Soviet Artillery practice?

[Jeff Duquette]

From: Charles Sharp’s: “Soviet Armor Tactics in World War II, from Combat Regulations of 1944”. It’s apparently a translated version of the original 1944 Soviet Combat Regulations for the individual armored vehicle, tank platoon, and tank company. Presumably the Soviet counterpart to FM17-32.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>289. Before starting the attack tank engines are started on a signal from the company commander. In addition to the signal from the company commander to start the attack, the platoon leader gives the signal, "March!" ("Forward!") and leads his platoon in the ordered direction to the attack, maintaining his position in the company formation. In special cases - because of obstacles or a long distance to the enemy main battle line - the platoon marches from the Start Position in close or march formation and deploys for combat on the march.

290. From the Start Position the platoon leader directs the movement of his platoon according to the Guide platoon. Upon reaching the effective range of enemy antitank gun fire (1000 to 1200 meters) the platoon attacks at extreme speed. After passing through the combat formation of our own infantry the platoon opens strong cannon and machine gun fire while on the move, breaks into the enemy main battle line and destroys

the enemy infantry.

291. The platoon negotiates antitank obstacles under covering fire from other tank platoons and with the support of guns assigned to support the tanks (self-propelled guns, infantry guns, antitank guns).

292. If the obstacle cannot be negotiated by the entire platoon at the same time part of the tanks in the platoon provide fire support for the others in crossing. In cases where the obstacle cannot be crossed, and no detour around it can be found, the platoon maneuvers to exploit the terrain (for cover), fires on the opponent and waits for a gap to be made by the following infantry.

293. In an attack with the fire support of the artillery and mortars the platoon advances close to the barrage of the artillery and mortars (within 75 to 100 meters). Any delay or falling back behind the artillery and mortar fire increases the losses of the tanks.<hr></blockquote>

Some comments on the various items:

#290 Moving fire…part of the reasoning behind poor Soviet Marksmanship on the part of tank crews.

#291 Looks like Soviets were beginning to think about bounding over-watch, although an over-watching element was not from the same platoon. Added coordination issues, especially in a day when Soviet Tankers were not overally endowed with wireless equipment.

#293 Hey…Russian creeping barrages!! And doctrine regarding how Russian tanks should take advantage of creeping barrages. Not sure I would want to be a tankodesantniki on board a T34 that crept a little to close the barrage line especially with only a 75m danger close zone. That might be fine for a 76mm barrage or 82mm mortar barrage...but 152mm’s commin’ in and only 75 meters away from troops in the open is pretty darned close.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Jason Said: A typical Russian infantry division did not lack tubes, but the main Russian type was a 76mm gun, which leaves something to be desired in oomph. Only 1 battalion per division had 122mm howitzers. Partially making up for this, each regiment had heavy 120mm mortars. In 1942 companies were still using 50mm mortars, with only the battalion level having 82mm. Above the division level you'd find what heavies there were (122mm in quantity, 152mm, 132mm rockets).

Russian div arty was "undergunned" by German or western standards, for one because they were using smaller tubes. They also lacked communications equipment, trained personnel, etc. Many of those 76mm batteries - 2/3rds of div arty - fired direct on targets they could see, for lack of the equipment and training to use indirect fire effectively.

It wasn't that they were out of tubes (from the fall of 1942 on, that is - earlier they couldn't get stuff to the front fast enough and it died rapidly when it got there).<hr></blockquote>

Sorry Jason…once again your commentary\speculation does not hold up to closer scrutiny . The lack of “tubes” was a very real concern for the Soviet Army in 1941 and 1942. And because of this lack of “tubes” divisional artillery was being supplemented via mortars.

From: “Soviet Artillery in WWII” by M. Foedrowitz.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The Red Army lost one half of its entire artillery equipment park in the first six months of the war; the German salvage depots alone counted 25,696 guns of every caliber by 20 December 1941. The Wehrmacht captured 5,396 guns in the double battle of Vyazma-Bryansk, 3,820 in the Smolensk area, and 3,718 in the battle of encirclement at Kiev! In contrast production of field artillery in 1941 totaled 7,282 guns.

The considerable losses in cannon, howitzers and heavy howitzers led to a drastic curtailment of the artillery equipment park of a rifle division from 280 guns to 132 including mortars. The forces thus released were used to form an artillery reserve under the command of the high command of the Red Army. In 1941 this force comprised 110 artillery units (8% of total strength). By I December 1942 this figure had risen to 255 and in August 1945 35% of the Red Army's artillery was in the artillery reserve.<hr></blockquote>

By the way Stalin had pretty much put the kybosh on production of the 45mm anti-tank gun as well as 76.2mm in January of 1941. This only further complicated the Red Armys predicament in 1941 & 1942. Both weapons were extremely important anti-tank assets to Soviet Rifle divisions (the 76.2mm had a duel purpose role and also made up a significant portion of a Soviet Rifle Divisions indirect fire capability). Factories had to retool in order to begin mass production of the 45mm and 76mm....again. Munitions plants also had to retool in order to begin manufacturing 45mm and 76mm ammunition. This all was occurring during a period when critical armaments plants were either being over-run by the Germans, or were being packed up on railroad cars and sent to the Urals.

From: Soviet Artillery Weapons, Part III, 1941-1945, by Arthur Volz.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> Soviet artillery was hard hit by the German invasion. Immense losses were suffered and by December 1941 around 26,000 antitank, field and anti-aircraft weapons had been captured by the German forces. Nine of the thirteen gun factories either were overrun, besieged or evacuated. Peacetime stocks of ammunition were consumed in the early months of fighting. Between August and November 1941 a total of 303 ammunition plants went out of operation, severely affecting an industry beset with chronic problems in peacetime.

Wartime difficulties were not those solely related to quantity production. They included problems arising from an almost immediate shift in priorities. Before the war it was normal to turn out a carefully planned mix of guns and howitzers in various calibers. This suddenly was replaced by a heavy demand for light field guns for antitank work and anti-aircraft weapons to ward off the far-ranging Luftwaffe. Evacuation came soon and dwindling resources had to be concentrated on turning out antitank, field and anti-aircraft guns, while the legitimate needs for high-angle support weapons had to be met by increasing numbers of mortars and multi-round rocket launchers turned out in converted civilian plants. The vastly increased demands for tank guns was another factor. All of this was complicated further by the fact that production programs had been mangled by Stalin's January 1941 order to halt manufacture of 45mm antitank and 76mm regimental guns. Prewar preparations for increased production of heavy and superheavy cannon were also suddenly a hindrance rather than a help, and the fact that the manufacture of the new light automatic anti-aircraft guns was just getting underway in factories that were soon to be evacuated was most disconcerting.<hr></blockquote>

And finally, somewhat of a reiteration of the above with some added caveats, an excerpt from an essay by Harold Gordon on Soviet Artillery contained in BH Liddell Hart’s The Red Army”.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Soviet artillery tactics and technique, however, were not what they might have been. The widespread purges of the late 1930’s had hit the Army hard. According to fairly reliable estimates, between 60 and 70 percent of the officers of field grade had been arrested. There had not been time to train replacements adequately, especially in technically complicated arms like the artillery. Infantry and combined arms commanders were also new and inexperienced. And, finally, the Russian peasant did not make the best material for handling the many complicated jobs needed to make an artillery unit function properly. Despite the increasing industrialization of the nation, a great percentage of the Army's recruits were fresh off the farm, and most of them were not even familiar with agricultural machinery. These and many other factors help to explain why fire-control and co-operation among the various combat arms were poor.

The first months of the war were disastrous for the Soviet Army, and great quantities of artillery along with crews fell into the Germans' hands.

The second phase was a phase of desperate improvisation. The losses of material had been extremely serious. The losses of trained officers and NCOs were even more dangerous. The artillery could not carry on if the existing organization and tactics were retained. The High Command recognized this, and ordered drastic measures to enable the Army to survive until new troops and weapons and leaders could turn the tide. The artillery in rifle divisions was halved by the removal of one regiment. The guns 'saved' by this method were regrouped into GHQ units and were held ready for employment wherever they were most needed. Great emphasis was laid on mortars and rocket-launchers and anti-tank weapons, which were produced in great quantities and given to the GHQ units.

Mortars were easy and cheap to produce, and could be turned out in quantity far faster than conventional field artillery weapons. Furthermore, they were much simpler to handle and fire than were artillery pieces. Raw recruits could master them much more swiftly than they could a howitzer or field gun. Also, by equipping even their heavy 120-mm mortars with light wheeled carriages, the Russians ensured that the weapons could be manhandled into position when necessary. The mortar was an ideal weapon for an army fighting for its life with half-trained man-power.<hr></blockquote>

[ 10-27-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[Jeff Duquette]

Another reference to Soviet Creeping Barrages. This is taken from: “The Soviet General Staff Study for The Battle of Kursk”. Basically a study written by the Red Army General Staff for the Red Army. Later translated by D. Glantz and H. Orenstein.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The planning and control of fire

A system of fire (fixed barrage fire, mobile [creeping] barrage fire, fire concentrations, and long-range fire) in front of the forward edge of the defense and in depth was developed and prepared in detail in the armies. The artillery of first-echelon divisions was the primary firing system. The artillery of second-echelon divisions remained within these divisions and prepared fire concentrations in front of the forward edge of the main defensive belt and against possible tank and infantry concentrations in the defensive depth and barrage fire (creeping barrage and fixed barrage fire) in the defensive depth and in front of the forward edge of the second belt and intermediate defensive lines. In separate instances, for example, in the 7th Guards Army the artillery of rifle divisions in second-echelon rifle corps and armies reinforced the first-echelon divisions.<hr></blockquote>

This is some information that Kip Anderson was talking about several months ago, but it’s worth looking at again. It regards typical delay time between a Red Army FO’s Call For Fire and actual impact time. “TRP's” have a fairly quick response time, no surprise there. Even surprise targets have a pretty darned quick response time @ 4 to 7 minutes.

I am only guessing here, but I would suspect the amount of time the Red Army was given to prepare its defenses around Kursk is reflected in these fairly rapid CFF to impact times. Within the primary defensive belts along the northern and southern shoulders of the salient it is probable that ever tree was pre-registered and ever bit of high ground had a dug-in Russian FO sitting on it with a field phone.

In addition the huge number of guns per km at Kursk certainly wouldnt have hurt response times either. Every infantry company -- no doubt -- had dedicated batteries to rely upon for artillery support...no waiting for whom ever might have priority of fire. Still these are impressive numbers and a reflection of the Skill\Professionalism of the Red Army artillery arm by 1943.

Again from “The Soviet General Staff Study for The Battle of Kursk”.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The plan envisioned the concentration of the fire of 5-7 artillery battalions on main axes. All planned fires were ranged by artillery units. Particularly serious attention was devoted to the accuracy and rapidity of the opening of fire. This was ensured by ranging, control, and verification of the readiness of artillery units to carry out the planned fire. The army and formation artillery commanders and their staffs usually carried out the verification. As a result of these checks and subsequent work on correcting problems, the opening of fire, which at first continued for 10—15 minutes and sometimes for as much as 40 minutes, was brought down to 40—90 seconds in a number of units. As a rule, prepared fire was opened 1.5-3 minutes after it was called for and the opening of unplanned fire took 4—7 minutes. <hr></blockquote>

[ 10-28-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[Michael Emrys]

Jeff, how typical should we regard this performance? As pointed out, the Soviets had a lot of time to prepare the Kursk defenses. Presumably they also were able to devote a goodly amount of time to preparing the opening of their larger offensives. But how did their artillery perform in more fluid situations, say after a breakthrough?

Michael

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Mike Said: Jeff, how typical should we regard this performance?<hr></blockquote>

I have no idea. It is the first time I have come across this sort of information with regards to Soviet Artillery. It sounds like it must have been typical with respect to Kursk. It may very well reflect any latter war CCF to impact times for Soviet Attacks or defensive positions that were well prepared. I certainly wouldn’t rest my hat on this information for 1941-1942 Soviet operations. Nor would I put faith in the above CCF to impact times for meeting engagements or fluid operations at any point in the war.

As far as the reliability of the information, I can only render my own opinion that it is probably very reliable. Glantz is perhaps perceived as a “Red Army-ophile”, but in my opinion he doesn’t pull any punches with regards to uncovering incompetence and/or challenges faced by the Red Army during WWII. Leafing through “Stumbling Colossus”, “Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat”, or “Kharkov 1942, Anatomy of a Military Disaster” will tell you that he is far from a simple Red Army Cheerleader. I suspect he wouldnt have published the Staff Studies if he felt they were BS....again this is just my opinion.

The following is perhaps a somewhat tangent approach to assessing the reliability of the Russian Army Staff studies, but if you will bear with me for a minute... It's something I posted here several weeks back on another subject, and regards an action between the Schwere 505th Panzer Battalion and the 16th Tank Corps up along the northern sector of the Kursk salient.

The following excerpt describes the brief but bloody counterattack of the 16th Tank Corps on the 6th Jul as elaborated upon in “The Battle for Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study”:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Operations on 6 July

The second day of the operation began with combat involving the 16th Tank Corps which, at 0400 hours, launched a counteroffensive in the direction of Step' and Butyrki with forces of the 107th and 164th Tank Brigades. The 107th Tank Brigade attacked first, and the 164th Tank Brigade moved behind it, echeloned to the left...

During the subsequent advance the 107th Brigade's tanks encountered concentrated fire from 16 dug-in 'Tiger' tanks. In a short time, the brigade lost 46 tanks and the remaining four tanks withdrew behind the dispositions of their infantry. <hr></blockquote>

Glantz in “The Battle of Kursk” gives us a little more on this engagement based upon his review of Soviet Staff Sources:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Attacking toward Butyrid at the deepest point of German penetration, Lieutenant Colonel N. M. Teliakov's 107th Tank Brigade, leading the 16th Tank Corps, fell into an ambush of the Tiger-equipped 505th Panzer Detachment. In a matter of minutes, the Germans knocked out 46 of Teliakov's 50 tanks, and Lieutenant Colonel N. V, Kopylov's supporting 164th Tank Brigade, attacking on the 107th's left, was also heavily damaged, losing 23 tanks.<hr></blockquote>

From Niklas Zetterling: “Kursk a Statistical Study" we can get strength returns for the 16th Tank Corps for its actions on the 6th Jul. Irrecoverable losses were 69 tanks. This matches well with the Glantz & Soviet General Staff accounts described above. From the unit history of the 505th battalion (Tigers in Combat I, W. Schneider) the kill tally for the battalion for this engagement was 42 T-34’s.

A couple things going on here:

• The Red Army General Staff is writing about an action in which two of their tank brigades were severally man-handled by only 16 Tigers. Obviously an indication of professional integrity in that this embarrassing engagement was not simply swept under the carpet.
  
• The numbers from alternate sources all match up fairly well, although German claims seem light relative to actual strength returns for 107th and 164th Tank Brigades.

My own conclusion is that the Soviet Staff Study is an honest portrayal of Red Army capabilities during Kursk.

[ 10-28-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[tss]

Michael emrys wrote:

Jeff, how typical should we regard this performance? As pointed out, the Soviets had a lot of time to prepare the Kursk defenses.

That is difficult to say. Soviet artillery certainly could respond quickly on its best days but I can't say how common these were.

For example, at Särkisyrjä (19 July 1941) Finns reported "quick and accurate" Soviet artillery fire that was "worse than at Taipale" [where the men had fought in Winter War]. This is quite illuminating comparison since at Taipale RKKA had literally hundreds of guns while at Särkisyrjä they had (apparently) only one 76 mm batallion and some heavy mortars. The defence of Särkisyrjä was more or less improvised with 12-24 hours warning time (Finnish attack was a flanking operation through a roadless forest).

Another case of quick artillery responses happened in 1944 during battles of Ihantala. Lt. Lars Holmström who served as a FO at Pyöräkangas reports that Soviets located (apparently by radio DF methods) his FO position and started shelling it immediately after his every radioed fire request, with first shells landing 30-35 seconds after radio use. [He believed that Soviets had allocated a battery or two specifically for silencing the FO post].

- Tommi