New Stealth destroyer is junked - can't use missiles!

[Affentitten]

The article's author is the guy who wrote the excellent piece on the EMP bomb.

I might have known you'd be a Carlo Kopp fan. I've interviewed him a couple of times in the past. A very interesting guy with a passion for his topics. Spending an hour on the phone with him is like having brain surgery: uncomfortable in the frontal lobes, but somewhat rewarding.

[Redwolf]

but who are France, Italy, and Spain going to fight or even deter with these platforms.

Based on location, the combined Andorrian-Swiss Imperial Navy, obviously.

[von Lucke]

Yeah. There is something about the seeming abandon with which the USN places its eggs in so few baskets that makes me uncomfortable. The presumption is that the baskets can be defended to the point of being almost impervious, something they've managed to get away with for the last 60 years or so. But what happens when someday somebody dreams up a weapon or tactic that suddenly renders your impervious fortress afloat not so impervious? Oops!

Michael

Yamato vs. USN airpower comes to mind.

And this, from the previously cited wiki article on the INS Eilat, seems particularly relevant:

Though not highly publicized at the time, the sinking had a considerable impact on the Israeli Navy. Israel started to develop plans for ships better suited to missile combat, principally small and efficient ships armed with missiles, able to patrol Israeli shores and undertake offshore operations at high speed, while at the same time able to evade enemy tracking and missiles. The sinking also proved the effective capability of guided missiles in combat, and was a spur for many navies to continue to develop offensive and defensive strategies to deal with the new weapons.

Design to meet the threat, not design something and hope the threat never materializes.

[Other Means]

Good theory gunnergoz.

Yamato vs. USN airpower comes to mind.

And this, from the previously cited wiki article on the INS Eilat, seems particularly relevant:

Design to meet the threat, not design something and hope the threat never materializes.

I worked on a tall ship in Eilat for some time, when we were doing a night cruise an Israeli patrol boat went by us so fast we - a 99 foot boat - were thrown about. What got me though was that it was so quiet. If it hadn't silhouetted against the horizon I don't think I'd have known where it was.

[Lars]

I worked on a tall ship in Eilat for some time, when we were doing a night cruise an Israeli patrol boat went by us so fast we - a 99 foot boat - were thrown about. What got me though was that it was so quiet. If it hadn't silhouetted against the horizon I don't think I'd have known where it was.

If he was subsonic, he was still too slow.

[Scott B]

I still can't believe the DDG-1000 can't fire any Standard SAM's at all, but the deputy CNO did say so, even though it goes against every piece of info released so far. Who builds a 14,000t general purpose destroyer without a hefty air defense suite? Who? That would be like removing Tomahawks from the Tico's and Burkes because "it's an air defense platform, not a cruise missile platform". Pure insanity.

Yeah, this is what I've been trying to figure out since the news came out as well. So far I haven't found an answer that makes sense, though the best written on this seems to be at the Information Dissonance blog. It appears that what has actually been stated in open documents at this point is that the DDG-1000 can't guide the SMs to target with its radar system. I thought the VLS cells that could carry the ASROCs and Tomahawks and what not could carry Standards as well, so I don't know what the deal is. Between Wired and Information Dissonance, they've brought out previous Navy statements saying the DDX/DDG-1000 would be a leap forward in area air defense, so who knows what the hell is going on.

DefenseNews recently ran a two-parter that basically suggested the Navy's senior leadership was more or less hopelessly overtaken by events, and this doesn't inspire further confidence. It's a shame; I have a really high opinion of the capability and readiness of our deployed forces, but we really seem to have a Navy of lions led by donkeys at the moment. Not sure if the situation given the current troubles with the Air Force is analogous (both are in bad shape at the top - perhaps an offshoot of the higher priority currently afforded the ground forces that are doing more of the heavy lifting in current operations?).

I had previously heard about the Chinese ballistic anti-ship missile threat, and it's my impression that they're really developing or have developed what amounts to a high speed, high altitude missile with terminal guidance for killing carriers (the "ballistic missile that turns into a cruise missile" thing seems suspect to me so far). Not yet enough information, though.

[John Kettler]

Affentitten,

Never met the man, but he writes well and knows his stuff. Was professionally concerned with various HPM threats, including EMP bombs, during my military aerospace days.

ScottB,

The VLS 41 will indeed handle SM-2 and maybe SM-2 (ER).

From this it appears that it will handle SM-2 (ER).

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sm-2.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[Affentitten]

Carlo is an OK guy...apart from his almost fanatic attachment to F-111s.

As a TV reseracher I once spent an hour on the phone to him discussing the mathematical allegories in the 'information warfare' suite carried by certain ants or something that duped certain wasps into feeding them. Or was it the other way round? Anyway, everybody in the forum knows I'm not that great with numbers and I was barely hanging on by the skin of my teeth to follow him and take notes. When I hung up the phone I realised the whole office had stopped working and was looking at me. There was a simulatenous "What the **** were you talking about?"

[volfrahm]

Why hasn't the USN developed a system to defend against swarms of low-tech speedboats? How many rounds can a Phalanx hold? How long does it take to reload? Could the USN really fend off, say, a few thousand low tech Iranian speedboats?

[Redwolf]

Why hasn't the USN developed a system to defend against swarms of low-tech speedboats? How many rounds can a Phalanx hold? How long does it take to reload? Could the USN really fend off, say, a few thousand low tech Iranian speedboats?

It's a long time since I looked into this, but the defense suite of an Aegis class destroyer has substantial autocannon capabilities and enough control to not waste your ammo. Before all that security hype in the mid-nineties I got to the the UI that they have on top of that suite. Very nifty, very simple. Basically a slider to say how much ammo you want conserved (aggressively slider), a couple buttons to declare who's hostile and a big red one when you are ready to go. The ship goes into robot mode after that.

[Michael Emrys]

Why hasn't the USN developed a system to defend against swarms of low-tech speedboats?

I thought that was what the M2 .50cal was there for.

Michael

[stoat]

The US navy isn't really a green water navy. That limits the exposure to small craft, and it's not like "a few thousand speedboats" is a realistic threat. Speedboats can't carry much by way of weaponry, so you must be talking about suicide attacks, a la Cole. A "few thousand" such targets is folly, and the only time the gray ships would really be in danger would be in port or in very constricted waters, like the Strait of Malacca. CIWS would destroy any speedboat, and the 5 in guns now carried by the light escorts are ridiculously effective.

A larger threat would be a small fleet of missile boats. 5-6 boats launching Exocets or C-802s in the closed confines of the Strait of Hormuz or any of a number of East Indian passages would be more dangerous than your speedboat armada.

[Tero]

All this makes me think using Phalanx ADA to (over)kill incoming single mortar rounds is just the tip of the ice berg when modern armies are starting to kill wasps with 16" artillery barrages....

Then again, with the price of oil skyrocketing is see the age of sail coming back into fashion in the military naval circles.....

[Tero]

By stoat

That limits the exposure to small craft, and it's not like "a few thousand speedboats" is a realistic threat.

The kill ratio is more cost effective in favour of the speed boats at any level though.

Speedboats can't carry much by way of weaponry, so you must be talking about suicide attacks, a la Cole.

Old fashioned, low tech torpedoes may come back into fashion one of these days. And once they move from suicide missions to more conventional tactics what is keeping them from starting to install ATGM's in them boats ? They are already using RPG's in them after all. When they lay their hands on some ATGM's they will undoubtedly start using them.

CIWS would destroy any speedboat, and the 5 in guns now carried by the light escorts are ridiculously effective.

True. But once they are inside their minimum depression the only thing the sailors have against them is small arms and potatoes.

A larger threat would be a small fleet of missile boats. 5-6 boats launching Exocets or C-802s in the closed confines of the Strait of Hormuz or any of a number of East Indian passages would be more dangerous than your speedboat armada.

Agreed. I think the concern now is there is not effective Patriot ABM system available to counter the short/medium (even long) range dynamically targetable selfguided re-entry warheads. Imagine what havoc a ballistic missile fired from a couple of thousand miles (indeed even from across the globe) can cause in a naval base when 20-something independently targeting conventional warheads seek out the juiciest targets in the base/anchorage. Pearl Harbour will pale in comparison.

[Bigduke6]

Why hasn't the USN developed a system to defend against swarms of low-tech speedboats? How many rounds can a Phalanx hold? How long does it take to reload? Could the USN really fend off, say, a few thousand low tech Iranian speedboats?

Funny that you should ask.

Awful stinking filthy liberal New York Times story about a 2002 wargame where, er, the motorboats won:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/12/washington/12navy.html

Probably more or less even-handed description of the same wargame:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002

And here's a Guardian article with some interesting details on the tactics used in the wargame:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/sep/06/usa.iraq

And finally here's an Army Times (hey...they're not pinko, right?) story about how, during the wargames, the powers that were decided things just weren't going well enough for the Navy against all the motorboats, so they changed the rules including telling the Iranian players to turn off ADA, let Marines land, and generally let the blue team win:

http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/0-292925-1060102.php

Pretty simple really. You cram a bunch of big warships into a relatively enclosed waterway, within the range of clever people that want to hurt them, immunity can't be assumed.

[YankeeDog]

Why hasn't the USN developed a system to defend against swarms of low-tech speedboats? How many rounds can a Phalanx hold? How long does it take to reload? Could the USN really fend off, say, a few thousand low tech Iranian speedboats?

There are actually several that are in late prototype stage, and there are systems out there that can effectively combat this threat, but they're not currently in the USN's hands. The most promising is actually one of the simplest -- a cheap, guided, shoulder-fired missile. Kind of like a Javelin, but at about 1/5 the cost (it loses some of the Javelin's range and also top-attack ability).

Getting top brass and Congress to fund stuff like this over other, flashier projects is another matter. But there is a group in the USN that is strongly advocating for this stuff.

When it comes right down to it, taking out a motorboat ain't all that different than taking out a T-72.

Cheers,

YD

[John Kettler]

Bigduke6,

Interesting! Would say that Van Riper very carefully read FLEET TACTICS, by Hughes, which outlined a similar devastating low end counter to Navy high tech.

As for changing the wargame rules, been there, done that. During my college days, I was involved in a massive intercampus WW II strategic simulation, with my school, Cal State Dominguez Hills, playing Japan. We underwent one quarter of acculturation as Japanese, after which we found ourselves as Japan at the time the militarists took over.

Once it became apparent people were feeding the lessons of history back into the game, we buried the opposition with superior research and decision making, so effectively that Japan outshone Germany during the war, crushing the U.S. before it even knew what had happened.

We were told going in this was an exploration of the period, but we found ourselves on an enforced track which led to war, though we did manage to avoid several train wrecks en route. Not only didn't we get bogged down in Manchuria (played it smart and were welcomed instead, with valuable concessions), but we came out of that smelling like a rose, never invaded China, and with the resources historically dissipated there instead cranked into deadly serious industrial base mobilization.

Working with my brother, Ed, we basically did the R&D (no pulling tech from one's tush; everything had to be logically justified, paid for, and developed in a credible time line) that put Japan on the road to military success. We built antiaircraft cruisers, scrapped the super BBs for basically bombproof super CVs, got superb torpedo boats via licensing the MAS boats from Italy, DB-603 aircraft engines from Germany the same way, built a slew of Long Lance equipped subs, thoroughly secured our crypto communications via one time pads, installed puncture sealing tanks on our aircraft, converted Emily flying boats to nasty, well protected heavy bombers, licensed and built an integrated AFV fleet, using the advanced Christie plans and Christie (who was available), URGs, etc.

Ed and I spent cubic hours working on coordinated battle plans, so many we had standardized forms for handling fleet movements! Once Control forced us to war, we delivered over an inch high stack of such movements, resulting in coordinated strikes

which not only equaled, but far exceeded the historical result. Pearl Harbor was hit, but only after the Pacific fleet was waylaid, shattered and sunk on the open ocean, never to return.

This followed by strikes against the vital fuel stocks, the even more important sub base, drydocks and yard facilities, naturally, after pounding the daylights out of the airfields.

Later, we seized the islands via amphibious attack, using the amphib vessels and aforementioned armor created for such actions. That was glorious for the U.S., though, compared to what happened later.

It seems there were several Japanese whalers in San Francisco Bay, each whaler carrying, under obvious whale carcasses, a pair of MAS torpedo boats and a bunch of commandos. When the balloon went up, out came both, not only blowing the daylights out of the port from the inside, but destroying the Golden Gate Bridge by cutting the primary cables with shaped charges, dropping it smack into the main channel. Various Japanese and Japanese controlled merchantmen, secretly configured as blockships and covert minelayers, had already laid mines, then sank themselves in key places, with salvage hindered by special antidiver charges. Much the same thing happened on the East Coast, too, with most of the harbors out of commission via mines and blockships.

We also mounted a very long range high risk attack on the Sault Ste. Marie locks, through which 80% of the U.S. iron ore production had to pass. Sadly, that one was judged a failure, but what wasn't a failure was the nightmare carrier based savaging we did of the West Coast, one much worse than the most extreme actual post Pearl Harbor

imaginings, for our means were much greater. The giant Boeing factory was destroyed, and thereafter, the IJN just went down the coast, ravaging every worthwhile military target as it went. Control tried to stop us with a magical huge U.S. attack off Los Angeles, but we destroyed 400 of their planes, lost a few ships, a slew of planes, and carried on, savaging Lockheed while in the area.

The Imperial Fleet wound up at the Panama Canal, where the piece de resistance was applied, my special contribution to the war effort: the annihilation of the Panama Canal.

So impressive was this meticulous plan that it helped get me hired at Hughes!

Targets: precision lock gates (torpedoed), canal dredges (bombed and sunk), Gaillard Cut (geologically unstable; bombed to close Canal), Gatun Earth Dam (key to operating the locks; destroyed by bombing, removing the means to operate the locks), power stations, pump houses, etc. destroyed. Approaches at both ends were mined, with antidiver charges sown. Cal State Long Beach's Engineering Department spent two weeks evaluating my strike, at the end of which the Panama Canal was dead, out of commission for a minimum of one year.

Meanwhile, Germany floundered, with the Russians supposedly building Kursk style barriers across the entire middle of the country. The Italians, having inadvertently borrowed from our playbook, outperformed the Germans. With nothing much going on to the west, the Russians tried to move against us in Machuria, but found Mr. Christie's integrated force deadly, a condition made worse when our heavy bombers, escorted by long range fighters, carpet bombed several arriving tank divisions before they could detrain! Earlier model aircraft did yeoman work in the ground attack role, despite being obsolete as fighter planes.

Thereafter, as they say, the border was restored!

The U.S., whose player commander happened to be female, was already reeling from Pearl and the devastation of the West Coast. The loss of the Canal was too much, the "President" cracked (much to Control's consternation) and surrendered outright.

That was where it suddenly became apparent the "exploration" was over. Control took over the U.S., which now got the Bomb a year early. We responded with "presents" of our own: hordes of fugu ballooons bearing every nasty thing Unit 731 could make--anthrax, Q fever, the plague, etc. After that, we stopped caring about the war and the course. We'd followed the rules as given--and been shafted anyway!

So, yes, I know the "Change the rules--they're winning!" drill.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Wilhammer]

Complete Fiction - how does that help this discussion?

[John Kettler]

Wilhammer,

The first part of my reply, the Hughes book I cited, was a direct response to the issue raised regarding the feasibility of the tactics used by Van Riper's force in the instant live action wargame.

The second part arose because my own experiences, under somewhat similar circumstances, neatly parallel what happened in the situation we're discussing. Also, I thought some of the people here might get a kick reading about the wargaming chance of a lifetime enjoyed by some very lucky senior level History students. That in my case it later helped me get my first aerospace job was mere gravy.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Wilhammer]

So, back to my question...

[John Kettler]

Wilhammer,

If you actually paid attention instead of baiting me, you'd go find and read FLEET TACTICS, after which you'd understand why I mentioned it in the first place for its direct relevance to the instant matter.

Here. I'll make it easy on you: the writeup for the fully revised new edition of this top rated book. Note particularly the extension that's occurred in the title and the URL surgery I did.

http://www.amazon. /Fleet-Tactics-Coastal-Combat-Hughes/dp/1557503923

Regards,

John Kettler

[Wilhammer]

Mind control over the Internet - gotta love it!

Here, phishy, phishy.

[Scott B]

Wilhammer,

If you actually paid attention instead of baiting me, you'd go find and read FLEET TACTICS, after which you'd understand why I mentioned it in the first place for its direct relevance to the instant matter.

Here. I'll make it easy on you: the writeup for the fully revised new edition of this top rated book. Note particularly the extension that's occurred in the title and the URL surgery I did.

Fixed URL: Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat.

So we don't assume that Kettler is full of baloney on this one, let me (overflowing with hubris) step in and endorse the Hughes book. I first heard it recommended by Eliot Cohen and it is still the single best work I have ever read on modern naval warfare. Moreover, it is particularly well written for the interest of those with a wargaming background, and I can't recommend it highly enough.

[Wilhammer]

No one said he is full of baloney. Just questioning his fiction part and its relevance to the discussion.

The Hughes book does look interesting.