Ignorant Commonwealth questions

[Broompatrol]

How were Vickers typically farmed out to units?

Would a company level operation ever have a Vickers?

Finally, was the reason they were not attached to Companies becuase of their mobility?

Thanks.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Broompatrol:

How were Vickers typically farmed out to units?

Would a company level operation ever have a Vickers?

Finally, was the reason they were not attached to Companies becuase of their mobility?

Thanks.

a) One MG platoon per a battalion, IIRC. Or one MG company (3 platoons of 4 guns) per brigade.

Name a company level operation. I don't believe such a thing was common.

c) They were actually far more mobile than the infantry, having tracked mechanical transport of their own, so I doubt that was the reason.

[flamingknives]

What you might find is that a battle might be a battlion level op (therefore having a platoon of Vickers) but the Battalion only has one company forward. Therefore one company plus vickers.

[Broompatrol]

When I said operation I simply meant a companiy sized mission. I should have been clearer.

I was wondering how Bn would use the Mg platoon. Spread them between companies or did they just use them as they saw fit dependant on the situation?

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Broompatrol:

How were Vickers typically farmed out to units?

Would a company level operation ever have a Vickers?

Finally, was the reason they were not attached to Companies becuase of their mobility?

Thanks.

a) One MG platoon per a battalion, IIRC. Or one MG company (3 platoons of 4 guns) per brigade.

Name a company level operation. I don't believe such a thing was common.

c) They were actually far more mobile than the infantry, having tracked mechanical transport of their own, so I doubt that was the reason. </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Mission or operation, how often did a company do anything on its own? Anything I can think of would be in the area of, say, a fighting patrol or scouting or something. Can you give an example?

I mean, independent of a battalion action, unless you're simply meaning in the context of a battalion action, in which case it was usually two companies up, two back, and the MGs likely deployed in conjunction with the battalion mortars and anti-tank guns. If you wanted the MGs to fire indirectly, say, at a covered enemy retreat path, that kind of stuff was dictated by the terrain - I'd imagine they were flexible about things like that based on individual situations.

I guess I should be more deferential in my treatment of you, since you are 11 days my senior...

[JonS]

Originally posted by Broompatrol:

I was wondering how Bn would use the Mg platoon. Spread them between companies or did they just use them as they saw fit dependant on the situation?

No, the MG Pn was a discrete unit, and the Pn Cmdr would object to his unit being farmed out 1 gun per company. FWIW, the MG Coy and Bn Cmdrs usually objected to their units being broken up too, though much good it did them. But splitting up the pn would be just pointless - the kinds of tasks an MG Pn gegerally undertook relied on a certain massing of fire, impossible if they were scattered.

Also, often the unit to which the MGs were attached - be it a bn with a pn, bde with a coy - didn't know what the heck to do with this additional firepower and gave the MG cmdr vague instructions like "go over there and make yourself useful".

Anyway, usually the pn would be deployed with ~20m or so (depending on the ground, tac situation, blah blah blah) between gun dets. They would typically be doing things like guarding an approach, covering a flank, or denying an area, via either direct or indirect fire.

There is a short overview of Vickers MMGs "theory and practice" here. Read the rest of the book for a fuller picture.

Also very good reading is Rex Fendick "A CANLOAN Officer". Fendick was an MMG Pn Cmdr in NWE from just after D-Day through to the end of the war with 3rd (British) Division. Good luck finding a copy though.

[ November 12, 2007, 08:22 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Broompatrol:

Finally, was the reason they were not attached to Companies becuase of their mobility?

c) They were actually far more mobile than the infantry, having tracked mechanical transport of their own, so I doubt that was the reason. </font>

[Broompatrol]

Thanks all, good info.

I guess I should have specified that my question would be how it relates to Combat Mission. I know that Coys don't wander the countryside looking for things to blow up on their own, but within the context of the game there are many company sized scenarios. I noticed that Vickers don't seem to be as common as HMG42's or M1919's. So, I was wondering how the Commonwealth forces visualized the proper use of Vickers.

Anyway thanks again. It helps to learn how they would be deployed.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Broompatrol:

Thanks all, good info.

I guess I should have specified that my question would be how it relates to Combat Mission. I know that Coys don't wander the countryside looking for things to blow up on their own, but within the context of the game there are many company sized scenarios. I noticed that Vickers don't seem to be as common as HMG42's or M1919's. So, I was wondering how the Commonwealth forces visualized the proper use of Vickers.

Anyway thanks again. It helps to learn how they would be deployed.

To add a spot of my own drivelling to the stuff so far contributed:

1. Prior to the 1937ish reorganization, the British Army normally had 1 MG coy and 3 rifle coys to a battalion, just like almost every other army in the known world. Thereafter, compared to almost anyone else's organizations, the British Army was quite light in MMG scaling, and continues to be so to this day.

2. From 1941, the normal arrangement for most of the war in infantry divisions was an MG battalion (initially 4 coys each of 12 MMGs) under command of the division. From 1944, one of the companies was equipped with 4.2-in mortars rather than MMGs.

3. Airlanding divisions had a comparable number of MMGs overall, but they were farmed out to the units rather than centralized -- I think typically 2 pls of 4 MMGs for an airlanding bn.

4. Commandos had a heavy weapons troop for the commando which could use some mix of Vickers MMGs or 3-in mortars, say something like three of each.

5. Armoured divisions normally had only one infantry brigade, and would have an independent MG company. In 1944 this might have 3 pls each of 4 MMGs and 1 pl of 4 4.2-in mortars.

6. The motor machine gun brigades were odd organizations which existed only for about the last half of 1940. Three were organised, 1st, 2nd and 3rd. They saw only home service, and by the end of 1940 had been reorganized and redesignated as 26th, 25th and 28th armoured brigades respectively.

7. As far as "proper use of the Vickers" was concerned, I believe the British Army was doctrinally unusual in visualising the use of MMGs for indirect fire up to 4,500 yards. I have not seen any account of this being done in action, but I believe it was still doctrine when a mate of mine shot a Vickers course in, I think, the early 1960s.

All the best,

John.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

As far as "proper use of the Vickers" was concerned, I believe the British Army was doctrinally unusual in visualising the use of MMGs for indirect fire up to 4,500 yards. I have not seen any account of this being done in action, but I believe it was still doctrine when a mate of mine shot a Vickers course in, I think, the early 1960s.

I believe the pepperpots in Operation VERITABLE used Vickers guns to thicken the barrages.

[JonS]

Yep. The above mentioned "A CANLOAN Officer" also talks about long range indirect fire missions at various points throughout the NWE campaign. Trolling through the link to 27(MG)Bn above would probably throw up other examples (I'd be surprised if it didn't, but I don't know that it does).

Jon

[ November 14, 2007, 01:52 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Mission or operation, how often did a company do anything on its own? Anything I can think of would be in the area of, say, a fighting patrol or scouting or something. Can you give an example?

I mean, independent of a battalion action, unless you're simply meaning in the context of a battalion action, in which case it was usually two companies up, two back, and the MGs likely deployed in conjunction with the battalion mortars and anti-tank guns. If you wanted the MGs to fire indirectly, say, at a covered enemy retreat path, that kind of stuff was dictated by the terrain - I'd imagine they were flexible about things like that based on individual situations.

i'm not too familiar with CW. is the above true, unlike most other nations they held to rigid formations thru out the war?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Mission or operation, how often did a company do anything on its own? Anything I can think of would be in the area of, say, a fighting patrol or scouting or something. Can you give an example?

I mean, independent of a battalion action, unless you're simply meaning in the context of a battalion action, in which case it was usually two companies up, two back, and the MGs likely deployed in conjunction with the battalion mortars and anti-tank guns. If you wanted the MGs to fire indirectly, say, at a covered enemy retreat path, that kind of stuff was dictated by the terrain - I'd imagine they were flexible about things like that based on individual situations.

i'm not too familiar with CW. is the above true, unlike most other nations they held to rigid formations thru out the war? </font>

[undead reindeer cavalry]

thanks for your reply. i was thinking more about company level stuff. with for example Americans or Germans it's not that rare to read about combat missions done by single companies.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

thanks for your reply. i was thinking more about company level stuff. with for example Americans or Germans it's not that rare to read about combat missions done by single companies.

It is not practicable for a company-sized sub-unit of one of the maneouvre arms to act independently for any length of time, simply because it does not have its own supply echelon. This is true in any army, and at any time up to the present.

For single actions lasting a day or less, sure, you can use a platoon or a company or any penny-packet you like, but AIUI German doctrine dictated that the company was the minimum force element to be used for armour, and British doctrine the half-squadron.

I do not think there was such a great deal of difference between national practices of augmentation and cross-attachment by the final stages of WW2; the Germans have always had the reputation of being "flexible" in organising their forces, but in many cases this was forced upon them because the units in question had already had the crap beaten out of them at least once.

I think that British WW2 task-organising practices have several recognisable threads:

1. The "desperate improvisation" trend. Early in the war, scratch forces were organised as necessary, for the same reason I mentioned above with the Germans. For example, while researching the death of a serjeant from 1 RWK in France 1940, I found accounts of West Kents, Queensmen and Berkshires all fighting together as a mixed force. Similarly, after HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk, survivors from their Royal Marine detachments (mostly from Pymouth) were amalgamated with remnants of 2nd Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders to form the wonderfully-named "Plymouth Argylls" [Note to American readers: Plymouth Argyle is a well-known soccer team]. Such practices continued throughout the war if units were hit hard enough to require amalgamation, as for example 3/4th CLY in the Desert and the "Nor-Mons" (Norfolks and Monmouths) in Normandy.

2. Private armies. Given the slightest excuse, an energetic British officer will improvise, with a greater or lesser degree of official approval, a bunch of blokes to go biffing the Boche on a private enterprise basis. The famous examples are the LRDG, SAS and PPA, which were highly specialised forces, but there were also special-forces type operations carried out by scratch or local forces, such as the Shan scouts mentioned in George MacDonald Fraser's "Quartered Safe Out Here", or the "Calcutta Light Sea Horse" mentioned in James Leasor's book "Boarding Party". In some cases these "private armies" grew to considerable size, as in the case of the second Chindit expedition.

3. Jock Columns. During the Desert War, "Jock" Campbell popularised these, not really an innovation so much as a return to traditional North-West Frontier habits of organising a column for a particular task -- "the section, the pom-pom, and six hundred men", as Kipling put it. They have been much criticised in the years since, but they did at least make the infantry mobile and capable of taking on armour.

4. The late war phase. Some divisions fought fairly much off the standard orbat, others didn't. For example, 11th Armoured notably organised as brigade groups, using the armoured recce regiment as a fourth armoured regiment and forming two balanced groups each of two armoured and two infantry units. Guards Armoured favoured "company-squadron teams", again producing evenly balanced forces but mixed at a lower level.

Whatever else one may be able to accuse the British Army of in its organizational practices, lack of variety is something it has never suffered from.

All the best,

John.

[ November 15, 2007, 02:15 PM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

[JonS]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

1. The "desperate improvisation" trend. ... Such practices continued throughout the war if units were hit hard enough to require amalgamation, as for example 3/4th CLY in the Desert and the "Nor-Mons" (Norfolks and Monmouths) in Normandy.

Hi John,

didn't the 3/4 CLY amalgamation occur in Normandy too? Or perhaps that was the second, and final, time that particular amalgamation happened.

Could you provide a bit of background on the Nor-Mons - date, units (1st Norfolks, 2nd Norfolks, etc), duration of amalgamation, anyfink really.

Regards

Jon

[undead reindeer cavalry]

John,

no matter what the theory was, in reality companies did have separate combat missions that lasted longer than a day. as for supplies, company simply sent men back to get supplies and at least Germans did have a supply echelon at company level.

i was simply wondering if it was true that CW forces held to battalion level actions. it doesn't seem that impossible, since for example Soviets held to regimental actions during early war and still in 1944 were rather slow to act on low levels.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

John,

no matter what the theory was, in reality companies did have separate combat missions that lasted longer than a day. as for supplies, company simply sent men back to get supplies and at least Germans did have a supply echelon at company level.

Can you give some examples please?

And no, the Germans did not have a supply echelon at company level. There must be a misunderstanding with the word 'Tross'.

Compare the company level organisation below:

http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/kstn131f1feb41.htm

http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/kstn131n1mai44.htm

http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/kstn11771nov43.htm

With an independent battalion level support organisation below:

http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/kstn/kstn1151c1nov44.htm

In the German nomenclature, there were Einheiten (units) and Verbände (Formations). The division was called a Grosseinheit (large unit), and was the lowest level at which sustained independent combat operations could be conducted. Everything below that was dependent on the next higher level of command for sustained combat, i.e. it was not independent. In the case of independent battalions, they were either dependent on Corps supply echelons, or on that of the division they were attached to. In Russia in 1941, one of the interesting problems was that even Panzergruppen did not have their own supply echelon, but were dependent on the armies they were attached to.

Of course, companies would have individual missions. But those would still be undertaken in the framework of a battalion operation (im Verband), which may or may not have been reinforced. IOW - even in the German army companies would not wander around the country-side on an operation.

All the best

Andreas

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JonS:

[snips]

Hi John,

didn't the 3/4 CLY amalgamation occur in Normandy too? Or perhaps that was the second, and final, time that particular amalgamation happened.

No, my brain has come undone, it wasn't in the Desert at all, I was thinking of the Normandy one -- after V-B, how could I forget? Umm, magma, it must have been magma flows impinging upon my brain.

Originally posted by JonS:

Could you provide a bit of background on the Nor-Mons - date, units (1st Norfolks, 2nd Norfolks, etc), duration of amalgamation, anyfink really.

3 Mons and 1 Norfolks (I think the Norfolks' 2nd bn was in Burma at the time), Perriers Ridge or thereabouts (Basher Bates' VC battle). Having has a quick glance at J J How's "Hill 112" and "The British Breakout", in one of which I'm sure I've seen the term used, I can't find the thing, but it does mention 2 coys of each in a position on Perrier (as he spells it) ridge, so I think this might just have been elements of two bns fighting the same battle rather than a formal amalgamation.

All the best,

John.

All the best,

John.

[ November 25, 2007, 01:16 PM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Andreas:

[snips]

Of course, companies would have individual missions. But those would still be undertaken in the framework of a battalion operation (im Verband), which may or may not have been reinforced. IOW - even in the German army companies would not wander around the country-side on an operation.

Well, quite.

I find it odd that a lot of people seem to be under the impression that the British Army habitually pitched its tactical planning at a higher organizational level than other armies. I would think it was more normally the reverse. The German, Russian and American armies, with a way of command adapted to large-scale continental warfare, typically regarded the regiment as the basic unit, whereas the British, with a tradition of small forces fighting peninsular campaigns or doing colonial policing, regarded the battalion as the basic unit (though they often referred to them as regiments), and the regiment-sized organization was a "brigade", and hence a formation rather than a unit.

The British Army's background of as a long-service professional army and the strong emphasis on the regiment (really, battalion) as the focus of tribal loyalty may make them less amenable to mixing elements of separate battalions of the same arm, whereas the armies with a more "continental" outlook might be thought of as being better able to treat elements of units as interchangeable parts; but I doubt that the difference is as strong as is commonly supposed. Nonetheless, reformers have tried since the end of WW2 to make the regimental system more "rational" on at least three occasions. In the aftermath of the infamously doltish Defence Review of 1957 there was a short-lived attmept to introduce brigade, rather than regimental, cap-badges. In the 1960s an attempt to amalgamate battalions into "big regiments" halted after the first few (Anglians first, Queen's next, combining many famous names from the English country regiments). Finally, just this last couple of years, a government whose members possess less military experience or understanding than any in living memory has succeeded in making the regimental system "tidy" and composed entirely of large regiments with dull names. Perhaps the stuffed suits in charge of it all imagine that this increased tidiness will produce "efficiency savings" to compensate for the lowest defence budget since the 1930s.

All the best,

John.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Andreas,

of course companies, like all units, act as a part of a larger context.

in traditional rigid battalion mission the companies act together against the same specific target, typically in some clear formation (like two up). this is what Dorosh was describing.

at least with some nations there were other types of missions, where companies acted separately from each other with different targets and aims.

i suspect we are discussing past each other, since these types of individual company missions are not at all that rare to come thru. but luckily enough, i just finished reading three AARs that offer good examples:

the first one ("Operations of the 2nd Battalion, 329th Infantry, 83rd Infantry Division, in the attack along the road to Periers, 4 July 1944") describes a classical battalion attack in one-up formation. companies end up fighting somewhat separately because of circumstances, but they still share the same target and act in concert (or at least aim to).

the second one ("Operations of Company B, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion, 7th Armored Division, in the vicinity of Meijel, South of Nijmegen, Holland, 27-29 October 1944"), describes a situation in which each three companies of the battalion are given individual missions (exact words from the AAR), though later they support each other. this is an armored infantry battalion though.

the third one ("Operations of Company I, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, East of Olzheim, Germany, 28 February-1 March 1945"), deals with infantry battalion and is another example of a company having a mission of its own (which lasts a couple of days BTW, and includes resupplying by company men), and which states at end that "In most instances (with wide frontages while on the offensives -URC), a battalion attack became widely divergent separate company attacks." (emphasis mine) the company mission is a part of larger battalion attack, but the company acts separately from other companies and has clearly a mission of its own. this is a very different type of situation from the rigid attack described in the first AAR.

what comes to supply echelons of German infantry companies, they had their integral supply trains whose duty was to transport supplies for the company from higher level depots. the supply train provided the fighting elements and extra unit of fire. the company didn't need battalion assets to get itself resupplied in 24 hours. of course the whole supply system was hierarchical and aimed at a situation in which company supply trains didn't need to travel up to army or corps level depot or railhead, but nonetheless the company did have integral supply echelon.

anyway the discussion about integral supply echelons is a bit moot, since company could send some men to get supplies if needed anyway.

resupplying is different with units that require fuel etc, but that's not really what the discussion was about.

[ November 16, 2007, 02:14 PM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[sand digger]

Originally posted by Broompatrol:

[QB] When I said operation I simply meant a companiy sized mission. I should have been clearer.

I was wondering how Bn would use the Mg platoon. Spread them between companies or did they just use them as they saw fit dependant on the situation?

....................

The latter. Well the better ones would. Its nonsense to ignore practical considerations and put restrictions on the potential use of weapons in the subject context.

If it works you do it, bugger what the book says.