How powerful is modern HE?

[Paper Tiger]

LongLeftFlank:

"I worry that CMSF is at risk to develop the same problems as another famous game: AH's France, 1940."

Ah, France 1940. I still have that and play it when I return to Scotland for a holiday. It's a good game but no matter how badly you handicap the Germans and build up the French, it's just a question of how big the Germans win. Still, it's fun tp play as the Germans.

I agree with everything Steve has posted about what would happen to these fixed positions. However, I am currently trying to design a hypothetical Red on Red campaign and I would really welcome more tools to make Modern Era combat a bit more challenging. But the game's focus is on a modern era lightning fast US strike and not modern era combat per se and BFC only have so many resources available to them so Red on Red isn't a priority for them. This new game engine has enormous potential but it looks like it'll be tied into MOUT for the forseeable future.

I also agree that MOUT is the best way to hurt the US. Therefore, the occassional fortified building would go a LONG way to helping out here. There's a post about a Marine MOUT AAR somewhere in the stickies about this. Fortified buildings are not uncommon and a dog to deal with, even for the US so I'd like to see them introduced sometime very soon.

[Secondbrooks]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Secondbrooks,

The problem with fixed defenses is that they are fixed. If the enemy has complete freedom to move around them, it will. If it so chooses it will lay the defenses waste at a time of their choosing or wait for the defenders to give up. This is what happened to the Iraqis in the First Gulf War. We probably have all seen the footage of thousands of Iraqis walking out of their fortifications towards the Coalition lines looking to surrender after weeks of bombardment and no friendly resupply.

I just had this discussion last week. Deja Vu in english. Yes this is typical answer but i think that during last week i managed to counter that... Let's try again:

Yeah. Have to admit that it ain't good way to defend several places, idea of isolation itself is bad, expacely if rest of the war is going bad. And if terrain such as in Syria, plenty of areas where vehicles can move (this is mind-set which is hard for me to understand).

Capability to move out from fixed postions is important if situation seems to be such, "stand there and fight" applies maybe only to defences of Damascus and areas near it. Fortificating borderzone is truly worst idea i can think of (enemy has lots of ways to scout it for weeks or months, it can bring awful amount of firepower against it, plan carefully and use supprise). WW2 should have thought that already. Fortified postions should be deeper in-country.

Example: A. Using 100 pieces of 155mm airbursts and going straight thru or B. bounding for weeks enemy positions while troops are tied down to encirclement or instead trying to break defence with assaults... Which one is more costly and timeconsuming + resource demanding to US?

About 2003: Was it so that US suffered severe lack of manpower to protect secured area's and secure supply routes? Luckly for US Iraq wasn't able to use this as a advantage...

Btw. What is Syria's defenceplan? Is it territorial defence?

[ January 18, 2008, 01:44 AM: Message edited by: Secondbrooks ]

[Barleyman]

You guys seem to be hell-bent on equating foxholes with top cover and Maginot line.

[Bigduke6]

Steve,

Well, it's your game. If you say the campaign background doesn't give the Syrians a chance to dig in properly, then that's how the game is.

Rapid attack, Syrians are flat-footed, the Arabs sally forth and do their incompetent best, the Syrians collapse after a couple of weeks, the Americans are quite willing to take casualties, etc. etc. You've set the assumptions, not much any one can do about that now.

Of course, you also have pointed out that 2008 scenario is practically impossible unless the Syrians were proved to be behind massive terrorist attacks on Western civilian populations.

But, were that specific far-fetched scenario to go down, then you'd get no flak from me. Certainly, if the Americans invaded fast and the Syrians decided to fight it out in the desert, then I agree, there is no sense for a computer wargame game simulating Syrians with serious overhead cover, reinforced buildings, spider holes, tunnels, or all that other good stuff, that a 3rd World force with its wits about it uses to equalize things vs. a 1st World force.

But if the game's point is to replicate asymetric warfare on a more general basis, well, I think you've got a hole there. Because right now what you've got is the Americans with most to pretty much all the expected American advantages in an asymetric conflict, pitted against Syrians shorn of a key advantage: the ability to dig in deep enough to survive smart munitions.

As to looking at the map, I would assume that if the Syrians were to try and fight Americans invading from Iraq, they would not drive out into the desert and make a stand out in the open.

If they had any sense at all, the Syrians would fight in the coastal zone, where almost all the population is. This is a place human habitation has been in progress since the beginning of recorded history, and to me that means basements, tunnels, catacombs, ditches, quarries, orchards, fences, etc.

There is also the psychological factor: for practical purposes, in the coastal zone the Syrian soldiers would not be defending some point in the desert, but the homes of their relatives and countrymen, in the very land of the Crusades, and if the US soldiery has never heard of the Crusades I assure you every Syrian certainly has.

I think that might well motivate many Syrians - soldiers and civilians - to try and fight the Americans hard, and that I think would produce creative fortifictions far beyond what your game allows. If a farmer tells you where he has a cellar dug to keep his dates, then that can save you alot of earth-moving, and what's more the cellar is not going to show up when the US sattelites do their fly by.

To me, the assumption that the Syrians would have no place to hide, or materials with which to improve their hiding places, or no help from the civilian population in making those improvements, if the Americans invaded, is close to baseless.

Certainly, if the war resulted from a nutso Syrian government pushing terrorism without the support of the Syrian population, and for some reason intent on fighting in the open, then probably you would get what Splinty saw: ditches in the desert dug by soldiers with little interest in fighting, but little choice but to dig in where they were told.

But if the point to the war from the average Syrian's POV was to defend a piece of the Holy Land from the infidel invaders, then I think you'd see a different order of defensive preparations, and probable or not it is quite clear CMSF does not replicate them.

[Battlefront.com]

skelly,

Yes, anybody paying attention to how the US fights knows that spending gazillions of Dollars trying to keep territory intact is a waste of money and effort. The only way to beat the US is to let them take it all over and then focus on making it ungovernable. This is the single biggest flaw in BigDuke6's line of thinking.

If I were Assad, and I wanted year round, inexpensive, viable defense of my country I would be stockpiling small arms and munitions all over the country. I would get rid of all my tanks, aircraft, and instead invest in ATGMs and shoulder fired SAMs. Anything too big to be reasonably man portable would be gotten rid of.

I would then decentralize my military and concentrate on giving every able bodied citizen training in unconventional warfare, then let them go back to their regular work. Refresher courses would, of course, be mandatory to keep knowledge alive and incorporate new lessons learned. To accompany this would be regionalized professional "asymmetrical" forces that would, in the event of invasion, take over local control of resistance. They would know the local terrain like the back of their hands and would have the ability to use it no matter what the conditions may be.

As for fixed defenses, a limited amount of effort would be directed into low key, subtle facilities that would expected to give the invaders an initial bloody nose, but would not be expected to last long while under occupation. Instead, focus on keeping defenses flexible and mobile under adverse circumstances instead of fixed and immobile.

The end result would be a vastly more effective deterrent for enemy occupation, a far more viable means of throwing the occupier out, and a way to dramatically reduce the overall defense budget as a % of GDP. That's been my position for a few years now and I see even more reason to think that it is the way to go. However, it means completely abandoning even the facade of ability to go after a neighboring country in any sort of conventional way. It also means a perception of weakness and cowardliness amongst one's own population, peers, and enemies. Worse, repressive regimes tend to undermine their own lifespan when they arm and train their citizens to fight against authority because the reality of the Syrian regime is there every day without any notion that it will go away, while the threat of an occupation by the US is not even in the same ballpark. Therefore, as practical as it is I doubt Syria, or any other authoritarian regime, would go this route. Instead, they will go about their flawed half assed conventional mindset.

NOTE!! All of the above is talking about strategic level planning. At the tactical level a bunch of T-72 TURMS-Ts can do a lot of damage, so at CM:SF's level such things are quite viable. But at the strategic level they wouldn't change the picture any. Fortunately CM:SF doesn't concern itself with the strategic setting except as the backdrop for the game itself.

Steve

[ January 18, 2008, 12:49 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Battlefront.com]

BigDuke6,

Well, it's your game. If you say the campaign background doesn't give the Syrians a chance to dig in properly, then that's how the game is.

Yup Beyond that there is room for discussion, though, since the "what ifs" of any environment are always interesting to discuss.

Rapid attack, Syrians are flat-footed, the Arabs sally forth and do their incompetent best, the Syrians collapse after a couple of weeks, the Americans are quite willing to take casualties, etc. etc. You've set the assumptions, not much any one can do about that now.

Er... I wouldn't say the Americans are "willing to take casualties" in the CM:SF setting. In fact, I would say the opposite is true. I also do not think that the CM:SF setting has the Syrians being caught flat footed either, but I don't think that they could do much to stop being occupied.

But, were that specific far-fetched scenario to go down, then you'd get no flak from me. Certainly, if the Americans invaded fast and the Syrians decided to fight it out in the desert, then I agree, there is no sense for a computer wargame game simulating Syrians with serious overhead cover, reinforced buildings, spider holes, tunnels, or all that other good stuff, that a 3rd World force with its wits about it uses to equalize things vs. a 1st World force.

Well, this isn't up to me, rather it is up to the current state of the Syrians and their defensive mindset. They have a huge conventional force and that force is useless unless it is out in the open and maneuvering to engage the enemy before being cut off and made irrelevant or (worse) destroyed while sitting in ambush. This is why I think it would be smart for Syria to not spend another penny on its conventional arms race and instead invest in the sorts of things you're talking about. But they won't. They've got too much pride and too much at stake in whatever interim time there is between now and the off chance that they get invaded. So they are likely to stick with a largely conventional approach to warfare. I think CM:SF gives the Syrian player a lot more flexibility and chance of success than would be seen in an actual invasion scenario.

But if the game's point is to replicate asymetric warfare on a more general basis

It isn't and never was intended to be. We've made that clear since the beginning. CM:SF is not an unconventional warfare simulation, it is a conventional simulation with an unconventional component.

Because right now what you've got is the Americans with most to pretty much all the expected American advantages in an asymetric conflict, pitted against Syrians shorn of a key advantage: the ability to dig in deep enough to survive smart munitions.

It is a key operational advantage if it can be achieved, it does little to nothing for a tactical setting. The Israelis were able to neutralize anything they found at the tactical level, but the operational ability to disrupt supplies and stockpiles was far more difficult. That's beyond the scope of CM:SF for the most part.

As to looking at the map, I would assume that if the Syrians were to try and fight Americans invading from Iraq, they would not drive out into the desert and make a stand out in the open.

For the conventional forces, there isn't much choice. Again, that's why I would ditch them if I were a dictator looking to keep the enemy from unseating me. Giving the US forces a bunch of expensive things to destroy is counter productive to survival of the regime WHEN such a battle commences. Any time before that the conventional big ticket forces have other purposes which is why they won't be going away any time soon.

If they had any sense at all, the Syrians would fight in the coastal zone, where almost all the population is. This is a place human habitation has been in progress since the beginning of recorded history, and to me that means basements, tunnels, catacombs, ditches, quarries, orchards, fences, etc.

I expect this is exactly what they would try to do. The problem for Syria is it can not survive long in such a situation. Sieges only work if the besieged can outlast the besieger.

I think that might well motivate many Syrians - soldiers and civilians - to try and fight the Americans hard, and that I think would produce creative fortifictions far beyond what your game allows. If a farmer tells you where he has a cellar dug to keep his dates, then that can save you alot of earth-moving, and what's more the cellar is not going to show up when the US sattelites do their fly by.

True, but such things don't matter for a CM:SF type battle. It's the sort of COIN Ops stuff that's going on in Iraq now and that CM:SF was explicitly not designed to simulate. To do so would have meant a radical change in focus, leaving out Syrian conventional forces completely and instead focusing on unconventional aspects. We never said we had the time and resources to do both and that's why we chose one over the other. To the vast majority of wargamers, a wargame would not be very appealing if it's primary focus was on a farmer's hardened hidey-hole serving as a local supply point for a half dozen guys that never want to be caught in an open firefight with the occupiers on the enemy's terms.

To me, the assumption that the Syrians would have no place to hide, or materials with which to improve their hiding places, or no help from the civilian population in making those improvements, if the Americans invaded, is close to baseless.

In terms of it being relevant to the conventional warfare CM:SF simulates, I have already outlined plenty of evidence to suggest we have it nearly right "as is". If we claimed CM:SF to be an asymmetric warfare centric simulation we would have a lot more work yet to do, starting with getting rid of all the Syrian conventional forces.

But if the point to the war from the average Syrian's POV was to defend a piece of the Holy Land from the infidel invaders, then I think you'd see a different order of defensive preparations, and probable or not it is quite clear CMSF does not replicate them.

It replicates most of what would be relevant to CM:SF's focus, which is why the game is like it is and is not likely to change much. Changing focus to an asymmetric centric wargame is not in our plans unless some organization pays us to do it. Meaning, it's quite easy for us to make a game like that, but compared to doing 100 other things it simply isn't of interest to us. Extremely large checks with lots of zeros can change our priorities quickly, though

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />If they had any sense at all, the Syrians would fight in the coastal zone, where almost all the population is. This is a place human habitation has been in progress since the beginning of recorded history, and to me that means basements, tunnels, catacombs, ditches, quarries, orchards, fences, etc.

I expect this is exactly what they would try to do. The problem for Syria is it can not survive long in such a situation. Sieges only work if the besieged can outlast the besieger.</font>

[Battlefront.com]

LongLeftFlank,

Isn't the coastal belt where the Marines land anyway?

Yes, though we won't be simulating amphibious ops.

I dunno, Steve, like BigDuke says, you're within your rights to design the game you want and no other. But I'm just not buying your argument that other kinds of combat than mobile ops wouldn't be (a) realistic and ( interesting in CM terms.

I'm basing my opinions on nearly 20 years of studying warfare and an intensive 4 years of studying contemporary warfare in the Middle East. The conclusion is that the Syrians would build elaborate defenses in very few places because they can not afford to build them everywhere. These places would probably be known to the US prior to the invasion (satellites for example) in at least general terms. When encountered on the ground they would be laid waste by artillery and air, not ground assaults. That is recent history that is directly applicable. If anything the US has acquired even MORE capabilities in this area than it had in 2003 (deep underground bunker buster bombs, for example).

For someone to make the case that elaborate, hardened defenses in a conventional setting would be a) common and interesting for CM's scale, one needs to make a case for it instead of just saying that my case is flimsy. I've made a case based on facts and very recent military history that is directly applicable. The few attempts I've seen to refute this (Lebanon 2005 and Golan Heights) have been addressed by me and, IMHO, strengthen my case. And that is...

Direct assault is the worst way to neutralize a highly fortified line of resistance. It always has been and always will be. Therefore the US has, not surprisingly, designed a considerable portion of its doctrine to making sure it doesn't have to resort to tackling such things with flesh and bones. Therefore, the more CM allows you to make elaborate hardened defenses, the less realistic it would be that a CM scale battle (in any interesting sense of the word) would take place for those defenses. Since realism and interest would both decline with the addition of these things, why bother diverting our energy to supporting them?

I could be wrong, but I want to make it clear that what I'm saying isn't just spin to defend not having certain types of terrain. I have yet to see a significant counter argument that is relevant.

Just because the infidels will eventually bring up something big and blow up your emplacements doesn't mean you won't dig them, lure them into ambush and make them bleed (ask the Imperial Japanese Army).

I can't as the Imperial Japanese Army... they were wiped out Seriously though, comparing WWII jungle island warfare to contemporary arid warfare is not very useful. They share almost nothing in common.

Resistance in an occupied but defiant Syria would likely be a more organized, competent and lethal version of what Saddam's sons tried (but largely failed) to set up in Iraq: a Viet Minh / Viet Cong type situation. Irregular formations and their arms are dispersed across numerous hideouts in the populated zone.

Yup, which is what I wrote above. Although one has to understand that this would take place mostly after the primary invading forces had rolled on past to some other place. The best time to hit an invader is when he is weak (spread out) not when he was strong (concentrated). Much better to strike an isolated foot patrol, small FOB, or Humvee than to hit a reinforced Mech Infantry Company! The latter is what CM:SF is primarily designed to simulate, though the former can be simulated quite well.

They assemble rapidly in up to company strength to strike US occupiers or local collaborators hard at vulnerable points. They then either melt away again or ambush and mine the quick reaction forces. The Marines have to adapt their own tactics and deployment to cope with this formidable and cunning enemy who can appear in substantial force out of nowhere.

I agree completely, though this phase is outside of the intended scope of CM:SF. Also note that elaborate, fixed, hardened positions just don't factor into hit and run tactics in an arid environment. Going back home is far more effective than hiding in a spider hole.

All the Sun Tzu stuff applies, quite challenging for both sides, and quite appropriate to the CM scale. Just no T72s, BMPs and old Russian helmets.

Yup, and that stuff is available for people in CM:SF already. It's another reason why we made the victory conditions so flexible.

Steve

[Barleyman]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

[QB].. The conclusion is that the Syrians would build elaborate defenses in very few places ..

..For someone to make the case that elaborate, hardened defenses..

..highly fortified line of resistance..

..Therefore, the more CM allows you to make elaborate hardened defenses..

Elaborate this, lines of resistance that.

For petes sake, can't a man ask for proper foxholes without getting swamped by this elaborate maginot line-nonsense?

One can be and WOULD BE dug with a spade, the other takes longer time and resources to set up.

Building a hole in the ground with an optional piece of plastic sheet (yes, plastic!) on top of which you can pile sand and mid-sized rocks doesn't reflect my view of "elaborate line of defence". And the said pieces of 2cm thick plastic (or whatever roughly 1.5 meter x 2 meter sheet that can carry a few hundred kilos of junk on top of it) are now high-tech item it takes huge logistics effort to have around? As opposed to having some ratty truck or 2 for a battalion sized unit carrying "entrenching supplies" .. They're probably carting several times of the required weight of food and water daily in the 1st instance.

You just simply refuse to see any difference between a reasonable foxhole and a line of bunkers?

[Barleyman]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

This is why I think it would be smart for Syria to not spend another penny on its conventional arms race and instead invest in the sorts of things you're talking about. But they won't. They've got too much pride and too much at stake in whatever interim time there is between now and the off chance that they get invaded.

Having a stake such as not being invaded by their neighbours or having their country degenerate into a violent cesspool of factional civil war a-la beirut? Generally not a brilliant idea for the stablest of goverments to distribute munitions in small caches all over the country and training everyone on "armed insurrection 101". If you absolutely want to have another failed state, that'd be pretty good way to go about it..

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Barleyman:

For petes sake, can't a man ask for proper foxholes without getting swamped by this elaborate maginot line-nonsense?

You just simply refuse to see any difference between a reasonable foxhole and a line of bunkers?

Yes, I get the sense that Steve is just talking past us at this point, rather than trying to understand what we're looking for. Which is pardonable, I suppose, given all the bitching and Monday-morning-quarterbacking on this board for the past 6 months.

If overhead cover and sandbags are too hard to program right now, and there's other stuff that's more important to work out, fine, I accept that. They're doing a great job with the game within its current scope ... I'm just hoping for more.

But like you, I just don't buy his arguments about why Syrian infantry would NOT bother to harden and hide their OPs and ambush positions (holes and buildings) so as to extend out of their only real tactical advantage: fighting at places of our choosing to make the infidels bleed for as long as possible before they bring up the heavy stuff and blow us to Allah.

[average]

I see what Steve is getting at in terms of complex linear defensive arrangements. They do take time and effort, and likely to be aligned along logistical nodes or in the approaches to major population centres.

The fighting positions are likely to receive heavy fires, and its likely they would be bypassed and then contained by cav. elements screening likely lines of departure for any attempt to severe the LOC.

So, probably, any long term defensive arrangment will be irrelevant.

That is however a straw man in terms of entrenchment and fortification.

A bn of rifleman with sapper in support can dig themselves to the point where they can withstand neutralisation fires within a day or two.

By that, I mean simply dig deep enough, fast enough, without enough overhead cover that the result of taking neutralisation fires is you might be supressed and fixed, but your formation will remain combat effective (ie not more than 1/3 of your force is dead, wounded or a stress casuality)until someone closes with you to finish you off (other rifleman or afvs).

Even a plt with limited building materials and a day or so can have a fair fist at least riding out smaller stuff and airbursts, if not perhaps mk 84s galore and mlrs bombardments.

At the moment, Syrian dismounts don't have the ability to remain effective in the open in trenches when engaged by anything more serious than a MK19 GLA.

Basically, I think the Syrian grunts should be able to dig in as fast and as effectively as a group of reservists on a weekened ex. I think it would make things more interesting tactically if you had to apply realastic amounts of force to neutralise a position, with only limited assets. It would get much harder for the US player to simply get into position, light up everything they can spot, and when faced with a local defensive node, call in fires and be certain its finished off.

In reality, fighting with fires takes a long time against people who are prepared to dig and die when the time comes. Ala 2nd Battle of Faluja, ala 2005 Lebannon. Meaning, if you want to effect a rapid break through, your going to be manouvering more and firing to support that, rather than the doom with stykers sort of combat you get at the moment, where its about geting body count and standing off with and crew served weapons.

[C'Rogers]

Seriously though, comparing WWII jungle island warfare to contemporary arid warfare is not very useful.

Not to mention a pretty drastic difference in military structures between Syria and Imperial Japan.

For petes sake, can't a man ask for proper foxholes without getting swamped by this elaborate maginot line-nonsense?

I get the sense that Steve is just talking past us at this point

I believe the answer to this has been "use craters". Not perfect, but close.

He did talk about this guys. Second page of this thread.

If you absolutely want to have another failed state, that'd be pretty good way to go about it

I am pretty sure that is what he is saying. "Worse, repressive regimes tend to undermine their own lifespan when they arm and train their citizens to fight against authority because the reality of the Syrian regime is there every day without any notion that it will go away, while the threat of an occupation by the US is not even in the same ballpark."

[average]

Re Barleyman and failed states, I think that had more to do with the Syrians and the terrorists than the lebanese government creating armes caches to prevent territorial incursions.

If you really do want to make invasion unattractive, you do what steve suggests, invest your money in man pack stuff, small arms and probably thermal blankets and ir netting. Then you train your militray aged population to use the kit, put the emphasis on field craft and leave them to it.

Where it falls down is you don't want your militia having modern anti-tank and anti-air systems,because you use 2nd line tanks and aircraft to keep your regime on top of the situation, and if your like the Syrians, you need to balance out each branch and tier of your armed forces against each other. Hence, the republican guard have nice AFV's, but I'm reasonably confident they would keep the modern anti air systems with someone else, so that you can use the airforce to bomb them back to the stone age should the republican guard decide they want to be in charge.

The airforce probably don't have the resources to defend their airfields in case they decide they want to be in charge.

The regular army probably have the manpower and resources to stop offensive operations by the republican guard in built up terrain.

The secret police probably make it their business to be seen hanging around the military district, just to let the military leadership know that their families will be 'looked after' should the unthinkable happen.

Then you factor in the dictator prestige factor in having tanks and aircraft, and the sort of arms deals you can do well on, and what neighbouring states have as a party pieces. You don't get a coherent procurement policy most of the time for those reasons. Its like how western defence spending is shaped by industry policy considerations into the expensive fiasco that it is today.

The last thing you want to do is give the militia the ability to defeat your loyal elements, because its harder to convince people who don't have a vested interest to play by the rules. Problem is that if they ever have to fight an external threat with better or equal kit to your own, they are in a world of hurt and upset, because you've deliberately underarmed them, not because your cheap (as is often assumed) but because you've been playing a political game.

The final thing I'll raise is its like western armed forces and their relationship between regs and reserves. As anyone who has served in a reserve force will tell you, the regs don't like the reservists getting the good gear. It might lead to questions about the size of the full time estbalishment.

I'm pretty sure i've borrowed the above from a book, but I can't remember what it is.

[ January 19, 2008, 06:37 PM: Message edited by: average ]

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by C'Rogers:

Not to mention a pretty drastic difference in military structures between Syria and Imperial Japan.

In his effort to be clever, Steve missed my point, which was not to compare Syria to Japan, or jungle to desert combat -- although Iwo Jima and Okinawa weren't exactly covered in lush jungle -- but that any outgunned force is going to use entrenchments -- and I'm NOT talking about deep defensive belts, but simple covered holes in the ground -- to extend its staying power.... and is going to try to take a lot of Americans with them.

This is a fundamental building block of warfare that has NOT changed, but is badly undermodeled in the game, and strips the Syrians of an important resource (as if they didn't have enough stacked against them already).

I mean, if we are expected to believe that Syria is competent enough to keep a well-motivated mechanised army in the field in the face of a lightning Allied advance (search for the lengthy treatise by JasonC on the evaporation of the Red Army armoured forces in 1941 for a scholarly discussion of how hard this is), they can certainly deploy and dig in their infantry along the likely axes of advance at least SOME of the time. The orders: ambush, kill and fight to the last man. Some at least will do it. This ain't Iraq, as we are reminded repeatedly.

I look forward to seeing how ELOS improves the currently dismal cover value of foxholes and trenches (to say nothing of their zero concealment value for purposes of ambush). But I'd respectfully differ from you both on "perfect" or "close".

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by average:

I'm pretty sure i've borrowed the above from a book, but I can't remember what it is.

I think Edward Luttwak wrote "Coup d'Etat: A Handbook", or some such thing back in the 1980s.

I like your thumbnail of the internal balance of power. Good grist for the Red v. Red scenario mill.

[Battlefront.com]

Barleyman

For petes sake, can't a man ask for proper foxholes without getting swamped by this elaborate maginot line-nonsense?

Er... can't a guy discuss elaborate maginot line-nonsense with the people that are asking me about it without getting sniped at by someone who wants just foxholes?

You just simply refuse to see any difference between a reasonable foxhole and a line of bunkers?

No, you "simply refuse" to comprehend that there is more than one discussion going on here. I already addressed your basic foxhole question so I didn't think you needed any more answers. Since you apparently do, I'll give them to you:

1. You can simulate foxholes using craters

2. You can not simulate overhead cover. I'd like to see a battalion on the move carry enough materials, or find them locally, to get everybody in under cover on the fly without the US noticing.

Having said that, I am not philosophically opposed to having more detailed foxhole treatment. It just isn't on the list of priorities.

Generally not a brilliant idea for the stablest of goverments to distribute munitions in small caches all over the country and training everyone on "armed insurrection 101".

Yup, already mentioned that "small flaw" in my theoretical argument

LongLeftFlank,

Yes, I get the sense that Steve is just talking past us at this point, rather than trying to understand what we're looking for. Which is pardonable, I suppose, given all the bitching and Monday-morning-quarterbacking on this board for the past 6 months.

Nope, I understand what you're saying better than you Look, if a Syrian Battalion or Regiment digs in, and magically finds all the resources it needs to get overhead cover (sandbags do not provide overhead cover!), you have yourself a fortified defensive line, do you not? And if you do, then everything I said applies. It gets spotted, it is pounded into oblivion by air and artillery, or simply bypassed until it is sufficiently irrelevant.

Now, if you are just wanting the oddball Syrian Motorized Rifle Platoon, that is on its own and not part of a larger defensive work, to be dug in then that's a different story. But you get into exceptional circumstances here. Syrians operate with Regiments as the smallest unit of action, therefore if that one Motorized Rifle Platoon is dug in with overhead cover then it is almost certainly a part of a larger plan and therefore part of a fortified defensive line, which then kicks in the obliterate vs. assault thing I already mentioned a dozen times.

If overhead cover and sandbags are too hard to program right now, and there's other stuff that's more important to work out, fine, I accept that. They're doing a great job with the game within its current scope ... I'm just hoping for more.

Nothing wrong with hoping for more, of course. But regardless of priorities and programming difficulties, the logic I have outlined stands on its own two feet. I'm not using what I see as logical battlefield realities as being an excuse for not having the sorts of defensive works you want to see.

But like you, I just don't buy his arguments about why Syrian infantry would NOT bother to harden and hide their OPs and ambush positions (holes and buildings) so as to extend out of their only real tactical advantage: fighting at places of our choosing to make the infidels bleed for as long as possible before they bring up the heavy stuff and blow us to Allah.

Because they don't get to choose where to engage the invading US... the US chooses that. And if the Syrians do make a stand, then the Americans let up a cheer of joy and obliterate them without getting bloody.

I'm finding this a rather amusing discussion, actually, because I'm not the one with a flawed argument In fact, my points have still not been challenged except to say "I don't buy it!". So let me ask this question:

What would happen if a US mixed infantry/armor force came upon a significant nest of resistance that was dug in beyond what CM already allows for (trenches, "foxholes", and bunkers)? The answers are:

1. Assault WWI style and get very bloody

2. Assault WWII style with combined arms and get fairly bloody

3. Call in organic artillery and attached air assets to obliterate the defenses then either mop up or bypass

As I said above, the more the Syrians dig in the happier the US forces would be. There is only one thing the US military machine loves more than a force caught maneuvering in the open... and that is a static force that is patiently waiting to be killed by indirect fire.

Average,

A bn of rifleman with sapper in support can dig themselves to the point where they can withstand neutralisation fires within a day or two.

Continuing on with the points raised above... what is standard US doctrine for dealing with such a situation? I already know the answer and have stated it over and over again... call in heavier indirect fire NOT assault CM style.

I think it would make things more interesting tactically if you had to apply realastic amounts of force to neutralise a position, with only limited assets. It would get much harder for the US player to simply get into position, light up everything they can spot, and when faced with a local defensive node, call in fires and be certain its finished off.

This would probably be done over the course of a day or two. That's beyond CM's scope. So we get ourselves into the same old problem that wargames often do... a battle can only be a skirmish or a pitched fight, not a prolonged engagement with multiple phases.

In reality, fighting with fires takes a long time against people who are prepared to dig and die when the time comes. Ala 2nd Battle of Faluja, ala 2005 Lebannon. Meaning, if you want to effect a rapid break through, your going to be manouvering more and firing to support that, rather than the doom with stykers sort of combat you get at the moment, where its about geting body count and standing off with and crew served weapons.

You can do this within the scope of CM right now. But it has to be it happens in bite sized pieces, with each battle representing one small piece. And I have to say that most of those pieces, from a wargamer's perspective, will be boring as Hell. That's a much larger discussion and is far beyond just foxholes with overhead cover or not.

C'Rogers,

Not to mention a pretty drastic difference in military structures between Syria and Imperial Japan.

Yeah, no kidding The history of warfare in the Middle East for the past 60 years has been extremely different than the decade of warfare the Japan engaged in. Japanese formations, almost to a man, held their ground under the most adverse conditions imaginable. The "Arab" armies have tended to melt away extremely quickly under sharp shocks to the system. Not always, and not evenly in all situations, but that has been the trend. Comparing one of the most tenacious and resourceful defensive armies in the history of warfare with one that packs it in within a few days really doesn't do this discussion any good

I believe the answer to this has been "use craters". Not perfect, but close.

I'm glad someone noticed

I am pretty sure that is what he is saying. "Worse, repressive regimes tend to undermine their own lifespan when they arm and train their citizens to fight against authority because the reality of the Syrian regime is there every day without any notion that it will go away, while the threat of an occupation by the US is not even in the same ballpark."

Another gold star for your forehead

Average,

If you really do want to make invasion unattractive, you do what steve suggests, invest your money in man pack stuff, small arms and probably thermal blankets and ir netting. Then you train your militray aged population to use the kit, put the emphasis on field craft and leave them to it.

Where it falls down is you don't want your militia having modern anti-tank and anti-air systems,because you use 2nd line tanks and aircraft to keep your regime on top of the situation, and if your like the Syrians, you need to balance out each branch and tier of your armed forces against each other. Hence, the republican guard have nice AFV's, but I'm reasonably confident they would keep the modern anti air systems with someone else, so that you can use the airforce to bomb them back to the stone age should the republican guard decide they want to be in charge.

Yup, that is the irony for nations like Syria. A big, expensive, chest beating military is great for crushing local opposition but will be quickly destroyed when matched up against a concerted Western type force. The opposite type of force is extremely inexpensive and has a really good chance of defeating a Western type force, however it has an even better chance of defeating the regime before such a conflict happens. So a country like Syria has no practical choice but to stick with a huge drain on their economy that will have almost no tangible effect on the outcome of a war with the West.

I still think there is room for a middle ground solution. Downsize the conventional armor and get that "off the books" as a drain on the treasury. Then plow a smaller amount of money into the kinds of things that have a good chance of scoring tactical victories -> man portable AA and AT weapons. The outcome of the war probably won't change, but the country would go out in a blaze of glory (so to speak) instead of an embarrassing whimper (like Iraq in both wars with the West).

Steve

[ January 19, 2008, 08:50 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[C'Rogers]

Steve,

Here is a simple question that may clarify matters.

In CMx1 I remember roughly a section of the manual that talked about the use of large artillery guns. I believe it said that they were included so that rare situations (assaulting a coastal battery I believe was the example) could be recreated. Of course I remember using such weapons probably much more than ever actually ever happened.

I take it that the ability to create rare scenarios is no longer a top priority (trenches with overhead cover for example, Syrian militia acting in a tactically sound but unrealistic way). That things that would be possible, but not likely, have been put very, very far down the list if not written off all together?

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Nope, I understand what you're saying better than you Look, if a Syrian Battalion or Regiment digs in, and magically finds all the resources it needs to get overhead cover (sandbags do not provide overhead cover!), you have yourself a fortified defensive line, do you not? And if you do, then everything I said applies. It gets spotted, it is pounded into oblivion by air and artillery, or simply bypassed until it is sufficiently irrelevant.

And if the Syrians do make a stand, then the Americans let up a cheer of joy and obliterate them without getting bloody.

What would happen if a US mixed infantry/armor force came upon a significant nest of resistance that was dug in beyond what CM already allows for (trenches, "foxholes", and bunkers)? The answers are:

1. Assault WWI style and get very bloody

2. Assault WWII style with combined arms and get fairly bloody

3. Call in organic artillery and attached air assets to obliterate the defenses then either mop up or bypass

As I said above, the more the Syrians dig in the happier the US forces would be. There is only one thing the US military machine loves more than a force caught maneuvering in the open... and that is a static force that is patiently waiting to be killed by indirect fire.

Steve, kudos to you for hanging in there with us malcontents on Saturday night! I have a sick baby and a sick wife here so I have a built in excuse for no life (although I am halfway through a nice Zin).

You forgot answer 4. Stumble into concealed positions in the Syrian kill zone, take serious casualties in the first few minutes of contact, be unable to shoot them out of their positions, withdraw and then bring in the arty and air, per 3 above. In game terms, Blue has lost decisively, even if they subsequently flatten the Syrians to a man.

And if you counter that the onrushing US Stryker brigades would seldom fail to spot such a large force dug in before running onto its guns -- they've got JSTARs and drones and Cav and IR and yadayadayada, I simply say: sauce for the goose. At least half the current CMSF scenarios implicitly assume some kind of SNAFU, weather/ sand-related or other, in that vaunted US C4I capability, otherwise they'd never take place at all. The Syrian vehicles if not the grunts would be sliced and diced by airpower before even arriving on the map.

Let's flip it around and look at it from the Syrian POV. Both in game and in life, they have no serious expectation of holding the ground, or of surviving. Like Hizbullah in Lebanon, they "win" by taking a whole pile of Crusader "white meat" with them to Paradise.

Their vehicles are kind of hosed -- they're big and easy to see, and it's a miracle they're even here on the battlefield as other than flaming wrecks. Their ability to kill anything generally depends on lighter US vehicles making a mistake and coming into range.

But for their jundi (infantry), the available in game options are:

1. Hide in whatever buildings are available without any kind of reinforcing, sandbagging or mouseholing.

2. Bulldoze and jump into the huge prefab mass graves that pass for trenches in this game and then wait for the Crusaders to spot and kill you from long range.

3. Sit in bunkers, which are basically immobilized vehicles that stick out even worse than the trenches.

4. Skulk in brush or whatever else is handy. You might succeed in shooting first, but you'll then live about a minute if you're lucky.

5. Hide behind crestlines and then do a good old fashioned human wave charge. Urrrrraaaaaaah!!!!!

Which would you choose? So sorry, option 6: site your OPs and HQs (preferably your ATGM and MGs as well) into easily-dug and roofed over/IR camoed slit trenches having good fields of fire and requiring direct HE hits to knock out (you know, that Soviet doctrine they follow so slavishly) so you can ambush and kill infidels for 15 minutes or more instead of 2, is not available as it would be rare and have little relevance to this game. Please wait for Normandy.

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Pandur]

1. Hide in whatever buildings are available without any kind of reinforcing, sandbagging or mouseholing.

2. Bulldoze and jump into the huge prefab mass graves that pass for trenches in this game and then wait for the Crusaders to spot and kill you from long range.

3. Sit in bunkers, which are basically immobilized vehicles that stick out even worse than the trenches.

4. Skulk in brush or whatever else is handy. You might succeed in shooting first, but you'll then live about a minute if you're lucky.

5. Hide behind crestlines and then do a good old fashioned human wave charge. Urrrrraaaaaaah!!!!!

i read the whole thread now and dont want to add more than i second this last list here, from a "players" perspective of view. i play pretty much on red side, red vs red as, from time to time, red vs blues.

basicly if you move anything, no matter how carefull, you get spotted and shot to pices. its not wrong to get shot to pices but to get spotted that fast in different situations isnt right. the often called example of movement in trenches and especally houses. or "crawling" over a crest and emideatly drawing fire. that also happens in RED vs REd battles where the enemy has sometimes no more than MkI:EB

if you even try to shift a spotted resistance group or platton/squad or whatever you might have to another position to "not" wait to get pounded by gods anger in form of 155mm´s, you find em pinned and stuck at the wall when you are in a command phase.

or they get shot to pices while running out the back side of the house, panicking there or asuming a slow command back into the house, the nearest cover ofcourse

well, thats my perceptions while playing, and i really try hard, its not iam to stupid to keep my guys alive, its just they want to die. i say that befor i get the "some players use faulty tactice thingy" trowen at me

EDIT:

trench with plastic plate and 2 inch of dirt dirt could be simulated as the new "sewer movement" without canche to get lost for red side. just show red some marks on the ground where thir tunnels are and they can move through there in a given time. that would help red ALOT

[ January 19, 2008, 11:02 PM: Message edited by: Pandur ]

[dan/california]

In support of the theory that better fighting positions are just better targets I would like to point out that the first 120mm laser guided mortar rounds have been shipped to Iraq for final combat testing. So if your position can't hide from the IR in a Raven drone or stop that little new toy from coming thru the roof it is going to be a short uncomfortable ride to paradise. It called the XM-395 I believe. It would appear that the X is short lived at this point too.

In the spirit of not seeming to be a complete fan boy I must point out that Charles horribly, woefully behind in simulating both of these wonderful pieces of technology.

[LongLeftFlank]

If you apply the rules Steve has applied above -- that the US juggernaut would inevitably spot and kill anything in its way whether or not it digs in or hides, so why would they bother -- then you get back to my "France, 1940" (the boardgame, not the battle) analogy.

According to that same standard of omniscience, the very notion of Syrian mechanized forces somehow making it to the front (or the front making it to them) in one piece and then being able to come into close action with main force Stryker units (as opposed to a few scout elements who promptly withdraw and call in air) becomes equally onanistic as a simulation, though a fun game.

And I've heard this "Syrian conventional forces will do things only in huge thundering herds or not at all just like the Soviets taught them" argument from Steve numerous times now. And a number of highly knowledgeable people on this board have disputed it. So why not give us the tools to model it both ways and make the call ourselves?

[C'Rogers]

Stumble into concealed positions in the Syrian kill zone, take serious casualties in the first few minutes of contact, be unable to shoot them out of their positions, withdraw and then bring in the arty and air, per 3 above.

Three issues with this.

One couldn't you already do this with a strict scenario design? Just create a scenario where the US player starts with burning vehicles surrounded by buildings (or whatever) and most fall back to preserve forces.

Secondly, would it be any fun?

Finally ambush scenarios can not really escape the fact that you as a player can not be completely ambushed. By virtue of playing the game you know that your moving troops are going to be heading into battle. You will not accidentally crest a hill and wander into those sited ATGMs (you may do so for other reason, but not because you are unaware of an enemy).