Manstein at Kursk

[LGMB]

Without Manstein supporting the finishing off of the Kursk Salient, the Germans may have been able to aviod the position they put themselves into after the battle. Not only this, but Manstein's actions as commander of Army Group South are undoubtabley the cause of what led to the ill fated confrontation between 5th Gaurds Army and the II SS at Prokhorvka. Without Manstein pushing for a quite resolution (in meeting Kluge in the North), he would not have ordered the continued and rapid advance of 4th Panzer Army which brought them into contact with the Steppe Front's reserves. Finaly, why did Manstein not commit his own Army level reserves? He had at his disposal and addition TWO panzer divisions (light reinforcements I know, but still enough to strenghthen the battered 4th), enough firepower to tip the scales in his favour had he fought on after July 11/12.

Clearly, Manstein and only Manstein can take responsibilty for the operation. He should, at the very least, have known that the Russians held the advantage in terms of numbers and defensive locations (though, admidtly, Hitler and Zeltzer would have pushed for the operation anyway).

[Alte Hase]

Part of the difficulty here is that the Russians counterattacked Ninth Army (the northern arm of Citadel) already on 11 July and vonManstein was ordered to release forces from his command including several armored units for the north. Remember that 11 July is the same period of Prokhorovka (11 - 12 July) in Manstein's sector in the south. In addition, the Russians also attacked in the south over the Mius River against German 6th Army. That plus the problem of the Allied invasion of Sicily was forcing Hitler to stop Citadel.

Finally, I believe that the reserve pz corps available to Manstein was XXIV with 2 pz divs and about 112 panzers but it could not be employed by him without OKH & Hitler's authority.