McNair v. Lynch on Tanks v. Tanks

[Harry Yeide]

Comrades! For the benefit of researchers and the curious, I have posted in the "public folder" of my website World War II History by Harry Yeide pdf versions of the key memos in the US Army's debate over whether tanks or antitank guns should fight enemy tanks, written by major generals McNair and Lynch. It is worth reading McNair's reasoning in its entirety rather than the usual soundbite summary, and Lynch takes a position one would not necessarily expect from the Chief of Infantry. Cheers.

[Other Means]

Interesting, thank you.

[JasonC]

It is a learned enough discussion, and McNair has the best of it. He is simply right, in all essentials. Above all, he properly diagnoses the head of infantry's mistake, tolerating excessive dispersion and seeing no way to avoid it. Both of armor and of guns.

The interesting thing to me is he correctly insists a useful ATG must dominate an individual tank, and believes that fully possible. That it is fully possible, anyone trying to attack PAK40s with T-34s can attest.

He says development of thicker enemy armor must be anticipated, not followed, again exactly correct. But not fufilled in the execution.

The AT deficiency of towed ATGs the US suffered in the real war, stemmed entirely from using obsolete 57mm for the lower "organic" half of the force. Directly contrary to what McNair calls necessary, here.

The Germans stopped Brit armor in North Africa with exactly the sort of PAK fronts McNair is advocating here. Without suffering dispersion, or pushing all their 88s etc down to each regiment and penny packeting them all along the line.

The Russians created towed antitank brigades and regiments and used them to excellent effect, pretty much exactly as McNair is advocating here. They suffered to some extent from 76mm armament that did not work against the heaviest German armor, but that in reality worked fine against most of it.

Naturally 17-pdrs would have been better. Anyone who thinks that extravagant or undoable isn't noticing that the head of the infantry wants a Sherman instead, pretty much every place you'd have a towed gun. A Sherman 75 is not a better AT weapon than a 17-pdr, and it costs gobs more.

[Kingfish]

What better place to ask a TD related question than a thread started by Harry Yeide.

Does anyone know if the American M10 GMC saw action in the battles around Kasserine pass in Feb '43? If so, which unit did they belong to?

The TD Battalion Histories page at Harry's site shows 4 possible candidates - The 701st, 776th, 805th & 894th. Several more saw combat in NA, but either arrived too late or were equipped with different TDs.

[John Kettler]

Kingfish,

El Guettar, Tunisia, March 1943, thus not at Kasserine. And take a look at the author of the main article here.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-vetscor/1074961/posts

Believe the unit was 701st; used to have an illustrated unit monograph for same.

Per second customer review here, it was definitely the 701st. Poster's father was at combat debut of

M10s in Company A, 701st TD Battalion, in North Africa, hence, El Guettar, which is mentioned directly.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1932033262/103-5752417-3869456?v=glance&n=283155

According to this, the other unit was the 899th TD Battalion. Main site's got all sorts of worthwhile stuff.

http://www.tankdestroyersociety.com/history_of_the_899th_tank_battal.htm

This piece from the FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL touches briefly on El Guettar, but is really about an M10 battalion at Anzio.

http://www.lonesentry.com/brassingoff/index.html

Regards,

John Kettler

[ April 15, 2006, 01:10 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[Harry Yeide]

Kingfish: All of the battalions that fought at Kasserine still fielded the M3, which might have been OK had they not been deloyed piecemeal across the front. As noted above, the M10 first appeared at El Guettar with the 899th TD Bn--where the 601st TD Bn, still equipped with the M3, did most of the antitank fighting.

[John Kettler]

Harry,

I'm now officially confused, in at least three ways. The monograph I mentioned covered a unit equipped with M-10s. The sources I've seen and cited above talk about both the 601st and the 701st, of which one is obviously a garble. Which is correct? Were there two TD battalions at El Guettar? From what you've said, the 899th definitely had M10s, but did the 601st/701st have any? Did it undergo even partial reequipment before the battle?

Regards,

John Kettler

[Harry Yeide]

The 701st (M3s) fought around El Guattar with the Tunisian Task Force in November 1942, but it was the 601st that fit the battle of El Guettar in March 1943 with the 1st Infantry Division. The 701st was at Kasserine, still using M3s.

From "The Tamk Killers" (if you buy the book, there's a map of this action):

The Perfect Test: Action at El Guettar

On 23 March, the Germans threw one last major armored punch at the Americans. Von Arnim counterattacked II Corps’ 1st Infantry Division with the 10th Panzer Division just east of El Guettar. At about 0500 hours, the Germans advanced slowly in a hollow-square formation of tanks and self-propelled guns interspersed with infantry carriers. Additional infantry followed in trucks.

Sergeant Bill Harper, an M3 commander in Company C of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, watched the advancing force with concern from the crest of the ridge above the pass to El Guettar. Harper counted seventy-five German tanks, and one platoon leader thought he spotted at least one hundred. These guesses were not bad, as the 10th Panzer Division had fifty-seven tanks and about the same number of armored cars and halftracks. The outnumbered TD battalion—on that day fielding thirty-one M3s and five M6s—was filling a two-and-a-half mile gap in the American lines.

The tank killers had expected trouble. Recon, which had established a picket line across the valley early that morning, spotted the advancing steel storm. After a brief exchange of fire, the recon jeeps, accompanied by a few TDs, raced back ahead of the foe. The lieutenant in charge of one group kept repeating over his radio, “Let the first three [vehicles] through, and then give ‘em hell!”

The battalion’s TDs were arrayed on the reverse slopes of the ridgeline and nearby hills. Companies B and C held positions in front of the 1st Infantry Division artillery, while Company A guarded the pass to El Guettar. The German formation split into three prongs and overran some American positions. Lieutenant Fred Miner in Company A reminded his men that the Americans had fled from the panzers in Ousseltia Valley and at Sbeitla; he told them that this time they would stand and shoot it out no matter what the odds.

In the weak light of early morning, the TD crews engaged the Germans as they came into range. Sergeant Raymond, of Company B, spotted a giant Tiger moving past and maneuvered to put six shots (probably from the flank) into the panzer, four of which ricocheted but two of which did the job. Raymond next set a Mark IV alight. German rounds found Raymond’s M3, and three hits set the halftrack on fire.

Guided by forward observers, most of the TDs raced over the crests of the ridges and hills, fired, and backed out of sight, only to pop up and do the same again at another location. The German gunners never knew where a TD would appear next. Except, it seemed, for one crew, which found itself the object of heavy fire every time their M3 crested the rise. They finally realized that their radio antenna was standing proudly tall and revealed their approach every time. They lowered the aerial.

After Company A’s TDs had knocked out eight tanks, the German assault force withdrew and circled to reinforce the attack on the rest of the battalion’s line. The panzers penetrated to within one hundred yards of the Companies B and C TDs. Some of the M3s were no longer moving, and a few were burning. The Germans were so close that Sgt Bill Harper at one point thought the outfit was surrounded. Even as ammunition ran low, the battalion doggedly held its ground. At the height of the assault, some TDs were forced to abandon the duck-and-strike tactics; they stood and fired as fast as the guns could be loaded. The crews also had to beat back German infantry using small arms, machine guns, and 75mm HE shells.

The German tide receded about noon, leaving a litter of burning tanks on the slopes and approaches. The tanks withdrew into defilade positions among wadis and small hills on the northeast side of the valley.

The untested 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion was in mobile reserve near Gafsa when, at 0845, it received orders to move to El Guettar. German tanks had overrun a field artillery battalion, and the 601st had already lost most of its 75mm guns. Company B entered the valley to engage the Germans while Company C provided overwatch from the ridgeline to the west.

Second Lieutenant Gerald Coady’s platoon led the Company B charge through the gap into the valley. As the M10s rolled by to their first test against an enemy, LtCol Herschel Baker stood among his remaining Purple Heart boxes and shouted an unprintable but heartfelt welcome.

The Germans had skillfully selected their firing positions and—combined with an American minefield—they left Coady little room for maneuver. Coady tried to rush his force into covered positions to the north three times, and three times he fell back with losses. After two of his own TDs had been disabled, Coady saw that the platoon leader in the next platoon had been killed. He dismounted under heavy tank, antitank, artillery, and small-arms fire and organized the remnants of the two platoons to continue the battle.

Corporal Thomas Wilson commanded one of the Company B M10s. His destroyer received two direct hits and had two fires aboard. Wilson helped extinguish the fires while his gunner, T/5 Stephen Kurowski—who was wounded in both legs—continuing to fire his 3-inch gun at the Germans. Kurowski knocked out two emplacements, an artillery piece, and several machine guns before the M10 absorbed a third hit in the fuel tank, which started another fire. Wilson decided that he could not allow the Germans to capture their first M10 and directed his driver to a place where American forces would be able to recover the crippled vehicle.

At 1645 hours, the Germans struck again, supported by Stuka and fighter attacks. Infantry advanced first, overwatched by tanks and antitank guns. On the ridgeline, as the crews of C/899th watched the advance as if from an opera balcony seat, the gunners itched for something to come into range. The TDs of the 601st and 899th blazed away, and American artillery pounded the German troops. Thirty-eight panzers pressed the attack until almost 1900 hours but gave up after suffering further heavy losses.

The TDs and the artillery together had wreaked havoc during the day. Twenty-seven of the 601st’s thirty-six guns were knocked out and fourteen men had died, but its sharp-eyed gunners had destroyed thirty-seven German tanks and damaged an unknown number of others. The crews of the M10s claimed fifteen Mark IVs for a loss of five TDs and a halftrack.

The battle at El Guettar had played out General Bruce’s dream scenario and doctrine to a tee. And, despite substantial American losses—concentrated among the antiquated M3s—the concept had worked. It would be nearly a year before the Tank Destroyer Force would have another opportunity to meet a large armored attack with a full TD battalion.

[kawaiku]

Thanks a lot for the read Harry. I plan on buying The Longest Battle(which I have been eyeing for months and is on my buy and read list) and maybe the TD Killers book.

[John Kettler]

Harry,

Thanks for clearing up the confusion and for providing such a useful excerpt. Am astounded the venerable French 75mm on a halftrack got a Tiger I kill!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Harry Yeide]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Harry,

Thanks for clearing up the confusion and for providing such a useful excerpt. Am astounded the venerable French 75mm on a halftrack got a Tiger I kill!

Regards,

John Kettler

It could happen. See

752d Tank Battalion for a 75mm Tiger kill.

[John Kettler]

Harry,

That's the battle which one of our members did as a graphic novel of sorts, using CMBO screenshots.

Terrific account you provided.

I looked up the muzzle velocities for the stock Sherman vs. the French 75 and got a bit of a shock.

FM 17-12 Tank Gunnery from 10 July 1944, p. 103 lists the vanilla 75mm Sherman as firing M61 APC at (converted into metric) 618.9 m/sec, and Gander & Chamberlain's WEAPONS OF THE THIRD REICH on p. 181 lists the high muzzle velocity figure (presumably AP of some sort) for the 7.5cm Fk 97(f) (captured French 75mm) as 675 m/sec. Talk about not expecting a result like that! The vintage weapon actually had higher velocity than did the then new Sherman gun. No wonder the Tiger I died at El Guettar!

Regards,

John Kettler

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

[snips]

I looked up the muzzle velocities for the stock Sherman vs. the French 75 and got a bit of a shock.

FM 17-12 Tank Gunnery from 10 July 1944, p. 103 lists the vanilla 75mm Sherman as firing M61 APC at (converted into metric) 618.9 m/sec, and Gander & Chamberlain's WEAPONS OF THE THIRD REICH on p. 181 lists the high muzzle velocity figure (presumably AP of some sort) for the 7.5cm Fk 97(f) (captured French 75mm) as 675 m/sec.

I suspect a misprint for 575 m/sec, the m.v. given by the same authors in their WW2 Fact File on light and medium field artillery, and corroborated by Hogg's "British and American artillery of WW2" and "German artillery of WW2" and Chant's "Artillery of WW2". A slightly higher figure of 610 m/sec, specifically for the M1897A4 gun firing APC M61 or AP M72, is given in Hunnicutt's "Half-Track".

Curiously, the first two of editions of Chris Foss' "Artillery of the World" give an m.v. of 624 m/sec, but I think the more widely-agreed figure is easily the more believable.

All the best,

John.

[John Kettler]

John D Salt,

The low value given was 550 m/sec, so your proposal, especially in light of your multiple credible sources, makes sense and isn't counterintuitive either.

Regards,

John Kettler