Foxbat
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Posts posted by Foxbat
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To his credit, it is clear he actually played the game (if only all reviewers did that) and he does a good job of describing game aspects that are probably unfamiliar to the uninitiated.. some things are still hilarious though:
"I’ve actually not seen an email option in a modern game." one can only imagine what a PBEM game Battlefield 1942 would be like
[ January 13, 2003, 07:37 AM: Message edited by: Foxbat ]
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Look, it may not be entirely clear but I'm not arguing anything. I'm just trying (with little success apparently) to point out that the soviets planned the initial counter-offensive in Model's sector. This gave Model additional grief (without which he might have been more succesfull).Originally posted by Bastables:Really, so the Soviets managed to "put" their strongest Defensive army versus the weaker German Army group north. I’m Sorry, would it not be more logical to have greater reserves earmarked for the Soviets Oral counter attack while the stronger defences faced south to increase attrition of German Panzer Divs? Without actual proof
These arguments are all starting to sound like Monty's “Normandy Plans by hindsight”: ‘No really Normandy went exactly to (my) plan, we meant to fight an enemy quater of our size while they held us in the bridgeheads for three months.’
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Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />
Manly Manstein's uses tanks as the spearhead, GOOD" versus "Stuffy Model uses his infantry in front of the tanks, the silly man, which is BAD".
I suppose this is how you interpret my posts on the subject of leading with infantry vs leading with tanks.</font>
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I'm sorry if I implied that, I was merely trying to sketch that there was more to it than "Manly Manstein's uses tanks as the spearhead, GOOD" versus "Stuffy Model uses his infantry in front of the tanks, the silly man, which is BAD".Originally posted by Bastables:I don't see how the North being for the Soviets stronger could be a sufficient explanation.
It doesn't have to mean that, at all. It seems to me that the soviet plan all along had been to counter-attack near Orel first. This makes a lot of sense because the Northern Pincer was percieved to be weaker (I'll stop there because if I credit the duhssians with any more "planning" I'll be slammed for attributing to them skills and insights they did not haveFor one thing it would indicate either a massive failure on the part of Soviet intelligence in not noticing that army group south had most of the Panzers, infantry and Luftwaffe supporting it. Or a surreal Soviet understanding that for Kursk the main German effort would be made by the weaker army group centre completely at odd with previous German operational conduct.
).
I don't have a good reference handy, but IIRC the counter-attack forces intended for the attack into the Kharkov bulge were not actually in postion for an offensive at that point. And those to the north obviously were, since they were able to go on the offensive while the Kursk fighting was still going on.The fact that Vorzney front (southern) sector was unable to carry out timetabled counter attacks may have more to do with the excessive casualties suffered versus Army Group south’s Armour heavy attack,That is what I'm getting at; Model was the main target for the initial soviet counter-offensive that would unbalance the offensive so that the southern pincer would be weakened (as units were pulled out to save the general situation) making it ripe for the second soviet blow near Kharkov.
In the North things went more or less as planned, but in the south the germans weren't slowed as much as expected and this led to the bloody counter-attacks. And while the losses inflicted on the commited reserves did push back the Kharkov offensive some weeks it was not the initial reason for the southern forces attacking later.
Or to put it in a more simple way, if the soviets had decided to mount their initial counter-offensive in the Kharkov area rather than near Orel Model would have been more succesfull (or at least would have had an easier situation), while Manstein would have been less succesfull than he was historically.
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Allied commanders didn't use infantry for the breaktrough because they were inhumane, or because 'men are cheaper than tanks'. Such tactics were used quite simply because that is what worked (for them anyway). In fact rather than this method being Dumb & Wasteful experience had shown that using the tanks to lead the way was wastefull and ineffective, so they should be commended for using the infantry effectively and not slammed for being soldier-killers.Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:Using infantry for initial penetration was standard procedure for the soviets in the later parts of the war. [..] and a Russian approach to own losses made this tactic a very good way to achieve breakthroughs. Use the cheap infantry for the penetration, then send in the expensive tanks for exploitation.
Same with Monty at Alamein. I dont remember the numbers exactly, but I know the Brits had a large superiority in infantry at the point of attack, and I also know that those british units suffered heavy casualties.
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Mission Impossible
Finns vs Russians, frozen plains. One Finnish Suomi submachinegunner vs a battalion of russians, player must play the russians of course.
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I think that can be explained without going in to the particularities of hydronomolonolucular flowOriginally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:Then I dont understand the principle behind APCR or modern day Sabot rounds.
Basically what APCR/subcalibre/sabot does is that a harder or heavier projeticle (solid steel subcalibre was still generally of a higher hardness than normal solid shot) is hitting a smaller area at a higher speed.
That it doesn't shatter is partly because the harder (or heavier) material is less shatter prone, and because penetration is more instantanious. For a comparison imagine for example pricking a needle into a cushion vs stabbing it with a knife, stabbing it with a knife uses more force and the blade is subjected to the same force it exerts. Take that situation to to the extreme and the stabbing force would be enough to break the point of the knife, while the needle would still penetrate. Things work much the same with sabot vs solid shot (and that that is caused by the penetrator acting like a flow through the armour is nice to know, but I'm pretty sure that that was only discovered after such penetrators come into use
).Well I guess my explanations isn't half as clear as I hoped, but I hope it helps some anyway.
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It is often pointed out as the difference between the northern and southern pincers, and thus a possible cause of the northern pincer's failure. I'm not sold on that though, first of all as was pointed out the soviets have claimed that the northern pincer was their best side. And that can be substantiated somewhat by the fact that several units intended for the northern pincer never actually made it there because of soviet actions, and the counterattack on the northern pincer did indeed start before the german offensive was called off (IIRC the southern counter-attack force wasn't even properaly positioned for a counter-attack at the time).Originally posted by coe:So from what I understand, Model decided to commit the infantry to eat through the defensive zone first? That failed?
Also there is the issue of the composition of german forces, I don't have any references handy but of the top of my head I would say that Manstein basically had the cream of the german panzer force while Model had a more infantry heavy force.
Anyway that's just a very global assesment of some of the factors involved, I hope some of the experts can go into some more detail.
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What the heck are these guys? Looks like some kind of naval uniform with the color & hats, and the guys in the front are using what is obviously a PTRD (albeit their method is a bit unorthdoxOriginally posted by Shadow 1st Hussars:A 20mm can deal with that!
). But the guy in the back seems to be packing something for more advanced :confused:
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Yes, especially for certain projectiles this phenomen actually causes them to penetrate a far thinner amount of armor than you would expect based on nominal penetration.Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:Are you guys saying that if the projectile has a smaller diameter than the thickness of the armour surface it hits, it will shatter/the likelyhood of the projectile shattering is substantial?
Just the thickness of the plate.The armour thickness, would that be the total thickness (armour plate thickness + angle) or just the armour plate thickness regardless of angle? -
Great links, especially this one http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/hobbies/resource.html has a great selection of "suspect" articles from the Leavenworth "Sovietologists", quite a few subjects that you won't find described anywhere else.
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I don't think so, I expect the only thing that would help (short of increasing the calibre) would be to make the projectile from better quality steel.Originally posted by LightningWar:But couldnt you increase the speed of the projectile to overcome in size issues it may have in regards to the thickness of the armor?
Gen
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I see.Originally posted by Sgtgoody:All regular Russian infantry are called Motor-Rifle Regiments. [..] By doctrine all frontline troops are supposed to be BMP mounted while second line troops will get what they can.
The BTR is obviously no IFV, but whether or not it is a true APC is a matter of definition. The BTR are is a nice piece of kit, but it lacks real dismount doors (new versions at least have those sidedoors) so it's more an armored truck than a true APC imho.The Russians regard BTR troops (which is a decent APC rather than a fancy truck) as light troops because they lack the support that the BMP troops have.
Or before that, hence 'rifles' and 'guards' unitsMuch of the naming convention is traditional dating back to the Great Patriotic War. But the GPW is/was really ingrained in soviet military culture.
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Oh yeah, and the only reason they are positive is because you can buy it off them
But based on the info they give I wouldn't... -
Ugh, no info, crap screenshots and an error in every sentence.. well at least they were positive.
"More of a prequel than a sequel, Combat Mission 2 takes place in the years leading up to Normandy 1944" Uh-huh, I suppose more info would be too grog-like
"RTS games can often be too similar, so authenticity and variety is crucial to help distinguish them from the competition." Big problem indeed, I always have trouble distinguishing between Close Combat, Combat Mission and Red Alert..
But what really takes the cake is the description of gameplay:
"Regarding gameplay, missions are turn-based. Many people may initially be discouraged by such a term, but it is a standard element of play in these games and is completely justified. Combat Mission 2 focuses continually on strategy and planning. Playing against the clock rushes players, and everyone makes mistakes. The trick to a successful mission is to take your time, think ahead and develop sound contingency plans."
Not only does it give no impression of what gameplay is like, it also gives a completely wrong impression by stating that the game is turn-based as you would expect of such a game.
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"many fail to understand that, in terms of World War II tank warfare, thickness is a quality in itself"
And there I was thinking that everyone was impressed by the fact that the tiger had very thick armor..
And I must say that I'm not entirely convinced by the argument that the Tiger is great because 80mm thick armor is supposedly in itself significantly better than sloped armor giving 80mm effective armor. That would depend greatly on the actual thickness of the sloped plate, and especially the extent to which overmatch is even an issue.
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Arent't the Motor Rifles supposed to be trucked to the combat zone in BTR's, while the infantry in the armoured units are actually mechanized (ie they have IFV's)? That would make them motorised because the BTR is really little more than a truck (a fancy truck, but still a truck).Originally posted by Sgtgoody:Interestingly it is the term "Motorized" that has survived to modern usage despite the fact that modern Russian infantry is most definitly mechanized. The standard Russian unit of manuever is the MRR or Motorized Rifle Regiment.
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I see that a lot of the smoke has cleared whi8le I was away
So we can cut right to the real issue.
5th Guards had lost something like 90% of it's combat strength and would have to be pulled from the line to be refurbished so it could take part in subsequent offensive operations (where they would again lose 90% of their tanks, a habit that ultimatly got Rotmistrov demotedOriginally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:Here we are coming into the what if part. I suppose my line of reasoning goes something like this. If we begin by looking at what happened to 5th Guards Tank army after its failed counterattack at Prokhorovka, we can see that this unit lost pretty much all of its combat strength that day. It would take a long time before it became an effective unit again.
). Whether or not they have enough crews left to reequip and return to the line is imho academic, but.. 5th Gds Tank is not the only reserve force they have. And they might not even be neccesary.
I guess we were essentialy on the same train of tought all along, as Obojan seemed to me the best possible outcome for the germans.Suppose Manstein switches axis and attacks towards Obojan.
While I agree that Manstein could have taken Obojan if he had wanted (or more precisely was allowed) to he'd have to do a little more than that, Obojan was still part of a defensive belt and his offensive would have to take into account infantry forces to the west that could threaten his flank, not to mention the possibility of the soviets mounting a counterattack near Belgorod (or even Kharkov) that might threaten his entire rear area.Facing him is parts of 1st Tank army and 6th Gds army. Both these units are spent, they have suffered heavy losses in the battles so far. Lets assume for arguments sake that Manstein punches through them and reach Obojan.
That would be an attractive option because it would leave the germans an empty victory as they close the pocket while pulling back units to strengthen the defense.Here the soviets have two options. Either pull out from the southwestern parts of the bulge to avoid encirclement of 40th and 38th army.In reality I doubt that this would be possible or acceptable to the russians.
If they keep repeating their mistakes they are in real trouble, but they don't have to. There are several options for a counterattack, one of them would be to simply wait and let the germans choose an axis after taking Obojan.OR pull another unit from the reserves and do another counterattack.
Using the remnants of 1st Tank to attack through the sector of 40th army would allow the soviets to unbalance a german move towards Obojan without requiring the use of major reserve units (such a counter-attack would not be strong enough to achieve very much, but it would force the germans to relocate units there).But the problem now is that the main reserve unit is spent (5th Gds Tank and 5th Gds), at the same time, the northern reserve unit 2nd Tank army has also suffered heavy during its counterattacks on the northern flank. Whats left really is 53rd army east of Kursk or 47th army east of Belgorod. But if these units are committed, then the ability for the Soviets to wage any offensive operations in the south is severely weakened.And if they are going to throw in some major units it would make more sense to use the Steppe Front units then those assigned to the Kharkov area. After all they are going to need those units rather soon.
But a better alternative would be to attack elsewhere, which was in fact already happening on the northern shoulder (and in Sicily). Now with Manstein's forces still locked in combat that is going to have some interesting consequences, the units needed to defend Italy have to come from somewhere and his forces won't be available to counter soviet offenses in the Donbas area.
If everything went along the worst case scenario for the soviets then the germans would be celebrating christmas in Moscow in 43If the Soviets would have launched another counteroffensive, and if that counteroffensive had failed like the one at Prokhorovka, then I am seriously doubting we would have seen any Soviet autumn/winter offensive in the south.
You mean if the soviets had managed to shatter all their remaining reserves for no gain? Yes that would put quite a dent in their plans.And even if we did, I'm seriously doubting that it would have had any serious success at all. That is what Im aiming at.But realistically the very best the germans could achieve would have been to take Obojan and lop of the bottom of the Kursk nulge, creating a new frontline on the Belgorod-Prokhovorka-Obojan-Sumi line, destroying large parts of 38 and 40th Army that would earn Manstein some kudos from OKH, but it would hardly save the german situation on the eastern front.
But what would they really achieve by such a 'stalemate'? Their strategic situation, both in the east and the med would be at least as bad and possibly worse. Their Front would not be shortened, large parts of their forces that were historically used to plug the defence of the Reich would be locked in combat trying to cut off and destroy a tiny part of the forces in the Bulge. And the soviet units earmarked for the counteroffensives would be in much the same state as they werte historically.. Unless of course the soviets start repeating the Rotmistrov counterattack, which is the operational equivalent of playing Russian Roulette with two maxim machineguns.Yes, but dont you see that that is exactly what the Germans were after when they launched Zitadelle in the first place. This was no "lets advance to Moscow" type offensive. This was a desperate attempt to lock the front. By attacking and defeating the soviets at Kursk, the Germans hoped to eliminate the risk of a Soviet autumn/winter offensive and at the same time shorten the front to free units for the west. A stalemate was what they wanted. This is what Im talking about when I say that I see a possibility for the Germans to snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat. -
So do you reckon things "just happened" for the Russkies? Because you really do make them sound rather backward, as if they only ever do things when forced by circumstance or providence and even then they screw up.
I wonder how they decided on their Kursk StratUHgy?
Stalin "Us attack first-us?"
Zhukov "Nuh, not attack we"
Stalin "But wot if not attack?"
Zhukov "Uh.... defend!"
Stalin "And after defend wot we do then"
Zhukov "Well ..uh.. we ..uh.. how can me know that wot has nut happUHnd yet?"
It could be just me, but I was always under the imrpession that they were a bit more savvy then that
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It is, in a very real way. The germans lost the strategic initiative there. And they created the preconditions for the russian offensives.Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:So now Kursk is the first step on the road to Berlin?
Still that is how it happened.You know, I am always fascinated by people who want to draw conclusions like that. Personally I find them a bit far fetched.
I never said it was, but it created the preconditions for the ensuing operations.While I agree that you might say that the Soviets suffered a tactical defeat against II SS Pz, I do not agree to the conclusion that Kursk was somehow all a part of a successful Soviet offensive operation.
As far as attributes and insights go, the soviets made a consious decision to allow the germans to attack in the hope that they would spend themselves, and allow the soviets to use the aftermath of the german offensive as the starting point for theirs. That happened at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk and I would therefore say that all three are soviet successes, high losses and german near breaching of the defense notwithstanding.As you say, Zitadelle was followed by a series of successful Soviet operations. That is not the same thing to say as "zitadelle was the first step in a successful soviet operation". You are attributing insights and capabilities to the Soviets that they did not have.
That's just not right. The fact that it was called of was an admission of failure, not the cause.Zitadelle failed for one reason; it was called off.
Do you really think that if the offensive was still viable it would have been called off?There are two reasons why it was called off, the inability of the northern pincer to gain ground, and the allied landings in Italy.The northern pincer ground to a halt, the southern pincewr penetrated only on a very narrow axis, pinching off the entire saillant had become unrealistic, and the units were thus better used elsewhere.
Are you a politician by any chance?Would you agree with this statement:The southern pincer was not halted by enemy resistance before the offensive was called off? </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />No, the tip of the southern pincer was precariously thin, still facing major opposition and without hope for real success. To make the advance inopportune is the same as halting it.
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How so? Looking at the tactical battle in the southern pincer is a nice way of salvaging some glory for the germans, but the operational and strategic consequences of Kursk are ultimatly more important. The soviets managed to turn tactical defeat into operational victory, and the Kursk battle was followed by the first of a series of soviet offensives that would end with the capture of Berlin.Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:If you want to define victory/defeat on the operational level, you will undoubtedly reach that answer. Personally I think that is the wrong level to judge the outcome at Kursk.
Quite the opposite of the aims of the german offensive, hence you can classify it as a failure.
No, the tip of the southern pincer was precariously thin, still facing major opposition and without hope for real success. To make the advance inopportune is the same as halting it.Would you agree with this statement:The southern pincer was not halted by enemy resistance before the offensive was called off?
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AFAIK the only one who can make new swuads or change the weapons of a squad is BFC, so tough luck on the germans vs the germans.
Germans fighting for the russians otoh is easy, just take a russians squad and say they are germans
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I see, that could of course mean anything from "plans had been made to replace them" to "full-scale production had been started"Originally posted by MikeT:Per my WWII uniform book it says they were being replaced. I just checked the book and nothing else is said about a schedule.
Oh well I guess it does answer my question in that the Ushanka was definitly being made before the Winter of 41.
This is the Webster book? Sounds interesting.Per the book [..]
Hmmm.. sounds like they were possibly already issued during the Winter War, maybe one of our Finns has a pic of a sov soldier wearing one?Under a drawing of a private, Red Army, 1939"The private is wearing a cloth helmet (the budionovka or shlem) named after the Russian Civil War cavalry commander Budenny, which was found to be unsatisfactory and during the Winter War against Finland began to be replaced by the fur cap with earflaps...."
Soviet uniforms is still a rather obscure subject, so I guess if you have read the book you are a grogNow beyond that you are going to have the find the services of a grog...which I am not.
Worst idea yet for a scenario
in Combat Mission: Barbarossa to Berlin
Posted
Ah, Sokoban! Those were the days...