Cauldron Posted March 30, 2002 Share Posted March 30, 2002 The Effects of Allied Air Power Attacks on German ground combat units in Normandy Occasionally attacks on German combat units in the battle zone are emphasized. Often the attacks on German tanks by allied fighter-bombers that are put forward as examples on the great effectiveness of allied air power. This is actually quite strange, since weapons carried by aircraft were unsuitable for attacking tanks. The image of allied fighter-bombers as effective tank killers is probably the result of claims by the pilots themselves. However, it is hard to conceive a less reliable source for information on the effectiveness of the attacks. Such claims are notoriously exaggerated. Often the German attack at Mortain is used as an example to show the effectiveness of the fighter-bombers as tank killers. But in fact this engagement is rather an example of vastly exaggerated claims. The British 2nd TAF claimed to have destroyed or damaged 140 German tanks in the Mortain area 7 - 10 August, while 9th US Air Force claimed 112.1 This actually exceeded the number of German tanks employed in the operation.2 In fact no more than 46 tanks were lost in the operation and of these only nine had been hit by air weapons.3 Actually it seems that very few German tank were lost due to hits from weapons carried by aircraft. Probably no more than about 100 tanks were lost due to hits from air weapons during the entire campaign. Rather it seems that air attacks on tank formation protected by AA units were more dangerous to the aircraft than to the tanks. Allied losses of aircraft were considerable, the 2nd TAF (including elements of Air Defence of Britain that took part in the Normandy campaign) lost 829 aircraft, while US 9th Air Force lost 897.4 The main reason for the poor results of air attack on tanks was lack of suitable armament. Machine guns and cannons had sufficient accuracy, but lacked the power necessary to produce more than superficial damage. Heavy bombs could destroy a tank, but it took a direct hit, which was very difficult to achieve. The vaunted rockets had sufficient penetration capabilities. Trials against captured German Panther tanks showed that the rockets could penetrate the armour except on the front of the tank.5 The accuracy of the rockets was however alarmingly low, even when fired in salvos of eight. At trials on training ground in England the probability of achieving a hit on a tank was at most 4 %.6 On operations, when the aircraft was subjected to AA fire and the targets not stationary on an open field, hit rates must have been even lower. Probably tanks were among the most difficult targets for aircraft to attack. Non-armoured targets were more lucrative. But even among such targets it seems that losses inflicted by air power were comparatively small compared to allied artillery, mortars, machine guns etc. Deployed German ground combat units were not easy targets for allied air power. No statistics on causes of casualties among the German units have been found among the documents. An alternative approach would be too see to what extent German daily casualties vary in correlation to the weather. An example is the 12. SS-Pz.Div. during June. The worst day for the division was 26 June, when it suffered 730 casualties.7 During this day it rained. In fact on the six most casualty-intensive days during June the weather either prevented or hampered air operations.8 If anything the correlation between air operations and casualties seem to be inverse in this case. A similar case can be made for the II. SS-Pz.Korps. The most costly actions for this corps were fought during Epsom. In a report the effects of the enormous allied artillery fire are described. It is said that this was the main cause of German losses. It is also explicitly stated that he effects of the numerous attacks by allied air units were of "secondary importance".9 Another example is the initial actions fought by the 346. Inf.Div. Until 10 June the casualties suffered by the infantry regiments amounted to 916. Simultaneously the elements of the division that were not involved in direct combat with enemy ground forces suffered only ten casualties.10 If allied air power had been a significant cause of casualties the losses would not have been as concentrated to the units directly engaged with enemy ground combat units as they were in this case. Neither does this appear to be an isolated example. On 13 July it was reported that the panzer grenadiers suffered 90 % of all casualties among panzer divisions.11 In the German war diaries too it seems that losses due to enemy air power were exaggerated. An example is the description of the German attack at Mortain on 7 August as it is given by the war diary of Army Group B12: In the early morning, the 7th Army, with its left wing consisting of four panzer divisions, thrust towards Avranches Š Mist during the morning favoured the attack, which by noon had gained 10 km of ground Š As the weather cleared, hundreds of enemy aircraft attacked the assaulting forces, which brought them to standstill, and heavy losses of men and equipment occurred. Even though it is not explicitly stated that it was the aircraft themselves that inflicted the "heavy" losses, it is quite easy to interpret the citation that way. Actually the German losses to air were modest as is shown above. Another example is a report conceived by Rommel on 3 July where he states that 12. SS-Pz.Div. suffered considerable losses during the march to Normandy.13 This is however hardly in line with the fact hat the division lost 83 men, to all causes, during the actual period.14 It is not only in war diaries and other documents that losses due to air power are exaggerated. In his post-war manuscript about the attack at Mortain von Gersdorff, the chief of staff of 7. Armee, wrote that the majority of the equipment losses had been caused by enemy air power.15 This statement can be compared with the true causes16: Hit by Air Weapons Hit by Ground Weapons Abandoned or Destroyed by Crew Unknown Cause Total Tanks & SP Guns 9 20 11 6 46 Other Combat Vehicles 12 9 2 9 32 Towed Guns 0 2 1 1 4 Cars 4 4 0 3 11 Lorries 6 2 2 20 30 Ambulances 2 0 2 1 5 Motorcycles 0 1 1 2 4 Total: 33 38 19 42 132 Evidently it was only about a quarter of the German equipment lost that had been hit by weapons carried by aircraft. This does not support von Gersdorff's statement. It should be emphasized that it is not likely that many of the unknown causes were due to enemy air power. The sources make it clear that air attacks were among the easiest to identify.17 Neither is the Mortain attack an example of unusually low efficiency for the allied air forces. It is interesting to see the causes for losses of Panther tanks. Three British studies of captured Panther tanks (or wrecks of Panther tanks), two of them during Normandy and one during the Ardennes battle gave the following results18: Armour Piercing Shot Hollow Charge Projectiles High Explosive Shells Aircraft Rockets Aircraft Cannon Destroyed by crew Abandoned Unknown 6 June - 7 August 36 7 7 6 2 6 3 13 8 Aug - 31 Aug 11 1 1 2 1 44 30 6 17 Dec - 16 Jan 16 0 3 3 0 10 10 5 Total 63 8 11 11 3 60 43 24 Evidently two of the main causes for losing Panthers were abandonment and destruction by the crews. These two categories accounted for nearly half the Panthers lost and during the period in August they constituted 80 % of all the Panthers lost. Air power only accounted for about 6 % of all the lost Panthers investigated. Those investigations showed above also included other types of tanks. Of 40 Tigers only one was hit by air weapons, of 121 Pz.Kpf.Wg. IV nine were hit by air weapons. Evidently allied air power was not really capable of destroying large numbers of German tanks.19 It should be noted that it seems that air power was an even less important cause of tank losses on the eastern front. At the Kursk battle in 1943 air power probably accounted for 2 - 5 % of Soviet tanks lost.20 As shown there are examples of German officers who after the war stated that the allied air forces to a large extent caused the German losses. Some authors, like John Ellis21, largely bases conclusions on such statements. Probably no German studies were made on the causes of their losses. No such studies have been found among the archival documents that have survived. On the other hand studies showing the causes of enemy losses have been found. It is not likely that the estimates given by German officers after the war are based on anything more than general impressions. Hence, it is important to consider the circumstances shaping their impressions. Most of the officers who have given their views held higher positions. Even in the German army, despite its emphasis on commanding from the front, such persons were behind the front line to a much greater extent than riflemen and tankers. For men who spent much of the time in rear areas allied air power naturally made a greater impact compared to enemy ground forces. The men who served in the combat units probably had a different view. To this must be added the fact that the extent of allied air superiority was a completely new experience for most German soldiers. It is quite natural that new threats are magnified compared to those experienced previously. Those officers and men who had served on the eastern front seem to have regarded the allied ground forces as less terrifying than the fighting against the Red Army. Finally it can not be excluded that many of the German army officers had a certain "bias" when they presented their views after the war. The Luftwaffe was responsible for stopping the allied air forces. If allied air power was the main cause of defeat this meant that the responsibility for the failure was not on their shoulders. Even if such thinking were not explicit it can very well have clouded judgement unconsciously. There are also examples of documents produced by army staffs during the campaign in Normandy that explicitly state that the lack of own air power was the main cause of enemy success.22 With this in mind it is not advisable to uncritically accept the statements of German officers concerning this issue. An example of this is Ellis assertion that "[heavy bombers] Š were not especially useful in attacks on static defences &emdash; a saturation bombing of Caen prior to Operation Charnwood was as counter-productive as the flattening of Cassino monastery and town a few months earlier. Against armoured formations out in the open, however, even working with broad tolerances, the bombers often wreaked havoc."23 Ellis goes on by citing a report by von Kluge to Hitler on 22 July that concern Operation Goodwood: "Whole armoured formations, allotted to the counter-attack, were caught in bomb-carpets of the greatest intensity, so that they could be extricated from the torn-up ground only by prolonged effort and in some cases only by dragging them out. The result was that they arrived too late. It is immaterial whether such a bomb carpet catches good troops or bad, they are more or less annihilated."24 A few points must be noted here. First, there are in fact very few occasions when heavy bombers hit armoured formations. Probably operation Goodwood and operation Cobra are the only real examples. Thus it can not be said that bombers "often wreaked havoc". Second, during the example given by Ellis, Operation Goodwood, the bombers hit one armoured formation, the 503. s.Pz.Abt. This unit suffered losses, but it was far from annihilated, since most of it remained fighting in Normandy until the end of the campaign.25 It seems that von Kluge was exaggerating grossly. It is clear that the carpet-bombing prevented the battalion from immediately intervening in strength, but the bombers did not annihilate it, rather it was temporarily incapacitated. Another example is Pz.Lehr during operation Cobra. Ellis cited Bayerlein who has stated that all his forward tanks were knocked out.26 Either a large part of his tanks were not in forward positions or he was simply exaggerating. On 1 August Pz.Lehr reported that it had 67 tanks and at least 10 assault guns, if vehicles in workshops are included.27 The number of operational tanks had shrunk from 31 on 23 July to 27 on 1 August.28 Unfortunately there is no information found in the archival records on the number of tanks in workshops during July. It must be emphasized that between 23 July and 1 August, several tanks must have been lost to American ground forces or abandoned during the retreat after 25 July. Whatever the case, the available evidence does not indicate that large parts of the division had been annihilated, even though the parts of it had been severely hit. Also, the division reported that it had a manpower strength of 11 018 men on 1 August, pretty impressive for a division that was supposed to be destroyed.29 For more information on the Carpet bombing of Pz.Lehr before operation Cobra see the narrative for the division. A result of attacks by heavy bombers, both during Goodwood and Cobra, was the disabling of tanks, rather than destruction. Often the tanks were disabled due to the need to dig them out after the air attack. Thus it was absolutely necessary to follow up the air attack by immediate advance by ground forces. Otherwise the aerial bombardment would have little lasting effect. This was also the conclusion by allied operations research teams, which investigated areas where allied heavy bombers had been used.30 An example of the swift recovery that was possible occurred on 29 June. Late in the afternoon the SPW battalion (III./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 20) of the Hohenstaufen division had assembled for an attack together with Panther tanks from the panzer regiment. About 100 Lancaster planes bombed the assembly area. A huge dust cloud covered the area and those who observed the event were convinced that all units in the area must have been destroyed. However, by the evening 80% of the armoured vehicles were operational again. About twenty men had died during the bombing attack.31 This unit was not dug in for defence, but rather deployed in a forest, which hardly provided any cover against this kind of enemy effort. These events took place during operation Epsom and there is another effort by heavy bombers that warrant discussion. During the night between 29 and 30 June about 1 000 tons of bombs were dropped on Villers-Bocage and its immediate surroundings. It has been said that this prevented units mainly from 9. SS-Pz.Div. to attack since they had to approach through Villers-Bocage. This view is however very peculiar, since the combat units of 9. SS-Pz.Div. were already north of Villers-Bocage. Possibly the allied bombing may have brought difficulties for supply transports to the division and it may also have hampered movements by tanks that had been repaired in workshops and were to rejoin their units. In fact the unit histories of the German formations involved do not mention this bombing at all.32 According to the OB West war diary the attacks by II. SS-Pz.Korps were halted by the very intensive enemy artillery fire. The bombing of Villers-Bocage is not mentioned at all.33 This entire story seems to be the result of faulty allied intelligence. Unfortunately it has been reiterated after the war.34 What is presented here are examples of data on German losses inflicted by air power and also examples of statements by German officers that do not stand up to the hard facts available. Of course it can be argued that the number of cases presented here are too few. There is some merit to that. But it must also be emphasized that not a single example supporting the image of extensive losses being inflicted by allied air forces on German combat units in Normandy has been found. In every case where reliable data has been found, losses by enemy air are not great. Also in every single case where data found has been possible to compare with German officers statements of high losses due to enemy air power, these statements have been found exaggerated. However, it must be made clear that it was usually not necessary to inflict losses to affect ground operations. An air attack almost invariably caused ground units to take cover. Air attacks on German artillery, even if not causing losses, could very well mean that German infantry was left without valuable artillery support at critical moments. Also, even if allied air units did not cause significant tank losses at Mortain, the air attacks caused German tanks to take cover rather than continue thrusting forward. http://w1.183.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/articles/article.html :cool: Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Bastables Posted March 31, 2002 Share Posted March 31, 2002 This has been discussed several times before. Might as well try here as well http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum5/HTML/000010.html [ March 30, 2002, 10:05 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Panzer Boxb Posted March 31, 2002 Share Posted March 31, 2002 If air power was so ineffective against tanks, then why did they always try to hide from it? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Michael Emrys Posted March 31, 2002 Share Posted March 31, 2002 The tankers, or at least a lot of them, didn't know that it was ineffective. The great strength of airpower is often not its physical effect, but the psychological. It is intimidating to be bombed and straffed from the air and it can induce a peculiar sense of impotence. And nothing destroys morale like a sense of impotence. Michael Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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