Krautman

Yeah these links. I bow my head in shame. Yet- I don't get it, my post in which the whole Haffner theory is elaborated on is on another page (4) than the post in which the links are given (5), so at least the annoying requirement to scroll rightwards shouldn't have kept you. However, nice to know not all forum members consider Haffner to be spreading Nazi propaganda. Until then, Krautman

btw, I'd like to apologise. I probably got quite carried away, emotion-wise, in my last posts in this thread. There's just some particular insults or allusions I can't stand. Greetings Krautman

Yes, that was it. Thanks Sergei.

Are halftracks the reason why the Soviets continued using the ATR until 1945?

That's right, it's quite annoying having to scroll. Sorry. Unfortunately, I do not know how to this.

Well, Bigduke's post was very good indeed, although I see no connection to the links I provided. I see your point, but still maintain that you cannot say Hitler was "stupid" in general. His achievements from 1919 to 1938 point in another direction. Furthermore, I'd say you could hardly call Hitler smart or stupid, he was a lunatic. The question you have answered is "was Hitler stupid as a military strategist", to which the answer certainly, I agree, is "Yes". Yet remember it was Hitler who made Guderian's reforms possible. Without Hitler, no independent Panzer division/corps; the conservative majority within the Wehrmacht would have prevailed. Without Hitler, Germany would've attacked France (if at all) according to the Schlieffen plan. And e.g. it was Hitler who demanded the Pz III be upgunned. So he wasn't entirely foolish in military matters, occasionally, he was aware of the demands of time more than most of the respective specialists. Of course, he also had those dreams of a super-super-heavy tank, and of the bolt-action rifle forwarding manly virtues, and etc. Greetings Krautman

For those that have a genuine interest in the history of Hitler and Germany. You'll find answers to the issues discussed. Sebastian Haffner. (excellent entry into the topic, easy to read, short book, brilliant writer) Haffner Was Hitler stupid? See esp. chapter "Achievements" Joachim Fest. (huge work, advanced, excellent writing, great references, still benchmark in many aspects. Bullock is obsolete by now) Fest Wehler and Aly, sadly, are not available in English. Edit: Links shortened [ February 02, 2006, 02:48 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

Richie, indeed I think so. Twisting words? As opposed to most other posters, he rarely ever quotes, but rather takes up some point and twists it to fit his argumentation. He said I was doing Nazi ideology excuses, ergo he said I am a Nazi, don't you think? And why would Jason have something in common with a Nazi (I did not say he is one, as you inferred!)? Well, the following is from Haffner, on Hitler (my translation): "Indeed he read a lot, though he only adopted what he thought he knew already. [...] He was really well-versed only in the area of military strategy and technology. [...] For the rest, he remained the typical half-educated person- someone who always knew everything better and spread incomplete and false knowledge, best in front of an audience which he could impress because they knew even less. [...] He totally lacked the ability of self-criticism..." Add zero tolerance of other people's opinion and a stubborn faith in one's own worldview. Plus considerable rhetorical skill and taking pleasure in causing distress. Now make of this what you want. [ January 24, 2006, 01:13 PM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

Christian Knudsen, good, constructive post. I took somewhat the opposite position from Jason's. Usually, if there are two extremes, the middle way is the closest to the truth. Greetings Krautman

This shows Jason is the silly one, because I said none of the above. There are those who believe in what they accept to be the truth and those who merely believe in what they want to believe, no matter what they are told. Fascists, communists and fundamentalists are also in the latter category. Apart from some members that have quickly been banned, Jason is the closest to a Nazi in this forum of whom I know of. But it's rethorics, not reason, that wins the day. Ok, not my field. Since Jason proudly mentioned the original point in dispute, this is it: Probably it was not only [not ONLY] overconfidence and stupidity. Götz Aly characterises NS Germany as a "Gefälligkeitsdiktatur" (~"dictatorship of accomodation"), meaning that Hitler based his reign on keeping people at bay by offering a limited amount of luxury, social security etc. Therefore the late shift to wartime production had a certain reason from Hitler's perspective [FROM HITLER'S PERSPECTIVE].</font>

Uh, I thought you said Hitler was merely stupid. Now you award him the capacity to see into the future. The fact that he thought the war was lost in 1941 does not mean he thought the same half a year later. But 1941, he couldn't know how 1942 would be. If you read a Hitler biography, you'll notice the extreme degree of his world outlook - it is either total victory or utter doom. The latter was the case in december 1941. Half a year later - different story. Finally, you come up with a theory which is indeed based on evidence and really worth considering. Congratulations. However, I don't think it entirely unproves Haffner's version. Do you really believe he thought he could win the war against the whole industrialised world? This is not a rethorical question, I really wonder if Hitler believed in a German victory before Stalingrad and possibly even before Kursk, which is by Müller + Ueberschär, IIRC, called the more deceisive battle. Yes, agreed. Good point. It seems to me you have not read important parts of my previous post. I can't see any positive evaluation of NS or revisionism in it. Calling the historians I quote or me and idiot and someone who talks nonsense does not offend me, I rather feel sorry for you that you are unable to expand your own horizon by ideas people much brighter than you will ever be came up with. But alluding to Wehler, Fest, Aly, Haffner or me as a Nazi is not only absolutely silly and showing ignorance of huge extent, I also take personal offense in your calling me a part of the "Hitler excuse factory". Do you actually realise what kind of people you are comparing me to? Stop that. Look at yourself: Your constant whining "O, why didn't he improve the economy? O why didn't he build more tanks, he would have won! O why didn't he listen to Guderian?" could very easily be interpreted as wishful thinking... Obviously, besides John Kettler and me, the majority shares your viewpoint that Hitler was merely stupid and that he did not utilise social improvements to charm the populace [differing theories are Nazi apologetics, after all]. Probably, in order to gain at least something from this discussion, we might agree that Hitler was no incarnation of common sense. No greetings this time Krautman, the forum's Übernazi [Edit: Fest and Haffner both had to suffer under the NS regime. In case your "pretzels the Hitler excuse factory comes up with" was an allusion to Haffner's real name, which was Raimund Pretzel: He had to change his name in order to protect his family which was still in Germany. If you didn't know that, your sentence was silly. If you did, then it was mean.] [ January 23, 2006, 10:14 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

Thanks, all. Very interesting posts.

Thank you, Mr Kettler, for the kind words. You are applying the measurement parameters of a sane human being and a politician with a firm populace behind him to Hitler. Hitler was different, and his early political career is full of examples that it can be an advantage acting in a way that no one can know in advance what your next move will be (=acting like no sane politician would; risking it all). On his declaration of war against the US, there is a theory by Sebastian Haffner. [Please note: The following might sound very offensive to some, but for the sake of being objective, I put the reader into Hitler's mind, if you can say so. Hitler's National Socialism is nihilistic, sick, abhorrent, and as incomprehensible to me as his antisemitism.] According to Sebastian Haffner, Hitler's ideology can be summed up like this: 1. History is nothing but the events within the endless struggle between races [btw, compare Marx' "Kommunistisches Manifest"- exchange "races" with "classes", then the wording will be almost exactly the same] for world domination. Only one race will prevail in the end, all others must perish or exist as slaves. Peaceful coexistence is impossible. This struggle is good, because survival of the fittest [the "master race"] is nature's intention and final goal. 2. The Jews are not taking part in this struggle, but are rather infiltrating the other races in order to weaken them and make them fight each other, which is evil. [one of the ideology's many logical errors: fighting each other was, after all, the races' purpose of existence as seen in 1.] Therefore, the 2 "logical" aims of Hitler's reign can be inferred from the 2 main points of his ideology: 1) Since only one race will prevail, it is clear that this race must achieve world domination. Germany, therefore, must conquer and dominate the world, nothing less. 2) The Jews weaken the master race, therefore, they must be destroyed. These two aims were Hitler's reason to go to war. All other particular military + political reasons to go to war (Avoiding bancruptcy through plunder, conquering the SU's oil fields etc., I'm sure Jason will intervene) can be deducted from these two aims. Obviously, the most important aim is 1), because 2) can be achieved after 1), while it is not possible to do 2) without 1). That is why Hitler went to war. Yet, in november/december 1941, he realised the war could not be won. Aim 1), world domination, was abandoned. Aim 2), the genocide, was left. Hitler went to action: During the Wannsee conference (in January 1942, immediately following Hitler's realising the war was lost!) the genocide was planned in detail, and began right afterwards. All Hitler needed now was time for the genocide. Therefore his "hold position" orders to the armed forces. Since the war could not be won anyway, why shouldn't Hitler declare war on the US, a country basically already at war with Germany, a country he deeply resented? It was a personal satisfaction for him to do so. Don't ask for objective reasons or for smart vs. stupid when dealing with Hitler. Jason, your military science is a logical science, while National Socialism is the opposite, it's chaos and nihilism pressed into an appealing (for some) form. Greetings Krautman

(A search for "Commissar" had far too many hits; the term is mentioned often, but rarely defined, and there's even a forum member of that name...) What exactly were they? How were they trained? Was "Commissar" a rank class of its own, or did the Commissars have the military ranks like Lieutenant, Captain etc.? Did they have to answer to a higher central authority or were they part of the normal military chain of command? Greetings & thanks in advance Krautman

Well, sorry about straying from the topic. I just recently learned the German Neonazi movement also had supporters with an IQ of above 50, and was shocked about the amount of "think-tanking" and deviously schemed revisionism they do. I can understand if this topic is of no interest to you anglo-saxons. The relevance, however, is how dangerous it is to qualify Nazis as "stupid", which is very easily done when you see them marching in the streets. You got a false impression- usually, German university professors are staunch democrats, at least that's my impression. There is no tolerance for Neonazis at university, especially not among historians. From a merely military viewpoint, you are correct. Guderian would back you up. Yet in my opinion you fail to get the larger picture. As you know, Hitler had these struggles with his Generals all the time and complained about their ignorance of politics. Hollow polemics. Occasionally, I am slightly inclined towards the impression that you do not want to discuss, but merely to lecture, and people to nod their heads in agreement. The only explanation put forth of this massive and entirely avoidable mistake so far, is that he was "stupid". The provided sources backing this up were, uh, scant. I am sure there are historians who share your viewpoint, you must have read them to develop your opinion. Why not give sources? A big threat is inner opposition. Hitler had himself witnessed the events of 1918 and did not want to repeat this situation. In "Mein Kampf", there are iirc whole chapters on the importance of keeping up the population's will to fight, and about the mistakes Wilhelm II made in this respect. There are several social improvements the NSDAP introduced to avoid rebellion (e.g. financial aid for soldiers' families, which was not available in 1914-18), backing up this theory about Hitler's fear of inner opposition. John - I'm a student, and will hopefully be a teacher for History and English at a German "Gymnasium" (=5th to 12th or 13th grade). The focus at our schools is basically on social/economic history (in the lower classes, of course, it's just the main events). Greetings Krautman

Sorry, but that is silly. Admitting Hitler had considerable political acumen is finding excuses for his numerous later mistakes? Joachim Fest wrote a 1000+ page biography in the 70s, which was, until Ian Kershaw's recent mammoth work, considered the benchmark, the sum and the essence of the historical research of Hitler. There is a certain air of disgust felt throughout the whole book (Fest's family had to suffer under the NS, perhaps that's why). Fest is surely no Hitler-Fan. Yet, he spends an entire chapter ("Hitler und die historische Größe") saying why Hitler was NOT a "great" person of history. Why would Fest have to write such a chapter? Because anyone who studies Hitler will have to admit that he indeed had his moments of genius, and not few of them. Fest asserts Hitler especially excelled at exploiting others' fears and weaknesses. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who usually says history is a sum of events NOT connected to the work of the particular acting person (politician/thinker/strategist etc.), but rather governed by over-personal (direct translation, sorry) currents and developments, asserted in his "Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914-1949" that Hitler is an individual of "universal historical significance" (=without him, history would have taken an entirely different path). So Hitler, to Wehler, is the one exception in his whole theory of history, is a person unlike any other who ever acted/"made" history. You could indeed say "horsefeathers" to this opinion of Wehler and Fest. Hans Mommsen also did (not literally though. He also didn't insult Wehler by calling him an idiot). But it seems to me that a majority of serious historians realise Hitler was a monstrous genius, evil, perverted, sick in any imaginable way, but a genius nevertheless. My opinion on this is, if you recall the Caesar discussion, that you tend to narrow your focus on military issues and then draw general conclusions. Saying Hitler was stupid is not only overly simplifying, it is plain wrong. How long did his political career last? And when did he start making mistakes? Your focus is on the war exclusively. You underestimate Hitler. That is a very silly mistake. The radical new right movement in Germany was underestimated as well. Stupid hoodlums, that was the average German's opinion on them. Most of them actually are - the local NPD candidate was recently sentenced for rape (!)- , but recently, there are more and more academics among them. Karlheinz Weißmann e.g. is a historian who advocates the preemptive strike theory (Germany's attack on Russia was a "defensive move", already mentioned in this thread). He truly is a Nazi apologist, one of the most dangerous you could ever imagine, because he doesn't sound like one at first. You complain about people who actually are no Nazi apologists at all, they just have a diverging opinion on Hitler's political skill. Hitler surely didn't think lipsticks could defeat Russia. You like to twist others' words in their mouths, don't you? Again, you see only the war. Social and political issues are of secondary concern to your historical world. I think John Kettler summed it up very well: Greetings Krautman

Yes, but why? Hitler was clearly afraid of a situation like 1917/18. Why else would he come up with all this KdF stuff, with the "Schlepperlass", with the "Judenbuße" and all that, if consumer goods weren't necessary in his opinion to back up the morale? The reason why the germans never really opposed him on a large scale is subject to whole generations of historians. Your opinion might be just that, an opinion. Some people here really like alluding to other forum members as Nazi apologists; that's almost becoming a running gag. I understand from some previous post of yours ("Kursk anniversary" thread et al.) that you are extremely anti-Nazi and get emotional pretty quick discussing these topics. That's ok for you, but here and now you are the one being pathological. Saying that Hitler seduced the Germans with a certain amount of luxury is in no way an excuse for his mistakes. Alluding to Götz Aly as a Nazi apologist is just silly. I went to a lecture of his. He was furiously attacked (verbally) by some old people who felt insulted: To them, they were the poor innocent Germans seduced by a mighty charming Führer (See Hans-Ulrich Wehler's theory of the "Führerstaat"), but then Aly came and said many Germans willingly accepted the darker side of the NS regime so they could benefit from the financial advantages. A sound theory, I would think, and supported by ample evidence, which Aly collected in ~15 years of meticulous research. Would you call that making excuses for Hitler? You said it yourself- the workers in German factories had a good life compared to their Allied colleagues. Women did not work in factories generally. Do you think Hitler ordered this out of concern for the poor workman/-woman? As you know, he was a heartless nihilistic misanthrope, an "un-person" (Joachim Fest). You know, as is frequently mentioned, your posts are usually interesting and instructive. Discussing with you would be much more enjoyable if you accepted other people's opinion and tried to give evidence for yours (there e.g. is considerable evidence against Aly's theory) instead of something like this: By the way- You actually sound a little bit like Wehler there... Greetings, and thanks for the Red Army training scenarios Krautman

Probably it was not only overconfidence and stupidity. Götz Aly characterises NS Germany as a "Gefälligkeitsdiktatur" (~"dictatorship of accomodation"), meaning that Hitler based his reign on keeping people at bay by offering a limited amount of luxury, social security etc. Therefore the late shift to wartime production had a certain reason from Hitler's perspective. Greetings Krautman

By the way, could you tell me Fuller's full name and the title of his book? You got me interested in it, but amazon, upon typing in "Fuller", has 1800+ hits. R. Fuller's "Mathematics of Classical and Quantum Physics" is surely interesting though. EDIT: Found it. Looks like Fuller is specialised in a strange combination of modern warfare, satanism and esoterics. Exactly what I'd consider a reliable historian of antiquity to be focused on. [ December 03, 2005, 04:34 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

I'd say the fact that he was killed doesn't mean he was a bad politician. Non sequitur. The admittedly rather impressive amount of holes in his upper torso is probably more a sign of his strong physique, the murderers' lack of martial prowess or the unsuitability of Roman knives to the task of murder than of a lack of political acumen on Caesar's side. Even in ancient Rome, you had to justify it when you went to war. Why would he have written the commentarii the way he did? Caesar almost always makes it sound as if he was fighting a defensive war. That's again overly simplified. It is not only success that counts. Verres was, in what the usual aim of a Roman provincial governour was, very successful in sicily. But then, after his term, Cicero made him regret what he did there. If asking whether campaigning well on the spot probably is part of being a great strategist is "trying to pretend", then well. As there were no maps, only local guides who each knew only a small part of the territory to be conquered, it is only natural no preliminary planning on a scale like 1942 was possible. Greetings Krautman [ December 03, 2005, 04:44 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

Well, I didn't want to mention this at first, since it's not significant to the question at hand. However, if you want to say "I did not follow your line of argumentation", then it should be something containing "non sequor", or rather "non secutus sum". If you wanted to say "this does not automatically follow", which I suppose you did, then it should be "non sequitur" (-or, -ris, -tur, -mur, -mini, -ntur). Probably that was a typo. Sorry for being so squeamish. What military history is to you, Latin is to me. And the morale of the story? Ea ex re sequitur, ut lingua Latina difficile sit scriptu. Multis cum salutibus, Krautmanus

Well, from what I know, I'd say it was Caesar who made the Gauls be sucked into war... He grabbed any opportunity to continue the war and to increase his fame. I finally looked that up and got me a book from the university library, which is considered a benchmark (as of 1997) on Caesar. Author and book will not be known to non-Germans, but anyway: Jehne, Martin, "Der Staat des Dictators Caesar". In this book, it is explicitly said that Caesar won the war in Gaul due to superiour logistics. Jehne, a professor for ancient history, is specialised in the civil war period and its political mechanisms. No matter whether he's good or bad, he is surely not "frequently judging by impressive externals without entering into the actual logic of strategy" as you said "general historians" would do. I agree on that. I never said he was a master of preparedness. You previously made it sound as if Ceasar, as a general rule, dashed forward mindlessly into any situation like Rommel at Tobruk. Well, nice to know it was general practice among the Romans. By the way, "castra" is also, as I found out today, a synonym for "a day's march", which illustrates the practice to build a camp every night. Again, I said I don't remotely know as much detail on the Gaul war as you. But the fact which you agree on yourself - he was careful in Gaul - at least indicates that Caesar did some planning. Come on, that's ridiculous. We're in antiquity here. No maps. No previous knowledge of the country. No real infrastructure. No aerial reconnaissance. No arms industry on a comparable scale; no specialised forces, with the possible exception of the fabri. No need for hundreds of tons of daily supplies. No air-sea-land cooperation which was to be planned, no parachute droppings (would've been great though: Roman 101st AB = "Legio CI Volans"). No Wehrmacht, still fierce in 1944, and centrally controlled, but a multitude of savage tribes whose motivations were hard to comprehend. No résistance. No secret service, spies etc... So others could've done better, or done it more efficiently, from the same starting point? Being able to "campaign well on the spot", isn't this a part of being a great strategist? Saying that others would have done better from the same starting point is just - unproven. How do you know it was mostly impulsive what Caesar did, and how can you say another commander would've done some planning and then achieved the same goal with taking less risks? "Half his hard fights were unnecessary"? That is a very audacious assertion. You weren't there. You could say Fuller claims that. Others might disagree. Historians quarrel, that is their job (most recently in Germany, the holy pope of social history, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, is behaving like the king of quarrel, up to the point of being ridiculous). You are applying the measurement parameters of a modern professional soldier to Caesar. Let me ask you: Does Fuller concentrate on antiquity, or on military issues in general? If the latter is the case, I don't think it is appropiate to entirely discard the opinion of historians specifically concentrating on Roman history, which anyway is military history to a certain extent. Greetings Krautman

sorry, double post.

I think this again is an example why it is a difficult thing having your sole focus on the military aspects of history. To say Caesar had no plan for Gaul's general conquest, and to take this as a proof that Caesar did not plan ahead generally, is to entirely mix up the issue at hand. Please let me explain. Fuller, I guess, looks at the way Caesar waged war in Gaul in highly sophisticated detail. No problem here. By judging Caesar like a staff officer concerned with military problems would, Fuller of course judges him by virtue of conquering Gaul as efficiently as possible. This is a viewpoint I would expect from a military history book, and this is the question which Fuller poses with regard to the Gaul campaign (please correct me if I'm wrong): How efficient was Caesar as a military leader who wanted to conquer Gaul? Fine so far. But then, either Fuller, or you, make a mistake: Being focused on military detail, you automatically assume that it was Caesar's initial primary goal to conquer Gaul entirely, which means preparatory operational planning would be expected from any sensible commander. But that was not the case. Caesar was not in Gaul to entirely conquer it at first. No please- don't stop reading, let me explain this a little further. Don't forget that Caesar was first and foremost a politician. Right from his youth, his aim was to become Consul, in order to be one of the ~15 people that really met decisions in the Roman senate. The whole cursus honorum was directed towards that goal. Now, incredible as it was, Caesar became Consul in 59. During this year, he overstepped so many regulations of the mos maiorum that his political enemies would have devoured him if he held no officium right afterwards- after having served your year as a Consul during republican times, you usually had to retire for a certain period, during which you could be legally convicted for any possible violation you commited (or your enemies claimed you commited, Roman law was strange) which was not possible during your time in office. Caesar took preparations (!): The lex Vatinia confirmed that he would receive command of the Cisalpina and Illyricum for five years right after he was Consul, without time in between. Furthermore, he made sure that his followers were elected tribuni plebis, who could obstruct any decision the Senate met. Additionally, he made arrangements with Pompeius and Crassus. Then, the person in command of the Narbonensis died. Caesar took hold of this province as well. After his initial five years in Gaul, Caesar needed to be re-elected, otherwise he would perish. His political and physical existence was at stake. Since Roman officials were elected, they needed prestige. Most prestigious was a successful military campaign. Thus, Caesar needed one for himself. That is why he had selected Cisalpina and Illyricum for himself: They offered the opportunity for such a campaign, while it was still possible to keep contact to Rome for political plotting. Excellently planned. This is what I'm trying to say: Caesar wanted a campaign, that's all. It was not his initial goal to conquer Gaul as a whole. It just turned out to be convenient to start the war there, since there was serious trouble at the time of Caesar's arrival. What luck for him he was in command of both the Narbonensis and the Cisalpina! It could just as well have been a campaign in Illyricum which was threatened by the Dacians. Caesar could not know in advance that this province would stay calm. And Caesar basically did not need a war of conquest: Q. Fabius Cunctator or Marius received great honours by defensive campaigns (vs Hannibal/Cimbri+Teutones respectively). You see, in my opinion it is wrong to assume Caesar had planned to conquer Gaul from the very start, as you, only/mostly regarding military factors, obviously did. Caesar just exploited any opportunity, thus the "was sucked into" impression. It was a step-by-step thing, not a pre-planned grand campaign with pre-set final goals like an Archangelsk-Astrachan line. Sorry for the lengthy explanation, but I thought it necessary to explain the motivation behind the war, which was personal political welfare -in Caesar's case, self-preservation- rather than expansive thinking. Focusing only on military issues might confuse the way you pose your questions to history, I would say. According to what his personal goals were, Caesar was extremely successful in Gaul. He had fame, a core of hardened veterans devoted to him, and money. Furthermore, I was so shocked by your saying that Caesar didn't plan ahead that I decided to look up what Caesar's war in Gaul was like and turned my bookshelf upside down. I found my notes on the commentarii. From what Caesar says, (which needn't be true, I admit) it looks like a well-planned and conducted campaign. Caesar, as it seems, took great pains in securing the supply of his forces. Basic food (frumentum) was stacked in camps along the major travel routes. His units usually sent a recon detachment ahead of the main force, which would select a place for a fortified encampment and start constructing it. And this was not a row of tents: Surrounded by a ditch (fossa) and a wall (vallum), the latter, as the wording suggests, being made of the earth that was dug out to make the ditch (fossae faciendo [milites] vallum fecerunt). Caesar discovered that ranged weapons (tela. not sure if that means arrows, stones or throwing weapons) were most effective against Gauls and Germans, who sometimes went to battle "naked" (?). Thus, he took special care in providing enough of these tela. The fact that he uses the term "Castra movere" (literally: to move the camp) as a synonym for "to start moving" suggests that a camp was built every time the Romans went to sleep at night (in the morning: Howdy boys! Let's castra movere!). I'm not sure if that was the general procedure of the Roman legion, (which would make a ten day march an awfully exhausting thing) but that looks to me like a very well planned and prepared (!) way of campaigning, although you surely have more knowledge on operational details. So why? He came as the victor of Pharsalos. You again presume he came in the role of a military commander who just comes to conquer. Caesar came to find Pompeius, who was a defeated (and, although Caesar didn't know then, a beheaded) man. The Egyptians were not willing to wage war on him in the first place. It was not until Caesar made his political blunders - behaving as if he were ruling the country, demanding money, supporting Cleopatra - that the Alexandrinian War began. As I emphasized repeadetly, Caesar blundered in Egypt like he did never before. But that doesn't mean he wasn't good as a strategist or as a politician all the way. He won at the Nile, he won at Zela, at Thapsus and at Munda. And the successful Gaul wars - which anyway were fought over a much longer period of time (58-51) than the wars in the east - inclined those historians I heard from to call him, if not outright a "genius", then an "exceptional commander" etc. I guess we won't ever change our respective viewpoints. Probably your measuring parameters are far different from mine. I see Caesar achieved military goals which few were ever able to reach. You say others could have done better, had they done it differently. There were hundreds of others who did. But few ever came close to Caesar. I think saying that inborn audacity and planning exclude one another is overly simplified. Think of the story with the Greek pirates. That's rhetorical play. My point was that Goering lost influence over the course of the war. His available recources and how he used them were not touched upon. What is power if it lies dormant? Greetings Krautman [ December 01, 2005, 09:33 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]