High Atlas Mountains

[Marky]

as we all know, the allies invaded North africa in november of 1942, in operation torch

it was regarded as "too soon" by many, and the operation was given only a 50% chance of success

the objective, was to attack the flank of the afrika korps, and eventually corneer and defeat them, which was accomplished only a few months later

anyway

they landed near casablanca, took the city if i remember right, and advanced

however as we all know, u cannot go thru the high atlas mountains, cuz they block the advance

will this be remedied to allow an allied invasion of northwestern africa?

[JerseyJohn]

The landings were made on the Atlantic coast for French Morocco and on the Mediteranean coast for Algeria with the advance being from Algeria east, into Tunisia. The map below shows the initial landings, all of them made within a few days of each other.

[Victor Reijkersz]

Isn't that a picture from Montgomery's book?

[JerseyJohn]

Interesting -- ? I went back to the source and this is it:

< Operation Torch Description >

I think the map from Montgomery's book is similar, but I don't know if it's the same one.

The U. S. and airborne operations at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers on November 8th prepared the way for the British 1st Army, which landed nearer to Tunisia starting on November 11th. Transporting the troops and their immediate supply requirements tied up most of the available naval capabilities and the advance east was sluggish primarily because the troops had to await the second circuit of those same ships from the U. S., with more supplies.

Which gave the Germans the chance they needed to rush troops across from Sicily.

German General von Arnim's initial actions were very good in organizing the forces being assembled and establishing a defensive line.

Historians after the fact have said a landing should also have been made at Tunis. Perhaps, but it seemed incredibly risky doing it the way it was done, without landing so close to Sicily and Axis air bases.

All things considered it was a pretty incredible plan. Unfortunately it pulled too many resources away from the UK convoys and for months afterwards their losses were extremely high.

[Victor Reijkersz]

Argh... sorry... i meant Eisenhowers book!!! Stupid, stupid mistake. It was Eisenhower: Crusade in Europe.

Btw a more bold plan was to go directly for Sicily and Rome and cause a total collapse of Italy, cutting the Afrika Corps completly off.

[JerseyJohn]

I don't think they were sure about Axis strength in the Mediteranean. Also, the plan was the same as it had been in the Pacific, to move forward always supported by landbased air support. After the initial landings the American and British aircraft carriers -- I think there was a combined total of about a dozen of them -- kept going back and forth to the U. S. to ferry fighter planes for the North African basis.

Personally I don't think a landing directly on Central Italy would have succeeded. It might have knocked Mussolini's government out of the war but the Germans would have rushed enough troops and air units to the invasion site to easily roll it back into the Mediteranean. The landing force would have been so short of supplies that after a few days of fighting they'd have been throwing stones at the attacking panzers.

Also, they'd have had no air support other than the carriers and in 1942 the Luftwaffe in the Central Mediteranean was still very strong.

A new Italian regime would have continued Italy's function in the war, probably more efficiently than was ever the case under Il Duce, and the United States would have been very demoralized and afterwards would have done things with much greater caution.

In North Africa Rommel could have withdrawn through Libya in a much more organized manner without having to look over his shoulder to make sure he didn't have his back door closed in Tunisia. Because, if the landing had been made in Italy instead of West Africa, and been repulsed as I believe it would have been, the North African situation would have been reasonably stable for the Axis.

Cursade in Europe had two maps I really liked, the front and back pages, I believe, called Festung Europa showing the location of every German division in France, Belgium and Holland at the time of the Normandy landings.

[Shaka of Carthage]

JerseyJohn's post is a good example reminding us that while we operate with 20/20 hindsight, our WWII equivalents didn't.

[Victor Reijkersz]

They could have used Malta for air support couldn't they?

The point is there were almost no german troops in Italy at the time of Torch. So if in a quick strike the Allies would just have occupied the main logistical (ports) and political centres.. the Italians would have switched sides. Especially because it would co-incide with the Italian debacle on the East front. The few germans in Italy at that time would have been overwhelmed by the Italians and Allied troops. This would then happen at a time that Rommel still had a LOT of italians fighting with him. A few months of no supply and surrendering italians would have surely killed him off. Ok the germans would have moved in and would eventually destroy the Allied troops and switched-Italian troops and militia in the North of Italy, but that would buy time to reinforce the south and middle of Italy, which is very defendable (as Kesselring showed) and it would result at least in a frontline just above Rome in early 43, instead of early 44.

[JerseyJohn]

Let's see ...

It's 1942, there are still millions of veteran troops in the German army, hundreds of thousands of them in France. There's a large stalemate battle going on fifty miles west of Alexandria that hasn't been won yet and so far we've had a string of alternating victory and defeats in North Africa.

Italy may or may not remain in the war if we capture Rome. But we do know it will immediately trigger the transfer of Tens of thousands of battle hardened, well trained German troops from France and the Balkans to meet any threat on the Italian mainland.

Italian midget subs have sunk two British BBs at their moorings in Alexandria harbor. A third, the Barham, was sunk earlier in the year near Tobruck by a German U-boat. We've just replenished Malta via a massive battling resupply effort; prior to that it had been reduced to three obsolescent fighters in the hardest air combat of the war.

We're not going to land in Africa, not going to stop Rommel by climbing his essential rear area. Instead we're going to land near Ostia and drive on to take Rome.

Behind us the Germans can base aircraft at Corsica and Sardinia and to the south they've already got a luftflotte stationed on Sicily.

No, I'm afraid aircraft flying across Sicily to support the beaches, aside from being at the very limit of their range, would be cut to pieces heading north and on the way south again. No, that wouldn't have worked, not even remotely.

The troops being dumped off in Central Italy will need to Rome immediately. If they do so they'll need to scrounge for whatever they find lying about in order to feed themselves and have fuel and -- ammunition -- naturally German and Italian ammunition will work fine in American and British weapons!

Even if they captured Ostia and Rome right away there was no logistical support, no additional troops landing, no supplies to be brought in, nothing! The same ships that offloaded the troops and their equipment and their supplies would have needed to turn around and sail to the United States to reload and then sail back across the Atlantic and Western Mediteranean to offload at Ostia.

If they weren't sunk during the initial landings they would certainly have gone under on their return!

How could it possibly have worked? Not a snowball's chance in hell. None, zilch, nothing!

But yes, it's the sort of thing that can be pulled off in a game, sometimes. But only in a game.

[Victor Reijkersz]

Very convincing. I surrender. Probably you are right... i concede against logical arguments.

I am not going for a detailed discussion. But as an afterthought i would like to ask you how Rommel's plans when he just arrived in Africa must have sounded... (we must be on the defensive, not the offensive)

What i am saying there is if the allies would have taken some chances they might well have paid off. The historical slow and low-risc allied advance always gave the germans the time to build up defences and get troops from other parts of the Reich. If the allies could have stalled the arival of this reinforcements for some months, which is an eternity in politics, the italians would have switched sides.

[JerseyJohn]

It was a good mental exercise and I'm glad we discussed it .

"I am not going for a detailed discussion... "

Neither was I, but here's what wound up happening ...

Rommel is a strange case for me. I think most of us have The Desert Fox as one of the early things we really saw and admired about WWII in Europe.

Originally there wasn't supposed to be any North African theater, of course. Italy was so severely beaten in Egypt and Cyrainica the they had very few troops holding Tripoli when the British stopped to at El Aghila to let their supplies catch up. It was supposed to be one more dash west and that was it, no more Italian North Africa. Rommel himself conceded that and it's collected in an old book called The Rommel Papers.

It was then that Churchill stepped in and pulled so many troops from Wavell's command to be sent to Greece and Crete. It wasn't only a waste of thousands of troops but also the giving away of a key opportunity. Mussolini, in his folly of crossing from Albania to Greece in the rainy season unintentionally saved himself from his earlier folly in North Africa! Because Churchill felt he had to aid Greece, countering the Germans, who felt they had to aid the Italians.

Naturally the Germans won out -- there was never a question about that, except for Churchill who often saw things as he wanted them to be rather as the way they actually were.

While this was going on Rommel arrived in North Africa with some motorized German troops principally known as the Fifth Light Division, later to become the Twenty-First Panzer.

His orders were to help the Italians hold Tripoli. He did this by rushing his units, peacemeal, to face the British at El Agailha. The opposing forces were very weak, Rommel at the time had only fifty tanks, mainly Pz IIIs.

I'm sure we're all familiar with the rest. Essentially, the next year of fighting in North Africa was stroke and counter-stroke across flat terrain; Rommel said it was more like naval tactis than those used by armies. The recurring theme was both armies had to anchor on the coast and whoever was able to successfully flank the opposite number would win the day. Neither side dared risk being cut from it's supply line, as the Italians had been under Grazziani, and once flanked they'd have to withdraw or be destroyed.

So we jump to the Afrika Korps taking Tobruck the second time around.

Rommel unexpectedly finds himself himself in possession of vast fuel stores captured in tact! Enough, he feels to bring him past the as yet unfortified Alemain narrows and into Alexandria, moving through what he thought was the routed British 8th Army.

While this is going on, Kesselring is in Sicily flattening Malta with the most intense bombing campaign of the war. He's also assembling German and Italian parachutte troops to take the place. Paulus is touring Libya, making an assessment for the general staff, and Rommel is chomping at the bit. Paulus recommends capturing Malta and consolodating the position in Cyranica before moving into Egypt. He also writes that the land supply across the Western Desert would be too long and exposed to be practical for German troops fighting near the Nile.

Rommel pleads that if given the green light he can take Alexandria in a single quick campaign. Malta would be immaterial, supplies and reinforcements would be sent from Greece to Alexandria.

Hitler, who up till then was convinced the Kesselring / Paulus ideas were the answer, shifts gears. He gives Rommel the go ahead and even agrees to send the German and Italian paratroops to reinforce his army. We all know the rest of it.

Rommel wrote notes and drew a map of two arrows moving out across the Sainai, one heading to Cuwait via Bahgdad, and the other going north, also through Bahgdad, and into the Caucasus and the Russian oil fields.

How he was supposed to do all that with his four German divisions and paratroop bridage I don't know. There about ten Italian divisions also available, two of them armored and also a partroop regiment.

Whether any of his ultimate plan was feasible I'm wouldn't want to speculate on.

I think Rommel, in 1942 at least, was a great tactician who had been promoted too quickly. He gave little thought to supply -- his logistics officer was only a major!

Perhaps he'd have served better in the Russian Campaign. I think the Ukraine would have been an ideal setting for his panzer tactics. An interesting what if but one that was probably never considered. After the fall of Tobruck Rommel is sent to command the Sixth Army and Paulus is put in charge of the Afrika Korps with orders to keep the Briish out of Libya, nothing more. Meanwhile Malta, beaten to a pulp and shattered, is taken by combined paratroop attack and seaborne reinforcements.

I wonder if, in that scenario, things would have turned out differently for Germany?

[Victor Reijkersz]

On the eastfront Hitler first issued his no retreats order. I think this would not have enabled Rommel to conduct the battle like a naval engagement.

I do not see how Rommel could have avoided catastrophy at Kursk. The only way he could have avoided that was: not strike at kursk but at an unexpected place. And that is something more people tried to convince hitler off.

Also the problem with the Ukraine is it large number of towns, rivers, and villages. The Ukraine is not like the dessert at all.

Now having made Rommel supreme commander in 1942 and having hitler leaving military affairs (like Stalin) to him, that would have been another case.

[JerseyJohn]

No, I was thinking in terms of Rommel being transferred to the Russian Front right after he captured Tobruck, before the Summer Offesive in the Ukraine got underway.

In Russia Hitler relieved Rundstedt as commander of AG South and replaced him with Richenau, who up till then had been the commander of the Sixth Army. Richenau had a fatal heart attack before the 1942 offensive could be mounted. There were delays through the Spring and it wasn't till the summer that it got underway.

Paulus, who, though a colonel general (4 stars) had always been a staff officer. He was very good at assessing situations but had no experience in the field of battle at all. Hitler put him in command of the Sixth Army, the lynch pin of the entire offensive, and Paulus moved east winning battles when the Russians stayed to fight, but usually the simply withdrew. At several points he missed opportunities to bag large numbers of Soviet infantry who were able to continue withdrawing into the city of Stalingrad. Rommel would not have missed those opportunities, he'd have bagged them while they were still out in the open.

True, the Ukraine is not as flat and featureless as the Sahara (in truth it has many different features, but essentially it can be considered a flat surface). But Rommel had no trouble dealing with rivers and hills and all other types of terrain as commander of the Seventh Panzer Division (subesequently known as The Ghost Division in respect to Rommels quick tactics) and he'd have had no problems at all commanding troops in the Ukraine.

The plus side is his logistics would have been handled by AG South and not directly by himself. He wouldn't have had the opportunites to make the mistakes he made in this regard in North Africa; no experienced German army commander would have left a fifteen hundred mile exposed supply line in his rear!

Hitler didn't start issuing stand and fight orders to the Sixth Army till Paulus had gotten himself bogged down within the city; I doubt Rommel would have made the tactical mistakes that Paulus made.

Aside from which, Rommel was issued the same order at El Alemain. He knew it was insane and he ignored it, withdrawing and saving the core of his army to fight later on.

Hitler would have exercised greater flexibility with Rommel, and Rommel would have taken advantage of it. Paulus was too proceedure bound to in any way do anything that deviated from his high command instructions; Rommel wasn't.

What I'm saying is, in the Summer of 1942 Paulus beloned in Libya, where he'd have reamained on the frontier, and Rommel beloned at the head of the Sixth Army, where his aggressiveness would have been an asset rather than a liability.

-- As I said, that switch was probably never considered by the German High Command.

[Shaka of Carthage]

I think Rommel, in 1942 at least, was a great tactician who had been promoted too quickly. He gave little thought to supply -- his logistics officer was only a major!

JerseyJohn, the above quote I believe sums up exactly the weakness of Rommel. Wheter its because he was ill advised or ignored the warnings, but he did not show a good understanding of the logistical requirements.

[JerseyJohn]

Shaka,

Thanks, it surprises me that this aspect of his command ability is so seldom taken into consideration when people discuss his great merits as a tactician.

He was an optimist, of course. I'm sure he'd never have deliberately let himself be stuck at the wrong end of such a nightmarish lifeline, but in his mind, after taking Tobruck with all it's prisoners and assorted stores, especially fuel, his strgnth became his weakness. Next stop Alexandria and maybe the Brits might try defending from across the Nile.

He had no idea that Auchinleck had already fortified the Alemain positions while the Afrika was still in Libya.

His optimistic lunge east was almost a desert version of what Napoleon did in reaching for Moscow.