Simcoe
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Posts posted by Simcoe
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3 hours ago, The_Capt said:
Well you have already been pretty badly mauled over this on already but lets unpack it a little further. First off "this" is not a "narrative", it is analysis and assessment. A narrative would be whatever you think my analysis was promoting. Much in that same way your own analysis is promoting another narrative.
But lets just break down your points:
1. Range. So you claim that the Adiivka salient is critical to continued UA ability to strike the "heart of Donetsk" and why it is so important to both the RA and UA. Well that statement simply does not hold up.
So that first one is a 22.5km circle from the center of Donetsk. As can be seen about the closest anyone is going to bring guns in the Adiivka salient is in and around Orlivka. Any closer and those guns are extremely vulnerable. Plus it is as close as the UA needs to get with modern base bleed rounds from 152mm or 155mm rounds. The major problem with your theory at point #1 is that the UA has a lot of terrain within the same gun ranges...that aren't currently in a threatened salient. Neetaliove and Krasnohorivka are both well within the same ranges, with far more free terrain to shoot and scoot. So unless the UA is parking guns right in the middle of the Adiivka salient (and they do not need to take that risk) this entire point of your argument falls apart. The UA can threaten Russian logistics from various points, none of them rely on the "critical node" of Adiivka.
Ok, point #2 - Fortification. Well ok, I can accept that it is heavily fortified. Well first question is "how many of those fortifications are new?"
Adiivka was a front line town back in 2015. So how old are all those bunkers? But let's say that they are indeed new. Well why would the UA build such heavy fortifications - likely on top of ones nearing ten years old? One conclusion is that this is somehow key terrain/vital ground. Or the other is that the UA has fortified because the RA keep attacking there. The fact that either side has fortified is a signal that this area is worth something, but it does not establish what that value is, or is not. Like Bakhmut, I suspect the value for the UA, on a piece of terrain they were fighting over for nearly a decade, is that it does threaten Donetsk...politically. It is a line on the map pointing at a rebel/Russian controlled city. That makes it an insult, a poke in the eye - but does not translate into military value. The UA could threaten Donetsk from about a 90 degree angle - as those other maps showed. So this is all about "I have it and you can't get it back." followed by "I disagree". The primary Ukrainian military value is the fact that significant numbers of Russians are being pushed to die there. Just like Bakhmut, which also fell and somehow did not lead to a full collapse of the entire UA defensive line.
And point #3 - "Ukrainian shelling civilians". Ok, if we are going to start throwing "narrative" around, I think I can smell where the one you are promoting one is coming from. The idea that Russia suddenly cares so much about Donetsk civilians who are suffering under the warcrimes of the UA is a pretty bold statement to toss out without a shred of proof. Do you have any references that show this? The actual loss of civilian lives in Dontesk? I am sure it has happened but do we have any proof of UA terror strikes in Donetsk? As to shelling ranges...see point #1. As to a Russian "hearts and minds" campaign...well they probably are coming late to that table given the horrendous losses the LNT/DPR have already suffered in the service of the Russian cause.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
The idea that a nation that has acted brutally with clear disregard of the LAOC suddenly "cares too much" is pretty weak.
Point #4 - you kinda snuck this one in under the door. Ukrainian losses. Well we know they are not zero, but given simple realities of defensive vs offensive, along with what we can see, the ratio is very likely in Ukraine's favour. How heavily in that favour remains unknown. What we do know is that despite losses, the UA has managed to hold this area under RA assault for over 3 months. This tells us that the losses have been sustainable. Russia has also suffered horrendous losses but keeps on attacking, so also sustainable...for now. Russia could be trying to wear the UA down to the point is suffers an operational collapse. But we have not seen this yet. We did not see it at Bakhmut and I have doubts it will happen here at Adiivka. In the end we will have to see but the levels of hardware the RA is losing alone brings into question the value of this current operation.
Last point - "Dumb Russia". Well here you are correct. We do no service to ourselves assuming Russia is always "dumb." However, we also do disservice if we assume that they are smarter than they are too, which appears a plague in some political circles. Throwing away a division on a piece of ground of dubious value is not militarily smart - it may very well be politically smart, I personally do not see it but... Russia has a pretty bad track record of bad ideas politically driven in this war, pretty much right from the start. They have made some pretty basic errors - like don't try and defend with a river behind you that has only one viable crossing; don't overreach and then double down on that overextension. I strongly suspect that Adiivka is being politically pushed from the top. It is a demonstration in the making. A demonstration to the Russia people, in their state controlled information bubbles, that Russia is still "winning". How politically smart or dumb that is, I will leave to others. Militarily, Adiivka is a horrible idea. Attacking heavily fortified enemy positions in continuing frontals, losing entire Bns at a time is not militarily smart.
Finally, I am not sure where you are getting these points from. Perhaps they are personal analysis, which is fine but you should likely work to learn more and refresh a lot of your metrics and assumptions. If you are getting them elsewhere (I get a strong whiff of MacGregor) would suggest you balance them out and keep coming back here with good questions.
Thank you for the well thought out reply.
#1 As your map suggests. Avdiivka is the closest and it's not out of the question to fire a shell or two into Donetsk. Being that close allows for shorter range to guns or drones to conduct fire missions.
#2 Doesn't matter whether they are new or not. Currently Ukraine can tie up a much greater percentage of Russian manpower with comparatively fewer forces. The question is how dense are the fortifications behind it. If there are none or few behind Avdiivka then Ukraine now has a section of the front that must be much more heavily manned.
#3 Here's a few examples. These were from a quick google search.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/21/ukrainian-shelling-donetsk-shopping-area
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelling_of_Donetsk,_Russia
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-shelling-russian-controlled-donetsk/32676019.html
#4 Even the US argued that Ukraine should leave Bakhmut. Multiple Ukrainian officials have lamented that Bakhmut should have been given up earlier to spare manpower.
https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/24/politics/ukraine-shift-tactics-bakhmut/index.html
I don't bring these up to celebrate one side or the other just to challenge viewpoints here. I've enjoyed reading the responses even with the insults.
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9 hours ago, The_Capt said:
I think this is an extension of the whole Zelensky/Zaluzny thing. Politically towns and cities matter very much. Militarily the answer is far less cut and dry.
Looking on the map:
Adiivka has next to zero operational value. It is stubborn salient that the RA is breaking a division upon - that is its military value. If Adiivka falls it means next to nothing unless this is somehow the lynchpin of the entire UA defence in this sector - which we know it is not. No natural obstacles, no transport infra implications. Any core resources or communications tech centered on Adiivka?
This whole "not one step back" plays well to the public but in reality land war is a lot of trading ground for options. And right now the RA is not buying anymore options through this whole exercise.
"But if we lose it, we will just have to take it back." Well true, but if the RA breaks another division there, perhaps it might be much easier to take back afterwards? And frankly this whole sector is an offensive nightmare - you take back Adiivka...so what? Next stop is an urban hell called Donetsk. This is a side show the RA is being pushed into politically and blowing itself all to hell over. So Ukraine should keep it just as long as it keep delivering 10:1 loss ratios for the RA. After that pull back and find another Bakhmut/Aviidka and let the RA smash itself to pieces.
As to Bradleys and Abrahams - sure keep them coming but they are not what this fight will ride on. C4ISR, unmanned, infantry and guns - get those right and then if there is room on the plane, load a Bradley.
The RA is not some bottomless behemoth. It is a mess of a military that is playing chicken with itself. Eventually it will lose.
I don't really buy this narrative.
1. It's close enough to the heart of Donetsk to shell/send drones from. This restricts the Russians ability to move and transport supplies up and down the line.
2. The most heavily fortified part of the entire line. You won't find such a large concentration of concrete bunkers after this until you reach the new line they're building farther to the west.
3. The Ukrainians have shelled civilian areas regularly from Avdiivka. As long as it stands the DPR and the civilian population will question Russians commitment to their cause.
Finally, I have a hard time believing Russia is the only one suffering during this battle. It's pretty easy to geolocate equipment losses but what about infantry hit farther behind the line with artillery, thermobarics, glide bombs, FPV drones. This is a fire sac surrounded on three sides.
Whether it's worth it I don't know but we have to stop assuming Russians are stupid. It's counterproductive. If they are spending this much blood and treasure and we don't understand why then there must be something they know that we don't.
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11 hours ago, Centurian52 said:
I expect anything in eastern Europe would be a no-go while the war is still on, for the same reasons that further work on CMBS had to be shelved. I think there are some interesting prospects for a new modern war game set in SE Asia/Pacific, if they are up for doing the artwork for the new terrain. Either a game depicting asymmetric warfare with North Korea vs South Korea and the US, or a game depicting peer/near-peer warfare with China vs Taiwan and the US.
The advantage of doing China vs Taiwan/US would be that a lot of the work on CMCW US forces could be carried over directly for Taiwanese forces. The advantage of doing N. Korea vs S. Korea/US is that there is probably a lower chance of the real thing breaking out a few years after the game is developed. And there is a lot of S. Korean kit that I would be very interested in seeing in action.
Wherever a new modern warfare game ends up being set, there is a lot of interesting new kit that will be entering US service in the next few years that will be interesting to see in action. The M10 Booker, the new, smaller, and more easily deployable cousin to the Abrams, will be entering service with US airborne units in the next few years. It would make sense to see it with the first American units to arrive in Taiwan. There are plans to get a new IFV to replace the Bradley, but I think we're still early in that process, so it's unlikely a Bradley replacement would make it into a new near-future title. There aren't any plans for a new MBT yet as far as I'm aware. So a new modern war title would bring us a shiny new light tank in light US forces, but we'll still be seeing the same Bradley/Abrams combo in the heavy forces.
The US is also getting new small arms. We're going back to the battle rifle concept with the XM7 rifle (presumably it will just be called the M7 when it enters service (the 'X' is usually dropped when a new system actually enters service)). The theory being that the greater penetration of a battle rifle is more useful now that all infantry are wearing body armor. And optics being available to all infantry means that modern riflemen should actually be able to take advantage of the greater range and accuracy of a battle rifle, which was completely irrelevant back when riflemen were limited to iron sights and the mk-1 human eyeball. But it still has most of the classic drawbacks of a battle rifle. It will be heavier than the M4, and troops won't be able to carry as much ammunition for it. It is reportedly softer firing than most older battle rifles, so it may still be controllable in full auto (certainly more controllable than the M14 was). Getting to play around with it in Combat Mission should give us a sense for whether going back to a battle rifle is actually a good idea.
But the XM7 rifle is actually the least of it. Maybe the brass think that going back to a battle rifle is a great idea, maybe they don't. Either way, that's not really why we're going back to a battle rifle. The biggest reason is for ammunition compatibility with the new light machine gun we're getting. The XM250 (again, presumably it will just be the M250 when it enters service) is going to be significantly lighter than the M249, significantly more accurate than the M249, will have significantly greater range than the M249, and will have almost no felt recoil. There's some give and take as to whether the XM7 will really be an overall improvement over the M4. But there is absolutely no doubt that the XM250 will be a huge improvement over the M249 in just about every way. Whatever you might think of the XM7, I have no doubt that the XM7/XM250 combo will represent a significant improvement in US infantry firepower over the M4/M249 combo. And I can hardly wait to try them out in a new modern warfare Combat Mission title.
I agree, it would be fascinating to see how the US adapts to the warfare environment we're seeing in Ukraine.
I'd rather them focus on Combat Mission 3. Unless we get some huge changes to how drones are handled, EW, artillery and aircraft a new modern game is still WW2 mechanics crudely bolted onto a modern game.
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Playing the new Final Blitzkrieg campaigns and the first Canadian scenario has mine clearing Shermans. The mines and mine clearing vehicles adds an exciting element to an otherwise bog standard scenario.
Why hasn't this concept been expanded upon? The Cold War especially, the Soviets invested heavily in mine clearing tanks and NATO invested heavily in mines. Why hasn't Battlefront added mine clearing vehicles to other modules?
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8 hours ago, Erwin said:
Good point. But since we don't know what Ukraine's manpower reserves are, it's hard to judge if they can survive a year or three+ years. Look at how Germany survived the last year or two of WW2 with boys and old men. All rational thought was that Germany would sue for peace.
Of course there is no equivalent cult of personality around Zelensky. But, my prediction is that the West will put pressure on Ukraine to negotiate due to the West's own domestic problems. The only question is how the West will be able to spin the result to its own population (us) as a "victory".
True. Do you think Biden is forcing Zelenzky to continue the fight until after the elections?
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5 hours ago, Erwin said:
In the same way that the Russians were expected by most on these forums to collapse last year, and instead the Russians summoned up their historic defensive stubbornness and willingness to endure massive casualties/pain last seen in WW2 (a personality attribute that we in the west historically do not understand) and survived and according to many journalists now seem to be doing ok (with support from around the world from those who are either hostile towards the US/West or at least neutral). My sense is that Ukraine also has massive reserves of stubbornness and if they are not forced by the west to negotiate, they will stick their heels in and fight - possibly to the detriment of their own future.
Maneuvering the yuan as an alternative or replacement reserve currency has been a significant effort by the People's Republic of China. The PRC has pursued this goal by conducting more international trade using the Chinese yuan, and negotiating deals to allow the purchase of Saudi Arabian oil in yuan.Jul 4, 2023
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/16/china-yuan-renminbi-us-dollar-currency-trade/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/21/china-yuan-us-dollar-sco-currency/
https://www.noemamag.com/china-wants-to-ditch-the-dollar/
However, no need to panic yet:
It's unlikely that the world will wake up one day with dollars no longer holding international appeal. Rather, in examples such as the British pound, there was a multi-decade process by which it went from the center of world economics to a second-tier currency.Sep 20, 2023
With Russia it made a bit more sense. They were already overmatching in tanks, artillery and airpower. Once they fixed their manpower issues they were able to mount a strong defense and immediately go on the offensive.
For Ukraine they are pulling people off the streets and they haven't been able to pass the new conscription measures. They may have the will but they are running out of people and equipment to man it.
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7 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:
Maybe they don't want to replace the dollar with the renmimbi, but instead to make for example the Euro the new reserve currency?
Even if they did, the European Union is still too weak and politically divided to ever become the kind of rival to China that the USA is.
Or in other words: Pluck the feathers off the eagle and give them to the chicken.
China and Russia are definitely pushing for a multi polar world where the USD is less prominent. As we've seen in the Ukraine war, any nation that goes against the US interests can be locked out of the global banking system. I'm sure finding ways to circumvent this is top priority.
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On 1/24/2024 at 5:53 PM, Erwin said:
I think that Ukraine can survive longer than next summer. But, one has to consider that many millions of Ukrainians have fled their country... and (according to Google) so far about 10 million have not returned and seem happy to stay abroad. If they don't want to fight for their own country that means that those who remain will be whittled down in an attritional war with Russia that suits Russia just fine since they have a much larger population.
One would expect that Ukraine will have to start fielding older men and younger men. The long term effects of a destroyed generation of men were seen in the UK (and France, Germany etc) after WW1.
It will be interesting to see how pressure starts to be applied on Ukraine to consider a compromised negotiated settlement that gives the West the opportunity to declare "victory" (while Russia and China will declare the same natch).
Seems that those who think that Ukraine will "win" are basing their hopes on Russia "falling apart". This seems akin to Hitler hoping the Allies would fall apart after the death of Roosevelt. From my experience and travels, Russia can endure much more pain and suffering than we in the west can imagine. And from the WSJ articles it seems that Russia is actually doing ok with exports and relations with its many supporters in the ME, Africa, S. America and of course China. The real threat is China's blatant attempt to overthrow the USD and replace it with the Renminbi by supporting the sort of chaos we see in Ukraine... and now other parts of the world - demonstrating the weakness of current administrations in the US and Europe.
If we assume the US is done sending support and the EU sends small batches of equipment and supplies I don't see how Ukraine can make it past the end of the year. Either Ukraine runs out of men, equipment or the will to continue. All three are possible.
My prediction is the loss of one or both of Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka trigger negotiations if they haven't already started.
How do you see Ukraine surviving past 2024?
As for China overthrowing the dollar. I just don't see why they would want to. Their economy is based on export, if they become the reserve currency the currency will grow stronger and make exports unprofitable. Also, who is going to trust the CCP as a reserve currency? They value their ability to manipulate their currency and their stock market according to the whims of the government. No one would want to hold the currency if the CCP could make it worthless after some unilateral decision.
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Nothing to see here folks.
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Thanks for sharing these. Short of a miracle I don’t see how Ukraine can last past this summer.
Russia makes gains daily and doesn’t look to be slowing down. Targets like Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar which used to be a pipe dream now seem to only be a matter of time.
This is exacerbated by the US and EU dropping or slowing down their support. The US was paying for pensions and government salaries. How will Ukraine make up this budget shortfall? How long will soldiers fight without pay?
Finally, where are they going to get the soldiers to man the NATO equipment? Is Europe going to deport millions of Ukrainians back so they can drive tanks and dig trenches? Able bodied men are already being kidnapped and sent to Avdiivka.
I believe the US, EU and Ukraine need to come to the negotiating table now while they still have leverage. How much leverage I’m not too sure.
I’m concerned the US will keep this going until the bitter end to further Russia’s attrition at the expense of Ukraine’s destruction.
This is just my take as someone that looks at the information from both sides.
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6 hours ago, Anthony P. said:
Personally, I'd rather there be some "off map" IADS factor, like Electronic Warfare is implemented. In the context of what technical capabilities that F-15s, F-16s, Apaches, etc. have compared to the on map air defences in game... the latter should be borderline irrelevant.
What may influence their abilities to provide CAS is the levels at which the IADS a few kilometres behind the immediate frontline can operate. If the mission maker sets that to High, attacking aircraft might be more likely than not to abort or terminate their attack runs prematurely to evade SAMs, resulting in ordnance either not being dropped or having a decent chance of missing (a high EW setting has IRL been demonstrated to degrade the abilities of GPS guided munitions, so they might miss due to that factor as well if ground forces aren't able to lase the target), etc. Additionally the attacking aircraft might even stand a ~10% chance of actually being damaged/shot down at High levels during each attack run, a not insignificant risk when contemplating whether and how often to use CAS platforms like the F-15E which can carry a large number of bombs.
I very much agree with your description, the WW2 mechanics are clumsily and unrealistically bolted on to SF and BS. Chasing after Tunguskas to clear the field for Apaches is... yeah, realistically the Apache is likely better at finding and destroying Tunguskas than the ground forces it's supporting would be.
Totally agree. Either let us decide what risk we’re willing to take or restrict the ordnance based on the AA/EW factor of the scenario.
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10 hours ago, Brille said:
Well but isn´t that exactly what happens in real wars ? If you have AA assets like manportable rocketlaunchers, you surely can end the threat often before it even begins. We can see it in the actual ukraine war: Where anti air units are fielded the losses in aircrafts of all sorts rise rapidly to the point of one faction keeping the usage of them to a minimum or very cautiously deployment.
I understand that there maybe should be some tweaks here and there but in general it would not change the outcome that much. For example I have the feeling that MANPADS have a to quick reaction time when an aircraft passes. I would guess in a combat zone as CMBS where each faction knows that the oponent has anti air assets, proper flight tactics would also be used (low and fast). Plus the MANPADS rely heavily on eyesight and are mostly not radar assisted. At least not in the actual spotting/identifying of an aircraft.
So I would guess that they would take a bit longer to actually take a shot, unlike AA vehicles like the Tunguska for example. Sure those are bukier weapon systems but they have radar and probably would have got a small blip on their screen beforehand to know that aircrafts are around. Plus they know directly if that aircraft is either friend or foe.
All in all however aircrafts feel like they should, at least by the scale that combat mission depicts.
Maybe BFC could add jetfighters into the mix to hunt down enemy CAS or to limit their effectiveness (aircrafts can not stay in the area for to long - reduced gunruns). But that would also lead to more randomness (which is not a bad thing entirely).
Other than that is just to communicate with your opponent to not use air assets at all. For the new PBEM++ system however it would be really nice to maybe introduce a check list of options of what you want to have in your game, as you have no way to communicate there.
But well that is more likely to come with CMx3....
As I agree that the spotting in CM is sometimes a bit too random (especially talking about forests), I find it to be working most of the time.
No offense here but if you loose an entire company of tanks in a turn without gaining anything, you either had bad tanks and/or low quality crews (compared to your opponent), bad tactics or you must have been very very unlucky.
If you have fielded T62 tanks against more modern ones (for example) you either start digging their graves already or you bring a huge bunch of them with you and even then you probably get beaten up pretty bad.
They are not that much more better than a WW2 tank after all so that seems about right. In CMCW they surely can compete with M60s until they get their TTS upgrade but that´s mostly the end of it. Random spotting has not much to do with that.
Fielding them with more experienced crews and keeping the commanders out for observation (against doctrine) helps a lot though.
And I also lost a full company of them once in 1-2 turns in CMSF2. But that came down to the lack of knowledge I had at that time and because it is an outdated tank even when upgraded.
I got to know the hard way that their smokebombs don´t block IR imagers. Oh what a fine turkey shooting my oponent had.
On the first point. I'm coming at this from a fun standpoint. I totally understand that CAS isn't fun for the opposing side in real life but there are many aspects that aren't fun that have been removed from the game in the name of fun.
All I'm saying is the mechanics are not fun because neither side has much agency over the results. I think there are ways to make it more interactive but I have low confidence it will happen.
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6 hours ago, Anthony P. said:
MANPADS are, provided you're somewhat on top of what you're doing, not a serious threat. Or rather, they shouldn't be, not for a capable military like the American one at least. Russia did seem to have gone into the war with the aim of sufficiently blunting the Ukrainian IADS that they should be able to fly high level precision missions, and low level within actual visual range of their objectives as opposed to just lobbing rockets all over a few square kilometers. Ukraine never had a hope of blunting the Russian IADS to that degree, and in the end the Russians couldn't pull it off against the Ukrainians either, hence the mess/suppressed air ops of both sides.
So for CMBS, sure, Russian and Ukrainian CAS can be argued to be reasonable, but American CAS is just so off that it fails to bear serious resemblance to reality (it doesn't even have a number of capabilites which the CMBS manual itself grants that they have IRL).
That's what's lacking with Western CAS in CMBS and CMSF. It is dumbed down to low tech standards which do not align with reality. AH-64Es, which for one should bring serious spotting abilities to the table in the shape of an FCR and its own drone, do not but are entirely dependent on spotting made by player controlled ground units and drones, and secondly, though it should be able to sit at a safe distance, well outside the range of the best Russian air defences on the map in CMBS (either lobbing laser guided missiles at targets painted by drones or ground forces or firing radar guided missiles at targets it's spotted by simply unmasking its small mast mounted FCR) they instead come flying in lasing their targets themselves and holding fire until within range of enemy air defences, even when being aware of them and actually targeting them.
That's one of the more egregious examples, but the overall point is that Western CAS in the modern titles (BS and SF) is horribly dumbed down to very unrealistic standards for simple gameplay balancing. Sorry, but an Apache or a Strike Eagle in SF going up against even the worst threats it could face should be even less vulnerable than an Abrams facing off against a T-55 in a plain desert at night time. Instead a single MANPADS is a very serious threat to both of them simply for balancing. CAS works well in the WW2 titles (because it works horribly and is almost as dangerous to your own side, which is realistic) and in CMCW (because that was prior to the Soviet systems being badly outpaced by Western tech and it was a scenario in which heavy air losses was something foreseen as inevitable), but in later games it becomes so poorly implemented that it's not much fun as an asset.
Great point. WW2 mechanics have been bolted onto a 21st century conflict.
It would be great if you had more control over CAS. For example, on the Russian side you could use the safe option of unguided rockets with a low chance of intercept but low impact or a full on bombing run that would have major impact but high risk of intercept.
Until then I'd rather stick with the age the mechanics were made for.
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14 hours ago, Brille said:
Im not that long into the modern war titles as other folk but air power should be a threat If not opposed.
As it is now the effectiveness of choppers and planes is decided mainly on the purchase screen and not so much (If at all) by skill of the user.
Mainly the decisive factors are if the oponent cares to take (enough) anti air assets with him and if he has meaningful units worth shooting at.
The rest is timing and luck.
But what would you change if you could ?
In my book air assets should be powerful if not opposed by anyone or anything. And they come with a good price if you want them in a heavy AT configuration, considering that they maybe even get shot down before they could launch a thing.
Would be nice however if the tanks could actually use their AA MG at least for helicopters closing in.
Shooting them down should be rare but maybe at least throw them of target or let them think twice to come back...at least as a possibility.
@T62 bad eyesight:
In my experience all tanks without any thermal imagers are bad at spotting things (closed up), though soviet style stuff are just a tick more bad.
WW2 stuff in that case is the same to me only that the gap between each faction isnt that wide in terms of optics.
So are these bugs/wrong coding or just false expectations ?
Thank you for the well thought out reply.
I really don't have any good ideas on how to fix air support other than quality of life features like allowing the player to zone off larger portions of the map as open for air strikes.
Air support is just frustrating to deal with on both sides.
The side calling it has no way to influence the air strike. The enemy team will hide their AA assets and aside from a lucky artillery strike there's no way you can take them out against a competent opponent.
The team receiving the air strike either has AA units and can destroy any air support no matter their position or they don't have any AA and you are at the mercy of a completely random mechanic. Sometimes you lose an infantry squad, sometimes you lose your only artillery observer.
At least in WW2 games it's a limited mechanic used in a small number of scenarios.
As for tank spotting:
I have no issue with tanks not spotting every target I can see. I've gone out hunting in the real world and glassed an area for an hour before noticing another hunter in a bright orange. I have an issue when the randomized spotting mechanics lead to losing an entire company of tanks in a turn.
In WW2 you at least have time to respond because tanks miss and shots bounce.
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1 hour ago, Halmbarte said:
It seems like that sometimes. And sometimes you get this:
T62 crossing open ground spotted the M150 launch, got off a shot and a hit while the missile was still in flight.
H
I could pull up a picture of someone winning the lottery and say the same thing.
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3 hours ago, AtlasActual said:
Not bugs, features!
Care to elaborate?
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53 minutes ago, Vacillator said:
We might be tarred and feathered for it, but that's where I'm at so far.
I used to be a big modern CM player but I'm firmly in the WW2 camp now.
Modern games exacerbate all the weaknesses of the engine. I think most people will agree the biggest issues in the game are aircraft(control is very basic and you either shoot them down easily or it's an enemy that you have no control over and completely random), vehicle spotting (T-62's in Cold War especially are crewed by Stevie Wonder) and artillery interaction with tanks (there's a bug where subsystems can't be damaged on tanks.
Modern modules all have more airpower, more tanks and more subsystems.
Until these issues are fixed (when hell freezes over) I'll stick to T-34's and Tigers.
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It's because Ukraine is losing and the war may be over before the end of 2024. It won't look good releasing a game about the war in Ukraine after they surrender or give up a large chunk of their territory.
I'm not pro Russia just calling it like I see it. Bring on the hate mail.
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Thanks for the update!
I may be in the minority here but I'm not too sad about the scrapped Black Sea module. I just don't think the current engine does modern warfare very well. If this helps the team focus on WW2 and Cold War then I'm happy.
The new Final Blitzkrieg module is an auto buy for me.
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4 hours ago, Chibot Mk IX said:
I have only played this scenario in a PBEM game as Soviets, so my suggestion here is more from Soviet POV.
Keep in mind this is a very large size map, but due to the difficulty of the terrain, Soviets has limit road to approach the objectives. And yes, German has limit AT power at the beginning. So their main task is to identify the SOV's main thrust. Then use mortar and HMG to area fire the fording points, separate the Tank riders with the tanks. In that case when the German main body show up they can easily control the village, change the close quarter tank battles in the village into a long range duel. If you need to use the scout to ambush the tanks, don't put them in the house, instead put them behind the house. And if the PzII Luchs are taking the Soviets headon then you are using them incorrectly. Hide them in the woods, later they can charge out of the woods bring havoc to the soviets trucks.
One more thing, the Soviets' 82mm mortar has a range limit on this map.
Thanks! Great tips.
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8 hours ago, Artkin said:
Set your troops to "hide" on turn 0, and when they are being shelled. It makes them significantly more survivable.
Good tip.
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I'm getting a new PBEM started and I've been obsessing over how to defend as the Germans for long enough to get my reinforcements.
I think the big tactical problem here is the lack of anti armor early on. You have few units that can stop a T-34 and they are short range hand held launchers or slow, clumsy SPW with mounted cannons. The scout tanks can maybe take out the optics after a few bursts. You have towed AT but do you put them forward where they get hit by indirect or bypassed or do you keep them back and leave your infantry to fend for themselves?
Finally, the amount of artillery available to the Russians means that the obvious ambush spots are equally obvious targets for indirect.
The Russians on the other hand have a dilemma of speed vs safety. They could slowly march forward with infantry on foot, calling targets for the tanks but that would give time for the German reinforcements. They could charge forward with infantry mounted but even a singe MG42 can make life Hell for any tank riders.
I'm definitely not looking for a "put pixeltrupen here" answer but does anyone else have any experience with this map in a PBEM setting? Any insights after finishing that you didn't see at the beginning?
Also, I just think this is a fun map with a lot of interesting tactical choices and it would be fun to discuss.
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5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
We don't want sugar coating, and sugar coating something that isn't very good wouldn't have helped anyway. There's been much better accounting of the Avdiivka in the previous pages if you cared to look at it, but I'll attempt to point out flaws in your analysis and conclusions....
First, this wasn't strategic or massive in any sense of either word. It was a large scale localized attack. Even if they took Avdiivka that would be the end of the operation.
Second, you seem to not be aware that Russia has repeatedly made dumb investments of large amounts of troops and material on attacks clearly intended on drawing Ukrainian forces away from where Russia felt threatened. The winter offensive was intended to forestall Ukraine's summer counter offensive, and it failed miserably. They also launched a sizeable attack in Luhansk to draw Ukrainian forces away from the counter offensives (including Bakhmut) after they were in motion. That failed miserably as well. Countless examples last year as well.
Third, the bulk of the forces used for this offensive were forces that were, for the most part, already in place. The bulk of the forces were former (and effectively still) DPR that could not be moved out of Donetsk without risking a mutiny. They were never going to be reserves for the south. I am also aware of no unit Russian unit moved from the south to take part in this operation.
To put it bluntly, the basis for your premise is factually off the mark by a wide margin.
Er, no. The only thing done differently in this attack was they used all the resources of an attack backing up their better forces (VDV/Spetsnaz/Marines) except with utter crap infantry instead. That's because all of their "elite" units had to go to the south and have been bled out. So Russia made do with with it had, not what it likely would have wanted.
Er, hardly. Russia massed this amount of artillery at multiple points simultaneously last year for most of the year. The reason why it stands out as exceptional is that they haven't been able to do it lately. I've speculated they stripped all the artillery and ammo from their failed Luhansk offensive in part because the logistics of moving it to Donetsk City is wildly easier than trying to get it into the south.
Ukraine never has had adequate resources to adequately man all sectors of the front equally. This sector has managed to hold out for 9 years without massive resources, so of course Russia was able to mass for this attack. Especially because Donetsk City offers major advantages for staging an attack.
The scale of the attack is what allowed them to make some gains. However, they also suffered MASSIVE losses and whatever they were attempting to do failed utterly. Which shows that Ukraine's forces were up to the challenge.
Ukraine largely defeated this massive attack, by recent standards, with the forces it had on hand. Taking ground back will require new forces, which may or may not be desirably to commit. After all, Russia almost certainly launched this attack in order to draw Ukrainian forces away from the south, so why give Russia what it wants?
On this we mostly agree. I also clearly demonstrates that all of Russia's inherent weaknesses were on display here. Bad quality forces being chief amongst them. Whatever the Russians use for a drawing board they don't seem to learn much because they keep making these sorts of attacks and Ukraine keeps demonstrating Russia's not up for it.
This is the thing all of us have been wondering about since last year. Is this the death of maneuver warfare, or is it that Russia sucks at it so badly that they just make it seem impossible. Ukraine's experience with large scale attacks is limited and is in the context of ungodly dense defenses handled by a competent defender, plus being under resourced for such a task and the defender having air superiority. So, not really clear what to take away from that.
Steve
Thank you for the detailed response. I hope to continue this discussion when I have time to write out a suitable reply.
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33 minutes ago, fry30 said:
I don't mean to be rude but what's really new here that we didn't learn in the opening phases of the "SMO"?
Not rude at all. The difference here is the addition of massive airstrikes. Neither side has been able to making meaningful use of aircraft to support an offensive until the mass production of FAB glide kits. The Russians have been dropping FAB 250, 500, 1500 bombs consistently for the last month. Not to mention Tornado S which has given the Russians a HIMARS like ability to strike rear areas. This has allowed the Russians to suppress fires, logistics and C2 to a greater degree than at any other point in the war.
I think if they are unable to achieve their goals this will show that even with complete suppression of defenses, the proliferation of handheld ATGM's and mines can still stop an offensive by themselves.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Ya I don't have time to respond to all the dissertations I get back but It's fun riling you all up every once in a while.