Finnish artillery

[JariL]

Hi,

I noticed that there had been a vivid and lengthy discussion on Finnish artillery on this site. After reading the posts I think that the technicalities of how the calculations were performed etc. were pretty well covered. However, what I did not see in the discussion was why the Finnish artillery was such a key factor in summer 1944.

When Finland became independent many of the high ranking officers of the new Finnish army had served in the Imperial Russian army. Russian army had put a lot of emphasis in artillery since Peter the Great and it was perhaps the most advanced part of the Imperial army. In WWI Russian artillery, like that of so many other nations, had huge problems in getting enough ammunition to the front. The envisioned firestorm thus never materialised. Soviet Union resolved this problem by developping ammunition production and building huge ammounts of artillery pieces. Despite of certain problems in the artillery method, Soviet artillery was the weapon that punched a hole for tanks and infantry into the enemy lines in almost all succesfull Soviet operations during WWII.

Finnish officers wanted to do the same what the Soviets did. There was only one big problem: the resources were not there and they never would. So the question was: can you get the same effect with the resources at hand? After lengthy discussions and testing the answer was yes -given that you concentrate fire to a very small area.

The first thing needed was the calculation methods that have already been decribed earlier. The other part of the equation was concentrating the fire. What was discovered was that the most effective form of fire was a strike where all available artillery pieces shot the same target at maximum speed of fire. This was possible only if the communications network was functioning properly.

In the winter war and during the first years of the Continuation war Finnish artillery had woefully few radios and those that were available were usually clumsy and unreliable. The result was that hardly ever could troops expect support from anything else than their own divisional artillery. But the fire was concentrated and accurate and the effect was good.

Situation improved from 1943 onwards thanks to domestic radio production and purchases from abroad. In the spring 1944 there was a sufficient number of radios. But there was something more important going on. Forward observers were not anymore tied to certain artillery units. Instead, all artillery units in a certain area were under the command of one artillery commander. All FO's and batteries were connected into one mutual radio network. Now when the FO's asked for fire, they relayed the request into the radio network where the artillery commander then decided who gets support, when and which batteries are going to shoot. When everything was ready the artillery commander released command to the FO in question for the duration of the strike.

This centralised system of controlling artillery was the desisive factor in the summer 1944. It brough a stalemate into the battlefield because any big concentration of forces offered excellent targets to concentrated artillery fire. For example in Ihantala Russian total losses rose to 18.000 men dead (5.000) and wounded at the culmination of the battle in the first couple of days of July. Most of the losses were due to artillery fire. An explanation to this number was that the Soviet troops were concentrated on a area that was less than 2*2 square kilometers in size and that it was encirceled from three sides by Finns.

Maximum time for opening fire to unprepared targets was 5 minutes. For prepared targets 2 minutes was the maximum. Here take into account that cannons had to be turned in some cases to point to the right direction even if the target was prepared.

Density of fire could reach up to 10.000kg of shells/hectar/minute in Ihantala, if the whole artillery force was concentrated into one 100x300 m target. In many other sectors it could go up to 4.500 kg/hectar/minute. Ammunition was for once not a problem because Germans promised to replace every shell used on 1:1 basis, which they also did.

Here it should be noted that Soviet artillery doctrine called 2.000/kg/hectar/minute "total destruction". This sort of density they used during the last minute of artillery preparation to key targets.

Before anyone jumps into conclusions or starts making comparisons to artilleries of other nations I would like to point out that I don't really believe in this kind of comparisons. Espeacially the big powers prepared for a totally different kind of war than Finns. They usually envisioned to fight the war on the enemies soil and thus everything had to be fitted to that. On the other hand Finns prepared to fight on their own soil and thus it was possible to base everything on maps and design an accurate map based calculation method. And in many cases also train the crews in the likely positions that would be used in case of war -even if live ammunition could not be used of course;)

Last a comment about the Soviet artillery. If Finns made life difficult for the Soviet soldiers in summer 1944 the reverse was also true. In Valkesaari Soviet artillery pulverised the Finnish positions. Later in Tali, Ihantala and Vuosalmi it was practically impossible to move anything bigger than a company without calling for heavy artillery fire. Absolutely the biggest portion of Finnish losses was caused by artillery and there were a lot of cases of shell shock. With hindsight both Russians and Finns drew the right conclusions about the WWI experince of the Imperial army even if the solutions were very different.

Regards,

Jari

[JonS]

Interesting post Jari. Shame about this comment though:

Originally posted by JariL:

Before anyone jumps into conclusions or starts making comparisons to artilleries of other nations I would like to point out that I don't really believe in this kind of comparisons.

Kind of kills any prospect for debate, dontcha think

Regards

JonS

[JariL]

Hi JonS,

Thanks for the comment! Should perhaps have formulated it in an other way. What I tried to avoid was "who's father is strongest" kind of discussion.

Regards,

Jari

[TN]

Excellent post that brought something new into the discussion. Now the Finns just hunker down to withstand the inevitable counterbattery fire

[Tero]

Originally posted by JonS:

Interesting post Jari. Shame about this comment though:

Originally posted by JariL:

[qb]Before anyone jumps into conclusions or starts making comparisons to artilleries of other nations I would like to point out that I don't really believe in this kind of comparisons.

Kind of kills any prospect for debate, dontcha think

Oh, man !!! Just when I was about to go public with some findings about differences between RA and the Finnish arty.

Methinks the entire subject is all about differences, not similarities.

Kind of like discussing the relative merits of Lada Samara, (Ford Pinto to you Americans), a Vauhall/Opel Astra and a MB500-series. All these get the job done but there are certainly differences in the implementation of the basics.

[ October 29, 2002, 08:59 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

Some remarks:

Organization:

Just as, if not, more significant in 1941, was a 'bottom up' tactical innovation that emerged in the surrounded town of Tobruk on the Libyan coast between Australian infantry and British artillery – close affiliation between a battalion and its supporting battery. This relationship spread rapidly throughout the British and like-minded armies. It was the critical element for a harmonious and trusting relationship between artillery and the supported arm, and the forward presence of the battery's senior officers was probably its key. With it came guaranteed fire support because the observers could order targets to their battery.

As noted earlier the Finnish arty had concentrated its assets at regiment/division level and at the same time placed the arty co-op at the infantry CP already during the 20's.

(A side note: I still find it quite intriquing how the British emphasize the importance of officers to the performance of their army during WWII.)

The main problem was four companies in a battalion but only two observers in a battery, so the latter often had to move between companies in battle. This could be a problem, particularly in Burma, where it was found that a battery had to deploy up to five observer parties. This was usually achieved by rotating gun-end officers and soldiers through the additional observation parties.

The Finnish arty had two observer teams per battery as well (6 per battalion). Generally they seem to have been placed at the right place at the right time. The Finnish arty was a regimental/divisional and not battalion level asset but its was still closely knit to the defensive/offensive operation of the unit it was supporting.

This indicates some very basic differences in the organizational problems and how they were solved at different level.

A characteristic of the British artillery system was great tactical flexibility by having units' senior officers forward, underpinned by well honed standard drills and uniform procedures for gunnery that enabled junior officers to run gun positions.

Quite the contrary in the Finnish arty. The FO's were junior officers or NCO's.

Something that has gotta be related to the fact the Finnish army was a conscript army and the British army a professional army.

Obtaining and checking parallelism (of the guns, keeping the guns parallel was of fundamental importance).

Can any überFinn verify how this was/is in the Finnish arty ?

Accurate survey was essential for predicted fire and a common grid facilitated multi-battery engagements. Procedures for the latter had been developed soon after WW1 as a fast process suitable for mobile operations instead of relying on RE survey units to survey all battery positions.

The Finnish arty did the surveying for itself.

However, it was always a 'bottom-up' process, unless deployment planning enabled survey to take place in advance.

A benefit the Finnish arty had established already before the war by mapping the propable areas.

Mapping, and survey above the level of the corps survey regiment, was the responsibility of the Royal Engineers.

How did it work IRL ?

Maintaining up-to-date MV data in war was a major challenge. Again practices evolved throughout the war because while the best solution is to remove the guns to a calibration range this was seldom practical. For example, in the period before El Alamein medium guns were being calibrated every three days.

However, this did not solve the problem of variations between batches of propellant, although sorting into batches and having all guns use the same batch for a target ensured consistent firing. Nevertheless in Italy in 1944-5 even this proved impossible because there were so many different batches from ammunition factories in many countries. This adversely affected the accuracy of predicted fire.

Both a major concern for the Finns as well.

-a range and switch from the zero line to a TCP

The second tended to be the preferred method when ranging because it was the quickest, the British view was that speed was more important than ammunition economy.

Well......

The observer also decided if corrections for non-standard conditions were to be applied.

A judgement call instead of reliance on the data available ?

This procedure meant that it generally took about 30 – 60 seconds from receiving the observer's data to firing the first ranging shells. Observers were supposed to be able to produce their data in about a minute from identifying the target.

Generally. What was the average ?

Corrections were always sent as orders to the guns to move their aim-point, they were never observations of where the shells fell relative to the target. Ranging on the BT line required more skill by the observers than ranging on the observer-target (OT) line. However, section ranging made it easier. The advantage of BT was that the CP did not have to convert and plot corrections from OT to BT so that they could be ordered to the guns, cutting out this step saved time.

Another alternative for ranging was ladder ranging whereby each gun in a troop fired one round at a different range and a short interval, enabling the observer to make a single correction and order gunfire, although the observer need good observation of the target area for this. This procedure had been long used by the Royal Navy and coast defence artillery but it never caught-on for field use.

Being a CA puke myself I find this interesting. AFAIK the Finnish CA method was to get the grouping as tight as possible and the direct it in unison.

Since these large concentrations covered quite large areas (regiment – about 250 × 250 yards, division about 350 × 350 yards, division with AGRA about 400 × 400 yards) precise corrections were generally deemed unnecessary.

MPI's being distrubted all around the target area - what is 100-200 yards between friends ?

Obviously the more regiments firing at a target the bigger the area affected by the fire. However, this was not a linear relationship. Basically, each troop's mean point of impact (MPI) would be a distance from the MPI of the whole concentration in some direction. The more troops there were the greater the probability of there being some at a greater distance, a normal probability distribution.

Obviously.

Next were those associated with target location, interesting because they show height as a bigger problem than location. The reason for this was that predicted targets tended to be acquired from locating systems such as sound ranging and flash spotting or gridded air photos that were reasonable accurate. However, the locations then had to be plotted on a map to find the target height. The problem then was the inaccuracy of the maps, particularly in France where a well marked feature such as a road junction could be mis-positioned by up to 100 metres. This meant that height was often wrong because it had been taken from the wrong place on the ground. Obviously these problems with maps meant that predicted targets selected by ground observers were also inaccurate, exacerbated by the much greater PEs for target locations by FOOs (some trials revealed a PE of over 100 yds by FOOs, even with good maps).

So in fact TRP's decreased the accuracy dur to inherent faults in the system ?

(Incidentaly the site mentioned someplace France being well mapped but I could not find the quote in a hurry).

Plotting was based on the use of 1:25,000 scale plots used on artillery boards in command posts, however, long range guns were plotted at 1:50,000 and this doubled the PE.

A very, VERY significant difference !!!

The underlying causes were the inability to plot to greater than 10 yd precision on a 1:25,000 grid and bowing in the steel range arms from rough handling.

Obviously !

Air-burst shells, with clockwork or powder burning fuzes were a further problem. It was virtually impossible to get the optimal height of burst (HOB) for HE (about 10 yds) by prediction, although a 'good enough' result for higher bursting shells such as smoke was possible. Even with ranging the HOB for air-burst fuzes was normally distributed so that from a battery there would be some very low 'daisy cutters' or ground-burst and some at 20 yds or more, and ranging HOB for regimental or higher targets usually meant ranging each battery's HOB in turn. The great advantage of VT fuzes when they were released for field use was their accurate and consistent HOB.

Anybody in the know care to comment on the HOB of the Finnish arty, given the 1:20 000 maps ?

The major question was whether to use observed (ie ranged) or predicted fire. The latter gave surprise and should, therefore, be more effective for causing casualties and not compromising an impending operation in the case of a fire plan. It also took longer to prepare to fire.

It did ?

However, predicted fire that took the enemy by surprise but missed the target was totally ineffective. In fact there is evidence that missing was worse than not firing because being missed enhanced the target's morale. Of course if it could be observed it could be corrected, but the result was no better than ranged fire, more ammunition was used and it may or may not have been quicker overall.

That is rather what the Finnish arty was trained to avoid.

Operations research at the end of the war suggested that the accuracy of predicted fire had been poor, as few as 7% of predicted engagements were effective. This indicates that predicted fire was not the best solution.

British operations research. I think Finnish data and experiences would throw an monkey wrench in this equation.

Of course one answer was to predict large multi-regiment concentrations and allow the natural spread of MPIs to ensure adequate coverage of the target.

Yes.

Another approach was to register a target and engage it again later with predicted fire to achieve surprise. However, this depended on the target staying in its registered place.

Unless the registration was speedy enough. For example aided by speedy deployment of accurate intelligence data (radio listening etc).

Predicted fire was insufficiently accurate and was exacerbated by longer ranges to targets than in WW1. The main causes were stale meteor data, target location errors from inaccurate maps, and ammunition that invalidated calibrated MVs.

The Finnish arty took care of the inaccurate maps issue and it tried to keep the calibtarions as accurate as possible. Stale meteoroligical data was a problem to all it seems.

[ October 29, 2002, 09:31 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[JonS]

As noted earlier the Finnish arty had concentrated its assets at regiment/division level and at the same time placed the arty co-op at the infantry CP already during the 20's.

The practice of affiliation did not prevent concentration of fire, and the battery was not under command of its affiliated battalion. It was a way of getting people used to working with each other. If the same BC is always working with the same CO, and the same FO is always talking to the same OC, then communication between them is likely to be faster and more effective. Again, it has nothing to do with who commands and controls the artillery.

Incidentally, CMBO is set in 1944-45 and CMBB from 1941-45. What happened in the ‘20’s isn’t relevant.

The Finnish arty had two observer teams per battery as well (6 per battalion). Generally they seem to have been placed at the right place at the right time.

Unfortunately for the RA they didn’t have überFOs who always knew where the right place was They just had to muddle along as best they could, which seems to have been good enough.

The Finnish arty was a regimental/divisional and not battalion level asset but its was still closely knit to the defensive/offensive operation of the unit it was supporting.

And so was the RA.

This indicates some very basic differences in the organizational problems and how they were solved at different level.

No it doesn’t, it indicates that you are seeing only what you expect to see.

Quite the contrary in the Finnish arty. The FO's were junior officers or NCO's.

Something that has gotta be related to the fact the Finnish army was a conscript army and the British army a professional army.

Dunno about that – by 1944 the British Army was effectively a conscript army too, yet they still trusted the FOs enough to allow them to command the guns.

The Finnish arty did the surveying for itself.

So did the RA through the use of Survey Regiments. The quote referred to WWI. That happened a bit before 1944, and things had changed.

A benefit the Finnish arty had established already before the war by mapping the propable areas.

Yes, quite. Still, not really practical when your AO encompasses more or less the whole world, rather than just a little bit of NW Russia

Well......

Well what? I take it you think leaving infantry unsupported under fire is better than wasting a few rounds of HE? I disagree.

A judgement call instead of reliance on the data available ?

Since the FO was the Johnny on the spot, don’t you think it would be a good idea to listen to him? Remember that in connection with this RA FOs were senior pers.

Generally. What was the average ?

Oh, I don’t know … how about 30-60 seconds being the general average?

MPI's being distrubted all around the target area - what is 100-200 yards between friends ?

Since targets engaged by an AGRA etc would tend to be fairly significant targets, this spread was usually seen as a good thing. After all, the 600 – 800 men of a targeted battalion don’t all fit in the 10m x 10m square identified by an 8-figure grid reference …

So in fact TRP's decreased the accuracy dur to inherent faults in the system ?

Huh? Where did you get that from? The quote has nothing to do with TRPs. TRPs are used to re-engage a target quickly some time in the future, not to determine the location of a target.

(Incidentaly the site mentioned someplace France being well mapped but I could not find the quote in a hurry).

The British Army fought in France twice – once in 1940, and again in 1944. Maybe the quality of the maps improved between Round 1 and Round 2.

A very, VERY significant difference !!!

Depends on the base PE. Doubling 20m isn’t that significant. Doubling 100m probably is.

Anybody in the know care to comment on the HOB of the Finnish arty, given the 1:20 000 maps ?

What do überMaps have to do with variable quality fuzes?

It did ?

Sure, why not? With observed fire once you have a round on the ground you can crack straight into adjusting, and can effectively forget about met and all other non-standard conditions. With a predicted engagement all those variables have to be taken into account and calculated for.

That is rather what the Finnish arty was trained to avoid.

Ammo is cheap. Soldiers aren’t.

British operations research. I think Finnish data and experiences would throw an monkey wrench in this equation.

Naturally. Nothing can compare with überFinnish überOR.

Unless the registration was speedy enough. For example aided by speedy deployment of accurate intelligence data (radio listening etc).

No, you’ve got the wrong end of the stick again. As soon as you start adjusting the surprise is gone. It doesn’t matter how fast you can complete the registration, it will still be longer than the time it takes the target to get into cover.

Registering in the morning, then shooting FFE on it in the afternoon – which is basically what the quote was on about – means that the target may have relaxed in the meantime, and exposed itself again.

Tero, you keep looking for differences and überness. And sure enough you’ll find it. But what does it mean in game terms? IMO, giving the current model, the differences are less than the resolution of that model.

Regards

JonS

[ October 30, 2002, 06:44 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Tero]

The practice of affiliation did not prevent concentration of fire, and the battery was not under command of its affiliated battalion. It was a way of getting people used to working with each other. If the same BC is always working with the same CO, and the same FO is always talking to the same OC, then communication between them is likely to be faster and more effective. Again, it has nothing to do with who commands and controls the artillery.

So why was the change (if there was one) called a "tactical innovation" then ? The Finnish army had made this innocation already in the 20's.

Incidentally, CMBO is set in 1944-45 and CMBB from 1941-45. What happened in the ‘20’s isn’t relevant.

Really ? Are you ready to claim the work in the '20's the Germans did on the concepts of Blitzkrieg is equally irrelvant ?

Unfortunately for the RA they didn’t have überFOs who always knew where the right place was They just had to muddle along as best they could, which seems to have been good enough.

Who ordered where the FO's should be ?

The Finnish arty was a regimental/divisional and not battalion level asset but its was still closely knit to the defensive/offensive operation of the unit it was supporting.

And so was the RA.

Again, why was there a significant tactical innovation made in 1941 that affected the entire system ? The Finnish arty went through the entire war with unchanged tactics and doctrines. The only significant improvements were the number of radios being increased and the invention of the korjausmuunnin.

This indicates some very basic differences in the organizational problems and how they were solved at different level.

No it doesn’t, it indicates that you are seeing only what you expect to see.

Nope. The Finnish arty tactics and doctrine were based on different axioms from that of the RA. The system was geared around the respective tactics and doctrine. The Finnish set remained basically unchanged while the RA had a series of changes made on the run.

Dunno about that – by 1944 the British Army was effectively a conscript army too, yet they still trusted the FOs enough to allow them to command the guns.

But from what I read not direct them. Incidentaly, in the Finnish arty the junior (reservist) officers ran also the gun positions.

So did the RA through the use of Survey Regiments. The quote referred to WWI. That happened a bit before 1944, and things had changed.

Should I interpret it then so that common grid replaced/substituted appropriate/proper survey procedures ?

Yes, quite. Still, not really practical when your AO encompasses more or less the whole world, rather than just a little bit of NW Russia

Ah, the universal soldier gambit.

No matter how hard and vigorously BFC beat that drum I still find it hard to believe the tactics and doctrine are the same all over and once the big picture is set (and it complies with the data which is most readily avialable - which is *gasp* the Anglo-American data) the forces using anomalous procedures just have to sit in the middle and suck on it. Why should the Finnish arty suffer from the afflictions of the big armies or suffer undue penalties when it had been developed to use advanced procedures and it had taken all the precautions so when the **** did hit the fan all the ground work and procedures were so good they lasted the rigours of combat all the way from 1939 to 1945. The only thing amiss were the resources. Once that was rectified things could only get better.

Well what? I take it you think leaving infantry unsupported under fire is better than wasting a few rounds of HE? I disagree.

There were times, especially during Winter War when there really was no HE to waste.

Since the FO was the Johnny on the spot, don’t you think it would be a good idea to listen to him? Remember that in connection with this RA FOs were senior pers.

Indeed. How often did standard conditions apply ? I think the Finnish system did not leave things like this to the FO's discretion. He was responsible for supplying the target coordinates and corrections. The rest was down to the system.

Oh, I don’t know … how about 30-60 seconds being the general average?

I think that is a bit too vague for a basis of a scientific model.

Since targets engaged by an AGRA etc would tend to be fairly significant targets, this spread was usually seen as a good thing. After all, the 600 – 800 men of a targeted battalion don’t all fit in the 10m x 10m square identified by an 8-figure grid reference …

True. But for maximum effect (density, kg/sqm, what have you) that is also a waste of resources.

Huh? Where did you get that from? The quote has nothing to do with TRPs. TRPs are used to re-engage a target quickly some time in the future, not to determine the location of a target.

Lets see:

Next were those associated with target location, interesting because they show height as a bigger problem than location. The reason for this was that predicted targets tended to be acquired from locating systems such as sound ranging and flash spotting or gridded air photos that were reasonable accurate. However, the locations then had to be plotted on a map to find the target height. The problem then was the inaccuracy of the maps, particularly in France where a well marked feature such as a road junction could be mis-positioned by up to 100 metres. This meant that height was often wrong because it had been taken from the wrong place on the ground. Obviously these problems with maps meant that predicted targets selected by ground observers were also inaccurate,....

Seems to me predicted targets (TRP's in CM) were a bit of a problem for the RA. If the CM model was correct the quote above should have the RA fire on a TRP arrive quickly but over 100m out of place.

[qb]The British Army fought in France twice – once in 1940, and again in 1944. Maybe the quality of the maps improved between Round 1 and Round 2.

Terrain features 100 meters off ? Does not seem to me they did.

Depends on the base PE. Doubling 20m isn’t that significant. Doubling 100m probably is.

You are forgetting the placement of the guns on the map.

What do überMaps have to do with variable quality fuzes?

I would assume with accurate topographical data you set the timed fuses that much more accurately.

Sure, why not? With observed fire once you have a round on the ground you can crack straight into adjusting, and can effectively forget about met and all other non-standard conditions. With a predicted engagement all those variables have to be taken into account and calculated for.

The question is: if you have all the data already in place and it is accurate how much longer does it take to execute a predicted fire mission as opposed to observed fire mission ?

Ammo is cheap. Soldiers aren’t.

When both are in short supply it pays to be accurate AND economical.

Naturally. Nothing can compare with überFinnish überOR.

You are missing the point. According to RA 93% of predicted engagements were ineffective. Why ?

I'll have to dig up the data on Finnish firemissions but fro Continuation War I'd have to questimate the efficiency rate for Finnish arty firing predicted engagements was way better than that 7%

No, you’ve got the wrong end of the stick again. As soon as you start adjusting the surprise is gone. It doesn’t matter how fast you can complete the registration, it will still be longer than the time it takes the target to get into cover. Registering in the morning, then shooting FFE on it in the afternoon – which is basically what the quote was on about – means that the target may have relaxed in the meantime, and exposed itself again.

What happened to silent registration ?

Tero, you keep looking for differences and überness.

Differences, yes. Überness, no.

And sure enough you’ll find it. But what does it mean in game terms? IMO, giving the current model, the differences are less than the resolution of that model.

In game terms the Germans and the Soviets get the benefits while the little guys get the shaft. No provisions are made for example for organizational stuff which deviates from the big picture norm. The übermapping is incidental but it did count for us Finns. We had accurate maps and ability to produce them quickly while the Germans complained about the lack of maps. For example.

[ October 31, 2002, 02:29 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[JonS]

So why was the change (if there was one) called a "tactical innovation" then ? The Finnish army had made this innocation already in the 20's.

The ‘tactical innovation’ was the habitual linking of the same battery with the same battalion. The doctrine of having guns centralised under higher command, and controlled by FO parties forward with the infantry had been established during WW1. Despite what Evans says about the innovation being discovered at Tobruk, it was in fact a bit older. It first appeared in India in the 1930s, and was known as ‘the Indian Method”, or ‘The Indian System’, or some such.

Really ? Are you ready to claim the work in the '20's the Germans did on the concepts of Blitzkrieg is equally irrelvant ?

In terms of its affect on CM? Yes it is irrelevant.

Who ordered where the FO's should be ?

The regimental CO (regt in this case being a grouping of three btys, or what most other armies call a bn). Despite belonging to the btys, FOs were seen as regimental assets, and were therefore under control of the CO, who could order them around as he saw fit. Except , of course, in normal operations the FOs from any given battery would be working with ‘their’ battalion. See Blackburn and Jary for specific examples.

Again, why was there a significant tactical innovation made in 1941 that affected the entire system ? The Finnish arty went through the entire war with unchanged tactics and doctrines. The only significant improvements were the number of radios being increased and the invention of the korjausmuunnin.

Affiliation was a refinement to a working doctrine, not a wholesale overhaul. Much more important than affiliation was the establishment of AGRAs and the Mike, Uncle, Victor system by Parham (see: Bidwell)

Dunno about that – by 1944 the British Army was effectively a conscript army too, yet they still trusted the FOs enough to allow them to command the guns.

But from what I read not direct them.

I’m not sure what you mean here. British FOs ordered the guns what to do. They didn’t have to ask anyone if it was ok, if they wouldn’t mind, could they spare a few rounds. They ordered the number of guns they wanted and ordered the number of rounds each gun was to fire.

If that isn’t directing the guns … :confused:

Should I interpret it then so that common grid replaced/substituted appropriate/proper survey procedures ?

Interpret it any way you like, I thought it was fairly clear.

Step 1: battery arrives at new position, and to the best of its ability places itself on the map. Its now at a state known as Battery Grid.

Step 2: Regimental Surveyors bring in line (survey line, not telephone line), so that all batterys in the regt are on the same grid. Batterys are now on Regimental Grid, and can fire on each others targets.

Step 3: Surveyors from the corps Survey Regt bring in line. All regts now on the same grid, known as theatre grid, and any bty can accurately fire on any other btys targets.

There were times, especially during Winter War when there really was no HE to waste.

Fine, so give the Finn artillery less ammo, and/or make them pay more for it.

How often did standard conditions apply ?

Never. (seriously)

I think the Finnish system did not leave things like this to the FO's discretion. He was responsible for supplying the target coordinates and corrections. The rest was down to the system.

Super. The Brits on the other hand trained and trusted their FOs.

I think that is a bit too vague for a basis of a scientific model.

Ok, how does 45 seconds grab you then?

True. But for maximum effect (density, kg/sqm, what have you) that is also a waste of resources.

Waste ammo or waste lives – you pick.

Lets see:

… predicted targets tended to be acquired from locating systems such as sound ranging and flash spotting or gridded air photos that were reasonable accurate…

These targets are outside the scale of CM and therefore irrelevant.

The problem then was the inaccuracy of the maps, particularly in France where a well marked feature such as a road junction could be mis-positioned by up to 100 metres. … Obviously these problems with maps meant that predicted targets selected by ground observers were also inaccurate,....

Seems to me predicted targets (TRP's in CM) were a bit of a problem for the RA.

As the saying goes … “eh, no worries, can take that up with the first round of adjustment.”

If the CM model was correct the quote above should have the RA fire on a TRP arrive quickly but over 100m out of place.

I understand TRPs to be targets that have been engaged (ie, fired) and recorded. In firing the target you get a reduced grid, which takes out all the inaccuracies due to non-standard conditions and poor quality maps. That being so, I disagree with your characterisation.

If you had said “well, then the RA firing blind (ie, in CM at a target out of LOS) should have their fire inaccurate by 100m or more" then I would agree. And you know what … that is exactly what CMBB does. So it wasn’t in CMBO … so what? The series is improving. Next time the RA feature in a CM release you can bet they too will have to cope with this.

BTW, I think you are getting a bit hung up on the specific example of 100m. It was an example that Evans used, not an iron clad rule.

I would assume with accurate topographical data you set the timed fuses that much more accurately.

Not really – if there is significant variation between the fuzes themselves, then it wouldn’t matter if the Brits had been using Finnish maps, there still would have been marked variation between the observed HOB.

When both are in short supply it pays to be accurate AND economical.

Fine, so give the Finn artillery less ammo, and/or make them pay more for it.

You are missing the point. According to RA 93% of predicted engagements were ineffective. Why ?

I’m fairly sure that Evans lists the main reasons.

I'll have to dig up the data on Finnish firemissions but fro Continuation War I'd have to questimate the efficiency rate for Finnish arty firing predicted engagements was way better than that 7%

Well, if we’re guesstimating, my pick is … BTW, make sure you are comparing apples with apples with any figures you do dig up …

What happened to silent registration ?

You’re going in circles. Silent registration achieves surprise but sacrifices accuracy. Adjusting ensures accuracy but sacrifices surprise. Are you with me so far?

Right then. Assuming you want accuracy AND surprise, then you need to adjust the target, record the information, and then fire the target again at a later time, hoping to surprise the enemy occupying that location who may have relaxed in the meantime. This is what Evans was talking about.

Differences, yes. Überness, no.

Right. That would explain your blanket statement that the Finnish were always more accurate firing purely predicted targets.

In game terms the Germans and the Soviets get the benefits while the little guys get the shaft.

Really? I thought in CM the Finnish artillery was exactly the same as the Germans (aside from the radios)? Who’s getting the shaft again?

Regards

JonS

[ October 31, 2002, 04:44 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Sardaukar]

Originally posted by JonS:

Fine, so give the Finn artillery less ammo, and/or make them pay more for it.

Right. That would explain your blanket statement that the Finnish were always more accurate firing purely predicted targets.

Really? I thought in CM the Finnish artillery was exactly the same as the Germans (aside from the radios)? Who’s getting the shaft again?

Regards

JonS

Few things to toss my oar in too

Lack of ammunition was not that big problem during 1941-44. During Winter War it was the main thing hampering efficiency of Finnish artillery. One Russian Army on Karelia Isthmus did shoot as much ammo as Finns had in their whole pre-war stock within one day.

Finnish artillery was almost always very accurate. Nothing involving humans is perfect, though..but it was still very accurate and responsive. Even Soviet reports from Isthmus during summer 1944 state that fact and importance of artillery in those battles.

During Winter War captured Soviet officer asked: "Since your artillery usually hits it's target with first rounds, why don't you shoot more ?" Reason for that is above.

One important factor is also that shells from different units were arriving as simultaneously to target as possible. Since most casualties from artillery fire happen when targetted soldiers have had no time to take cover, that has utmost importance. It maximizes the effect when used on attacking enemy.

Amount of ordnance used has less effect if it's used more sporadically. In Winter War against one sector of Finnish defences, Russians used 34 000 arty rounds during one day. Result was 2 wounded Finns. Intense, concentrated and quick barrage has lot more effect.

As to compare Finnish and German artillery..that is almost a slur Frankly, (no offence to Germans) their doctrine or use of artillery was not in par with British, American or Finnish practices. Very rarely they could get quick support from other assets than what was under their direct commmand. I guess it's because their doctrine was very offensive-centered, so defensive tactics were not as refined (they still did OK, though).

Cheers,

M.S.

[Engel]

Well, for more information on Finnish artilery, go to http://www.winterwar.com/forces/FinArmy/FINartiller.htm

The site is based on books written by artillery colonel Jyri Paulaharju, whose father was a famous artillery commander during the wars (Ahti Paulaharju, IIRC).

[Tero]

Originally posted by JonS:

The ‘tactical innovation’ was the habitual linking of the same battery with the same battalion. The doctrine of having guns centralised under higher command, and controlled by FO parties forward with the infantry had been established during WW1. Despite what Evans says about the innovation being discovered at Tobruk, it was in fact a bit older. It first appeared in India in the 1930s, and was known as ‘the Indian Method”, or ‘The Indian System’, or some such.

So what was the big broobahah about the system Monty came up with (reinstituted) ?

In terms of its affect on CM? Yes it is irrelevant.

You are correct. When we take into consideration the way armour is modelled in the game. It is very different with the artillery modelling.

.....

snipping and coming back later because the bloody browser ate my replies the first time around.

Really? I thought in CM the Finnish artillery was exactly the same as the Germans (aside from the radios)? Who’s getting the shaft again?

That IS a slur.

Eino Tirronen, Tykit Jyrisevät

pp 276-277

The German officers wondered how we (the Finnish artillery) could fire barrages as close as 100 meters from friendly troops without firing any ranging or even registering shots first. The German artillery was well trained and it acted fast, when for example opening fire, but its firing methods and especially its metheorological preparations were nowhere as good as the methods of the Finnish artillery.....

The German infantry specifically requested the Finnish artillery fire at targets closest to friendly troops at the southern tip of Hannustiensaari island. The German artillery was tasked with counter battery fire missions and laying smoke at Uuras, Ravansaari, Hietasaari and Esisaari.

[JonS]

Originally posted by tero:

So what was the big broobahah about the system Monty came up with (reinstituted) ?

...