM1 you can get SS and >Volksturm units into same force, which is >okay. Having Finns and Bulgarians in the >same force in CM2 would not be quite so >believable... on the other hand, Germans >sometimes fought together with their allies, >which should also get in. I think the joint Finnish-German operations can be counted with one hand. I agree, there should be some restrictions to joint forces operations. You could have the Finnish SS battalion modelled though.... >A question: will BT-42 get in? I know there >were only 18 of them and I know they were as >useless as a French partisan armed with a >worn-out sock, but still... It is basically a version of the BT-7 so it should be no sweat. It is also the only Finnish design so it should be included, IMO.

>It was the invasion of Sicily and it was >probably not calculated since the timing of >Kursk was up to the Germans and the timing >of Husky was up to the allies. Unless they >were in collusion of course The stellar constellations came together favourably ? And Hitlers astrologist missed that ? Bad astrologist, bad BAD ! >I am confused as to your justification for >discounting POW as a combat statistic. >Exactly what do you think they are? I am thinking from the purely tactical point of view >Certainly not irrelevant I would think. When it comes to tactical effectiveness they are irrelevant. Take a look at the German and Allied losses sustained during the opening phases of Overlord for example. The Allies lost an insignifican amount of men as POW's while a sizable portion of the German losses were POW's. If you lose the POW's you get the number of actual COMBAT losses. In that light you can see that the Germans did perform better in combat than the numbers which include the POW's lead on. Sure, the strategic significance of the number of POW's is significant but when we are talking about things from purely tactical point of view the POW's are superfluous. Look at it this way: If we lose the POW's the loss ratio becomes less favourable to the Allies. We can not have that, now can we ? >Whether you deny the enemy the use of his >manpower through death, wounding or capture >the effect upon his capabilities is similar. Yes. But is that denial tactical or strategic in nature ? How many KIA would you say equals ,lets say, 1 000 POW's ? And how much do the POW's actually affect the fightig capabilities of a unit ? The POW's captured might be rear echelon troops. If a company loses a few men as KIA but most of its cooks and bakers as POW the company is still almost 100% combat effective. Until they run out of food in a few days. Lose your horse train and you'll run out of ammo in a few days, at best. These kinds of losses are strategic in nature, they are not tactical losses. >Excepting of course you have to look after >the POW. Perhaps you are suggesting that by >executing POW one could improve the combat >efficiency of your units? Actually, no. I believe there is a provision for the excution (or was it disposal of) of POW's in the Geneva Convention though. I'll have to look that up.

Did the German officers still use the whistle to mark the start of attacks in 1944 ? There was an incident when a mob of Finnish soldiers almost lynched a German officer for litterally blowing a sneak attack on Soviet positions in a dense forest where surprise was all important.

>Yup, agree with all you say, Soviet >Operational Art was their secret, or not so >secret, weapon. I think it has been so secret because the Western Historians were harnessed to keep up the Cold War view of the Red hordes which the Western armies could beat with one hand tied behind their back, provided they were given the expensive toys they called for. >I am not so sure I count them as victories >for the Soviets. I think they were almost defeated at Kursk. It was only their ability to recover from such blows better than the Germans could by that stage that decided which way the scale tipped. >What I mean by this is that a loss ratio of, >Soviet to German, 4:1 at Stalingrad and >3.5:1 at Kursk was “too” much. Staligrad was a prestige target for both so I think a victory there justified the casualties sustained. Stalingrad made the Germans uneasy so that was a morale buster as well. >If the Soviets had continued with that sort >of loss ratio during the period September 43 >to September 44 they would not have won the >war in the East. The fact that the loss >ratio fell to 1.64:1 was a “necessary” but >not “sufficient” condition for their >victory. How much of the German losses were actually POW's ? And how much of the previous years Soviet losses had been POW's ? I would say that the ratio got better because it was the Soviets, who captured the POW's this time around, not the Germans. This is why I really think the inclusion of POW's in the Dupuy equation distorts the outcome too much for it to accurately reflect the actual fighting capabilities of the armies it is trying to measure. >The Soviet Operational Art alone, would not >have won them the war in the east. It was >this, which kept many Germans fighting. The >Germans no longer controlled the >battlefields after the fighting so they did >not “know” how many causalities they were >inflicting. Had they still been inflicting >losses in the ratio they did up to and >including Kursk they would have succeeded in >bleeding the Russians dry. I would rather say they still inflicted the combat casualties as effectively (or even more effectively, given the fact they were defending) as before. It is just that they lost more men without the possibility to recover them. Their WIA for example often fell into the hands of the Soviets. The Soviets on the other hand could take care of their wounded and they did not lose men as POW's in anywhere as near numbers as they had lost in 1941-43. The Germans were subjected to the same conditions as the Soviets had been under earlier. >Only I do not believe we are still looking >at a Soviet “steam roller”, something very >different is afoot from Kursk a year >earlier. The Finnish books describe the summer of 1944 assault on the Finns as much improved vesion of the 1939/40-style assault. But IIRC they do not say that it was that much different in its execution. The use of artillery was more flexible and CAS was more prolificate than it had been before but that was about it. Then again the terrain very different from that in which the Bakration was fought. >PS. As I indicate above, the strange thing >is I take a “far less flattering” view of >the Soviets during Stalingrad and Kursk than >most. Given the knew, true figures, I am not >at all sure they won. Was the invasion in Italy, which coincided with Kursk, coordinated so that it would distract the Germans ?

>Hope you like the taste of crow, Tero. >You're about to eat a big helping. Please feel free to join in. >...PTO is not currently on our list. If it >were, it would be about 4 years out. It >absolutely will not come before any of the >other three games currently planned. Did I ever set a time frame for the arrival Pacific CM ? The question will still be on the table in four years just as it is now. >I'd rather be a groupie than a fool I hope you do not shoot yourself in the foot too often in you zeal. [ 06-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>Vanir, where did you read this? Sounds like the standard FLAK they (the more devout groupies) throw out when someone dares to question BTS designs desicions. Perhaps he is also running out of valid arguments. I would think it was a waste of possible, nay sure, income if they did NOT do a Pacific CM. The game engine, warts and all, is still the best around in the gendre.

>your computer game squads will employ >exactly those tactics which you as the >player are using. If I as the player decide >that finns will always charge in a zig zag >line then they will do that. If you read my post carefully I was NOT talking about tactics, I was talking about AI dependant behaviour. Or should I say automated responces. And the effects of different "givens" embedded in the code. >That is the status quo and I am sure BTS' >stance on that will remain like that for >all future versions. I still wonder how they are going to model the Japanese. And when they HAVE TO make alterations for them it opens the can of worms then. >Doing your suggestion of implementing >national characteristics is understandable >from a historic perspective but it's simply >invitation to quarrel about which country's >soldiers should always do this or should >always do that, and we would not reach any >consensus exactly how it should be modeled. That is why I suggested the use of the Dupuy formula to verify at least some of these features that are based on legends and subjective accounts. >Take for example that some people here even >question whether the russians used human >wave assaults later etc. The footage I have seen would suggest they used tactics that could be said to be human wave assault. But not the early type where they came in at walking pace singing and holding hands. >The only way to reflect poor or good >behavior are the nation-independant >experience settings from green to elite. >It will not sufice totally for what you are >aiming at but that is the closest you will >ever get to it in CM. The only thing is these qualities are NOT nation-independent. In CM the system works because it is Germans vs US/British/Canadian/French/Poles. In CM2 it Finns/Germans/Italians???/Rumanians???/Hungarians??? vs Russians. There is a huge difference in the demographics of the forces in CM and CM2. The Germans in CM and the Russians in CM2 are easy, they have different types of formations (SS and Guards) but the same demographics. The Allies in CM were easy as they use the same basic doctrine. The other forces against Russia in CM2 are so diverse there is bound to be troubles implementing the AI satisfactorily to reflect the differences in demographics and the way in which the diffences in equipment affected the tactics used.

>Tero: > >I think you can forget convincing BTS to >include any sort of nationality traits or >modifiers. There is no harm in trying. >There was quite a bit of debate on this a >while back and they seemed pretty adament >against the whole concept. Well... lets put it this way: do you feel it is totally OK when in a situation two squads of different nationality are subject to the exact the same patterns of behaviour ? I am talking about from the AI point of view. It is after all the AI, not the player, who decides what is done when certain events coincide in the game engine. I am not calling for a "all (insert a nationality) units will not panic under fire" modifier. I am talking about the differences in tactics and doctrine that have a fundamental impact in the way in which the units respond to stimuli. In CM it works when the forces are rather uniform in their demographics and tactics. I for one will absolutely hate it if the Finnish squads act according to the German set of behaviour patterns because the tactics employed by the Finns were nothing like the tactics employed by the Germans. >I'm still wondering about the shapes of QB >maps. I'm thinking it would just be best to >allow the game creator more custom contol >over size and shape. If someone wants to >play a 1000 pt game on a 3000m x 3000m >square map, why not let them? Maybe allow >them to pick the number and type of VLs as >well. Why not have a XXX by YYY field in the map generator routine that would allow different shapes, also deep maps instead of just square and wide maps. Ceterum censeo: QB maps should include rivers and streams.

>As for Tero's concern about simulating troop >qualities, CM1 has absolutely no "national >biases" built into it, and neither will CM2, >CM3, CM4, CM5, etc. Hmmmm..... I would hesitate call it national BIAS. That would infer that soldiers of a nation are inherently superior than those of another nation. What I call for is a set of nation dependent variables that allow for the "established" national traits to manifest themselves in a way that is meaningfull in the game. At AI command level (depends on the period of course): the Russians AI will not deviate from the predetermined attack plan; Finnish AI will not perform frontal assaults over open terrain and so on. If there are to be NO national differences at all I wonder how the green Japanese squads will wind up fighting in the upcoming Pacific CM. "And there was much wailing and knashing of teeth. Again." >National biases are largely based on >stereotypes or the end results of more >tangiable factors. Sometimes. Sometimes they are not. For example the Finnish troops were willing to even sustain casualties while retrieving the bodies of their comrades. The fallen were evacuated if at all possible and they were transported to their homes to be buried there. How do you propose to implement that as it is a vital part of the performance and a VERY vital part in determining the morale status of a Finnish squad ? >When you open the door to such conjecture, >all thoughts of scientific objectivity go >out the window. Why do you have to do that ? There are conjectural factors that can be proven scientifically. For example the very number of Finnish POW's taken by the Soviets corraborates my claim that the Finns should evade rather than surrender. No matter what the level of training of the troops is. >This is why many people, including us, have >big problems with Dupy's QJM system. It >simply does not hold up to scientific >standards. Don't get me wrong, I think Dupy >and his team's research and documentation >skills are top notch. I have about a half >dozen of his publications right here. But >the QJM is fundamentally flawed. What is, in your view, the fundamental flaw in it ? I think the fact that it includes POW's in the eqauation distorts the very ratio it is trying to reflect. >We don't use any QJM equations in CM and >never will. How then are you going to model the differences in the national (for the lack of a better term) performances ? >The reasons why we did not simulate the >Winter War is because it was NOT a part of >the Eastern Front as a whole. It was a >seperate war that just happened to take >place in the same spot as a later one. Not in the Finnish view. We call the 1941-1944 war the Continuation War. The fact that the Soviets claim WWII started for them only in 1941 is BS from our point of view. >Just like France 1940 is different than >France 1944. I disagree. The similarities in the differences are non-existent. >Much changed in the years between the Winter >War and Barbarossa. Years ? Some 15 months to be exact. Winter War: November 1939-March 1940, Continuation War June 1941 -September 1944. What changed was the level of readiness of the Finnish army (thanks to the equipment captured during Winter War) and the geopolitical situation of Finland. >We simply do not have the time to cover >39/40 and 40-45 in one go. I can understand that. >It would be a whole other matter if we were >saying that we weren't simulating the >Finnish front of 1941-1944, but we are in >fact including it. Your call. Ultimately. I will NOT beg on my hands and knees. No much longer.

>Don't confuse local superiority at the >tactical and operational level with >strategic superiority. They are not the same >thing. I am not confusing them. I am just taking the point of view of the lowly groundpounder at the receiving end. To him it does not matter if the superiority he is facing is classed as tactical/operational or strategic level. He is till facing the odds then and there. >Everyone tries to achieve local superiority >as a matter of course (and to prevent their >opponent from achieving it). That's Basic >Warfare 101. If the Russians were frequently >able to achieve local superiority of 10:1 or >greater while only having 3:2 or even 3:1 >superiority over all (strategic), I am not disputing Kips logic or the validity of his point. I'm just pointing out that in additon to the actual numbers you have to take into account the actual disposition of the forces. The situation seldom resembles a coffee table top where you can see all the troops involved in the battle in the same space. For example, the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 against the Finns the overall odds were not very serious, 2-3:1 (order of magnitude in men, worse in aircraft, artillery and tanks). But the Finnish army was dispersed to defend two isthmusses so the actual overall superiority of the Red Army in the Karelian Isthmus was 5:1 or greater in men. And the superiority in the Red Army Schwehrpunkt was close to 10:1 in the outset. The Finns had to fall back while the army reserves were massed to the final defensive line NW of Viipuri. The Finnish army maxed out at 500 000 men that summer so it can be said that the Red Army superiority in men did not reach or exceed much over 2:1, overall. But the local superiority they were able to adcheive initially was 5:1 or worse (better, depending where you are looking that from ). When the odds evened out their attack was repulsed. >then this is evidence that they did indeed >out-maneuver and out-plan the Germans,which >is the whole point of what Kip was >saying. Out-plan. Yes. They had the initiative so they could pick the time and the space. The Germans had resources to respond only. I would hesitate to say they outright out-manouvered the Germans. I would rather say that it was a case of a sumo wrestler against a bantam boxer. The bantam boxer was agile and could hop around the sumo wrestler right to the end but the sumo wrestler used his superior weight to wear down the bantam boxers defences. The boxer was furthermore following his trainers orders to stand fast and not to take one step back so he lost the inherent advantages of his agility and better responce time in fixed positions.

>Strange... On a board that generates 200 >posts about ROF of ISU-152, one would expect >this to cause a dicsussion. You used the wrong bait. Is the article saying Stalin was preparing to invade Germany or not ? There is no punch line. Try posting the article at the RMZ board http://network54.com/Hide/Forum/116312 You WILL receive a very diffent kind of response. I quarantee you will get shouted down, not silenced to oblivion. [ 06-11-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

>I agree, Kip. Especially wrt Soviet numbers >there is no way the Soviets fielded an army >that was 8:1 or 10:1 times larger than the >Germans in Russia. Physically impossible, >because the Soviet had neither that many men >of military age, nor the equipment to arm >such a tremendous host. From late 1943, on, >the Soviets became very adept at deceptive >redeployment of their forces along the >front, thus creating the odds that German >memoirs quote so often. The German memoirs >weren't wrong, there really were that many >Soviets in the main attack axes. But, those >numbers were the result of redeployments >done through deception operations, something >the Soviets became second to none at. So, as >far as the Germans were concerned every time >the Soviets launched a major attack from >late 1943 until the end of the war the >Germans encountered heavy numerical odds in >their disfavor. I think that the misconception rises from the fact that the German figures are taken to mean the entire situation along the entire lenght of the front. They were being hammered by superior forces up and down the frontier but never in two places at the same time. I think it is odd that the Anglo-American historians never picked up that little tidbit. Then again the Cold War needed some fuel to keep the fires burning... >Naturally, it seemed like the Soviets were >just swarming across the countryside, but >nothing could be further from the truth. In >fact, the Soviets had developed the means >whereby they could take substantial >forces(which were never higher than 3:1 in >numerical superiority, and that in late >1944), and redeploy them laterally along the >front(along with STAVKA reserves from the >rear) to weakpoints in the German line, and >German intelligence was by and large unable >to detect it. I still think that the 10:1 (or near that anyway) superiority in combat effective troops was reached once the defensive lines were breached and the Red Army switched to exploitation phase.

>I should just have said that all my comments >referred to the German/Soviet fighting and >not Finnish forces or the Winter War. That goes without saying. If he had applied the formula to the Finnish/Soviet figures the result would have bent the Gauss curve out of shape and the results would have been made null and void as a statistical anomaly. >I claim to know nothing about Finnish forces >and the Winter War other than that the Finns >are regarded as the best by all those that >know. That is not the first time I see a statement like this. >When it comes to Soviet causalities I >believe we are no longer in the dark. Both >David Glantz and John Erickson, in my view >the worlds top men on the Eastern Front, in >the English language, regard the work by >Colonel-General GF Krivosheev, Soviet >Causalities and Combat Losses in the >Twentieth Century, as reliable and unbiased. Arguably, yes. But even the right honourable Glantz uses Soviet/Russian and GERMAN sources when he is discussing the Finnish involvement. That is why I do not think he is totally un-biased. >If the Germans had been defending against >forces that numbered the same as Soviet >forces “actually did” but, were in ever >detail, “clones” of Germany’s own forces >then the casuality ratio, attacker to >defender, would have been 1.44:1. In reality >it was 1.64:1, Soviet to German. This tells >us that the Soviet forces performed nearly >as well as German forces would have done in >similar circumstances. All comments refer to >the post Kursk period. What about the pre-Kursk period ? >PS. If you use the casualties from the above >book for the early period of the war you >find that the gap between German and Soviet >forces is just as great as the Germans >claimed in the fifties. It is just that from >about the autumn of 43 onwards the Soviets >were far better soldiers, and far fewer in >number, than the Germans liked to claim post >war. I think the 10-1 claim has a grain of truth in it. If you look at total figures spread over a map on a coffee table you are correct, the forces look equal. But I have never heard that even this late in the war the Soviets would attack the most heavily defended portion of the defensive line. That is to say they sought numerical superiority in the place they attacked. And at that focal point the superiority may well have risen to as high as 10-1. The forces may be equally strong but the defender is fighting with the forces at that location only while the rest are spread all over the landscape and moving to intercept. That means that the Soviets could count on having this superiority for as long as it would take the reinforcements to arrive. They had also deviced a concept of feint attack in which they took advantage of their knowledge of the defenders tactics. A breach was made in the defensive line in order to draw counter attacks which in turn were hit with heavy artillery fire, IF they were done according to tactics and doctrine. If the counter attack was done in an unconventional way the Red Army wound up in troubles.

>I'm sure there will be none of that. BTS >has been pretty clear they will not go that >way. The only factor affecting troop >performance is the experience level. And >apparently physical fitness in CM2. > >You can simulate the differences with >experience levels if you like to... ... and have only Elite force quality for the Finns ? How realistic is that ? The current system is not quite good enough. A green rifle squad is a green rifle squad, no matter what which nationality. Will a green Red Army rifle squad act exactly the same way a green Finnish rifle squad would in every phase of the war and in all situations ? As things stand the answer is yes. Which will result in a various outcomes in different tactical situations that are less than historically accurate. Should the green Finnish rifle squad for example surrender as readily as its counter parts ? Or should it try to evade capture, lets say by dispersing and regrouping near a preset location or disengageing controlably before the tactical situation prevents evasion ? What would be the suitable level of suppression that trigers surrender or should the Finnish troops simply fade away in, say, 98,5% of the cases when everybody else would surrender ? Should a squad with only one or two men left be able to fuction as effectively as a half squad ? When should they fight to the death and when should they fade away to fight another day ? Should the Finnish squad with casualties move slower when retreating because it is carrying its dead with it (or have its casualties doubled to simulate that evacuation process, depending on the mission)? Should the Finnish squads get a casualties evacuation detail attached to it ? If the answer is yes to any of these examples you need to have a set of modifiers that distinquish different nationalities with the same level of training but different tactics and doctrine. Most of these traits can be calculated using the Dupuy formula to reach a fair set of modifiers that would leave the game engine itself intact while the modifiers handle the special "national characteristics" and the calculations they involve. IMHO.

>I am a huge fan of his analysis. I would not say I am a big fan. But I do see that they could serve a purpose when you are modelling different nationalities for computer games. >He was professor at Harvard and his work >was used by both the British and the US for >operational analysis. When is comes to >operational analysis he has no equal, in my >view. Well... I think that since his is the only formula around that tries to assert qualitative values of different armies scientifically he must be the best. >However, when it comes to the Eastern >Front, although his formulas still hold in >every detail, it must be remembered that >the “data” he entered into his formulas was >almost completely wrong, with regard to the >Soviets. Not his fault though. >By this I mean that in order to use his >formulas one has to “know” the force ratio, >the size of the Soviet forces relative to >the Germans, and, the causalities suffered You mean casualties ? >by the Soviets. In the 1970s and 1980s the >only people who knew the true size of >Soviet forces, and even more so, their true >causalities were the Russians, and they >were not telling. But then again they were not denying the figures floated around very vehemently. There must be a reason for that. >Now we know both. Yes. We now know that the casualties they suffered during Winter War were as big or even greater than we Finns estimated after the war. >As it turns out Soviet forces were far >smaller than was believed in the 1980s; >also their causalities were far less. That is debatable. Even Glantz is feeling his way around in the dark. And the figures coming out of purely Russian sources are contradictory. >The Germans were simply not killing as many >Soviets, post Kursk, as had been believed. Hmmmmmmm..... what does the term kill mean here ? The Finnish estimate for KO'd Soviet tanks during Winter War was 1 200. The actual figure of vehicles lost to all causes was over 3 000 (in the Isthmus alone mind you), with around 1 200 lost in combat. Irrevocable (total) losses were listed at around 300 tanks. And that does not include the hundreds of tanks captured north of lake Ladoga. After Kursk the Soviets had more opportunities to recover KO'd but salvageable tanks so the number of German kill claims is bound to be greater than the number of TOTAL reported irrevocable armour losses sustained by the Red Army. >The average force ratio during the period >July 43 to March 45, Soviet to German, was >only 2.7:1. Not the 4-5:1 as had been >believed. Also the causalities ratio over >that period, Soviet to German, was only >1.64:1, not 2-3:1 as had been believed. >(Remember these figures exclude the round- >up of April-May 45.) One think that has always bothered me the most in the formula is the fact that when calculating tactical combat effectiveness the POW's are counted in the casualty figures, not only the actual combat losses. When the POW's are excluded the picture becomes a bit more non-congratulatory to the Western Allies as well as Soviets. In my view the POW's should be counted in only when you are calculating strategic effectivness. >To cut a very long story short if you run >the Dupuy formulas, using the new data, you >get a combat effectiveness figure for the >Germans against the Soviets, during the >period given above, of 1.15, not the 1.8-2 >or 3 given in Dupuy’s books. Was he using total German losses (including POW's) or reported German combat losses (KIA, WIA) ? I believe the most basic problem in applying the formula is the incompatibility of the opposing reporting. For example the Red Army "accounting" was often weeks behind the actual events. >This is no criticism of Dupuy; the figures >were just not available in his day. >The conclusion is that the Soviets were >very nearly as good as a Germans, battalion >combat team V battalion combat team, post >Kursk. The Germans were often fighting battalion combat teams vs multiple divisions in the area where the Red Army was attacking. >Note that is “post Kursk” not at >Kursk. At Kursk the Soviets really fought >in the “old” style for the last time. Kursk was the last major German offensive in the east.

>No, it was just one bite too many for us to >chew. Unfortunately, doing the Winter War >would have required far too much work. In what respect ? >If our first confirmed Finnish CM >fanatic "TSS" counts as a parameter, then >that is your answer I also have some good >sources here for Finnish uniforms and >equipment, but Tommi has already provided a >wealth of details for us to go by. I'm not concerned about the minutae like the OB or stuff like that. I know Tommi can handle that without any difficulties. I'm concerned about the bonuses or similar modifiers you plan on using to implement the variables that make out the "national characteristics" aspects. Are you going to use the Dupuy formula for example to model the relative effectiveness of the various armies in relation to each other ?

>Who said a dumb thing like that?? Basically every historian who has listed the Stalin personal cult as fault in the Soviet system.

>As for Stalin's reputation during and after >the war, as well as a lot of other >information I advise you to read Churchill's >fundamental tome "Second World War". I have seen it dubbed "Second World War - How I won the war" in some reviews. I doubt it can be said the definitive nor the most objective and even accurate of accounts of the events during WWII. And still Churchill memoires are still revered as one of the basic sources in Western WWII research. Then again the most cited book on the Finnish involvement in WWII is Mannerheims memoires. As if there were no more recent books around on the subject which are more objective and accurate. And they say there was/is no personal cults cherished in the West... [ 06-08-2001: Message edited by: tero ]