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winkelried

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Posts posted by winkelried

  1. And there were just as successful soldiers who were not at all Nazis. Like the father of a friend of mine, Erich Hohagen, 40-kill ace, flying the Me-262 at the end of the war - who was a good man caught up in a bad war without a chance of changing anything. All he could do was to try and survive.

    I heard this excuse a lot - when I talked with veterans and when we arrested some of those "followers". Not just from Germans. This attitude makes things possible like Srebrenica, Rwanda or Abu Ghraib.

    It's too easy. Everybody carries part of the responsibility as a soldier. And every soldier or citizen can say no. Look at the Weisse Rose or what happened in Denmark in 1943.

  2. It's a bit absurd trying to figure out which of the German services had the biggest hard-on for Hitler, so perhaps we can agree that they ALL at one time or another actively and vigorously courted Hitler's favour.

    This is, of course, a different position to the one Childress tried to put over that the GAF was somehow a-political.

    I concur with you statement JonS. All branches of the Wehrmacht were instrumental for the consolidation of the Nazi regime in the 30s and all bear their part of the responsibility of the human disaster which followed - to create a gradual index is quite absurd.

    And some exponents of the Luftwaffe get forgotten in this context: Albert Kesselring, Kurt Mälzer (just to name two examples) - under their responsibility, or direct orders, massacres like the one of the Fosse Ardeatine were committed. Also Luftwaffe ground troops, e.g. the Fallschirm Panzer Division Hermann Göring were involved in war crimes ...

    BTW: Before and early in the war the air aces of the Luftwaffe were willing instruments of the Nazi propaganda - despite that some did what pilots do when the situation goes out of control -they bail out (see Wever, Udet ... and later just to confirm the pattern Göring, Greim, ...) - there were just a very few who tried to resist actively in the Luftwaffe like Caesar von Hofacker or Herbert Gollnow.

  3. 1) Since I thought the */3 model is the radio-equipped version, why does the Panzergrenadier Battalion HQ get a 251/1 ?

    2) Why is it that the 251/1 is the only version that comes without a dedicated gunner when bought individually ?

    3) What is the rationale for the other distribution within the battalions ?

    Try to answer 1) and 3)

    I checked the KStN 1108 (gp) Stab und Stabskompanie eines Panzergrenadierbattalions (gepanzert) from 1.11.1943 and the later with Freie Gliederung (F.G.) from 1.4.1945: Both show a 251/3 in the Stab - the 1943 Version had an additional 251/8 (Ambulance) in the Stab. In addition the Stab has 1 Kübelwagen and 4 Krad or Kettenkrad. The Stabskompanie has two 251/11 (Telephony) and one 251/3 - no other 251s. The 1945 version had just three 251/3 in the Stabskompanie the 251/11 had gone. There were no gunners assigned in the KStN on battalion level to the 251/3, there is a comment stating that one of the radio operators was a gunner at the same time.

    The KStN 1114 c Panzergrenadierkompanie (gepanzert) from 1.11.1943 shows two 251/3 in the Kompanietrupp (HQ) with no gunner and not mentioning who would be the gunner. The Panzerzerstörertrupp then has a 251/17 (Flak) [Hope we'll get this one soon :) ]. Each Zugstrupp (Platoon HQ) was assigned a 251/17 too. The three 251/1 per platoon had assigned 1 gunner each. The heavy platoon had a 251/17 assigned to the Zugstrupp (platoon HQ) and the four HMGs were transported on two 251/17 too. The two 251/2 had MGs, but no specific gunners assigned. There were two 251/9 too.

    In reality the 251/17 were a bit rare and were replaced by 251/10 and 251/1 it seems.

    Later (1.7.44) the Zugstrupp of the heavy platoon had a 251/1 assigned instead of the 251/17. A 251/17 was assigned to the Kompanietrupp at the same time.

    There is another KStN 1114 a (Freie Gliederung) dating from 1.8.44 with just two Panzergrenadier platoons with four 251/1 each all with gunners, one heavy platoon with one 251/1, two 251/2 (all without gunners) and two 251/9 . In addition there was a fourth platoon with six 251/21 (Flak).

  4. Would it be a disadvantage or an advantage for the shreck team to have an MP40 and if it would be a disadvantage then why? The work of a shreck team is necessarily close work so a little more fire power at close range would seem to me to be an advantage.

    Sure - that an MP would be an advantage. But it just wasn't there in history. And since the proper tactical employment of a Panzerschreck would be embedded with additional infantry. Since CMBN strives to get us a feeling as historical as possible there should be no MP in a Panzerschreck team.

  5. It makes sense they would have an Mp40 with them in the panzerjager team for close fighting, if needed, and one would think it would be fairly normal for them to have it. So unless there is evidence showing they rarely had them, then it would be a good addition in the next patch.

    Even if it's not in the official TO&E for standard wehrmacht panzerjager teams to have them, are there photos and such showing they did in fact use them?

    There was no need for an MP for the Panzerschreck teams since they would operate under the cover of other troops, e.g. an infantry squad. And that's what you should do in CMBN too. To use a single Bazooka/PIAT/Panzerschreck team is just not tactically sound. So no need for an MP for the team.

  6. If firing from indoors is so dangerous, couldn't BF just add a chance that it would result in a 'red' or 'yellow' casualty? Since the player has to assume the role of the squad (or team) commander anyway, he should be able to decide whether to take that risk or not.

    And the Panzerjäger to ignore the stupid suicidal order right away and shoot the squad commander (by accident naturally)?

  7. I love flogging dead horses ... just one example I am deeply into researching (yess getting close to playtest the campaign ;) ) to support Jason's point.

    The operations of the 11th Panzer Division moving from Bordeaux to Avignon (some 600 km) with some occasional fights against the Maquis, and then retreating along the Rhône river to Lyon (some 250km) fighting off the Americans (mainly the 36th U.S. Infantry Division) and then the battle at Meximieux starting on 31. August:

    The division lost some 11% of its personnel, almost 60% of its Panthers and as it seem not a single of its 170 250/251 ... only during the battle of Meximieux between 31. August and 3. September the loss of 2 251s is confirmed ...

    On the other side: on the huge maps i designed (up to 2.6x4 kms) the 251s come quite handy to move the Panzer Grenadiers at acceptable speed.

  8. In my particular case, I'm in the middle of the Kg Engel Campaign (Crossing the Dives) and I'm in the setup phase. One of my Panthers sustained damage to the main gun during the previous scenario that renders it inoperative. It would be nice during the setup phase, particularly during campaigns, where ammo sharing could be accomplished - as no resupply was allowed by the campaign designer.

    I guess that in this particular situation, the damaged Panther should probably be taken out of the game since it would transfer as quickly as possible to the repair shops. I doubt that there would be time to swap ammo though.

  9. I have been asking for ammo crates since release. :)

    Each crate could take up a certain number of passenger slots in either a vehicle or bunker, and then be subject to the acquire command.

    Largest ammo in the game for on-map asset is the 150mm German Infantry Gun. Say 3 per crate, 2 HE and 1 HEAT/Smoke. Scale ammo count up as caliber scales down from there.

    Stick them in the "Independent Teams" section for QB/Design purposes.

    I would love to have a truck full of ammo crates come on the map at around 45 minutes... wouldn't you?

    The US 60mm and .45 cal Thompson rounds... The German MP44 "K" ammo and Panzershrek ammo... Everyone's large ATGs...

    There are work-arounds for most ammo, but crates would make everyone's life a little easier in longer engagements.

    +1 to this one.

    Edit - Plus, if they could be placed in structures, then one can imagine the effects of artillery fire/demo charges, and sympathetic detonation effects, in a village turned into an ammo dump.

    The night commando scenario from Hell...

    that would be a hell of a scenario :cool: especially at night :D

  10. I would think that if the crews are not under fire that this would be possible, although I don't have any evidence of this in practice, I find it hard to believe that this wasn't done on the battlefield when a tank ran out of fuel or suffered a mechanical failure that rendered it inoperative. My two cents. Thanks to all who replied.

    I am sure that some ammo swapping was done, but assuming that the tankers then and now show similar characteristics - they would need to be a bit farther away from the frontline, than in the average CMx battle to begin such a procedure and only under real emergency conditions. Just for reasons of cover and not being surprised by then enemy so close to a frontline. So e.g. averaging out the ammo between tanks between two battles in a campaign would be an interesting option (if they don't get resupplied) BFC could provide us with.

  11. JasonC/Georgie - even during the Cold War the ammo allocation for the individual weapons for the "average" soldier was very limited - i remember something of 100+ shots in basic training. when an army still trained large amounts of soldiers it was often a cost/production issue too - you had to multiply the ammo allocation with pretty big numbers.

    Same was true btw for "real" ammo for LAW/ATGMs etc where the focus was on handling the weapons and correct tactical behaviour and eventually fired training ammo.

    So in a ww2 context i wouldn't expect zook or shreck crews to have fired a lot of shots in training either - don't know even if there was training ammo. probably a lot of "training on the job" with a good part of "black swan effects".

    Yes, as i mentioned a lot of holes in the air when you fire an automatic weapon - HMGs, LMGs, SMGs, assault rifles ... especially since the other side tends to return fire you try not to stay exposed for too long.

  12. Mostly it reflects horribly on the riflemen. 200 yards under range conditions with a .303 rifle is an easy shot, if the rifle has ever been properly zeroed and the operator has any idea what he is doing. In combat? Agreed, another story. But it would be with a Sten too. If they are just spraying and praying, more bullets thrown might be marginally better, but from dismal to horrible. Just take the rifle and actually aim...

    IMHO that's why MGs, SMGs and assault rifles were invented in the first place: To get an appropriate fire density into the area of a (moving) target. So that the hit probability increases - not for the single bullet, but for the burst.

    Semi-automatic weapons like pistols and semi-auto rifles go into the same direction: usually you would fire a quick sequence of several shots at a target.

  13. In CMx2 Mp40s open fire at up to 280m if given direct fire orders which one cant avoid if a single SMG is within the firing unit.

    Just for reference ;)

    I think that BF will have to look at this kind of complexity, if they haven't done it already. In units with a mix of weapons used on different effective ranges the soldiers should open fire only when the target is within the range of a particular weapon. This is not just true for the SMGs, but probably also for LMGs and rifles, where one could also argue that they have different effective ranges. They consider effective range already for other weapons eg the short ranged Panzerfaust or rifle grenades.

  14. Wich leads to the question if it makes a difference if i give mines "veteran" or "conscipt" experience in the editor. Will AT mines with -2 motivation run away if a tank approaches them? And what about the fitness of mines?

    As the price doesn't change in QBs i would assume, that these paramters don't have an influence on mines and the like ... probably just something in the GUI which isn't very nice.

  15. again from a RL perspective (80s to mid 90s):

    we sometimes selected SMGs (e.g. Uzis) instead of assault rifles when we expected fire fights to be below 100m or when we were engaging in urban areas. Usually at least one guy in a squad kept an assault rifle (normally sighted) to handle long distance and sharp shooter stuff together with the Minimi of the squad.

    The main advantage of the SMGs in our eyes was that they were significantly lighter and shorter than assault rifles. So they were easier to move to fight fast moving short opportunity targets - as are modern assault rifles. We trained hard (I remember quite a few days fulfilling norms on the short distance moving target range) to be consistently able to hit fast moving targets at short ranges (0-100m). There was also a feeling that the 9mm ammo the SMGs fired had a better stopping effect than the 5.56 the assault rifles we got in the 80s. Accuracy was never an issue (on distance below 100m at least). The training for SMGs as for assault rifles focussed both on firing with the shoulder support and from the hip (which was significantly harder to manage to be accurate).

    Coming back to CMBN

    So in a WW2 context we have to understand that usually the light MG was the main weapon of the squad and the SMG was around mainly (except maybe some units which were equipped heavily with SMGs - see below) for the form factor (e.g. U.S. tank crews had the grease gun AFAIK) and for NCOs to increase fire density in short range combat.

    I think that the same idea to increase fire density in short range combat and the form factor of the SMG was the motivation for some units to be equipped mainly or heavily with SMGs - e.g. Soviet tank riders were certainly better off with SMGs than with the longer LMGs or normal rifles. Same holds to some extent for paras which could drop with the SMGs and where it would not be a good idea to jump with the heavier LMG. Could also be that one of the ideas behind these SMG heavy units in pre-assault rifle times, was that the loss of one individual weapon (like the LMG) in a drop would not compromise the whole firepower of the squad.

    Anyway - to come back to the original question. Based on my own experience I assume that SMGs would rarely have been used above 100 meters in combat with an effect.

  16. Interesting discussion - some feedback from RL. I had to do with mines quite a bit during my career.

    • we made a difference between hidden (usually dug in) mines or openly laid mines. although openly laid mines sometimes became hidden through sand or leaves being blown over them.
    • the engineers never mapped single mines. just the area where the mines were laid was mapped and usually marked in the terrain. But these marks often got lost over time.
    • in order to allow own troops to pass - eg us exfiltrating from a recon mission - gaps were left in the minefield. these gaps were always covered with fire - HMGs and Mortars - and usually ran in zig zags through the minefield to make it difficult to follow them. these gaps were marked with unsuspicious objects.

    In CMBN you are able to create gaps in minefields as I mentioned above. At least I do this when I have larger fields.

  17. It appears to me that even if there is only one lone enemy soldier left in an objective zone I am defending, The AAR says I failed even though I have more units left in that zone. To ensure a successful mission, I have to comb through every inch of the entire objective area to make sure there is no enemy force sneaking in. Which side wins if both the attacking force and the defending force have units occupying that contested objective at the end of the game?

    My experience tells me the AI has an advantage in fighting in forest/wooded area and house-to-house fighting. Maybe it is my bad tactics, I find it very difficult/frustrating to flush out enemies inside a building and/or forest/wooded area without suffering much heavier casualties than the enemies. I am sure some of you feel the same way losing 4-5 men to storm a building only to find out that there was only 1 or 2 soldiers in there. To add salt to injury, it was a lowly ammo bearer. This ratio of loss is unacceptable.

    As I said above - the enemy is the biggest game breaker :D

  18. Hrrm. TH teams in BN get a Faust per trooper, so I don't think the 18-in-48 ratio is being observed in "specialist teams" at least. What year are your sources coming from; I'd imagine there was significant variation during the course of the war...

    The "faust" was called Faustpatrone and Panzerfaust and were distributed a bit everywhere.

    We talk about the Panzerschreck or 8.8cm Raketen-Panzerbüchse 54 - the German equivalent of the U.S. Bazooka - which were allocated differently.

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