MG42's - An extract from an article to discuss

[Gary T]

Hi,

As we all wait with baited breath for Cm to appear I though you might be interested in this extract from an article in the British Army's in house journal. The author was a platoon commander (MC) with Somerset LI from June 44 to May 45. I think I may have posted another extract from another of his articles some time back (he quite a prolific writer). Anyhow, as the teachers say at scholl when they can't be arsed to do any work - discuss.

To get the ball rolling I'll say the main thing that is at odds with CM in the Beta demo is the ease with which MG's are spotted in CM. Almost instantly in most cases. Also does Cm make allowance for the special tracer he mentions?

A Matter of Vulnerabilities: German Infantry

Weaknesses in WWII

Key Dependencies

Many years ago, when I was writing '18 Platoon', I said that: 'in many attacks the prisoners we took on numbered our attacking force and Gemian units who would continue to resist at close quarters were few indeed'. Stupidly I did not expand on this statement.

Recently, while dozing after Sunday lunch, my mind wandered around the extraordinary change in the fighting performance of most of the German infantry that occurred during the closing stages of a battle. German platoons, companies and battalions which, early in the battle, had fought with heartless ferocity, would surrender in aimless droves. This phenomenon happened frequently. Why was this?

After pondering on this matter a factor, common to my experience in many battles, emerged. The German infantry lost heart once we had knocked out their MG42 detachments. There was undoubtedly an over reliance on their MGs both in the attack and, more obviously, in defence. I suspect that this was the consequence of the training they received which certainly dated back to the Somme in 1916 and probably before - certainly it was noted on many occasions in the 1918 battles that ordinary German infantry did not seem to know how to use their rifles. In 1944-45 their riflemen, not including their, snipers, were generally poor shots. 'They seemed to be primarily carriers of cases and more cases of linked ammunition for their MGs. (Please see BAR 114, 'Firepower- at Platoon and Company Level').

Eliminating the MG42 was our- first priority and, due to the gun's high rate of' firepower - has it ever been exceeded? - and well sited mutuallv supporting positions, it could rarely be achieved by physical assault, even using fire and movement. To knock them out we required HE, fired directly by supporting armour or, indirectly by Dennis Clarke or Bramley Hancock, our beloved FOOs. It took me until our assault on Mont Pincon on 6th August to realise what game the Germans were playing. Clearly, they did not like close combat and chose to keep its at arms length with a display of massive MG firepower. Without HE support it was almost always impossible to get close enough to assault with rifle and bayonet. Our infantry platoons could not match the firepower of the MG42. This was recognised to some extent in the training pamphlets of the time; 'The Infantry Company 1942' states that two British platoons were required to win a firefight against one German - and this was before the MG42 was on general issue. Of one thing I am certain, a platoon armed with SA80 and LSW would be stopped by MG42s well out of' range of their own platoon weapons. At this stage you had better refer again to 'Firepower at Platoon and Company Level'.

But remember, there was airways the perennial problem of locating well-camouflaged MGs. The Germans were very good indeed at concealment and their tracer rounds, igniting two hundred yards from the muzzle of the gun, assisted this. For instance, during the early stages of our assault on Mont Pincon we were engaged by about a dozen MG 42s: to this day I have no idea of their position.

German reliance on the MG was by no means restricted to defence. In the attack they rarely finished with an assault with rifle and bayonet preferring to deluge the opposition with a powerful display of MG firepower supplemented by machine pistols and stick grenades.

[Guest R Cunningham]

Very interesting. Matches some other evaluations of the Germans I have seen. In "On Infantry" an allied battle report states:

"the Germans almost always attack your flank. They seldom close with the bayonet, but try to drive you out by fire."

Interesting notion that whole units could be demoralized by the loss of their MGs. I know from CC that the Germans couldn't hold with out them and that when they were lost I got a little demoralized. Haven't noticed the same situation in CM, perhaps because hte squads are more heavily armed.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Gary T:

I suspect that this was the consequence of the training they received which certainly dated back to the Somme in 1916 and probably before -

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Breathtaking arrogance from an army that in 1944 had not evolved it's attack formations far from the slaughterhouse approaches of the Somme (e.g. Goodwood) and until the end of WW I never seemed to realise that the enemy had machine guns and that cavalry was sort of passé. The mind boggles.

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Andreas

[Guest Big Time Software]

I think one of the key points here is the timeframe in the context of the Western Front. I think he is speaking more of the last battles (i.e. 1945) more than Normandy. He is also speaking in generalities that are hard to translate into CM. Although interesting observations, I think it isn't strong enough to create some sort of special "lose LMG, call it quits" chance. Still, if you close assault a Green squad, with a few casualties including its LMG, you should have a pretty easy time of it. So it might just be that CM simulates this in a general sense sorta naturally.

Steve

[Gary T]

Andreas,

Actually, the idea that the British Army of 1918 resembled the one of 1916 is a well oiled myth. Recent studies have shown that the British Army in 1918 had extremely well developed all arms tactics (infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft) - see Paddy Griffiths book. The fact that they promptly forgot it all and had to relearn it in WW2 is another story.

What the author is referring to is squad level tactics not the strategic cock ups that the Brits are famous for. The training of individual markmanship in the British was (and still is) a vital part of infantry training - more so than in other armies. Its a matter of philosophy - in the German army the MG was supported by the riflemen, in the British the riflemen were supported by the MG. As a matter of interest (an the articles are written so as to develop and criticise modern infantry tactics) the author is fully supportive of many parts of German WW2 military doctrine including the issue of belt fed 7.62+ calibre MG's like the MG42. He is usually highly critical of the modern infantry magazine fed squad support weapons like the LSW. As he states a modern unit so equipped would be pinned down long before it closed with the MG42's.

[Gary T]

Steve,

The assault on Mount Pincon he mentions was on the 4th August and he referring to his experiences before that date. An interesting point is that after being pinned down all day during the initial assault by the MG42's the objective was taken by using night infiltration, a tactic he urges the modern British Army to devote training (but thats an altogether different article). In another of his articles on urban combat he states the two most important weapons in the British armoury were the Flamethrower (either Wasp of Crocodile) and the AVRE - please tell me the AVRE is going to be addedat a later date. It was certainly in more widespread use than the Jadgtiger and thats in. I shall stop grumbling now.

[Colin]

Hey Steve,

Are them purty tracers in CM modeled like the one mentioned in the story? I really love them...mmmmmmm.....CM.......

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Visit my webpage!

http://cm4mac.tripod.com

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Gary T:

Andreas,

Actually, the idea that the British Army of 1918 resembled the one of 1916 is a well oiled myth. Recent studies have shown that the British Army in 1918 had extremely well developed all arms tactics (infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft) - see Paddy Griffiths book. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I was slightly exaggerating Can you give me a title for that, please, sounds interesting. All I know about it is that the reason the British forces were so shocked by the 1918 German spring offensive was that they still relied on old-fashioned training, also the low quality of incoming replacements. Can't find the sources now, but they might be out of date, as you suggest. According to that, the British and the US troops were the least prepared for the more mobile warfare of that year, while Germans, French, Canadian Corps and the Anzacs had learned some hard lessons and applied them. There must be a reason why the Canadians had to pick up and succeeded where the British failed, e.g Passchendaele (spelling?) in '17. Again, it is probably our library that is not up to date, but that is my knowledge.

Coming back to WWII, John Ellis talks about the misconception by soldiers in the ETO that rifles were not threatening, when they still accounted for a large proporation of casualties. Apparently the Allied soldiers were very scared of tanks, 88s, MGs etc. but not of rifles. It is an interesting table.

Ellis, John, - The sharp end : the fighting man in World War II - London : Pimlico, 1993. - 0712658912

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Andreas

[Guest R Cunningham]

By the Paddy Griffith book, I think he's referring to "Forward into Battle - Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future" Presido 1981, 1990 ISBN 0-89141-413-4. Good read.

[This message has been edited by R Cunningham (edited 02-29-2000).]

[Guest Big Time Software]

Simon has fed me weekly doses of Jary's "18 Platoon" and am in fact going to land myself a copy sooner rather than later

I'm still not convinced that there was some sort of endemic problem with mid 1944 German troops in terms of their over reliance on the LMG. I agree with Jary that once the average German squad loses its LMG its firepower, and therefore effectiveness, drops off dramatically. Therefore, it follows that the surving members would lose heart, so to speak. I'm sure the loss of the BAR or Bren was not welcomed either

As far as the downhill trend of the German infantry man's training, the units fighting in the summer of 1944 weren't all that bad (many in Normandy were "elite"), but it got to be very bad after the staggering losses during June and July on the Western and Eastern Fronts.

But I don't think Jary is saying that the remainder of a squad would more or less instantly surrender when the LMG was completely put out of action. Remember that a CM firefight is just that, leaving plenty of time and oportunities for the Germans to pull back or surrender before the next fight

Just keep in mind that this is the opinion of one veteran. As anybody who has looked at veteran accounts of any aspect of military life and combat, you almost always find amazingly different opinions on stuff that one would think was more or less imperical in nature. Take the US 60mm mortar for example. Some vets swore at it, others swore by it. Same weapon, generally same combat conditions, totally different opinions.

Steve

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by R Cunningham:

By the Paddy Griffith book, I think he's referring to "Forward into Battle - Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future" Presido 1981, 1990 ISBN 0-89141-413-4. Good read.

[This message has been edited by R Cunningham (edited 02-29-2000).]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks!

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Andreas

[Gary T]

Andreas,

The book I'm referring to is 'Battle Tactics on the Western Front' by Paddy Griffin. Yale University Press ISBN 0300066635. While some of the conclusions you may not agree with (I didn't agree with them all - I've not got a very high regard of British military leadership) its does redress the balance and provides food for thought.

On the subject of Canadian success. Firstly I beleive they were (together with the ANZAC's) an all volunteer force which counts for alot. Secondly one must remember their success where the British failed was against a much weakened German army. One could also argue that that was how and why the Allies in general got the chance to refine their tactics to a fine art in the last months of the war.

[Gary T]

When Jary refers to the Germans surrendering I don't think he gets the point across very well. The way I see it was that once the MG42's had been taken out the British were then able to close assault, which they couldn't do before. I think the surrendering was due more the psychological impact of the bayonet -which after all is its purpose - rather than the loss of the MG42's. However the silencing of the MG42's remained the key.

I think the psyche of the British infantry training was to close with enemy and destroy him (it fundamentally still is). I read somewhere that the German army no longer seriously practiced bayonet drills in WW2.

[Fionn]

Aye but German units on the Eastern Front sure as hell had sharpened entrenching tools.

Don't forget that a lot of what you are seeing here in these books is purely a side-effect of Allied soldiers fighting against German soldiers who have lost the will to die for "the cause".

While the Allies were at long range all soldiers would continue to fire and do their duty. As the Allies got closer and closer those soldiers who still believed fought on and died at their posts or slipped away to continue fighting a few hundred metres farther back.

The guys who stayed in the positions were a few guys who wanted to die rather than retreat and a LOT of guys who had had enough.

If you wish I can point you to a large number of circumstances in both WW1 and pre-1944 in which German soldiers engaged in bayonet fights with English troops. In one particular case in 1917 I remember talk in British histories of an entire British regiment getting virtually wiped out in hand to hand fighting in only one day in a forest.

The Brits in the Great War did note that the Germans weren't fond of close quarters fighting and preferred to keep the enemy far away but to a large extent this was both said as a sop to British propagandists ( Jerry can't take it when good old Tommy gets close in a 1 to 1 fight.... remember the trauma of the MG and the desire to convince the nation that man for man Tommy is better than Jerry ) and to encourage the soldiers to GET CLOSE.

ALWAYS look for the reason behind the myth. most of these things explain themselves if closely examined

FWIW Germans in WW1 exhibited the same professed propensity to surrender to bayonet charges in 1918 as we see in 1944 for much the same reasons ( general demoralisation in many units etc)... Also have a good look at SS units vs the Brits.. I have read many accounts of SS units INITIATING close quarters battle. So, as I hope you can see now there's a large dose of propaganda involved, a large dose of cherry-picking the facts and a forgetting of good quality German units which liked to use the bayonet (or entrenching tool really as I hear that was more popular) too

[Gary T]

Fionn,

I am completely aware of the myth/propaganda of the 'Jerry doesn't like it up 'em' line. I can't seem to think where I've said otherwise. However, the fact remains that the German soldier did not like close combat by his own admission - and that counts for pre-1944 as well. Why did he not like it? Not because he was lacking in moral fibre or any other such reason but from the simple fact that his training and doctrine stressed the use of firepower in the assault.

This is not to say that the German soldier did not take part in close combat - of course he did and when required could be extremely efficent at it.

Yes you are right about the reasons for the lack of fight amongst certain German units in NW Europe in 44-45. IMHO though I'd say that no matter what the nationality, once an attacker has broken into a defensive position the defender (if he hasn't managed to withdraw) is always likely to surrender when faced with the possibility of close combat. The momentum and psychological edge is strongly in favour of the attacker. Where surrender seems the worse option (i.e. Germans vs. Russians) or the defender has high moral then there will be vicious hand to hand fighting.

I know there are many cases of bayonet fights in both world wars but these are VERY much the exception.

FWIW Jary (in his other articles) is not being critical of the Germans philosophy of assault by fire. In fact quite the opposite. That technique was far more modern and forward looking that the British/Russian/Japanese method of closing with the enemy. He uses the German method to recommend the issue of squad weapons (to the modern British Army) that are capable of putting high volume of suppressive fire down i.e. belt fed LMG's and automatic grenade lauchers.

Coincidentally the current standard by-the-book British infantry training method is still to close to withing grenade range and follow up with close assault. And yes they are still taught bayonet drills. Not because they'll be of any real use but because (to quote and instructor I work with) 'they create an aggressive spirit'. Now where I have I heard that before? 1914?

[Fionn]

Gary,

Yup, I know you probably know but lots of others don't.. Probably a few thousand people visit the forum every day. Lots of THOSE mightn't know some of these myths for what they are.

FWIW I still think there is a use for the bayonet in war especially as a psychological anchor.. IF you can convince your men that such horrid close-in fighting can occur then they are less likely to crack if it does occur.

Psychological toughening is an imporant aspect sometimes forgotten by people.