Panzer V against any US tank

[Destraex1]

Nonsense. In June, well before things got bad logistically for the Germans the following German Panzer divisions conducted attacks:

21 Pz

12 SS Pz

Pz Lehr

17 SS PzGren

2 Pz

9 SS Pz

10 SS Pz

They all failed, with heavy losses.

When did the Germans start using alternatives because of factory bombing?

[Destraex1]

Destraex - sometimes Panthers lost out to Shermans or TDs because the initial LOS was low, as in Normandy hedgerows or Arracourt morning fog. And sometimes they lost out to them despite good visibility at long range under clear skies, for example the Panzer brigade vs. the CC of French 2nd Armored on the approaches to Nancy, or 2nd Panzer vs. 2nd Armored at Celles.

The Germans actually strove for the former rather than the latter. "Huh?" Yes, truly.

Great visibility and wide open ground aren't all that helpful against an enemy with total air superiority.

In the case of the French CC, they were caught in low ground in a village area while the CC had them pinned there by cross fire from higher ground. As long as they stayed low and among the buildings, they weren't sitting ducks for P-47s. Whenever they came up the crest, they were hit from multiple sides by both plain 75mm Shermans and Priests firing direct. While they stayed low, they had 105mm HE dropped on them for literally hours, while the Shermans crawled in closer to sweep more of the lower ground with crossfire. In the end the German brigade lost all but 4 Panthers out of a full battalion complement. A relief attempt by the Panzer IV battalion of the same brigade was stopped with the loss of about a company.

At Celles, clear weather didn't mean long lines of sight at clay pigeon Sherman targets. It meant L-5s overhead continually, perfect tactical intel for the Americans, and 105mm barrages dropping on the Germans wherever they were. The Americans then raced around them with full ridges in between, then crested into cross fire set ups and ranched them. The Germans were strung out at the exposed tip of a long salient, operationally speaking, making it easy for the Americans to get on all sides of them. They were also worn and tired from weeks of fighting to get there, while the 2nd AD slamming into them was fresh and near TOE. The Germans were even low on gas.

Look, there is no question a Panther is a better tank in pure gun and armor terms. That just isn't usually the most important factor in real world armor engagements, which are emphatically not about fighting fair. Somebody is usually in an operational pickle. That may just be a misconceived negative odds counterattack, it may be poor tactical handling by green leaders, it may be abysmal recon and tactical intel, made harder by enemy soft firepower stripping tanks and buttoning them, etc. Bigger scale factors setting the entire context of the fight, simply matter more than the difference in tech specs between vehicles.

That wouldn't be true for all vehicle match ups. But it tended to be true, because the types numerous enough to matter weren't all that far apart (e.g. front dominant but sides still thin, or turret vulnerable, or vulnerable to the upgunned part of the enemy vehicle fleet, etc).

In other than tactical gun and armor specs, the Panther had a major problem - very short time to failure for its drive train. This made it ammo, operationally speaking, with a limited "shelf life" in combat, rather than a permanent military asset. Fire off a fresh formation of them at the enemy and they will kill some enemy tanks and hold some ground for some modest period of time. Then they will be spent, from even exchanges, or running into an operational trump situation and getting clobbered en masse, or flat breaking down.

Yeah, all acknowledged. Still goes to my earlier points. Strategically you cannot match an enemy with total air superiority and what amounted to the war being against them in almost every aspect etc. This is not the tanks fault. Not being able to use its advatages such as open fields of fire because of air superiority has nothing to do with shermans being good for instance.

The initial poster asked why his shermans get owned by panthers. Its rather simple. The Panther is better one on one before anything else is considered.

So we are all in agreement... to better the shermans shortcomings in tank vs tank combat, you need numbers and special tactics.

The over all war of course has many more mitigating circumstances that all people here have tried to cover not withstanding the original question.

[JonS]

Fair is fair Magpie; 'the truth lies in between'

He said that "Shermans did break down a lot just like Panthers". Which is technically true. Shermans did break down a lot. As did Panthers. He didn't say the two broke down at the same rate. Teach the controversy!

[JonS]

When did the Germans start using alternatives because of factory bombing?

What are you babbling about? They were all basically brand new, fresh divisions when the Germans decided to piss them up against a wall. Their initial failures have nothing to do with logistics, or strategic bombing, or Hitler. It has everything to do with being tactically on the offensive.

[Destraex1]

Cross country the Sherman and even more so the Cromwell left the Panther flagging due to their better power to weight ratios. In many instances, noted particularly in Italy the could cross ground the PzV could not. The Panther did have an advantage on boggy ground because of its wider tracks.

The Sherman did not break down anywhere near as much as the Panther. I have seen the Panther gearbox quoted as lasting 150km at best. The M4 beyond all else was noted for its reliability far in excess of it opponents or allies.

Point well taken from magpie though JonS. My point was simply that the M4 was not exactly great considering the powers that be did expect % losses during every single road march. Which the US did a great job of making good. Most were repaired in the field on the march. Spares flowed quickly, especially spare parts.

I would actually love to read lengthy german accounts of the panthers unreliability (not doubting it, serious here). Especially well after the kursk debacle gave them the opportunity to over come teething.

In Italy I am not surprised due to the nature of italian terrain that the panthers. On normal gradients apparently the off road manoeverablility of the panther was very good, I thought in comparison to the sherman. Perhaps that was just the wider tracks though.

Certainly the churchill was going where the sherman could not!

[Destraex1]

What are you babbling about? They were all basically brand new, fresh divisions when the Germans decided to piss them up against a wall. Their initial failures have nothing to do with logistics, or strategic bombing, or Hitler. It has everything to do with being tactically on the offensive.

It was a genuine question. Not an attack. I was wondering when spare parts and raw materials were substituted due to bombing. The Germans had to make do with a lot of synthetics and sub standard substitutes due to running short of raw materials. I was wondering whether any of that made it into the panther factories.

As for pissing them up against the wall, are we referring to the battle of the bulge?

[Magpie_Oz]

Teach the controversy!

Now who is babbling ?

Point well taken from magpie though JonS. My point was simply that the M4 was not exactly great considering the powers that be did expect % losses during every single road march. Which the US did a great job of making good. Most were repaired in the field on the march. Spares flowed quickly, especially spare parts.

All tanks break down a lot, the nature of the beast. Even modern tanks have appalling mean time between failures. Point is that the Sherman was far more reliable and broke down substantially less than the Panther. Allowing the crews more confidence that their tank was not going to break down and be a sitting duck in the middle of a battle.

Sure those that did break down were returned to service quickly by the generous support train which only heightened their advantage over the Panther, particularly when they were easier to repair as well.

[Bigduke6]

It's one of those "where do you draw the line?" deals.

If the time period is Summer 1943, do we look at Prokhorovka? At the Battle of Kursk? At Citadel and the Rumyiantsev together? Yes the Germans destroyed a great deal of Soviet personnel and equipment during the Battle of Kursk. But if a necessary result of that fighting was a German retreat across the Dniepr crossings with all the German losses that entailed, how do we factor that in to our "who-was-more-effective" equation?

If the Germans abandoned pretty much all their Tigers in the retreat to the Dniepr, then no the Soviets aren't painting kills on the turrets but nonetheless those Tigers were certainly no longer of use to the Germans. So is the Tiger still a great tank?

How valid is "tactical skill" as a military value if the price of that skill is equipping your soldiers with such expensive kit, it harms your war effort? Doesn't it follow that saying "The German panzers were tactically superior" is another way of saying "The German army fixation on tactics helped lose them the war, and a great case study is all those abandoned Tiger tanks inbetween Kursk and the Dniepr."?

What about those subsequent battles where the Germans got swamped by Red armor? Was that overwhelming Red tank numbers, a case of quantity defeating quality? Or was it: "The Germans were paying the price of building big expensive heavy hard-to-maintain Tiger tanks that you pretty much inevitably have to abandon if your army has to retreat fast."

There is no question that the Germans retained tactical skill where they concentrated well-trained forces in for tactically-rational tasks.

But as the war wore on, the German capacity to do that on a substantial scale fell. I think it is worth bearing in mind when we try and make comparisons of tactical performance.

Speaking generally, using the Eastern Front, and in my opinion, the progression went roughly like this:

1941 - Germans are tactically competent for defensive and offensive operations from perhaps across the entire Eastern front in 1941. Even an technically overwhelming edge in tank quality does the Soviets no good.

1942 Germans are tactically competent for defensive operations for the great bulk of the front but with a few outliers, but offensively competent only a large sector of the front, call it an army group. The Soviets can only defend, anywhere, by feeding troops into the meatgrinder. Offensive operations are generally disastrous, and the only time they manage a success they either have a major weather edge or months of planning.

1943 Germans are tactically competent for defensive operations across the front generally but weakening skill forces the use of fire brigades. Unless the terrain is particularly favorable the German infantry cannot by itself stand unassisted against a Soviet offensive. The Germans are capable of offensive operations generally by a single army or two, and specifically only the panzerkorps prepped to make the attack. The days of a sustained army group offensive over large distances are gone.

The Soviets meanwhile are capable of deliberate defensive in depth backed up by multiple army-level counter-offensives. Their offensives can still be clumsy, but they can also be ruthlessly pressed, they Soviet by this point have learned how to break the German front and push an advantage. The Soviets display excellent tactical knowledge on German technique and are willing to spend lives to compensate for superior German equipment and, to a lesser extent probably, training. By the end of the year the Soviets conduct their first Front-level offensive which the Germans fail to stop, instead the Soviets call a halt themselves because of logistics.

1944 - German infantry is tactically incapable (which is not exactly incompetent but close) to stand defensively against a standard Soviet attack. Further, mobile unit fire brigades of division or rare korps size can only slow down the Red attack. The German army across the Eastern Front is capable of, in terms of effective force, roughly a Korps- or at best 2-Korps sized attack. This is nice and it includes Tiger II and Panthers, but it is pretty much meaningless across a line of contact the size of the East Front. Also, the Soviets are quite capable of shooting up the Tigers. The rest of the German force, generally speaking, is incapable of useful offensive action. Not enough men, equipment, training, morale- you pick it they don't have it.

The Soviets for their part are capable of multiple-front offensives, and routinely maneuver to handle German counterattacks. For a full-dress Front offensive they throw partisans, reconnaissance, propaganda, and the rail network of two continents into the buildup; in some cases the Red planning makes a mockery of the superiority of German staff work. When the Soviets break into the German operational depths, for weeks at a time the Soviet mobile units move at a pace pretty much just as the Germans did during Blitzkrieg. Soviet equipment practically nowhere is decisively inferior to the Germans, and at times it is superior.

1945 - The Germans are defeated and with the exception of major defensive positions like Budapest or Berlin or a precious very few concentrations of panzers, the Germans are on the defensive and when hit by the Soviets they crumble. The main limiting factors on Soviet offensive action are logistics and politics. What the German army intends to do about the Red Army is no longer relevant.

I would say we could probably see a similar progression in NW Europe, with the qualification that since the Soviets spent more time fighting the Germans they had more time to learn ways to defeat the Germans.

It is probably fair to say that it took the Allies in NW Europe something like 6-8 months to get to a point where they could dictate battle conditions to the Germans, while the Soviets needed about two-and-a-half years.

How much Soviet fighting taking the "edge" of the German war machine helped the Americans and Commonwealth forces in NW Europe, is another question.

Certainly, even after the first half of 1944, given the right terrain or concentration of units, the Germans could give a good account of themselves on a small scale. They had a fair tactical doctrine and it helps to have the German army officer and NCO corps running your military.

My point is, unless we are to compare only the best German units with the average Allied units, or narrow our source of test cases to tactical situations particularly suiting German strong points, it is hard (for me anyway) to come to the conclusion that the Germans had a powerful tactical edge over their opponents post- Summer 1944.

A simple way to put it is, it is sloppy research to spend a lot of time looking at the panzer troops, the bocage defense actions, and the SS, and draw general conclusions from that sample. They were a minority not representative of the German army as a whole.

Another way to put it is, if we want to simulate the real German army summer-1944 and onwards, if we are honest, it should be greens and conscripts, and almost always without much artillery or an armor. That was what the Allies fought against most of the time.

At Kursk the Germans attacked against a deeply entrenched enemy at 1:3 odds. They lost. Yet they somehow managed to inflict roughly 3 times as many casualties as they suffered. I'm sure someone more knowledgeable than me can explain that, but it seems to me that if we are talking about the tactical level, the one applicable to CM, just pointing out that the Germans lost and therefore concluding that they were not very good at any level may be too simple.

[sburke]

Were these the ones at point blank range?

Why? Is that the excuse de jour? How come whenever folks make a claim about the uber capability of the Panther and claims are made that it would produce much better results if it had been used in x manner, when anyone cites it being used in x manner and not performing there is always some caveat.

Tell you what cite an example of the Panther being used on the Western front on the offensive that backs up your suggestion. I will grant you that the German army could have made much better use of the tanks sent to the Western front in fall 1944, but I am hard pressed to be able to find an example to support your theory. Is it that the Germans simply always found a way to lose or is it that qualitatively the Panther just wasn't that much better to be able to offset the weaknesses of attacking a competent opponent with an adequate AT capability?

Arracourt lasted several days and yes there was a fair amount of close encounter fighting, but the Germans chose those conditions to attack under. The fog was generally early morning and if it weren't for the fog, then the excuse would be allied air power. As my Grandma Rosannadanna used to say, it's always something. If it isn't allied airpower supposedly destroying hundreds of German tanks, it's fog making the Panther somehow weaker than the Sherman.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/lorraine/lorraine-ch05.html#b4

[Charlie Marlow]

It is probably fair to say that it took the Allies in NW Europe something like 6-8 months to get to a point where they could dictate battle conditions to the Germans, while the Soviets needed about two-and-a-half years.

With some exception, the Allies were dictating the course of battle by late July. So more like a month. However, it isn't like the Allies hadn't been facing the Germans for 5 years by then for the UK, and two years for the Americans. Not to the same extent as the Soviets, but the Allies didn't need to overcome the same drawbacks as the USSR in massive early casualties and the pre-war purge.

[Michael Emrys]

Sure, there's that, but I was more talking about the operational and tactical level.

Prior to Normandy, for example, Hitler was not responsible for Rommel's farcical showing in Op CRUSADER.

Prior to D-Day, Hitler was not responsible for Rundstedt, Rommel, and Geyr v.S. being unable to come up with a decent plan.

After D-Day, Hitler was not responsible for the futile attacks by the divisions referred to in my previous post.

Blaming Hitler is all very convenient, and I have no intention of defending him or the many boneheaded decisions he did make, but the German Armed Forces managed to screw things up quite well enough on their own, even without input from him thankyouverymuch.

Agreed on all points.

Michael

[JonS]

With some exception, the Allies were dictating the course of battle by late July.

The Allies held the initiative pretty much from 6 June onwards, but I don't think that's what BD6 was getting at. I believe he meant 'dictating the course of events' in terms of choosing objectives based mainly or purely on logistic and political imperatives, and then promptly securing them despite anything the Germans might try to confound the issue.

[Destraex1]

Why? Is that the excuse de jour? How come whenever folks make a claim about the uber capability of the Panther and claims are made that it would produce much better results if it had been used in x manner, when anyone cites it being used in x manner and not performing there is always some caveat.

Tell you what cite an example of the Panther being used on the Western front on the offensive that backs up your suggestion. I will grant you that the German army could have made much better use of the tanks sent to the Western front in fall 1944, but I am hard pressed to be able to find an example to support your theory. Is it that the Germans simply always found a way to lose or is it that qualitatively the Panther just wasn't that much better to be able to offset the weaknesses of attacking a competent opponent with an adequate AT capability?

Arracourt lasted several days and yes there was a fair amount of close encounter fighting, but the Germans chose those conditions to attack under. The fog was generally early morning and if it weren't for the fog, then the excuse would be allied air power. As my Grandma Rosannadanna used to say, it's always something. If it isn't allied airpower supposedly destroying hundreds of German tanks, it's fog making the Panther somehow weaker than the Sherman.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/lorraine/lorraine-ch05.html#b4

correct, it is an excuse that the Germans could not use their tanks as intended due to all the allied advantages. The close combat nature of any offensive the germans used was not actually their choice, it was dictated by allied air cover. The fact that German offensives happened in rain, snow and fog was certainly not condisive to allowing the panther to succeed in what would be termed normal tank vs tank fighting in normal weather and terrain conditions.

What people have already agreed to here is that the sherman is the underdog in an engagement vs a panther under most normal circumstances. Close combat certainly neutralises most of those advantages.

You certainly do not see US tankers closing the range with iraqi t72s given a choice. Why? Because that would be silly and they know it. Tanks are not meant for close combat... thats been doctrine in most armies for a long time. Exactly the same as the BAttle of the Bulge street fighting is not SOP and is where the germans lost most of their tanks. Bad weather and running the gauntlet through towns.... stupidity and they knew it. What choice did they have? Of course we all know now that they should have surrendered.

[sburke]

correct, it is an excuse that the Germans could not use their tanks as intended due to all the allied advantages. The close combat nature of any offensive the germans used was not actually their choice, it was dictated by allied air cover. The fact that German offensives happened in rain, snow and fog was certainly not condisive to allowing the panther to succeed in what would be termed normal tank vs tank fighting in normal weather and terrain conditions.

What people have already agreed to here is that the sherman is the underdog in an engagement vs a panther under most normal circumstances. Close combat certainly neutralises most of those advantages.

I am not disagreeing that the Panther in a stand up fight at 2000 yards in clear weather with no air cover, not having to race cross country or travel any real distance to the battlefield, with a crew that won't bail when hit with a WP round and having your turret faced in the right direction is a better tank. But if you have to have all those conditions to prove it then it it really that much better? If you want someone to say the Panther had better armor and a more powerful gun, hey I'll be happy to say it. What is being questioned is, is that the only basis to evaluate the Panther and if so...I'll take the Pershing.

[Michael Emrys]

...the BAttle of the Bulge street fighting is not SOP and is where the germans lost most of their tanks.

I don't recall a whole lot of street fighting in the BotB. My take on how most of the German tanks were lost is that they ran out of gas and were abandoned. The ones that were lost to gunfire weren't mainly in built up areas, but out in the woods or fields, and trapped on roads they couldn't move off of.

Michael

[sburke]

I don't recall a whole lot of street fighting in the BotB. My take on how most of the German tanks were lost is that they ran out of gas and were abandoned. The ones that were lost to gunfire weren't mainly in built up areas, but out in the woods or fields, and trapped on roads they couldn't move off of.

Michael

How can you forget the twin villages?!!! If you don't already have it Michael, you have to order The Battle East of Elsenborn and The Twin Villages" by William C. C. Cavanaugh.

[Michael Emrys]

How can you forget the twin villages?!!! If you don't already have it Michael, you have to order The Battle East of Elsenborn and The Twin Villages" by William C. C. Cavanaugh.

Isn't that the one where all the artillery in the known universe fell on the Germans?

Michael

[JonS]

I am not disagreeing that the Panther in a stand up fight at 2000 yards in clear weather with no air cover, not having to race cross country or travel any real distance to the battlefield, with a crew that won't bail when hit with a WP round and having your turret faced in the right direction is a better tank. But if you have to have all those conditions to prove it then it it really that much better?

Isn't it richly ironic that a tank built by the Germans - those supposed master of the art of combined arms warfare - is only any good if it's in a fictional one-on-one devoid of operational context?

[sburke]

Isn't that the one where all the artillery in the known universe fell on the Germans?

Michael

LOL that would be the Elsenborn part. The Twin Villages would be where the 12 SS found out the Panther was meant for nice country roads and not village driving. Parking spots were just too small and occupied by nasty little GIs stalking em with bazookas.

Seriously if you don't have it, pick up the book. Would make for some nice scenario development come the Bulge game.

[dieseltaylor]

Maximum daily rate was 76,000 shells in BoTB. The problem was individually addressing the shells fast enough : ) Of course some short-cuts were taken as some Germans were NOT called Fritz.

In "Tank Men" it actually records a Sherman 75mm crewman saying how they really appreciated the short barrel where there were plenty of trees as they played on the fact the Panther was handicapped by its very long barrel. Nice to have a positive.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Tank-Men-Robert-Kershaw/dp/0340923474

[Destraex1]

Isn't it richly ironic that a tank built by the Germans - those supposed master of the art of combined arms warfare - is only any good if it's in a fictional one-on-one devoid of operational context?

I'm not asking for ideal conditions. Just not the crazy odds stacked against the panthers at that time in history from every direction.

I think some of the people here would say the spartans were poor troops because they lost thermopylae.

[Magpie_Oz]

In terms of armour 4:1 is not crazy odds, particularly if your best tank is supposedly meant to be able to achieve a 6:1 kill ratio.

8:1 odds against the Israelis in 1973 is crazy and they won.

[Charlie Marlow]

The Panthers of Panzer Brigade 107 didn't do so well, and I don't recall the fight being close combat, nor do I recall fighter/bombers playing a significant role. The 107th was tasked to take a bridge from a battalion of the 101st Airborne. Couldn't get it done. The paratroopers eventually had support from a squadron of British tanks, and drove off the Panthers with the Germans losing about a third of their tanks.

[Bigduke6]

Yeah, that's it. I mean, they were to the point where the Allies' own internal capacity set the limits of their military operations. The Germans were just immaterial as whatever they put wherever they put it, the Allies could overwhelm it at will.

I don't want to take away from terrain and geography as factors. In the initial stages of NW Europe when the Allies were in bocage and operating a supply line across the English Channel, and their front was narrow and restricted. Meanwhile the while the Soviets (generally speaking) had a line from the Baltic to the Adriatic to decide, where they wanted to concentrate force - AND they had a good year of practice organizing offensive operations that pretty much always worked.

The Allies held the initiative pretty much from 6 June onwards, but I don't think that's what BD6 was getting at. I believe he meant 'dictating the course of events' in terms of choosing objectives based mainly or purely on logistic and political imperatives, and then promptly securing them despite anything the Germans might try to confound the issue.

[Black Jack Pershing III]

I'm not asking for ideal conditions. Just not the crazy odds stacked against the panthers at that time in history from every direction.

I think some of the people here would say the spartans were poor troops because they lost thermopylae.

Another problem with this sort of analysis is that it proves way too much. For example, it would lead one to the conclusion that the Hetzer is superior to the Sherman, because in a H-2-H confrontation with a Sherman with no other variables, it will win more often than not. Heck, a PaK 75 is "better" than a Sherman when viewed this way.