Spook
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Posts posted by Spook
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I know of that too, but I don't know if there are similar days of commemoration for the anniversaries of raids like for Leipzig or Nuremburg or for the "Battle of Berlin." The "Fabled Few" of RAF Fighter Command are always revered for their efforts in 1940, but of the 79,000 RAF crewmen who did not return, 55,000 came from BC.Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:Well, "we" from my own limited perspective. Battle of the Atlantic Day was just commemorated and made the national news. I can't remember if we have such a day for veterans of the air war or not. I know there is a Battle of Britain day commemorated in the UK.
Of course the BC veterans would step forward, as they are justified to do so.By "we" I mean society, I guess specifically Canadian and I would assume British society - for at the least, kind words are spoken of the men of Bomber Command on Rememberance Day. When the TV series The Valour and the Horror came out a few years back, there was a lot of controversy over the episode "Death by Moonlight" and a lot of Canadians stepped forward to defend BC, or at the least, the very young men who chose to fly with BC.
I don't really debate the notion of BC crewmen being heroes, Mike. They were. In fact, their kind of war, flying at night, throughout the year, in typically inclement European weather, and against a determined and capable Luftwaffe opposition, probably took a toll on human nerves in no less way as what beset a typical combat infantryman.Perhaps the best way to resolve this apparent discrepancy between war crimes and legitimate acts of war is to go in reverse. By that, I mean we feel it is okay to kill soldiers in the field, but repugnant to roast babies alive in their cribs through area bombing. So we elevate the bomber pilots to heroes because of their devotion to duty. Maybe we need to do the reverse, and make the soldier in the field as repugnant a character as the area bomber, and view killing in the field not as legitimate acts of war, but as crimes versus humanity.
It won't work unless everyone in the world agrees on that...hmm, how hard could that be?
For what it's worth, I am sure many of those BC veterans have nightmares to this day of what they did. It's a burden I am thankful I don't have to live with.
And after a 30-mission tour, it was sometimes "expected" of many BC crewmen to "volunteer" to do another such hellish tour.
They were a special kind of "army" in their own way (as was the USAAF), and the story of BC could deserve better telling than seems the typical case even today.
The choice of city-bombing at night was not that made by the BC crewmen, it was made by the British leadership, and that's where any debate over its "morality" should be directed.
EDIT: On that last note, I personally understand the rationales as to why RAF opted for area-bombing as it did. But further discussion on same, by those inclined, would be better done in a separate topic thread than in here.
[ May 06, 2003, 03:32 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]
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Off on a tangent, but anyway.......
"We"?Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:Think about it - the entire concept of "Fight Like A Man" involves some element of risk. We revere Bomber Command not because they roasted German women and babies alive, but because they took such severe losses doing it. Had Bomber Command been able to do what it did without suffering a single loss, how would history view them?
Mind you, Mike, I've plowed through a few odds-and-sods references related to BC's campaigns that I too have developed no small amount of respect for the BC crewmen for what they accomplished under the hazards that they faced.
But on a larger scale, it seems a mixed verdict as to how well the "we," in the postwar allied nations' populations, "revered" BC's efforts. It's my understanding that contrary to other services' veterans, BC crewmen were not awarded their own postwar campaign medal, and "Bomber" Harris was snubbed at being granted peerage. Even Churchill made one attempt to distance himself from the application of "terror bombing" in the waning war months when he thought it in his political interests to do so.
And in more recent times, in other forums, I've frequently seen some posters openly talk of the sum Allied (UK/US) bombing campaigns being in the same vein of war crimes as typically held against Nazism. That is heavily debated when brought up, of course, but some do broach it in that way all the same.
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Tch. Ya know, I just remembered that I submitted a CMBB scenario earlier to the Scenario Depot. Last I checked, it hasn't been reviewed. It's called "Into Kurovitsy."
Alternately, you can download from the link below:
Just right-click on the link, choose "Save target as....", and that'll download the file.
It's about 34(+) turns, and pits a Soviet Guards force to the job of clearing out a fair-sized town bisected by a small river. Best done in multiplayer, as it provides little "surprises" to both sides, but alternately playable as Soviets.
(mirrored comments in BF General Forum)
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Hate to break this to you, MG 42, but.....
The CM game system is still that; a game. Just a damn sight more realistic on so many elements of WWII tactical warfare than all of the other contenders out there.
If it were to be a true die-in-the-wool sim, then "Franko's True Combat Rules" (or somefink) would have to be coded in as mandatory settings.
Artillery plotting would jump to about three or four magnitudes of complexity to perform.
And so forth.
I'm glad that BF has demonstrated how to walk the fine line in the CM evolution. Where it can improve realism while also maintaining playability, it does so, but doesn't sacrifice one on the altar of the other as often the case in so many other games.
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I'm sure at least the Firefly IIc did.Originally posted by JonS:As Gordon said, Fireflies did make it to Italy. They were used by, for example, 2(NZ)Division. I'm not sure if all the various marks and models made it though.
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No, the long-feared Cold War era WPO conventional assault never did happen. But I think you would acknowledge that this isn't an apples-to-apples comparison given that Stalin wasn't in charge throughout that entire timeframe.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:Now, is it likely that Stalin would have attacked Nazi Germany at some point in the future? I would not be so sure. Certainly the desire was there, but so in theory was it during the entire Cold War. But that attack NEVER happened. And yes, there were Soviet officials who wanted to attack the Nazis, but that is also irrelevant.
As I've noted above, I don't buy the "pre-emptive" argument. But I think the "1942" scenario, of the Soviets striking first then if the Germans still hadn't attacked, remains valid. The devil in the details IMO is of projecting some probability beyond just the validity point, to which again I regard as very speculative for now.
Thanks. On my end for now, I can review Werth again, and now finally have the Glantz/House "When Titans Clashed" for potential correlation to the above.My two best sources (off the top of my head) about this are "Operation Barbarossa" by Brian Fugate and "The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front 22nd June - August 1941" by Glanz.
I think you mean "if imperfectly executed".I think the evidence is quite clear that the defense in depth was carefully planned, if not imperfectly executed.
From the occasions that I've looked at Barbarossa Soviet army dispositions, I would concur that a "defense in depth" plan was being applied. Actually quite sensible, in hindsight. But I think it was more the case of contingency planning (after all, you noted it being considered since 1940) than it was of Stalin expecting a German attack at a very specific timeframe.
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This is pretty much my sum outlook at present too. There was SOME mobilisation and reorganization, but hardly consistent in application, and notional at best for those forces expected to first contact the Germans.Originally posted by Sailor Malan:Sorry, I have to comment here. Whilst Stalin was involved in Finland, and the troops there were undoubtably 'mobilised', you cannot use this to 'prove' that the whole west of the USSR was 'mobilised'. Similarly the almost unopposed advance into eastern Poland 9 months before is also not evidence.
In fact, Stalin was thoroughly convinced that Hitler would not attack at that time, if not provoked, and (despite increasing evidence to the contrary) was caught completely off balance by the attack. IIRC, he even forbade frontier units from taking precautions such as deploying to war positions.
I am similarly not convinced yet that Stalin fully expected a German attack in 1941. If that was the case, the materials shipments could've been stopped sooner. The "defense in depth" planning was IMO an effort to cover the bases. Unless, Steve, you'd like to point out some key references as could help indicate otherwise.
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I wasn't arguing earlier that Hitler was seeking to "pre-empt." Whatever all Stalin could have done bending over backwards to avoid war even on into the following years, I believe Hitler still would've attacked. The role of aggressor meant nothing to him.Originally posted by Xavier:I agree with Steve. The idea that Hitler was forced to attack USSR just to defend Europe from communism is false. I think that, for AH,the west front was just a waste of time and effort. His main goal was the east.
Rather, my comments were intended to highlight if Stalin entertained comparable notions of aggression against Germany as did Hitler vs. the USSR, after 1941. At present, I think this is valid to argue.
There's an irony to Hitler's "lebensraum" goal; in an indirect way, he succeeded. Even allowing the postwar German border shifts to the east, it could be reasonably argued that those Germans who survived did have more "lebensraum" by war's end, after losing millions.
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In absolute --- no. Maybe Stalin would've concerned himself more on other matters, or changed his mind about attacking in 1942 or in later years. Much can happen in a year to bring on a change in view.Originally posted by Sergei:Can we then, absolutely positively, say that Barbarossa prevented Stalin from backstabbing Hitler?
But neither can it be "absolutely, positively" argued that Stalin would have NEVER attacked first. If events and circumstances existed as that Stalin thought a successful offensive could be done, I think it entirely valid that he would've considered same.
But because Hitler attacked first in 1941, and 1942's setting was radically different from one with the USSR still at peace, what Stalin would have done instead remains forever in the realm of the speculative.
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Was it really so obvious? I mean, is there historical evidences of that? </font>Originally posted by Xavier:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Panzer76:
I thought it was pretty obvious that Stalin was planning to attack Hitler
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Sorry to break your streak.
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I'm kind of behind the curve keeping up with CMMOS (heck, even keeping up with the CMBB forum), but I'm popping in to add my voice to all the others, MikeT, to give you, and those others (including the modders) who helped you, a big THANK YOU for all your efforts .
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Splendid!!Originally posted by Battlefront.com:I'll see about making a smallish QT movie out of the segment. However, I will need to secure CNN's permission to post it. At least I am nearly sure I need to do that
We'll work on it this weekend.
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To Jeanne & Battlefront:
Many thanks, Jeanne, for your coverage, which I unfortunately missed. The historical wargame market is about as "niche" as it can get in computer game categories, and good publicity can therefore be hard to come by.
Would it be possible for you & Battlefront to arrange that a video clip file of the news coverage be provided for download or viewing from the Battlefront site later on? Or is there a CNN news archive link as an alternate?
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So, what will be the title of MrSpkr's next thread for a scenario review call-to-arms?
"Anna Kournikova provides her e-mail address here ... while she does CM scenario reviews"
"Winning Powerball Lottery numbers ... hidden within the CM scenario ratings."
" 'Pulp Fiction' ... the essence of CM scenario review text."
"Final Fantasy ... the good scenario reviews within."
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So far, I think that I'm holding up that end for my submitted reviews; at least for the ones I've done for yours & MrSpkr's scenarios that I've played.Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:Hey Admiral Keth, here's another idea - how about a 100 character minimum for scenario review comments?
When time avails to finish the game, it'll be Andreas as my next "victim." My GUIDING RULES offered to those who download scenarios from the Scenario Depot and other sites:
1) On AVERAGE, a scenario review is NOT going to take as long to do as it will to play the scenario; let alone the time spent by the scenario designer to put it together in the first place.
2) EACH scenario that I download AND play from the Depot gets reviewed.
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You're welcome, for whatever they're worth.Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:Spook -first of all, thanks very much for trying out the GD series and reviewing some of them at the Depot. Extra thanks for your suggestions.
Unimpeaceable references fail me now, but my initial recollection of the practice was while inspecting TO&E's of brigade-level formations in the earlier TalonSoft "East Front" game, varying by year of course. It was also read by me from occasional articles much earlier that the Soviet tank riders (among the first to apply this concept) were primarily armed with SMG's.My knowledge of Soviet practices are limited. I like the idea of the SMG company replacing the "leg" company - you mention this was the standard TO & E?
My follow-up web search availed the following as the closest I could find to Soviet tank brigade TO&E:
Nov '42 Soviet Tank Brigade TO&E
And, as noted at that site, the TO&E is drawn from "German intelligence documents," let alone being a TO&E not of 1944. Regardless, this, and a more sketchy reference at another site, infer that at within the tank brigade's attached infantry battalion, a SMG company was organic to this.
I agree -- I'm not altogether firm on the notion of changing out some T-34/43's for T-34/85's, as the latter started entering service in Feb. 1944. So it is quite possible that the GD's Soviet opposition in May '44 hadn't gotten some of these yet. But if some "swapping" was done, it would indeed be best on a platoon basis. And I couldn't recommend changing out to provide an entire company of T-34/85's, given that the scenario's German defenders don't include "killer tanks."I was also wondering - was it common for the T-34 76s to be upgraded piecemeal into T-34 85s within a tank platoon? I have no idea, but have read that tank companies were homogenous in the Red Army. Was this only with regards to suspension and chassis, and not main armament as well? The only problem I see with replacing a T-34 76 in a platoon with an 85 is that the 85 is now independent and has no platoon commander.
(Some net references suggested that Soviet tank companies had drifted down to seven tanks typical by 1944, with three platoons of two each, but I couldn't confirm this for now.)
Definitely, the German defense's chances are GREATLY enhanced by the air support. (Your having both kinds of Stukas buzzing around also keeps the battle stirred up!) So those cetainlyI made the Stuka support 100 percent because they were a large part of the actual battle this scenario is based on; wouldn't seem right to me not to include them.
need to show SOME time within the scenario, and not in the later turns. Instead of "100% arrival at turn 6" as an example, I was thinking of something like "45% at turn 5" as a counter-example. After five turns, each turn checking at 45%, it's only a 5.03% chance of the aircraft STILL not having shown up after the fifth turn. Just makes the specific entry turn less predictable.
Most of the trenches can remain padlocked, but I thought that perhaps the pair of trench markers close to the woods, as a minor example, could be reset freely.However, the points on trenches are well taken. I think I padlocked them because in real life, these trenches had been dug long previously - possibly by the Soviets, I don't recall - and were not optimally placed for the defenders who routed out of Giurgesti. I'd have to revisit the sources.
I'll say one thing --- some on the CMBB forum have complained that the "Shoot & Scoot" command doesn't "work well enough." I used it for the German Marder's which came in as reinforcements, which I kept back behind a crest near the exit edge. That S&S command proved a lifesaver to those TD's, who certainly would've been killed otherwise by the T-34's.
I suppose the T-34/85 suggestion could just be punted then. The present Soviet tanks in the game are capable enough for the job on hand. SPG's might be another matter though.
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"Shoot & Scoot" works well for many AFV's, but best IMO for those TD's with potent long-range guns and poor armor, like a Marder or Nashorn.
Such vehicles with good long-range guns have a reasonable chance at a one-off shot. But if they hang around too long in exposed position, like through hunt/reverse, the follow-on enemy return fire (multiple shots) get a better chance to hit.
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Correct, which is why I only cited "width" and not "depth" in my earlier post.Originally posted by Simon Fox:These densities are intended as a basis for comparisons of army sectors only and may not be relevant to CMBB. These deployments should be seen in the context that they are echeloned in depth of up to 30km, although of course greater strength is generally found in the first defensive belt. It is not entirely clear from the source whether they represent first echelon units and their assigned support only or the entire depth of the first three belts. Even if they did the depth of the first belt might be 5 or more km. For CMBB you would need to delve into divisional and regimental frontages to get a more accurate estimate. The available artillery support may be more relevant as supprting arty may have been deployed forward to support the first defensive belt. You would also of course have to add in the very considerable obstacles including 1-2,000 AT mines per km.
To which yes, one should delve into specific battalion/regimental accounts if one truly wanted to do a CMBB historical scenario of the northern attack on the Kursk salient, instead of "frontal averages". But it's my GENERAL impression that very few present CMBB scenarios attempt to approach the kind of noted "density" for a 1-km map width, even allowing to 5-km depth.
It was similar with the earlier TalonSoft game "East Front." With some notable exceptions, most original scenarios were devised as to provide fast-paced games than to attempt historical unit concentrations.
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It could just suffice to provide a link to the Scenario Depot in your web site. Having downloadable scenario files resident to your site in specific is not the only way to help expand attention to the CM gamer/designer community.Originally posted by Knavery:Ok... With things the way they are, is there a way to get some of you scenario designers to allow other sites to host SINGLE downloads of your scenarios regardless of review scores? A completely unbiased position would give all an opportunity to get recognized. Many of you designers have given the Scenario Depot the rights to destribute these, but what of new start-ups like my website and those of others?
But if you want to host certain scenario files, then e-mail the designers and ask their permission. Some will probably grant your request.
To get you started, click below. I'm not particular at keeping it at the Depot alone, but be mindful that this scenario is a "draft" and is subject to later revision by me.
[ January 20, 2003, 03:32 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]
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Just for record, the USAAF didn't go after the Romanian oil targets until the Ploesti raid of Aug. 1943. Follow-up raids on Ploesti and other nearby oil targets were flown mainly in 1944, within a few months of the Soviets taking control.Originally posted by Bastables:The "damage" inflicted by USAAF aggravated a serious situation ie fuel shortages in the Caucasus constrained mobility during 1942 ( 2000 Zetterling). These figs do agree more with Andreas reasoning.
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Yes, the invasion "impeded" Soviet industry, but many Soviet industries still were successfully dismantled, moved to the Urals, and set up there instead. What then of overall Soviet production during the critical time of the East Front if these could have been attacked too? Speculative, of course, but valid speculation with all else.Originally posted by JasonC:One fellow says that Germany couldn't interfer with UK and USSR production because it didn't have a strategic air force. But it did interfer with the production of both, without one. It interfered with UK production by sinking millions of tons of shipping. It interfered with USSR production by occupying a third of the country, in population and industrial terms. Those were at least as forceful interventions in those economies by military force, as strategic air was in Germany's. Especially if you look at the period before 1944.
Not quite correct. As you noted, the RAF Bomber Command focus prior to 1944 was to impede industry the indirect way by targeting cities. If it hit the factories, all the better, but "disrupting" production by targeting civilian homes was the more tangible (if overoptimistic) expectation. But bomb-marking techniques, even at night, had progressed such that "point" targets could be hit too. The pre-Normandy rail campaign is one such example, and the RAF contributed to bombing the synthetic oil refineries too with a measure of success.The Brits had more success with mass night bombingof city sized targets. But you can't hit a target as small as a factory at night, with WW II bombing technologoes, except by the scatter of luck. The German night fighter force became more effective, but the Brits retained a lead in radar and especially intel that let them continue to operate. They certainly were not able to reduce production of German aircraft, which was at that time their primary target.
The British desired aircraft production targets very early in the war, but after the results of 1941, had long since shifted focus. Communications (rail), oil, and the continuance of city-bombing were rather more the primaries of Bomber Command targeting in the last year.
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If you can latch onto a copy of Roger Freeman's "The Mighty Eighth," Combined Arms, that would be one source looking at the effect of one strategic air force. Or, the out-of-print "Mighty Eighth War Diary" will detail each mission as well as losses & kills during same. The latter book is harder to find, however (usually in specialty military bookstores), and thus will carry a bit more of a price tag.Originally posted by CombinedArms:BTW, does anyone know of a good book about the Allied defeat of the Luftwaffe in 1944? Most of what I've read is pretty general. What I'd like to see is some good stats and analysis of the impact of the P-51 escorted raids on the Luftwaffe's fighter arm. How many fighters and pilots did they lose? How did this compare to earlier eras of the war, etc? Was this particular phase especially crippling, or was it just the last straw in a long process of attrition?
This doesn't consider the added losses to the RAF, the US 9th, 12th, & 15th Air Forces, and the Soviet air forces, of course. A more far-reaching source for this, looking instead from the German perspective of all air campaigns and their effect, is "Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-45" by Williamson Murray.
I tend to regard the effect of P-51 escort in 1944-45 on a "last straw" basis. Prior attrition took a greater sum toll (P-51's accounted for just less than 5,000 air kills in the ETO/MTO), but the presence of the P-51's along with the other fighters pressed the Luftwaffe into the "air superiority battle" that was considered critical to win before the Normandy invasion.
[ January 19, 2003, 10:17 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]
American and Commonwealth Tactics on Sicily through German eyes
in Combat Mission: Barbarossa to Berlin
Posted