How powerful is modern HE?

[Battlefront.com]

molotov_billy,

I think test examples, in scenarios specifically to suss out something specific, are probably more effective tools for seeing what's going on. Just set it up as a hotseat game so you can track, for sure, what is happening to the other side (i.e. no FoW messing with perceived results).

Oh, and back to the defensive stuff... I totally forgot to remind you guys that bunkers are included and, unlike CMx1, you can stick units in them. Combine these with trenches that zig-zag and you should be able to get a pretty damned good fortified position.

Mind you, there are a lot of improvements to trench behavior coming in v1.06.

Steve

[SlowMotion]

Anything about this Mark Mines command that has been pretty difficult to use?

[Secondbrooks]

Problem is that those bunkers are visible to long distances. They make great practice targets (or decoys) for enemy.

Foxhole with strudy roof, camoflage and supportstructres would be quite okay The kind which requires almost direct hit from big HE-shell to break.

If that is undoable, then how about same kind trenches? It's unrealistic ofcourse, but they could back-up lack of proper foxholes.

Does this fit to Syrian theme? Or do they use just open topped trenches?

[Meach]

GAAAHHHHH for the love of all that is holy!!!

I have heard so much about 1.06 and I want to play it.

Steve,

Put me out my bloody misery!!! I need that patch!!

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Since we ourselves have limited resources, we had to focus on a smaller subset of defensive capabilities.

Oh, and I would like to see the ability to designate houses "reinforced". It's something I'm not sure if we'll get to, but certainly it would be nice.

CMSF now does a very good job recreating the kind of fluid engagements that showcase the Stryker brigade concept under the blitzkrieg backstory.

I'd hope though, that the Marines module doesn't just swap in new gear for us to replay the same kinds of mobile actions. I'd hope to see more focus on blood-and-guts infantry assaults and MOUT, the kinds of stuff Marines are known for.

Adding a few basic fortification elements

1. sandbagged/reinforced cement buildings

2. wire entanglements

3. sandbagged/camouflaged trenches

would go a long way toward opening up a fresh set of modern warfare possibilities for the game system, both for Blue on Red and Red on Red.

And for people like me who enjoy Iraq scenarios, the US could be the dug-in defender for a change, with quick reaction forces, Dagger runs, et al.

[cool breeze]

I imagine you could get the fortification result your looking for by having a surplus of light and medium bunkers connected by trench? Hide behind the bunkers or away in trenches to avoid recon fire? I dont know, havent tried.

[molotov_billy]

Originally posted by LongLeftFlank:

I'd hope though, that the Marines module doesn't just swap in new gear for us to replay the same kinds of mobile actions. I'd hope to see more focus on blood-and-guts infantry assaults and MOUT, the kinds of stuff Marines are known for.

Might be cool to see some additional improvements to MOUT for the module if it focuses on it in any way - stacking up at doors,etc

[Barleyman]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Yup, but when the depth of the country is open to attack and the invader can (theoretically) be at any point within a few hours drive time, it's very difficult to have effective static positions simply because finite resources can't cover a practically infinite amount of places.

A pair of soldiers can dig a foxhole with top cover in a few hours. I've done so personally. Fun fun and good for building those back muscles.

Now we have EXCLUSIVELY linear trenches and NO foxholes. You'd think if the defender had time to dig the death-traps, they'd have some foxholes for AT teams etc dug in for good measure. After all, you've got lots of pairs of hands at your disposal.

I quess the real answer is "Because the game engine can't handle dispersing squads in foxholes right now"

[Battlefront.com]

Sure, foxholes can be dug relatively quickly. However, when you're in an arid area, where do you get the materials to have overhead protection worth a darned? That stuff has to a) exist and get trucked in specific to your position. That's the sort of thing I'm saying... I don't think the Syrians would have much of it. This sort of thing takes planning and flexibility, two things which the Syrians aren't likely to be able to do for a variety of reasons (static command and control, disruption of logistics by air, disruption of C2, etc.).

Foxholes can be simulated in the Editor by using craters. Soldiers will deploy into them no problem. Obviously not to the extreme dispersions that would likely be seen in real life, but that is a game limitation we can't overcome.

For WW2 we are going to see what we can do to have the defensive stuff deployable by the defending player instead of relying on what is already put down by the scenario developer. Unfortunately, I can make no promises about this. Unlike CMx1 this isn't an easy thing to do because these defensive elements are true terrain, not 2D "decals" placed on top.

Steve

[c3k]

Steve,

Wouldn't it be easier just to let the defender place 2D tiles for defenses then press a new "Process 2D Defensive Tiles into 3D Graphically Represented True Terrain" button?

Ken

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Sure, foxholes can be dug relatively quickly. However, when you're in an arid area, where do you get the materials to have overhead protection worth a darned? That stuff has to a) exist and get trucked in specific to your position. That's the sort of thing I'm saying...

I'm assuming ELOS will improve the direct fire cover value of unimproved trenches some. But the simple addition of some kind of sandbag "wall" terrain (plenty of sand in the Mideast IIRC ) could put this kvetch to bed once and for all... Unlike stone wall tiles though, these should be placeable if possible either in the middle or the edges of the squares so as to get them right up next to your trench, building or whatever else you're reinforcing.

And BTW, in all but the most unpopulated desert some basic topcover can be built for OPs and other small emplacements. Just rip some corrugated tin roofing off a farm outbuilding and cover it with a layer or two of... wait for it... sandbags and rocks. Add a camo net, and MacGyverhammed be praised! But I'm OK to wait on this one (and on wire) as long as we can get some kind of "reinforced" cover soon.

(Alert: Whining follows)

Do we REEEEEEALLY have to wait for Normandy to get this stuff? Huh Dad, huh? I love CMSF, but I feel like it's only showing "half a war" right now. Send in the Marines!

[Bigduke6]

This sort of thing takes planning and flexibility, two things which the Syrians aren't likely to be able to do for a variety of reasons (static command and control, disruption of logistics by air, disruption of C2, etc.).

I question that.

The Red Army was never famous for its planning and flexibility, particularly with regard to supply. Yet their reputation for digging in is among the world's best.

Syria is not only open desert. Indeed, some of the desert is really damn rocky. And rock if large enough to cover a trench, makes excellent overhead cover. As does building debris, construction materials, and whatever else Syrians might come up with if they are imaginative.

Syria has plenty of real-life experience digging in the Golan region, and even if they didn't, there is the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 2006 to draw experience on the importance of digging in vs. a higher tech force.

Certainly, if the CMSF scenario assumes the Syrians are caught flat-footed and unprepared, and the Stryker brigade and its USAF buddies don't give the Syrians a chance to dig in anywhere, then I would say weak Syrian entrenchment could be expected.

But if the Syrians had any sense and lead time at all, they would be fools not to get under the ground as fast as they could - where they could not hide in populated areas, of course.

I think given the source of Syrian doctrine - the Soviets - it does not make much sense to argue Syrians inherently lack the C2, will, brains, materials, or whatever to dig in. If the Syrians actually intended to make a fight against the US with their regular forces, a basic assumption of CMSF, then strong Syrian entrenchments seem to me to be a high rather than low probability.

[PeterLorre86]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Sure, foxholes can be dug relatively quickly. However, when you're in an arid area, where do you get the materials to have overhead protection worth a darned? That stuff has to a) exist

Steve

This excuse is really not valid. Others have pointed out how sand and corrugated steel can quickly and easily be made into top cover for foxholes and trenches. But also contradictions are brought up by making this point. When people complained about the 'blandness' of desert warfare, we were told by battlefront of Syria's diverse climate. Then when we ask where the top cover is we are told the arid environment would not provide the material required to create top cover.

Do craters even do anythings as far as cover? My men seem to die just as fast as when they are in the open. Hopefully the new LOS improvements will make them less visible, and i am hoping, more cover.

I would say the real reason is closer to what Barleyman suggests, that the engine simply cannot represent it at this point.

Sorry if i come off as overly negative.

[SlapHappy]

So that brings up the question: If 40mm HE is medianly compressed because of the infantry model's troop spread, why aren't troops spread more?

In other words, what is the basis for the visual abstraction?

[SlapHappy]

Ok, sorry, saw this:

If anything we are purposefully undermodeling HE effectiveness, which incidentally we did in CMx1 for the same reason. Due to limitations of computing resources and programming time, it is not possible to have a completely realistic soldier density in all situations all the time. Since HE is an area effect weapon, the more soldiers that are in one spot the proportionally more effective a single close by impact will be.

That brings up some issues right away to my mind and explains some things I've witnessed as well.

When you've got some enemy troops holed up in a building that seems (to scale anyway) to be about the size of someone's two-car garage and you're pumping several 40mm grenades into that and getting marginal results, yeah, that seems kind of stilted. Am I wrong in assuming that what these rounds are going to do is penetrate and detonate in the interior or possibly worse, create a shrapnel cone into the building at the point of impact?

Perhaps not? Cut from an on-line article:

"The 40mm Mk 19 Mod 3 grenade machine gun has more than sufficient range in built-up areas, a high rate of fire, and excellence in providing suppressive fire. But even with high explosive dual-purpose (HEDP) projectiles, it lacks sufficient penetration of concrete and masonry. It will penetrate 12 inches of pine logs, 16 inches of sand-filled cinder blocks (two layers), and 20 inches of sandbags (two layers). Their behind-the-target effects, however, are somewhat limited."

Still wouldn't want to find out by being in this building:

http://www.metacafe.com/watch/296500/40_mm_high_explosive/

[Battlefront.com]

c3k,

Wouldn't it be easier just to let the defender place 2D tiles for defenses then press a new "Process 2D Defensive Tiles into 3D Graphically Represented True Terrain" button?

If only That's the way it needs to work, but it's not something that is very easily done from a coding standpoint. I don't understand why, but when this was discussed with Charles several times in the last 4 years I always got the same answer.

LongLeftFlank,

I'm assuming ELOS will improve the direct fire cover value of unimproved trenches some. But the simple addition of some kind of sandbag "wall" terrain (plenty of sand in the Mideast IIRC ) could put this kvetch to bed once and for all... Unlike stone wall tiles though, these should be placeable if possible either in the middle or the edges of the squares so as to get them right up next to your trench, building or whatever else you're reinforcing.

There is a difference between sandbags and overhead cover. As for sandbags, we asked a bunch of OIF vets if they saw a lot of sandbags and other fortifications during the initial phase of OIF and the answer was "no". I don't know why not either, other than what I said and that is the Maginot Line problem:

"Build it and they will go around"

As I've said a dozen times already, I'm not saying that this type of thing wouldn't exist at all in Syria, I'm just saying it wouldn't be there that frequently *and* we had to make decisions about what to include. Defensive terrain that we didn't feel would be all that relevant to a realistic setting was considered, and still is, lower priority compared to other things.

But I'm OK to wait on this one (and on wire) as long as we can get some kind of "reinforced" cover soon.

Bunkers are in, so I would suggest using them. A lot more effective in real life compared to sheet metal that won't do anything but protect from rock spatter.

Bigduke6,

The Red Army was never famous for its planning and flexibility, particularly with regard to supply. Yet their reputation for digging in is among the world's best.

And look at the terrain they were in. They had all the materials they needed right there. The Germans were very good at this as well. Plus, don't forget the Soviets were on the defensive for 3 years, the Syrians would likely be on the defensive for 3 weeks. Not much time to adapt and evolve "make do" construction techniques

Syria is not only open desert. Indeed, some of the desert is really damn rocky. And rock if large enough to cover a trench, makes excellent overhead cover.

Large rocks take equipment and time to move around, even when practical. Again, this isn't something I see as being realistic in the sort of fast moving, full breadth invasion CM:SF is set up for.

Syria has plenty of real-life experience digging in the Golan region, and even if they didn't, there is the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 2006 to draw experience on the importance of digging in vs. a higher tech force.

Years of peacetime defensive construction has absolutely nothing to do with improvised "McGyver" installations.

Certainly, if the CMSF scenario assumes the Syrians are caught flat-footed and unprepared, and the Stryker brigade and its USAF buddies don't give the Syrians a chance to dig in anywhere, then I would say weak Syrian entrenchment could be expected.

Sure, and I said as much. But where? The frontier and a few places around a few key areas, that's all. Iraq had years to prepare in general and months specifically, yet that's all they managed to do.

I think given the source of Syrian doctrine - the Soviets - it does not make much sense to argue Syrians inherently lack the C2, will, brains, materials, or whatever to dig in. If the Syrians actually intended to make a fight against the US with their regular forces, a basic assumption of CMSF, then strong Syrian entrenchments seem to me to be a high rather than low probability.

Swap in Iraq and you'll find that all your assumptions were wrong there. Again, a country, especially one that is cash strapped, can not afford to reinforce the whole country. It's got to pick and choose and the US can pick or choose to hit those locations, just like the Germans decided to go around the Maginot Line.

PeterLorre86 ,

This excuse is really not valid. Others have pointed out how sand and corrugated steel can quickly and easily be made into top cover for foxholes and trenches.

Points covered above already.

But also contradictions are brought up by making this point. When people complained about the 'blandness' of desert warfare, we were told by battlefront of Syria's diverse climate.

No contradiction. The presence of, or lack of, overhead defensive cover (besides bunkers) doesn't make or break the concept of diversity/blandness. It is just one element which, as I've said, I don't see as being all that realistically relevant. Sure, if we could toss it in without affecting more important stuff it would be in already. It's all about priorities and we do not see this as a priority area.

Do craters even do anythings as far as cover? My men seem to die just as fast as when they are in the open. Hopefully the new LOS improvements will make them less visible, and i am hoping, more cover.

Craters do give some cover, though it depends on the relative conditions. And yes, the Enhanced LOS should make it a bit better than it is currently.

SlapHappy,

So that brings up the question: If 40mm HE is medianly compressed because of the infantry model's troop spread, why aren't troops spread more?

In other words, what is the basis for the visual abstraction?

This is no visual abstraction, which is the problem The guys really are that close and they really can't be any further apart. The reason is that splitting Teams, the basic component piece, up amongst more than one Action Spot means (in code terms) creating new units on the fly and then assigning them AI resources along with everything else. This means a company sized force of roughly 70-90 units (Squads sorta count as 2 each) could balloon into several hundred very easily. The computer just can't hack it, and that's just a company sized force! RAM is one of the big reasons, CPU a close second.

What happens now is when a unit is on the move it can be spread out amongst several Action Spots. This does require more computing resources, but the code can still treat the unit as a whole entity for many of its functions (such as TacAI). Similar thing with Squads, though they do require almost as many resources as two independent Teams.

Er... I think that answers your question!

As for the 40mm... yes, it has limited penetration capabilities. I was surprised when I learned that too. I had originally assumed they would make swiss cheese out of the average structure.

Steve

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Bigduke6]

Swap in Iraq and you'll find that all your assumptions were wrong there. Again, a country, especially one that is cash strapped, can not afford to reinforce the whole country. It's got to pick and choose and the US can pick or choose to hit those locations, just like the Germans decided to go around the Maginot Line.

Sure, if Iraq and Syria are comparable. I don't think so.

It all comes down to motivation. The NVA were dirt poor, but motivated, they dug in very well indeed.

Saddam's army was a bit wealthier than the Vietnamese, but it was demoralized, gutted by a 10-year war with Iran, and in several parts during the actual invasion actually bribed by the Americans. The Iraqi troops, many of them, had no interest in fighting, they just were looking for the best way to surrender.

Unsurprisingly, Iraqi defensive works could have been alot better.

The question is, how would Syria's military try to dig in if invaded by the US?

In a theoretical conflict between the US and Syria, would the Syrian commanders be so dumb as to stake out defensive positions in the middle of a sand desert? So incompetent as to be unable to issue shovels to the troops and force them to use them? So incapable as to fail to find trucks to carry basic construction materials to wherever the troops were digging? And would the troops and junior commanders themselves be unable to dig credible fortifications, without some higher command telling them how to do it step by step?

And critically, would the Syrians fail to learn from positive examples right next door? As I mentioned, Israel in rough terms applied many of the assumptions you are making about the Syrians, to their opponents in the 2006 war in South Lebanon.

The logic was, basically, Arabs are unprofessional soldiers, terrorists like Hizb'Allah are even more unprofessional, we have the high tech. Therefore, we will defeat, with ease, whatever fortifications we come up against. Or in any case we will go around them, we are mobile.

This seemingly reasonable Israeli attitude came up against a few real-life complications, some old, some new. The old one was, of course, that men dug in ground are pretty much always much harder to harm than the side with the massive firepower thinks. Another old one was, it is all very well to talk about bypassing fortifications, but if your goal is destruction of the enemy, and the enemy won't come out of his holes, what then?

The classic old one is, even unprofessional soldiers will quite often fight quite hard, if they believe they are defending their homes.

The relatively new one was, at least some modern Arab infantry is at least sometimes capable of standing up to the firepower of a modern army. Remember, for the entirity of Israel's military existence, it is possible to count the actions where the Arab infantry fought even moderately well on one's hand; for instance from the 1973 the Egyptian Sagger line by the canal, or the Syrian commandos on Mount Hermon.

So, it is probably pardonable that in 2006 Israel was a bit surpised to find that a supposedly unprofessional guerilla force was capable of fielding infantry that would, in fact, defend the holes it had dug itself.

And it was pretty much a brand new Israeli revelation to find out that, if the bad guys are dug in really deeply, your side runs into a RL capacity problem. International political considerations prevent you from flattening every defensive position you come across, and domestic political considerations make it hard for you to accept the casualties your own infantry must take, to dig the bad guys out of their unflattened holes.

Yet, if you leave them in their holes, you come close to losing. After all this is modern asymetric warfare, and you are the side with all the advantages, why can't your incredibly expensive First World force deal with a gang of people you have been calling gutless criminals?

It seems to me a key question to ask, therefore, is how much would the Syrian military learn and be able to apply from the Hizb'Allah experience?

Intuitively, given the probable links between the Syrian military and the Hizb'Allah, one would think the chance of learning would be relatively high.

More generally and probably more importantly, I think a key factor that you are discounting is that, unlike in Saddam's Iraq, in Syria the rank and file would most likely fight to defend their country from foreign, and indeed infidel invasion.

Me, I don't believe the Saddam regime had anything like the legitimacy among its people the Assad regime has. Sure Syria has a crappy human rights record but Syria is not a country of mass ethnic cleansing of its own population. Syria is ethnically and religiously pretty homgeneous - a decisive difference from Iraq IMO.

So I think all of that would add up to Syrian soldiers and officers trying hard to do the best they could to fight the Americans, rather than the minimum necessary to stay out of trouble with the dictator, as was often the case in Iraq.

And that, I think, would translate to furious, beaver-like digging the moment it became clear there is going to be war with the US. The holes that got dug in many cases would, I suspect, be occupied by people aware of the need to protect themselves from First World firepower, and willing to put out the effort to do what it takes to stand up to the Americans.

[Splinty]

Many of the posts on this topic have discussed the Iraqi defenses of OIF in 2003, but everyone has forgotten the Iraqi Republican Guard dug massive defensive belts in preparation for Desert Storm. They slowed the US Army down for about 45 minutes. After an all night MLRS preparatory bombardment and several conventional arty attacks, we (D co 4/7 INF) didn't have to do anything but hogtie the EPWs so the MPs could come and collect them. My point is, with all the advanced recon assets available to the US player, even the strongest defensive belt can be beaten down and neutralized before friendly forces even hit the objective.

[Secondbrooks]

Question is. How long would they have lasted if A. There would not have anykind fortifications. B. Strong enough fotification. I'm with understandment that they mostly were trenches during there. I could be wrong.

Charts what i've seen, are telling that casing 60% casualities to troops in strongly fortified postions 100x100 meters area requires about 800-1000 grenades. Basically platoon would require about 1600-2000 grenades. Fortification are foxholes, with so called coverholes, enough to defeat atleast 81-82mm mortar's direct hit and maybe having also protective roof enough for fragments and bomblets (for spotters who's task is to watch the movement of enemy). + bunker were men live and having trenches enough to crawl from position to position. I don't know how old is that chart, but not from ww2

How long can supply keep up with use of required firepower, if enemy is determed and will stay in it's foxholes even when surrounded. I would quess Syria have terrotorial or local troops which idea is to hold the terrain they are given, tie down enemytroops and even fight isolated if such situation arises.

Atleast during campaign i thought few times that Syria could have put better fight if it have had better fortifications than trenches, much more harder to destoy. I would have ran out of HE and HEAT of M1s and MGSs in no time. Now i could see trenches and just request indirect fire on top of it. Companyes were eliminated in few minutes thanks to that.

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

There is a difference between sandbags and overhead cover. As for sandbags, we asked a bunch of OIF vets if they saw a lot of sandbags and other fortifications during the initial phase of OIF and the answer was "no"...

As I've said a dozen times already, I'm not saying that this type of thing wouldn't exist at all in Syria, I'm just saying it wouldn't be there that frequently *and* we had to make decisions about what to include. Defensive terrain that we didn't feel would be all that relevant to a realistic setting was considered, and still is, lower priority compared to other things..

OK, Steve, I appreciate why these things aren't in CMSF due to the focus of the game on fluid, mobile actions to simulate the Stryker brigade in its preferred element. And the game does a great job at that.

I'm just hoping that the Marines module doesn't simply swap in LAV "Pigs" for Strykers and T-90s for T-80s and offer up more of the same kinds of actions. I'd rather pay full price for a module that offers a wider range of combat possibilities, and ones not so heavily weighted in favour of Blue.

But as I said, you guys are the best judges of what you can do when -- this is just feedback. I'm willing to wait until CM2WW2 for fortifications, so long as the features are backwards compatible.

Bunkers are in, so I would suggest using them. A lot more effective in real life compared to sheet metal that won't do anything but protect from rock spatter.

Yes, but because they're essentially immobile vehicles they stick out like a sore thumb, unlike a sandbagged and camouflaged slit trench (with or without topcover). This limits their value. I mean, the Syrian doesn't have too many strategy cards to play as it is, and different flavours of ambush from hiding is one of the few. But if the cover is no good*, Red gets about 30 seconds to shoot before a semi-competent Blue player who has learned to stand off his AFVs at optimal range guns him down. Also, the US side can't use or enter bunkers AFAIK (I've tried!)

I've loved the game since the start, but I say again, it's modeling half a war right now, and the half where the US basically romps. Maybe we're just spoiled by the near-infinite scope of CMx1 for reasons you've already explained ad nauseam, but since you brought up the Maginot Line, I worry that CMSF is at risk to develop the same problems as another famous game: AH's France, 1940.

* Looking forward to seeing how ELOS helps this

[ January 17, 2008, 03:36 PM: Message edited by: LongLeftFlank ]

[Battlefront.com]

BigDuke6,

The problem still comes down to... where do you invest your bundle of energy and money on entrenchments? Look at a map of Syria when thinking about this. Then think about what Splinty (who has been to Iraq more times than I can count) said about the effectiveness.

Lebanon and Golan are exceptions. They are extremely geographically small areas where the defender KNOWS, without any question of a doubt, that the enemy will have to pass through. Of course it's a no brainer to fortify the Hell out of these places. A powerful enemy will still work their way through (the IDF did in Lebanon 2005 and in Golan in the Six Day's War), but it will cost them time and lives since there is no alternative than slugging it out. Even then, in the Six Day's War the Israelis were outnumbered 2:1 and attacked. Within a few days they had the Golan.

Again, look at the map of Syria and look at where the invaders are coming from. The logistics are massive and the likely results not very good.

Oh, and I think if I can't use Iraq as an example, then you certainly can't use Russia or the Vietnam War

Secondbrooks,

The problem with fixed defenses is that they are fixed. If the enemy has complete freedom to move around them, it will. If it so chooses it will lay the defenses waste at a time of their choosing or wait for the defenders to give up. This is what happened to the Iraqis in the First Gulf War. We probably have all seen the footage of thousands of Iraqis walking out of their fortifications towards the Coalition lines looking to surrender after weeks of bombardment and no friendly resupply.

LongLeftFlank,

The problem is nobody has been able to put forward a cohesive argument that the US forces, Stryker or otherwise, would either find or tangle with (if found) a significant hardened defensive location without first pounding it to China with air and artillery. This is, actually, where the US "romps" The US loves fixed things that it can zero in and hit with precision weapons from 20km away. It's what they do better than any force in the world, IMHO, so the irony is the more hardened the Syrian defenses, the more the US would "romp". Having a Stryker platoon duking it out in a free-for-all Urban landscape is far, far harder on the US.

Steve

[skelley]

Any weak country we fight from now will most likely not set up hardened defenses but use the cities as their defensive terrain. Make us go in and kill civilians so we lose the war in the bad press from it. They will use civilians as shields because they know we won't take them out if we can avoid it. They have zero benefits from fighting outside urban terrain even if fortified.

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request