Lockheed P-38 Lightning & CAS

[c3k]

"Capable" is user-defined.

If I'm leading a platoon through the green zone in a-stan, I don't want a 600 knot bombing pass based on GPS from an F-16 dropping at 25,000 feet. Yet, that capability is critical to some missions.

The A-10 is great...at what it's designed to do.

Is what it's designed to do the best set of capabilities to support our troops as they are currently operating? Fuel burn, loiter, bomb load, communications up and down the kill-chain, ID'ing targets, hitting targets in close contact, etc., etc.

What about its basing? Are distant bases with thousands of feet of pavement the best option? Maybe.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Hard to say. The A-10 has about twice the carrying capacity as the A-1 and nearly twice the range. I'm guessing it's gun is more accurate than the A-1's cannons.

If you factor in cost the A-1 may be more bang for the buck. Then again, against low tech opposition a Sherman may be better bang for the buck than a M1A2 Abrams.

[JonS]

Regardless of loiter time, carrying capacity, and all the rest, the A-10 has the ability to deliver precision munitions, which alone makes it far more useful than an A-1. I suspect the A-67 probably won't have precision munitions capability.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Recent upgrades have given the A-10 a high resolution FLIR and a data link with Blue Force Tracker. If I were a grunt on the ground I think I'd feel more comfortable with the Warthog above me.

[JonS]

And that.

Sometimes the extra money really is worth while. (see: Thanh Hoa Bridge)

[argie]

All those, PGM and NVG/FLIR are already standard, for instance, in the AT-29 Super Tucano.

The FLIR was standard on the OV-10 before the program O/A-10 was started and all the all time/all weather capabilities on the single seat A-10 are fairly recent.

The Avenger is a great gun, but, again, overkilling. Most of the time what is needed is a spray of a few 12.7 to 20 mm ammo than being able to peel off the armor from anything on threads at 4.200 rounds a minute. In fact, just from the bang for the buck perspective, there is nothing on battlefield more expensive than a burst from the Avenger. The A-10 is really cost efective when carrying Mavericks. Something the turboprop CAS airplanes can do.

The A-10 can go twice the distance than a A-1, but you can deploy de A-1 directly on the frontline, not a few hundred kms away on a thousand meters road. If you uses the A-10 STOL ability or in dirty roads, the payload gets brutally reduced (to around the same an A-1 can carry in the same circunstances). Maximum design values have very little to do with actual operational capabilities. Yet, the A-1 can loiter for a few more hours over the battlefield than the Warthog.

Anyway, today, the A-10 is the more capable CAS a/c. That doesn't mean that automatically is the plane needed for the all tasks at hand, or the best suited.

In fact, the subject is even more complicated, as in the USAF the real problem resides in lack of air controllers, which are difficult to train, given the cost of operating the aircraft they should train with. So, to the operational cost of such beasts (including F-15Es and F-16s) you had to add the deficit, because of the cost of training mainly, of the ground specialized teams to work with them. It is a long logistical chain that claims for something that not excels, but that is just suited for the job and lowers the costs in all the processes implied.

The A-10 is complementary in specialized CAS tasks, like destroying AAA and AFVs, and having it is a BIG plus over sending multirole fighters to a job that isn't the best for them.

[Statisoris]

Lol, I guess my thread is now on the "and CAS" portion if the subject.

[argie]

A fairly entertaining take on OA-X

[Michael Emrys]

The Avenger is a great gun, but, again, overkilling. Most of the time what is needed is a spray of a few 12.7 to 20 mm ammo than being able to peel off the armor from anything on threads at 4.200 rounds a minute.

My 40 year memory of the A-10's development was that the design started out in the '60s as a robust purpose-built replacement for the A-1. Then the Viet Nam war ended and its mission got redefined to tank killer in an anti-WARPAC environment, and that's when the gun got added. It's an impressive weapon, but as you say, serious overkill for COIN work and a big weight penalty to haul around.

Michael

[YankeeDog]

My 40 year memory of the A-10's development was that the design started out in the '60s as a robust purpose-built replacement for the A-1. Then the Viet Nam war ended and its mission got redefined to tank killer in an anti-WARPAC environment, and that's when the gun got added. It's an impressive weapon, but as you say, serious overkill for COIN work and a big weight penalty to haul around.

Michael

Requirement that the airframe be able to carry a high-ROF 30mm cannon was part of the original 1970 RFP that eventually became the A-10, so this was always part of the design. The project's genesis was in 1967, but the work from 1967-1970 was preliminary and did not involve any complete airframe designs. So there was never an A-10 prototype, or even an engineer's sketch, without a 30mm cannon.

In fact, the A-10's airframe is literally designed around the cannon. It's sometimes referred to as a cannon with a couple of engines and a pair of wings strapped onto it.

[c3k]

Any A1 re-build would of course require new avionics/comms. It would be modernized to use the systems now in use. The idea of just pulling some out of a museum and declaring them the new solution is ridiculous.

The core of an A1-style CAS aircraft would be a single prop of some flavor for simplicity and cost. Heavy lift for a robust weapons loadout. Trade some loadout for extremely rough field performance. Knobby tires are must. Modern comms/avionics/targeting systems. Cannon vs. .50: cannon have a longer range/explosive fill and can keep the aircraft beyond enemy small arms and HMG fire. (A longer reach is a good thing.)

[YankeeDog]

Some sort of decent-sized autocannon is definitely a good idea for CAS work in a COIN environment. Recent engagements in Afghanistan in particular show the value of a good, accurate aerial gun platform for working close to friendlies.

But it certainly doesn't need to be a 4,000 RPM, 1,000 m/s mv gatling gun. Something with 1/4 the rate of fire, and somewhat lower mv, would be fine and would save considerable weight.

[c3k]

Absolutely. Making it 25mm/bushmaster compatible would be nice. Installing 6 of them in the wings would add style points. (The A1 only had 4x 20mm.) Enabling selective fire so the pilot could choose how many would fire on each pass would get extra scoring from the judges.

[Bigduke6]

Although I like the idea of cheapo platforms dropping precision-guided munitions, this good idea still has some problems, not least because not all COIN operations are created equally, nor is it particularly clear that Afghanistan is a particularly good measure of success.

That LTC's write-up that Argie posted is a pretty good example of the idea. Take something off the shelf, make a bunch of them, deploy them densely, and life is wonderful. The grunts get lots of flexible air support and the air force gets lots of slots for F-15 pilots who otherwise would have to fly a desk or just search for work with the civilians. Sounds great, right?

Well...

For starters, there is the question of whether a little low/slow plane can really survive out there in the big bad COIN world. The article (which was written by a weapons and ground control air force guy) says "no", because in the main the threat from the ground is the odd .50 and Kalashnikovs.

This is all well and good - but what if say the Taliban actually do read up on Vietnam? Maybe they would realize that where you can plant 1 x .50 you can plant a quad, and a quad .50 will definately throw enough lead to smack a little propeller plane that is equipped with - get ready - a .50 of its own. Or God forbid a Zsu, those things are dirt cheap and available if I was an insurgent and the western infidels were using little propeller planes to call artillery and drop bombs and missiles on me, I'd sure work hard to get me a couple.

Of course you could always bring in the fast movers or the artillery to whack the AAA nest, but that sort of defeats the purpose of the little bitty cheap air support platform that is supposed to make air to ground support possible without the jet jocks.

Then there is the arguement, well, technology is so advanced it's easy and cheap to built a propeller plane that drops flares and carries spiffy exhausts, so it won't get tracked and hit by a hand-held missile.

I find this a bit hard to believe, if these missiles are designed to run down fighter jets, how much harder can it be for them to nail a putt-putt prop plane? This is assuming that flare technology stays ahead of IR tracking technology, which is not exactly guaranteed. Plus there is the same issue as the the Zsu or any other autocannon - a cheap little prop plane for doing ground support pretty much assumes, that the bad guys on the ground aren't going to get any kind of AAA bigger than what might be carried in pieces on a mule or a man.

Finally, and the article actually does a good job of illustrating this, if you go for a bunch of planes that can operate from remote airstrips, then you definately are going to reduce response time and increase loiter time for the grunts in the field.

But it is a good idea to think about the enemy, and I think that when I look at a map of proposed OA-X light ground support aircraft airfields throughout Afghanistan, I think:

"Jeez, where NATO and the IASF had three big airfields (like Baghram and Kandahar) to keep the Taliban from mortaring and sending suicide bombers, now there are something like two dozen small ones. All those airfields need security, meaning more or your limited infantry, which you want in the field, has to sit around on airbase defence. And if you skimp on the defence or the insurgents do their job right, you have wonderful images of US aircraft burning on the runway from a guerilla attack."

This I think is a fairly good example of why Air Force colonels are not allowed to make theater-level decisions.

But the real problem with the light/cheap ground support aircraft is this. It's all well and good to say "OK, we think we are only going to fight fourth and fifth world opponents so really we don't need the spiffy stuff, we need relatively cheap systems to use our high-tech advantages in supressing insurgencies or forcing regime changes etc."

Let's assume for a moment that's true, there are no well-armed enemies willing to fight it out in a more or less conventional fight in the forseeable future. It's a very risky assumption and not something I would want to be the national security on, but where does that logic lead?

The article gives a big fat hint. Again, this is a effectively a work of "wish fiction" b a serving Air Force officer who is arguing that since COIN is the future, the Air Force needs a whole bunch of cheapo planes to do the ground support job, and the article in substantial detail writes up the period 2010 - 2018, and how the OX-A airplane was fielded and did just that.

The story line even tells us about great collaboration between the USAF and the Afghan Air forces with these little planes.

It does not, however, tell us when and how the Afghanistan war ends, nor does it tell us how US air strikes and airpower helped that happen. And I think the reason for this is, that the author cannot even in his wildest fantasy concoct a reasonable story of how that would be likely to happen.

This, I think, is the essence of the problem. What is the point of spending a bazillion dollars in resources and retraining F-15 pilots to OA-X, setting up the ordnance people to build and maintain and support not just a few big fast jet airfields but dozens of small propeller plane airfields in the next great counterinsurgency, when even an officer rah rahing for doing all that can't come up with a believable way all that would defeat an insurgency?

Money better spent on a losing proposition, remains money lost.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Finally, and the article actually does a good job of illustrating this, if you go for a bunch of planes that can operate from remote airstrips, then you definately are going to reduce response time and increase loiter time for the grunts in the field.

But it is a good idea to think about the enemy, and I think that when I look at a map of proposed OA-X light ground support aircraft airfields throughout Afghanistan, I think:

"Jeez, where NATO and the IASF had three big airfields (like Baghram and Kandahar) to keep the Taliban from mortaring and sending suicide bombers, now there are something like two dozen small ones. All those airfields need security, meaning more or your limited infantry, which you want in the field, has to sit around on airbase defence. And if you skimp on the defence or the insurgents do their job right, you have wonderful images of US aircraft burning on the runway from a guerilla attack."

I was going to post something very similar to this but you beat me to it. It all sounds great in theory, but I agree that in practice the A-1s would likely end up operating out of the same large airbases as everything else.

Upgrading all the electronics and senors to the latest and greatest raises the cost.

[Vanir Ausf B]

The Avenger is a great gun, but, again, overkilling.

If a 30mm cannon is overkill, what's a 500 lb bomb?

[c3k]

Ooh, ooh, I know. If you're concerned about force protection with a lot of smaller, dispersed, airfields, put a twin-cannon dorsal turret on the plane. That way you could man the turrets while on the ground and protect the field.

[MikeyD]

This talk about the A-1 Skyraider remnds me of how often the Pentagon has tried and failed to field a replacement for Chinook. For some reason the Pentagon's reach always exceeds its grasp. They go for too fancy, too cutting-edge, too wiz-bang. Sometimes all you need is a sturdy work mule, not a racehorse that could win the Belmont stakes,

[YankeeDog]

Setting aside for the moment the very valid points regarding the validity of "under the gun" nation building and military COIN operations in general, comparing a hypothetical light propeller-driven CAS craft to an F-15 or even an A-10 is going in the wrong direction. What you should really be comparing it to is an AH-64.

Turboprops have excellent fuel economy; this is why they're so popular as short to mid-range passenger carriers. Rotary wings are extremely inefficient flyers. So, for a given fuel load, a turboprop can be based much further from the "hot" area than a rotary wing craft can.

And fixed-wing craft can loiter for many hours at altitudes far above the max. ceiling of rotary wings, well above the range of lighter AAA (23mm AAA has a practical ceiling of ~2000m, and even the very modern Igla-S MANPADS can't reach above 3500m; a turboprop can easily cruise at 6,000m AGL).

Fixed wing aircraft also take far less training for fly, require less maintenance, and are generally more likely to stay in the air after a few hits than a rotary wing craft. A fixed wing craft that loses power temporarily turns into a glider. A rotary wing craft that loses power even briefly turns into a brick.

So... question is whether the attack helicopter's ability to do VerTOL and hover, is a worthwhile trade-off to all of the above.

[argie]

So... question is whether the attack helicopter's ability to do VerTOL and hover, is a worthwhile trade-off to all of the above.

Is worthwhile for one, and maybe two, CAS roles it excels to: Anti Tank (think on them as the fastest way to set an AT ambush or to cover a flank with offensive AT maneuver, inside the ground operations plan), and, marginally, Anti Helicopter (it's very difficult to kill helos with jet planes at high speed on diffcult terrain).

[YankeeDog]

Is worthwhile for one, and maybe two, CAS roles it excels to: Anti Tank (think on them as the fastest way to set an AT ambush or to cover a flank with offensive AT maneuver, inside the ground operations plan), and, marginally, Anti Helicopter (it's very difficult to kill helos with jet planes at high speed on diffcult terrain).

... Neither of which applies to COIN.

Also interesting to note that in GWII, attempts to use AH-64s in the role for which they were originally intended (anti-armor) were not particularly successful -- in the most famous instance, a large force of AH-64s was tasked with attacking the armored Medina Division, but the Iraqis set up a flak trap to good effect, shooting down one and driving off the others before they could execute the attack.

They did better in GWI, but overall the U.S. Army's own assessments did not give the AH-64 great grades for its performance even in this war -- while the AH-64s did destroy a considerable amount of enemy armor, it was difficult to keep them in the air, and total number of sorties were far lower than what had been planned.

The attempts to deploy them in in Bosnia and Kosovo were also infamously unsuccessful, due in no small part to logistics problems involved with getting them in-theater and concerns about their vulnerability to ground fire.

I'm not so sure about the helicopter vs. fast mover thing anymore, either... this may have been true in the 1970s, when most air-to-air missiles systems had a relatively narrow engagement envelope, and were also less capable of tracking slower, but highly maneuverable targets. But modern air-to-air missile systems are capable of gaining a lock and engaging far off the aircraft's direction of flight, making it much easier for fast movers to engage slow, but highly maneuverable targets like helicopters. And overall, I'm not at all convinced U.S. ground forces need their own helicopters to protect against enemy attack helicopters, even against a hypothetical opponent of similar technology. Given the proliferation of highly advanced MANPADs and other weapons systems with a secondary anti-helicopter capability (like the Javelin), I really wouldn't want to be in a helicopter anywhere near a first world military ground force.

[Vark]

The AH-64 would have been good at doing it's original job, hunting down and attriting armour and mech heavy Soviet formations, to aid fixed wing CAS and friendly ground forces. Trouble is the Taliban don't have masses of armour, so to save their tank killer the army sold the AH-64 as an ideal precision weapon platform and tried to turn all its Cold War features into USP's for COIN (enhanced protection, sensor suite, etc). If the AH-64 did not exist does anyone think the next attack rotary platform would look anything like it?

As for the shambolic non-deployment in Bosnia/Kosovo that was more due to a cut back in pilot training stateside, outdated counter measures suites and a turf war between the airforce and the army. The former denied the latter any of the usual ground based support assets, fearing any CAS operation might escalate into a de-facto invasion, so the AH-64's stayed grounded.

Final points, rotary craft are particularly affected by hot and high conditions as found in many parts of Afghanistan, and if forced to operate there become even less economical.

Talking to a group of MOD planners for the British in Afghanistan the concensus was the operation was doomed because of lack of manpower, technology being a poor substitute for lack of boots on the ground. One member of the group suggested trebling the deployment (and boosting squad sizes) and stripping them of most modern weapons, which often only needed because the situation deteriorates so quickly with such a tiny operational footprint. AH-64's are repeatedly used to extricate NATO troops who have become pinned down, when a larger force, with decent reserves could aggressively deal with the threat, albeit with higher casualties, but that is another topic!

[Bigduke6]

I think it has to do with the procurement system. The more complicated and cutting edge the the thing, the more liveliehoods of businesses and so lobbyists depend on the thing. And therefore, the more likey one of them will trot out the "our boys have to have the best" arguement.

This in turn makes the thing as expensive and complicated as it needs to be, to defuse the people who are trotting out the "our boys have to have the best" argument. Which, strangely, very often seems to happen when the contractor that was cut out, gets cut in. Or another contractor with better lobbyists manages to step in.

For something boring that every one agrees on what the specs should be and what it should do, like JP4 or shoelaces or something, it's relatively easy, contractors pitch their products and - assuming there aren't any pay offs and corruption and so forth - the military just hands the business to the lowest bidder.

But the moment you get into "we need this because the experts think it's necessary, and the precise definition of "it" and "necessary" varies from expert to expert, military need starts getting subordinated to which lobbying group can make the best argument.

That's what that AF colonel's essay on how great this light attack planes would be really amounts to. A guy with all sorts of priorities besides rationally-calculated military need is pushing a serious purchase with very debatable actual value on the taxpayer.

Another problem with a politicized system of military equipment procurement is, you wind up buying what the military thinks is cool and maintains their jobs and branch's importance, rather than what is most efficient.

Which brings us back to the real question, which is of course, what war(s) do you plan to fight? Everything flows from that, not just cold rational planning but emotional fighting over contract money as well. The whole thing is driven by whatever perception there is, of what wars are next, including of course ongoing wars if they happen to be ongoing.

The Brits Vark spoke with had the opinion "boots on the ground" is the answer, to wit -

Talking to a group of MOD planners for the British in Afghanistan the concensus was the operation was doomed because of lack of manpower, technology being a poor substitute for lack of boots on the ground. One member of the group suggested trebling the deployment (and boosting squad sizes) and stripping them of most modern weapons, which often only needed because the situation deteriorates so quickly with such a tiny operational footprint. AH-64's are repeatedly used to extricate NATO troops who have become pinned down, when a larger force, with decent reserves could aggressively deal with the threat, albeit with higher casualties, but that is another topic!

But I would argue those Brits and even the "boots on the ground school" are missing a bigger point. The assumption at the base of that thinking is, "If we just get the force mix right we would win."

The counter to that is, of course, maybe sometimes there is no force mix that can win, given other factors, and at the top of that list I would put at the very top the willingness to sacrifice on the part of the people doing the fighting, and of the people supporting the fighters

Vark hits it on the head that yes, larger numbers of infantry could be more effective against nickel and dime insurgents than small numbers of infantry supported by the wizzest-bangest of air support, IF there was a willingness of all involved to accept more infantry casualties.

But infantry like it or not comes from the populace, and it is not possible to recruit or pay infantry well enough, in any kind of numbers, so that the population from which the infantry came will happily accept dead and maimed infantrymen no matter what. The infantrymen and the populace have to believe it's worth it, and for that you need clearly defined and achievable war goals.

This is one of the reasons there is so much ridiculously technologically advanced air force capacity in Afghanistan. Not because it's the right tool for the job, but rather because:

- The flying military community has all sort of incentives to justify their existence in real not just in theoretical wars

- The infantry is happy to call down as many air strikes as they are allowed

- The populace has been sold a bill of goods - advanced technologies will defeat nationalist insurgencies

- Military manufacturing contractors maximize profits selling high-tech weaponry, whether or not that's what the military needs.

If that sounds like a losing combination, well, we'll see. I know what I think.

But the key to all this is, win or lose, smart procurement policy or stupid, the longer there is an ongoing conflict that can justify accelerated military procurement, the businesses and the lobbyists stay employed. A long, drawn-out conflict with plenty of arguing about which high-tech solution will end it, and lots of experimentation, is in their interest.

Heck, if you want to be really cynical you could say that an impossible-to-win conflict is most in their interest, as it would allow them to force all possible high-tech solutions on the taxpayer, rather than just the ones needed to win the war.

This talk about the A-1 Skyraider remnds me of how often the Pentagon has tried and failed to field a replacement for Chinook. For some reason the Pentagon's reach always exceeds its grasp. They go for too fancy, too cutting-edge, too wiz-bang. Sometimes all you need is a sturdy work mule, not a racehorse that could win the Belmont stakes,

[argie]

This talk about the A-1 Skyraider remnds me of how often the Pentagon has tried and failed to field a replacement for Chinook. For some reason the Pentagon's reach always exceeds its grasp. They go for too fancy, too cutting-edge, too wiz-bang. Sometimes all you need is a sturdy work mule, not a racehorse that could win the Belmont stakes,

Then the NATO Force lean some Mil Mi-17s to do the all the lift than only needed a VTOL truck.

[argie]

in the most famous instance, a large force of AH-64s was tasked with attacking the armored Medina Division, but the Iraqis set up a flak trap to good effect, shooting down one and driving off the others before they could execute the attack.

IIRC, there wasn't a proper flak trap, but the usual small and medium weapons fire any soviet style division could deliver.

The affected helos came back mostly with 7.62 holes on them.

BTW, I wasn't limiting the discussion only to COIN, thoough it can be even more difficult than many other CAS missions, despite being considered low intensity.