Reinforcements vs. Replacements--Contradiction

[EB.]

First of all, this being my first message here, I would like to give the highest praise to the game Strategic Command and its creators. Truly excellent work. Also, I would like to give greetings to the forum posters who seem very intelligent.

Okay, here is one problem with the game. It seems to me that in the game it is cheaper to bring a weakened unit up to full strength than to simply build a new unit. You always seem to get more combat points per unit of spending if you send replacements to understrength front-line units than if you just build fresh units in the rear areas. The difference seems to be twice as much--that is, you can bring two units up to full strength from almost zero for the same amount of spending to build a single new unit. The problem is that this is exactly the opposite of the way things were in the real war. Actually, it was far cheaper, easier, and more practical to form completely new units in the rear than to try to send replacements piecemeal to the front. Replacements are a relatively expensive, cumbersome method--you have to send some here, some there, all in the midst of the chaotic front lines. If anything, it should cost twice as much to bring a weakened unit up in strength than to form a new unit. Now sometimes it would still be worth a little extra cost to get the combat points directly to the front immediately, but it should still cost extra. However, with the current rules, the player is actually rewarded economically by using inefficient methods.

These lessons can best be observed by the combat on the Eastern Front which of course is the main sphere of the entire war. The Soviet method was to use units in the front lines until they were depleted to nothing and then completely re-form new units in the safety and order of secured rear areas. This was an efficient, effective method which maximized Soviet resources and allowed them to raise ever more divisions against the Germans. On the other hand, the Germans engaged in the chaotic, piecemeal, ad-hoc method of trying to send a few troops here and there from time to time. The result was that the Germans at any given time had a bunch of weak, threadbare divisions, hardly any of them at full strength. And at the same time, any given Soviet unit would be fully packed and ready to punch. The difference is of course somewhat from the amounts of military production, but it also reflects the different approaches with respect to military administration. Anyway, back to the main point: historically, reinforcement (creation of new units) has been a more efficient method of utilizing military resources than replacement (strengthening weakened front-line units); however, the game makes replacement relatively cheaper than reinforcement. This should be reversed. Now, I have no problem with withdrawing a damaged unit from the front and then "rebuilding" it in the safety of rear areas--then there should be a cheaper cost. But as long as a unit is in the front line, in contact with enemy units, it will of course be more expensive to spend resources there. It is all a simple matter of logic--order is more efficient than chaos. Easier to organize units in safe areas than trying to get it done in the middle of combat.

Again, the game is a holy work, and I feel ashamed to point out even this tiny defect. Most respectfully and sincerely, EB.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by EB.:

[QB]

Okay, here is one problem with the game. It seems to me that in the game it is cheaper to bring a weakened unit up to full strength than to simply build a new unit. You always seem to get more combat points per unit of spending if you send replacements to understrength front-line units than if you just build fresh units in the rear areas. The difference seems to be twice as much--that is, you can bring two units up to full strength from almost zero for the same amount of spending to build a single new unit. The problem is that this is exactly the opposite of the way things were in the real war. Actually, it was far cheaper, easier, and more practical to form completely new units in the rear than to try to send replacements piecemeal to the front. Replacements are a relatively expensive, cumbersome method--you have to send some here, some there, all in the midst of the chaotic front lines. If anything, it should cost twice as much to bring a weakened unit up in strength than to form a new unit. Now sometimes it would still be worth a little extra cost to get the combat points directly to the front immediately, but it should still cost extra. However, with the current rules, the player is actually rewarded economically by using inefficient methods.

These lessons can best be observed by the combat on the Eastern Front which of course is the main sphere of the entire war. The Soviet method was to use units in the front lines until they were depleted to nothing and then completely re-form new units in the safety and order of secured rear areas. This was an efficient, effective method which maximized Soviet resources and allowed them to raise ever more divisions against the Germans. On the other hand, the Germans engaged in the chaotic, piecemeal, ad-hoc method of trying to send a few troops here and there from time to time. The result was that the Germans at any given time had a bunch of weak, threadbare divisions, hardly any of them at full strength. And at the same time, any given Soviet unit would be fully packed and ready to punch. The difference is of course somewhat from the amounts of military production, but it also reflects the different approaches with respect to military administration. Anyway, back to the main point: historically, reinforcement (creation of new units) has been a more efficient method of utilizing military resources than replacement (strengthening weakened front-line units); however, the game makes replacement relatively cheaper than reinforcement. This should be reversed. Now, I have no problem with withdrawing a damaged unit from the front and then "rebuilding" it in the safety of rear areas--then there should be a cheaper cost. But as long as a unit is in the front line, in contact with enemy units, it will of course be more expensive to spend resources there. It is all a simple matter of logic--order is more efficient than chaos. Easier to organize units in safe areas than trying to get it done in the middle of combat.

QB]

This post is almost completely wrong.

1. Basic Economics : it is far more economical to feed replacements into existing units than to build new units wholesale. This is as true in business as it is in the economy of war. Many studies of both economics and military costs bear this out. Check reputable historical sources for reference.

2. History : The tendency of the GERMAN army was to burn out their units and then pull the small cadre back to Germany for reconstruction or assimilation. This constitutes the strategic system of favoring new unit construction than field replacements. The Germans did have a replacement system, but it was inadequate to the task and focussed on constructing new units from small cadres, rather than an extensive field replacement system. The Germans were in a quandary in that their line was so thin they could not afford to take units out of the line while they still had cohesion, their replacements were inadequate to keep units staffed, so that by 1944 they were in a situation where units were by routine left in the line until it was almost completely destroyed. The exception to this was the SS and a number of panzer formations, who were pulled back while still cohesive for refitting and sometimes broken up into cadres for new divisions.

The Soviets oriented their replacement system more towards field replacements as the war progressed. There were a couple of reasons for this. First, in the early part of the war, the Red Army had to be rebuilt from scratch. The replacement system which was established and developed in 1941 was therefore focussed on the creation of new units, and close to 1000 divisional-sized units were formed in air, armor, marines, paratroops, artillery, anti-aircraft, infantry etc.

With increasing Soviet successes in the field, the replacement system was oriented to field replacements. This had a number of benefits. Units were regularly rotated from front line duty, enabling front commanders to maintain strong reserves, and cost and time savings resulted in not having to transport the unit back to a replacement center, fully outfit a new unit with a full compliment of heavy equipment and heavy weapons. Also, a field replacement system tends to preseve the morale of the unit -- provided that it is permitted to rest and recuperate and is NOT in constant front line duty, as most German divisions were.

The MOST cost effective system is to pull a unit back to a replacement center while it has most of its strength. The LEAST cost effective system is a field replacement system that is inadequate to keep units adequately staffed, such that a point is inevitably reached where the unit has zero effectiveness and must be rebuilt from a very small cadre. The Germans had the worst system of replacement of all the major combattants in economic terms.

Another reason that a field replacement system can be more cost effective is transport time and cost. There is much less load on the transport system if you have a steady stream of field replacements than if you are transporting whole units back and forth from the field to the replacement center. Transport takes time and requires infrastructure, each of which requires expenditure of wealth.

[I/O Error]

As a shorter version of agreeing with dgaad, it's a LOT harder to create a new unit from scratch than it is to integrate new soldiers into a unit that still has some of the grizzled old NCOs lying around.

In my opinion, SC has it being done just about right. That small cutting edge of experience and skill can be crucial to the creation of a unit, and that's as true for a Corps as it is for a Company.

[EB.]

I refuse your argument. In fact, as stated clearly by another author on Soviet military administrative policy: "it was the Red Army's policy not to make any attempt to replace rank-and-file personnel losses, in most units at least, while the unit was on the front line. The strength of most Russian units, especially infantry divisions, therefore declined rapidly in action, and eventually the division, severely weakened and depleted, had to be withdrawn for complete rebuilding." I would add that this is exactly true and that it made perfect sense. By creation of a new unit, we mean to take existing cadres (withdraw a burnt out unit to the rear) and add fresh troops and equipment to bring the unit up to full strength. And of course this should be done in a safe rear area. There is no wasteful transport back and forth as one person says. If you are going to organize a unit, it must be done in a safe place. If you try to take all of those troops and equipment and try to get them directly to the front line in a sporadic, ad-hoc, piecemeal fashion, then it is going to cost a lot more. That is the simple and true military-economic reality here. Anyone who does not see that is a real fool. And you are completely wrong to say that the Germans had the policy of completely building new units as their main policy. No, in fact, their persistent policy was to try (as you suggest) to feed new troops and equipment into the front line piecemeal. That is why you have a lot of burnt-out German divisions--not because of rear-area rebuilding but because of constant front-line band-aid treatments, the piecemeal replacement of damaged units.

You see, when an army has a policy of rebuilding units, then at any given time, most units will be withdrawn when they get depleted and those at the front will be relatively packed. On the contrary, when you insist on replacing losses directly to the front itself, then at any given time, you will have a lot of burnt-out units still hovering at the front line. They don't get withdrawn to the safe rear because they are waiting (and waiting and waiting) for their losses to be made good at the front itself. So when we see a situation like the Germans were in during the war with lots of weak units at the front, this obviously reflects a "replacement" policy taking precedence over a "reinforcement" or "rebuilding" policy. Other authors suggest the opposite, and they are of course wrong.

Anyone who disagrees with my original post is basically arguing that it is cheaper to try to sort out new troops and equipment at the front line itself, near the chaos of combat, than to do so in a calm, secure rear area. Well, that is complete nonsense.

The most efficient method is to use a fully-packed unit in combat until it is heavily depleted. Then the unit will still have troops but their combat value will be almost nothing. Then withdraw those experienced troops to a safe rear are. Then add fresh troops, officers, and equipment to bring the unit up to full strength. Then send the unit back to the front line.

Any deviation from this simple routine will be automatically less efficient.

If you propose to add the fresh troops and equipment at the front line itself, then of course it will be less efficient. If you don't think so, then try doing your job in the middle of a busy street instead of in a quiet office. I am not saying that new troops cannot learn from experienced ones--not at all would I say that--but I must insist that the most efficient method of introducing these new troops into the system is to completely rebuild new units in rear areas, using the experienced cadres as the skeletal frame. History shows that I am exactly right on this. I doubt even that the argumentative commentators speak or read Russian or German, or even that they have consulted primary documents in this field. Lastly, I would say that it is important to analyze these things objectively instead of resorting to anti-Russian or anti-German propaganda, however fashionable this might be in the West.

[Zeres]

This is a theorietical arguement. Perhaps you should look at it from a game-play angle. Would altering the mechanics of the game (in such a big way) have a deterimental effect. You can imagine it happening both ways during gameplay. Sometimes your going to pull back your beatup troops and if your lines are near a city, your going to replace the unit with new troops. It's always in your best interest to have numerical superiority on the battlefield. So if you can afford to your going to rearm the damaged unit later and put in some fresh units. Other times your going to be forced to send replacement to the line ( when you can't afford to pull back). Your military doctrine is going to change to meet your new strategic situation or you are going to fail. I have to agree with I/0 and Dgaad....Wouldn't altering the replacement structure that is in place change game-play significantly with no assurance that it would improve it? Historical accuracy is great but game play should take priority. I don't think that the replacement structure ( as it relates to game-play) is broke so why fix it?

[dgaad]

Originally posted by EB.:

In fact, as stated clearly by another author on Soviet military administrative policy: "it was the Red Army's policy not to make any attempt to replace rank-and-file personnel losses, in most units at least, while the unit was on the front line. The strength of most Russian units, especially infantry divisions, therefore declined rapidly in action, and eventually the division, severely weakened and depleted, had to be withdrawn for complete rebuilding."

You are taking a single statement out of context, and misinterpreting it to boot, to support a postion that is NOT supported by the historical evidence.

Note the key point of this paragraph is "while they were in the front line". One wouldn't normally attempt to replace units in the line as they are under threat of artillery barrage. In fact, the Germans had several notorious instances of groups of front line bound field replacement personnel and equipment being bombarded, or hit by air attack near the front, and decimated.

As I stated, Soviet policy was to rotate the units off the line and into reserve, but NOT back to replacement centers, where they would be replaced. This was largely the case with most Soviet Rifle Divisions starting in early 43 and lasting to the end of the war. Prior to the January 1945 offensive, gaggles of divisions were rotated to operational reserve and fully replaced. Same was true for most of the units that participated in the final Berlin offensive.

Another key *word* in the paragraph is "rebuilding". This is wide open to interpretation. If you have nothing else to go on, you could assume that meant wholesale re-construction of the unit. In most sources I've read, this wasn't the case at all. Of course, many divisions would get burnt down to virtually nothing in intense periods of combat as was characterized by the Eastern Front. This does not change the general orientation of the Soviet replacement system.

It is not a good idea to focus on one statement in one source to make assumptions that fly in the face of basic economic analysis.

By creation of a new unit, we mean to take existing cadres (withdraw a burnt out unit to the rear) and add fresh troops and equipment to bring the unit up to full strength. And of course this should be done in a safe rear area. There is no wasteful transport back and forth as one person says. If you are going to organize a unit, it must be done in a safe place. If you try to take all of those troops and equipment and try to get them directly to the front line in a sporadic, ad-hoc, piecemeal fashion, then it is going to cost a lot more. That is the simple and true military-economic reality here. Anyone who does not see that is a real fool. And you are completely wrong to say that the Germans had the policy of completely building new units as their main policy. No, in fact, their persistent policy was to try (as you suggest) to feed new troops and equipment into the front line piecemeal. That is why you have a lot of burnt-out German divisions--not because of rear-area rebuilding but because of constant front-line band-aid treatments, the piecemeal replacement of damaged units.

The German system was oriented to wholesale constuction of new units. Many divisions never got sent back to Germany simply because they couldn't be spared, the transport system was overloaded with the transport of, among other things, new units heading to the front, etc. Many other divisions, however, were sent back to Germany, most of them with only a few hundred men left and zero equipment. I've read dozens of divisional histories in which the common practice was to leave all their heavy equipment at the front for replacement of other units, while the cadre itself went back to Germany and was either fully rebuilt or assimilated into a new unit. This is wholescale reconstruction, and very inefficient.

German field replacement was woefully inadequate throughout the war. Units could not expect under the best conditions in Russia to be anywhere above 60% of establishment unless they were sent back to Germany.

As I have said, there are many studies available which demonstrate that the most cost effective method of replacement is a full blown large capacity field replacement system, not wholescale rebuilding from small cadres.

You see, when an army has a policy of rebuilding units, then at any given time, most units will be withdrawn when they get depleted and those at the front will be relatively packed. On the contrary, when you insist on replacing losses directly to the front itself, then at any given time, you will have a lot of burnt-out units still hovering at the front line. They don't get withdrawn to the safe rear because they are waiting (and waiting and waiting) for their losses to be made good at the front itself. So when we see a situation like the Germans were in during the war with lots of weak units at the front, this obviously reflects a "replacement" policy taking precedence over a "reinforcement" or "rebuilding" policy. Other authors suggest the opposite, and they are of course wrong.

Anyone who disagrees with my original post is basically arguing that it is cheaper to try to sort out new troops and equipment at the front line itself, near the chaos of combat, than to do so in a calm, secure rear area. Well, that is complete nonsense.

This is exactly what the US system was designed to do, and it worked fairly well in difficult circumstances. It's still the case today. It is that way not because the US could then or can now afford to waste military economic resources, but because of efficiency studies.

Read up on the Reforger system.

The most efficient method is to use a fully-packed unit in combat until it is heavily depleted. Then the unit will still have troops but their combat value will be almost nothing. Then withdraw those experienced troops to a safe rear are. Then add fresh troops, officers, and equipment to bring the unit up to full strength. Then send the unit back to the front line.

Any deviation from this simple routine will be automatically less efficient.

If you propose to add the fresh troops and equipment at the front line itself, then of course it will be less efficient. If you don't think so, then try doing your job in the middle of a busy street instead of in a quiet office. I am not saying that new troops cannot learn from experienced ones--not at all would I say that--but I must insist that the most efficient method of introducing these new troops into the system is to completely rebuild new units in rear areas, using the experienced cadres as the skeletal frame. History shows that I am exactly right on this. I doubt even that the argumentative commentators speak or read Russian or German, or even that they have consulted primary documents in this field. Lastly, I would say that it is important to analyze these things objectively instead of resorting to anti-Russian or anti-German propaganda, however fashionable this might be in the West.

I have zero interest in promoting anyone's propaganda. I have no idea why you've even said this in fact. I've read the two volume Great Patriotic War, Kruschev's autobiography, Dmitri Volkogonov's Stalin biography, several serious analyses of the Barbarossa campaign by both Western and Soviet / Russian authors, excerpts from Zhukov's books, and numerous articles by historians. Needless to mention, I've also read every important memoir by German participants in the campaign including Manstein's Lost Victories, Guderian's Panzer Leader, Mellinthin, Speer, etc.

You have been consistently using words like "automatically", "I am exactly right", "real fool", "simple and true", etc. etc. This is not objective analysis or even objective comment. Its beating your chest saying "I'm Right". I don't say this to insult you, but to suggest that a different approach would serve you better. I always like to encourage anyone with interest in history to read primary sources, and use objective and constructive presentation of ideas. They are far more convincing that way.

Edit Note :

It might interest you to note that between August 1944 and the end of the war, the Germans actually created more new formations than the Soviets in the same time period. Facts like these are indicative of the orientation of their system.

[ October 11, 2002, 01:55 AM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

[Panzer Cmdr]

Perhaps for game purposes it would be best if units "in the front lines" could not receive replacements. To receive replacements perhaps the requirement would be that a enemy unit must not be adjacent. This would require units to be "pulled back" to recieve replacements.

In this manner units that are surrounded could not receive inforcements, but perhaps them "resting" could improve the units rediness.

P.S. I still think aircraft should have to operate from airbases...

[HankWWIIOnline]

The replacement system is fine. It is up to you whether to continually reinforce beatup units on the front, or pull them to the rear to reorganize in safety. I like having that choice.

On top of that, in a lot of situations it is a waste to continually reinforce a battered front line unit. Usually the units it is facing will eventually have more experience and will progressively inflict more losses upon your patched up unit. All you end up doing is pouring MPP's into a front line unit, simply for the sake of keeping it there.

However, in cases where you outnumber the enemy, patching up battered units on the front is to your advantage. Even if the enemy keeps pounding away at that specific unit (And you keep pouring MPP's into it), you will eventually overwhelm them. So the tactic of keeping that unit on the front is more effective in that situation.

[EB.]

I shall refine my suggestion to the following then: for more accurate gameplay, units should not be able to receive replacements while they are adjacent to enemy units.

Also, I should point out that in my mind, when during the game Strategic Command a unit is destroyed and removed from the map, it is not really 100% casualties. It is just removed as a unit with military value. Specifically, there are many troops which are then used as the skeletal frame upon which the player can build new units. So, when the player builds a new unit, it should be understood that what is really happening is that new troops and equipment are being added to old troops. The original unit disappears from the map and then reappears as a new rebuilt unit. All of this process I have called "reinforcement" or "rebuilding" and it is all quite efficient. Another poster mentions the Soviets "rotating units out of the line"--well, I would strongly agree that this is a very efficient, wise method of military administration, but I also thought that this is exactly what I was referring to. If there is a contradiction, maybe it is my fault from the words used. In any case, we must beware of the trap of trying to send new troops directly to the front line as replacements. That was my original concern with the post. As I played, I found that I was rewarded economically for raising units with strength of 1 or 2 back to their full amount while those same units were in direct contact with the enemy units. Well, I must say that from about 20 years of research that that is flat wrong--the exact opposite of the way it really was. Anyway, these have been good comments.

[EB.]

Oh, by the way, I would give Khrushchev's autobiography no value whatsoever--it is a nest of lies and badly edited ones at that. There are many good works in Russia published within the last few years which are thousands of times better. Also, we must beware of the German generals' works which are mostly self-protecting, blame-everyone-but-me works. Plus, they are written for a specifically NATO / US audience, so this bias must be taken into account as well. In other words, they write what their new employers want to hear. Similarly, we see when the captured Germans are interrogated by the Soviets, they often tell them what they wanted to hear as well. Anyway, Khrushchev's work is the biggest load of lies in history. I would rather trust a book by Martha Stewart.

[Zeres]

I think on this scale you should be able to replace units ajacent to ememies. The supply structure works well. You need an HQ and a nearby city to reinforce properly. On a smaller scale you may be right (EB) but with army and corp level units? Turns are anywhere from a week to almost a month. So on this scale, with that kind of frame work for turns, your just asking for trouble with the excellent gameplay in SC if you mess with the current replacement structure.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by EB.:

Oh, by the way, I would give Khrushchev's autobiography no value whatsoever--it is a nest of lies and badly edited ones at that. There are many good works in Russia published within the last few years which are thousands of times better.

Historians are interested in all points of view.

[HICOM]

Units completely surrounded should not be able to replenish at all.

Units replenished should lose "effectiveness" somehow. Maybe a reduction in entrenchment, since an "organization" values is not incorporated.

Also, I'd like to make this point: if you notice a front-line unit at, say, a value of 4, and you can only replenish up to 6, but it is facing 3 sides of enemy units, it is BEST to pull it back and replace it with another unit, since when it is hit again, it will likely be destroyed. I found this happens a lot, even when I had plenty of cash to potentially rebuild it to full strength. However, some units not even adjacent to enemy units also had this limitation. So, it is in the game (the need to pull back in order to replenish some units), but not always required.

As it is, I think it works pretty well, considering no stacking ability.

--HICOM

[ October 12, 2002, 01:17 PM: Message edited by: HICOM ]

[Martinov]

EB is a historian, actually, and author of No Greater Glory civil war & Revolution '76 computer games, also an interesting simulation called Stalin's Dilemna (see underdogs site).

However I think he's off the mark in this instance. Its true that the bravery and determination of the russian soldiers enabled the Soviets to make a virtue out of a necessity regarding unit rotation rather than individual replacement.(I have read several battle memoirs which indicate that soviet front-line units did receive daily drafts of replacements in any case)

I think it's generally accepted (and there are many historical examples that demonstrate) that filtering replacements into existing units is the more generally efficient system, in terms of passing on 'veteran' skills, and wargames nearly always take that approach. (The one instance of it being the replacement system failing i can think of is in Vietnam, where the constant impact of the behaviour of individuals on the verge of completing their 'tour' demoralised their fellows.)

In any case the large scale of the game makes the issue irrelevant, either method could be occuring when you click a unit.

Completely agree with you about the ridiculous situation regarding reinforcement of Egypt, by the way, Dgaad.

EB, by the way, have you completed your second edition of Stalin's Dilemna?? - I would love a copy....

[dgaad]

I did enjoy NGG. However, EB's approach to history in this thread leaves much to be desired. Especially revealing is his dismissal of Kruschev's autobiography. Any historian attempting to understand the history of modern Russia would almost have to read this work. There is no question that any memoir or autobiography suffers from bias on the part of the author. That shouldn't lead to the same or reverse bias on the part of the historian. Historians collect information from all sources, then make determinations about what words and text will best communicate an objective understanding of past events and societies. There is plenty of good information in Krushchev's work, but that doesn't mean I accept as gospel his iteration of the facts. However, it is especially revealing of the mindset of a person who did in fact have a significant impact on history.

[Wolfpack]

Originally posted by Martinov:

EB is a historian, actually, and author of No Greater Glory civil war & Revolution '76 computer games, also an interesting simulation called Stalin's Dilemna (see underdogs site).

Good lord would I love a remade version of NGG. Still the best American Civil War game after 11-12 years. Of course getting it to work on my system now is impossible. Sorry, that had nothing to do with the topic, but I just had to say that.

[EB.]

Well, of course it is important to read different versions of things. I myself have read Khrushchev's works more than once and I dare to say more times than most historians "expert" in the field, even original unpublished works and documents. What I am saying, however, is that you should be extra wary about Khrushchev's works because they have an unprecedented amount of BS. I just had a conversation with someone (non-historian) who after reading a much-praised book on World War Two had the lasting impression that Khrushchev was the leader of the USSR in the war, that he alone was responsible for the evacuation of industries to the Urals, for the victory at Stalingrad, for the capture of Berlin, and so forth--all mega-BS of course. I tried to argue with him, saying that I have read hundreds or thousands of books on the topic, but of course I could not convince him. There are many like that.

Anyway, go ahead and read Khrushchev--just don't believe any of it.

Also, I am sorry but I cannot take credit for the wonderful computer games which you have mentioned though I do have all of them on my shelf. The genius of "Stalin's Dilemma" game is that it shows in real figures the sense behind Stalin's economic policies of the 1930's. The fashionable "crazy dictator" line of debate is just silly--all of the Soviet economic moves were rational prerequisites for the Soviet victory in the war. The game shows this very well. The game author is a true genius, I must say. He deserves a medal.

Also, finally, I realize that every army in the war had a combination of front-line replacement and rear-area rebuilding in their military administrations. What I am trying to point out is that the Soviets throughout the war focused on rear-area rebuilding relatively more compared to most armys. So, of course you can find some instances in which the Soviets sent replacements directly to the front. And when they did rebuild, they did not necessarily sent the units far to the rear--in fact, "rotating" them a short distance to the rear to rest and refit would qualify in my mind as "rebuilding in the rear".

My bothered me most originally is that the player receives a magical discount on his purchases at the front. That is silly. If you want to make it cost the same to raise a unit by one combat point in front-line replacement as rear-area rebuilding, then that is fine with me. Just please do not give a DISCOUNT to the front-line replacements.

All the best, EB.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by EB.:

The fashionable "crazy dictator" line of debate is just silly

I caution people not to consider EB's posting as any kind of serious expostion of history of economics. The way you can tell is by his persistent chest beating statemetns like "absolutely true" or "just silly" "we know this to be a fact" and other statements like this. No one who has studied history at a university would ever present history like this.

Stalin was a paranoid megalomaniac who killed about 20 million people. There are MILLIONS of families in Russia that would take issue with the idea that his domestic policies were completely sane. There are tens of millions of souls who, if they could speak, would tell of years of untold paranoic horror under his regime.

[EB.]

dgaad criticizes me in a most rude fashion for my education, but I assure you that I have more degrees, more articles, more research, more speeches, and more discussion for many years on these exact topics. I know exactly what I am talking about--inside and out. The unfortunate thing is that the arguments which you use are just the same old tired lines from American propaganda. Repetition without thought. It is very dangerous to believe that nonsense. You must distrust the Western sources or at least understand their bias, their anti-Soviet propaganda purpose, and their intellectual weaknesses. If you really believed what you say (that Stalin was a bad leader in terms of economics, politics, and military affaris), then the war would have been over quickly as a German victory.

To all of your arguments, our people can simply point out the ultimate truth: we won the war. Our people see more and more that Stalin was not an insane bumbler as the democratic reformers have tried to teach us (these same anti-Russian reformers who destroyed our country and sold its pieces to the West) but instead that he was a great leader whose ruthlessness was an absolute prerequisite to the eventual Soviet victory. As current situation in Russia proves, the American way is just a big myth--as it is today, so it is with the American version of history, a version which praises the US only and seeks to steal the rightful glory of the Russian people.

So, to repeat: we won the war. That solves all of the arguments. You are in fact the one who seeks to take things out of context and who completely fails to prove the things which you state. Do you have a community college degree? Pray tell.

I myself am very objective about the war. For example, I admit most readily that Churchill was a great leader--in fact, the very best leader that Britain has ever had in my opinion. He on many occasions praised Stalin himself, calling him the greatest leader in Russian history, pointing out that Stalin's name will remain rightfully glorified for centuries to come because of his great successes before and during the war. Is Churchill wrong on this point? I think not.

Please improve your logic and research skills. You quote paperbacks and hearsay-upon-innuendo evidence, while I myself have seen the original documents and sources. Keep your opinions, fine, but do not try to spread them in Russia any more.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by EB.:

Do you have a community college degree? Pray tell.

I have a degree in History and Education from the University of Michigan (1988). Maybe you've heard of it.

I also have a Law degree from McGeorge School of Law (1992).

I'm guessing you have a degree in Agitation from Patrice Lumummba University.

[ October 15, 2002, 04:09 PM: Message edited by: dgaad ]