Steppe terrain fighting

[JasonC]

Then, when I said you have to be able to do it ten times in a row without running out of anything, for some strange reason you think this must mean laterally along the front. Um, no. You have to be able to do it today at 6 AM. You have to be able to do it today at 10 AM. You have to be able to do it tomorrow at 4 PM. And the day after that. And the day after that. Wars aren't over in 30 minutes, nor in 30 minutes times 6. If you break through, so what he has reserves, then another line, then another army, then another front, then he rallies on an obstacle, then... You have to be able to do it 10 times over with the same force without running out of anything. 33% losses in any one arm to take one field are a sign of tactics that make no sense and cannot in practice be used. We are talking about the tactical fights where you bring the high cards - armor vs none in the open. You have to win them outright, without mussed hair.

[JasonC]

On CM canister, it is hopelessly wrong in fielding and in modeling. Most of what they show as canister in Russian ammo loads was simply shrapnel rounds, no more effective than HE. And in CM, it does silly things like penetrate stone buildings, because all they have is an exposure number. The modeled effect is also crazy when compared to bullet volumes etc. It is just wrong, a broken bit of the module. I don't use it.

[JasonC]

As for what a drill means, it means any tactical procedure designed to accomplish some definite and common objective under typical and frequently simplified conditions. "To cross open ground under MG fire to the next cover, use short advance by alternating units so only one is exposed at a time" - that is a drill. It involves a kind of movement, who moves when, procedures to use when fired upon or when a unit panics or pins, etc.

A drill differs from an individual tactic by coordinating several requirements, actions, or roles (individually, "tactics") to effect the result and to deal with typical counters. Going hull down is a tactic. Top hat and lowski periodic firing from different points along a ridge line by an armor platoon is a "drill".

Defeating entrenched infantry in open ground is an objective. When armor is available, there is a standard drill that reliably accomplishes that objective. Driving light armor up to 150m away to look over the trench system is not part of it. Driving a platoon of medium tanks to close range to dose the defenders with fire, with impunity, is part of it. As is prior ranged overwatch by heavy weapons, and follow up by infantry.

Drills, like tactics, are standard tools for tactical commanders. They need to know how to do a whole set of them, and then need to pick the right one to apply in some given situation in front of them. They need to know the external move-and-counter relations that exist among them. And they need to know the internal logic of each one, why it reliably works, why things are done that way instead of a different way, what methods exist to break the alternatives, when the proper conditions for it aren't available so it should not be attempted, etc.

Which you can only learn by picking the drill apart, considering every alternate action at every point, and its counters. Once you have learned it, unpacked it, packed in up again - you simply know how and when to apply it. And it becomes one more tool in your bag, as basic as "a mortar can kill a gun without reply if somebody spots for it". If you see a trench fort in the open and have armor, you know how to kill that position as reliably as the mortar takes out the gun.

[JasonC]

As for your silly statements about Russians ignoring minefields and the rest of the propagandistic crap out of signal magazine, sorry, I've read too many Russian pioneer training manuals to believe a word of it. There is a reason pioneers went with every assault detachment, and no they didn't ignore mines or just walk through them. They weren't all descendents of the mongols either, they didn't eat babies, or any of a thousand other lies just as silly.

[JasonC]

Then you want to know how there can be PAK in the German army. The Germans fielded as many PAK as tanks. Typical IDs at the time of Kursk had 40-60 PAK, in their divisional panzerjaeger battalions and the 14th companies of their infantry regiments. The Germans also occasionally used 105mm howitzers in gun fronts, though it was more common early in the war. 88mm Flak were of course used for it throughout. The Germans led the world in gun front tactics, employing them to excellent effect as early as the campaign in France in 1940, made extensive use of them in North Africa, dealt with the early Russian heavies with them, etc.

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by JasonC:

And by the way, we aren't talking about nations at all, we are talking about tactical principles. What one man can do, another can do. If you want to play nationalist watering contest games, try the general forum.

I think you need to talk nations. While it is true what one man can do, another can do, we are talking machines here. What an Sdkfz 232 8 wheeled armored car can do a BA-64 more than likely cannot.

I'm not going into the untermensch line of thought here. I believe that the Russian soldier showed that they can fight with anybody.

What I am talking about is the difference between the doctrines of the two armies during the July 1943 time period. They are not the same and would not be applied the same. You can make generalities but you said earlier:

We are discussing not principles but drills.

Now you want to discuss drills. Okay with me.

I don't buy any of your "established maxims of war" - which in fact apply to a far higher scale than CM tactical. It is simply the advice to use a large echelon unit to fight a smaller one.

Firstly, they aren't my axioms of war. Secondly, they apply at all levels. You need firepower superiority and concentration of force at the point of attack to be able to win...in most cases. When these axioms are ignored or broken and the attackers are successful is when medals are issued because it is an unusual event.

No, you do not need to get a company killed to kill a company, even attacking, even in open ground.

Where did I say that you did? I said that you will more than likely take heavier losses than the defender. If the odds are as you just stated them...one company against another one attacking across open ground you are going to get most of them killed and not get the position 9 times out of 1o.

As you stated, the difference is in the force multipliers. Either more than 1 to 1 or other multipliers like other infantry, tanks or artillery. Maybe it's something as insignificant as a smoke screen that allows your company to only have to engage a platoon of his defenders at a single time. BUT you are going to need some force multiplier to attack his force at greater than 1 to 1 odds.

Attackers regular inflict losses up to 10 to 1 against the inferior forces they hit - defender eliminated, attacker intact.

Once again, this is true to an extent. Most defenders are killed during the exploitation phase of a battle. Not during the assault phase.

However, if you get 10 to 1 odds during the attack the defender will take grievous losses while not inflicting many casualties themselves.

Quite an impressive description of a drill. All of which is accurate. You started this thread by asking this question...

So I thought I'd start a thread on tactics in this terrain type.

There was no mention of "The Drill" in that statement. The premise, I have carried on most of our conversations with, has been about tactics. Not "The Drill", which as we both agree changes by the moment. So if you want to discuss "The Drill" now that is fine too. But I think for "The Drill" we need a bit more information. Like who is the attacking force and who the defenders. What is the exact tactical situation, because as you just pointed out "The Drill" changes with each and every application and you need to know them all to choose which of them covers the situation at hand.

Then, when I said you have to be able to do it ten times in a row without running out of anything, for some strange reason you think this must mean laterally along the front. Um, no.

Sorry, I misunderstood you to mean that the attack was an ongoing chain of events that were closely related. Not in the context of your campaign. That is a valid point. You cannot burn your unit to death and use it up in a single attack because there is always tomorrow. UNLESS you are a Russian commander.

The Soviets routinely used their units up in combat and had them rebuilt later. It was so ingrained in the Soviet military that it was a strategy they employed throughout the 70's-80's as well.

[JasonC]

20mm ACs are not remotely able to scout an infantry position in the sense of IDing all its trenches by driving with 200m of them. If they try, ATRs kill them, no problem. Infantry is apparently an ambiguous term. For squads only, the statement would be true. But Russian infantry comes with a definite supporting weapon mix of MMGs, mortars, and ATRs, and never appears without it. And the ATRs are all they need to keep thin ACs honest.

Incidentally, you also seem to have the idea that German light ACs actually did such close battlefield recon in the real deal. They didn't, not remotely. They were not provided to every attack sector 3 or 6 at a time to do recon by death, nor to screen a front already in contact. They were used as a battalion, often working with the half tracked portion of the division's panzergrenadiers, and typically following (*not* leading) closely behind the panzer regiment, or the bulk thereof.

Sometimes they had independent missions. When they were expect just to screen a flank or some such, they might be alone. When they were expected to attack things, they usually had real armor of some sort attached - e.g from the divisional panzerjaegers, or StuGs. When they encountered AT fire they stopped. They generally did not press, and light armor losses were much lower than tank losses because they simply were not used as aggressively. I can cite any number of unit battle reports to this effect.

[JasonC]

As for the "large amounts of AT guns", yes the Russians had prepared defenses at Kursk. The Germans still broke through the front line defenses essentially everywhere, because those defenses were so deeply layered, the number of ATGs actually at the front line in any given area was quite modest. Sending a full regiment or battalion of armor over a narrow frontage was quite sufficient to break through the front line ATG network. But that network did not stop after the front line - it just kept on going. And more and more units slide in front of the attacks that were still making any progress. The gun fronts thickened ahead of the break-ins - that is one reason the Germans were continually changing the point of main effort and axes of attack in the south, e.g.

If anybody has the impression there was one continous gun front at Kursk, of the tactical densities that term denotes (meaning, guns per unit space equal tanks attacking that space), over the whole frontage - no there wasn't, not remotely. At the front line a km of front might or might not have a single nest of 4 45mm ATGs. Deeper, there were batteries of 76mm and occasionally 2 of them near each other. A panzer regiment launched over 2-3 km of frontage could easily destroy the modest number of guns it would face in the first few lines, with each engagement conducted as a many on few. They might lose a few tanks but were in no danger whatever of actually being stopped.

Later that changes, but only because the Russians can afford to concentrate their reserves in the places the Germans are striking, instead of trying to protect the entire front. They can truck in a brigade of 76mm guns to double the AT defense thickness (and improve its average quality) of one rifle division e.g., because there is German armor opposite. That sets up the feint and probe, twist line of attack stuff one sees after the first couple of days in the south. In the north the attack was stopped, though by armor rushed to the area at least as much as guns.

[JasonC]

And no, the attackers should not always expect a tough and bloody fight. Occasionally, where they meet the strongest part of the defense or encounter the defender's reserves, sure. But Kursk is a very large battle well spread out in space, in depth as well as along the frontage, and in plenty of places the defenders had precious little - particularly early on. Read the initial break in battle reports. Often a Russian rifle regiment is sitting there with its organic weapons only (which means for AT, maybe 12 45mm and 12 76mm all told), and a full panzer division runs right over them.

[Mad Russian]

I agree. Neither sides recon forces were tailored to fight early on. Later they were but that isn't in the scope of this conversation.

At least I got the German attack/Russian defense part of this thread right...

German Recon Bn's had their own AT assets. There were far from helpless. So much so that they were often used as firebrigades.

You are correct that in this tactical situation where the enemy defensive line is established in a non-fluid environment the AC's of the Panzer Division would not be used. The recon element of the PG regiment more than likely would be. That would be an infanty recon type unit. It would be more than the half squad you quoted earlier for the recon duties however.

Our discussion of the AC's kind of took on a life of it's own away from the other. That happened when I obsessed on the Recon element that you keep going away from. The evolution of battlefield recon in WWII, especially on the Russian front, is a very interesting subject. One we try later, in another thread.

I'm wondering why you aren't interested in finding where the enemy is in strength before you start your attack.

The other military axiom I quoted you earlier was, "Find them, Fix Them, Destroy Them." You have been, for the most part, skipping the first one. Do that and you will pay a high price in casualties for your units.

I still maintain, as you supported in your own comments, that the only hard and fast rules of the drill, is that, there are no hard and fast rules.

The Drill is also known as going by the book. Good commanders normally throw the book out the window. They operate on a situation by situation basis, letting the circumstances dictate their response and not the set drill that somebody maybe thousands of miles away and decades ago dreamed up.

Two examples of how armies viewed the book answer are, the Germans were noted for throwing out the book and making decisions on the spot while the British were noted for doing everything by the book and changing nothing from the drill.

[JasonC]

You don't need 3 to 1 odds to have firepower superiority. Having several platoons of medium tanks against an enemy whose largest AT weapon is a 45mm, or an ATR, you can and frequently do have overwhelming firepower superiority with even numbers.

And have no reason to lose as much as you kill. No more than a 81mm mortar blowing apart a 76mm ATG should lose as much as it kills. It is a combined arms paper scissors rock relation, where one weapon simply trumps another completely, when the conditions are right.

What caused this thread is those conditions can be right and those combined arms relations can be true, and yet the result can be the trump doesn't work. Because the trump holder *doesn't know how to use it*, to get that assymmetric, "I just win", effect. When you tell them they need to have 3 to 1 odds, you aren't helping them or giving them instruction. Because it isn't true.

[JasonC]

It has nothing to do with the AT assets of a recce battalion. The question was whether light armor can scout trench forts on steppe, closely enough to allow them to be shot up by ranged overwatch, without getting killed in the process. The answer is "no", and AT assets supporting the light armor have nothing to do with it - because it isn't anything armored that does the light armor killing. It is stealthy light AT, which stops their approach before they can ID all the trenches.

You seem to me to have some particular bee in your bonnet that all discovery of useful information on battlefields must be the province of an armored recon battalion, which is a rather silly thing to think. Previously you at least also noticed the existence of foot recon, too. But that will be stopped by MGs as readily as light armor is stopped by light AT.

Adam suggested it as the way to go. It wasn't working in practice - though by whole platoons rather than a few half squads, it does get close and get spots. It just loses too many people doing it, and leaves the infantry too ragged out to do the rest of their job. Adam even suggested a version of the right answer - send one real tank close enough to spot. Right asset, wrong number sent.

He wanted to protect most of his tanks, usually a sensible thing. It is just cautious. If the defenders have one ATGs somewhere, it is actually less helpful than sending the platoon, too, because you are more likely to get separated from the overwatch (by keyholing, slope and LOS, smoke, etc).

But wanting to send light armor is just high theory smacking into cold reality and falling apart. They can't do the job, they'll die. They didn't do the job in the real deal, either. Driving to within 200m of every enemy infantry position to ID every trench, is not some specialized function whole divisions had recon battalions for. It is an entirely normal battlefield task that every single combat unit has its own organic methods of doing. In the case of a tank company, that method is drive a platoon up there and shoot the heck out of anybody that lets out a peep, which "recons" the place just fine.

[JasonC]

You aren't throwing the book out the window, you just haven't read it and don't have any idea what it is about. The thread started because it is entirely possible for experienced CM players to have a fight in open steppe terrain, where they have an entire company of armor and the enemy has none, where the enemy has only shoestring anti tank assets, and yet lose that fight. Or exchange a bit of infantry with nothing decisive happening. Or win, but without hurting most of the defense. Or win, even crushing the defense, but losing 4 tanks in the process to a force whose dedicated AT assets consisted of 4 ATRs.

People achieving those results are not gloriously experimenting or adapting to changing conditions with their own special ways of doing things. They are *failing* at a *simple, routine* combat task. If they knew the book, they could do it in their sleep. They don't know the book. Your comments are like noticing that chess grandmasters depart from what is printed in the Informant at some move, and concluding that nobody needs to know chess openings. When these quite experienced players are getting fish-mated in 4. (To date, your arguments make me think you are more in their position than you care to admit).

[ May 22, 2005, 03:29 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Mad Russian]

As for the "large amounts of AT guns", yes the Russians had prepared defenses at Kursk. The Germans still broke through the front line defenses essentially everywhere, because those defenses were so deeply layered, the number of ATGs actually at the front line in any given area was quite modest.

Jason, I don't know what histories of Kursk you've been reading but from "The Battle of Kursk" by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House on page 64 it states...

"In the Central Front for example, the overall density of per kilometer of defensive front was 870 men, 4.7 tanks and 19.8 guns/mortars. However,in the sector of Central Front's 13th Army, this density increased to 4,500 men, 45 tanks and 104.3 gun tubes."

The 13th Army was assigned the sector of the Kursk salient given to Model's 9th Army to attack on the northern shoulder.

So, yes, I do think that there were Soviet guns there in anything but modest numbers. The reason that the Germans kept switching directions was to attack the Pak Fronts and defenses from different angles instead of frontally. Trying to catch the Soviet defenders off guard.

One should never forget that the Soviets knew when, where, and in what numbers the Germans would attack at Kursk. They set and baited a trap and the Germans walked right into it.

The Germans still broke through the front line defenses essentially everywhere...

The Germans advanced for half the distance of their objectives. Only one German unit reached it's first day objectives. That was the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion (Tiger).

The German offensive was so well run that half way through it the Soviets launched their own offensive. Yes, Kursk is a shining example of German operational genius.

But we digress...

If anybody has the impression there was one continous gun front at Kursk, of the tactical densities that term denotes (meaning, guns per unit space equal tanks attacking that space), over the whole frontage - no there wasn't, not remotely. At the front line a km of front might or might not have a single nest of 4 45mm ATGs.

The main attack sectors were loaded with Soviet At guns. The other secondary sectors had more than your estimated 4 45mm guns. 19.8 is a far cry from 4. Even if 2/3 of those were mortars that still leaves 6 as AT guns as the average.

You may have done the Soviet commanders in your campaign a disservice by not giving them plenty of AT firepower.

It was there.

[JasonC]

PC - you don't seem to have any idea how they were deployed. Anybody can count guns in an army and divide by the length of its frontage. But where are they? Go look, you will find out. An army at Kursk was deployed on frontages around 30 km, to *equal depths*. That's right, 30 km deep. You don't get 104 guns in each front line kilometer when you deploy 30 km deep.

The figures I gave are quite exact, I assure you. A rifle regiment whose positions were in two echelons typically have a few nests of 45mm in the first AT line and a few of 76mm in the second. 13th army in the north, at the point of main effort, had 44 AT nests in its first echelon, 34 in the second, and 60 in the third - with an average of 5-6 each, most 4 a few 8. The frontage was 32 km. And one of those echelons means within a belt 5 km deep, not all on-line side by side. Those are in fact divisional belts, and inside them there are regimental and battalion subgroupings.

As for the composition of the guns in 13th army, 1488 were mortars, 537 were rocket launchers (counting M-30 frames as full pieces, which is perhaps dubious), 694 were field guns, 757 were either ATG or regimental infantry gun (probably 150-200 of those, the latter).

There were 270 AFVs with the front line army. The bulk were in reserve - 843 more. In the forward belt, the attackers faced a few hundred ATGs, a few hundred field guns, and a few hundred AFVs. As they reached the second, they faced the same again, large scale arty, and then a massive wave of reserve armor doubling everything they had seen so far.

That armor wave put them on the tactical defensive for about a day. They tried for a few more days with limited success, feeding an entire fresh panzer corps into the line. Another was setting up to follow that one, when the Russians counterattacked up at Orel and the attempt was cancelled.

Kursk was a massive fight in space, not one battlefield, and in time, both sides in the north but especially the Russians in the south using their forces not all at once but in successive ways separated from each other in space and in time. No single mathematical division of overall forces can give any accurate sense of the tactical match ups it actually involved.

I've researched them extensively, read all of Glantz, read all of the German divisional combat reports, studied all the deployment maps and historical positions reached, the casualty reports, the units strengths down to the last 81mm mortar, and I know exactly what I am simulating. (Which incidentally, isn't even meant to be perfectly historical - I could do that too but I consider my modifications to it better for playability in CM).

[ May 22, 2005, 03:53 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

Objectives are dreams. Nowhere were the Germans stopped at the start line by gun front fire. In the worst places, the tanks got hung up half the day in minefields or other anti-tank obstacles. All the front line RDs were penetrated by at the latest, the evening of the first day. Of course the Russians then reacted, counter-massing with arty fire and reserves, especially armor reserves. They tried reckless counterattacks in many places, which failed completely. Nowhere was it just wall the wall guns pulling triggers and wrecking German tanks at the start line. It is a completely false picture of the battle. Any reading of the German division level (or below) reports will show it, as will reading Glantz's actual narrative.

[Mad Russian]

Let me ask you a simple question...

Do you only use the drills that you have read about while playing CM? Do you know them by heart and can resite them verbatum?

I don't think you do. Any of the above. I have all the German and Soviet tactical doctrine. Use it as it's set down and you will more often than not lose. That is because each and every tactical situation is different. The book answer only gives you a starting place not a definative absolute.

Tactics are different than the drill. They are more often followed. For instance, the German tactic, of counterattacking immediately any Soviet breakthrough.

Sadly, we have come that point in most threads where someone dares to discuss a different position than you have, where you begin to get personal and derogatory. Why you see a need to go there is beyond me. What makes you so insecure in your life that you think you have to know everything there is to know about WWII and can never be wrong? That you make personal attacks against the person that is in a discussion with you.

Or is it that you are so much smarter than all of the rest of us? Or maybe you are just so much smarter than I am...

[JasonC]

I am trying to give practical advice to CM players who clearly need it. You are trying to tell them that rules never apply or are meant to be broken, when they don't even know them in the first place. I don't think you are helping them, and that is quite completely all I care about here. I think you are talking to the wrong person - me - when you should be talking to players trying to learn something.

This isn't the CMBB forum where the subject is the history of WW II in Russia and new CM scenario ideas about it. This is the tips forum, where players come to learn how to play CM better. If "don't follow any rules" were good CM advice, this forum would be pointless, since such rules are all it can give people. But this forum isn't pointless, because it isn't good advice.

Of course after one knows drills, you use them or not as conditions and opportunities dictate. If a player asks how to get a platoon HQ to spot for his mortars, "don't follow rules, do your own thing" is not good advice either. When he knows how to do it, it does not condemn him to the horror of never using a mortar for directly observed fire. It means instead, if he wants to kill a gun without it seeing him, now he can. If a player with armor wants to kill entrenched infantry in steppe terrain, now he can.

P.S. also I probably seem pissy because you jumped into and half wrecked my thread (ignoring an early suggestion to start your own), making it about everything you think that I might happen to disagree with, instead of the original subject matter. (At least that other conversation managed to happen).

[ May 22, 2005, 04:10 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I am trying to give practical advice to CM players who clearly need it. You are trying to tell them that rules never apply or are meant to be broken, when they don't even know them in the first place. I don't think you are helping them, and that is quite completely all I care about here. I think you are talking to the wrong person - me - when you should be talking to players trying to learn something.

This isn't the CMBB forum where the subject is the history of WW II in Russia and new CM scenario ideas about it. This is the tips forum, where players come to learn how to play CM better. If "don't follow any rules" were good CM advice, this forum would be pointless, since such rules are all it can give people. But this forum isn't pointless, because it isn't good advice.

Of course after one knows drills, you use them or not as conditions and opportunities dictate. If a player asks how to get a platoon HQ to spot for his mortars, "don't follow rules, do your own thing" is not good advice either. When he knows how to do it, it does not condemn him to the horror of never using a mortar for directly observed fire. It means instead, if he wants to kill a gun without it seeing him, now he can. If a player with armor wants to kill entrenched infantry in steppe terrain, now he can.

You changed the emphasis of this thread so many times a person would need a road map just to follow along.

I'm sure that new gamers would have a wonderful time trying to determine what it is that you are trying to tell them.

You are right that at the end our discussion had elevated to a level that was beyond the scope of the new gamer.

What the main point of my "Drill" explanation is that each and every tactical situation requires different answers. That the "Drill" that they read about in Jason's thread just doesn't seem to work here for me now. What am I doing wrong?!

Nothing. "The Drill" doesn't fit this situation.

What then? The guy runs back here for more of your advice.

This thread started as a discussion of tactics in the Ukraine. At least that was what you said it was going to be about. It ended up being about drills that new guys need to learn for the world over and has really nothing to do with tactics in the Ukraine.

To me the discussion of drills is worthless. Because the very act of learning them means that you have to unlearn them later.

If you want to teach the new guys something worthwhile IMO, try to use your vast knowledge to teach them tactics. You know them and from what I have seen are a good teacher. You paint a visual picture that others often can relate to.

Myself included.

This was a very good post. Direct and to the point.

You seem to be a very well educated man. Discussions are just that, discussions. I know that we have crossed swords before and maybe that frustrated you when I joined your thread. That was not the intent. I like to see what your views on things are because we have such different ideas of how WWII was fought. I know how much research I have done and it appears to me that you have done a fair amount yourself.

I personally think it is far beneath you to get personal with people that try to have discussions with you. Being insulting and condescending doesn't bring anything to the discussion. One thing that really bothers me personally about all of your arguements is that you are right but NEVER quote sources. While those having a different opinion than yours freely quote theirs. That doesn't help you convince other more knowledgeable gamers that you are correct in your views.

Maybe someday we can have our discussion on Battlefield recon in Russia. I would like that...

Have a good day Jason.

[JasonC]

PC-

Very first line - "many CM players are pretty unfamiliar with fights in steppe terrain, and have only a loose grasp of its principles"

I announce that there are people out there with something to learn. I was not including myself among them, or asking for you to tell me how to fight in steppe terrain.

I then discussed the set up, and how its more realistic conditions differ from typical QBs. Then I said -

"These are all well understood tactical issues in general terms. Such terrain is nevertheless considered excellent tank country and very suitable for attacks by anyone with armor superiority. I happen to think that traditional assessment is entirely correct and works just fine in CM. But apparently, judging by the typical outcome of the campaign's tactical fights so far, most players don't "grok"."

As clear as I can while being gentle about it, I was saying, this is eminently doable, people understand the general principles involved, but they still do it wrong and completely stuff it up.

"I'll start by just mentioning one thing that is typically done on defense and why it works, then pause to hear from others and to gather questions."

I then described the trench fort tactic and how it is designed to exploit stealth and stop infantry in particular. I ended with -

"There is a proper "drill" for dealing with this sort of strongpoint defense. From the limited evidence of the Kursk campaign so far, that "drill" is not common knowledge. Anyone care to explain and present their solution, before I give my version?"

How much clearer does a first post have to be, for people to see I am claiming there is a right way to deal with a definite tactic in a definite situation, that many otherwise experienced CM players manage to get wrong?

I asked for others to give their solutions, so people could see the alteratives and the problems each different approach typically encounters. Not to get into a debate with anybody, nor because I need to be taught what to do. It is Socratic questioning to engage the students in the process of discovering the answer. There is an answer. There is a way that works and works well. There is nothing hidden or esoteric about it. It was actually used in real combat, I've used in in CM, it works fine in both cases. The alternatives have all kinds of problems and were regularly seen to fail in practice, in the campaign that prompted the post. I presumed all experienced players knew it; the evidence of campaign battle outcomes falsified that presumption; I realized it needed to be taught. So here I was teaching it.

Others had no problem noticing what was going on. Adam presented his solution to the problem. Others asked entirely pertinent questions at the relevant points, that showed the escalation chain of related tactics. Nobody else flew off on elaborate tangents - they stayed focused on the problem presented and what to do about it.

PC, I am not the one having a problem here or having difficulty playing well with others. I am well aware I can be prickly and get entirely reasonable people's backs up. But you were not contributing to the substance of the thread, others were, productively. You were interested in the overall subject initially, which is commendable. You wanted to widen the subject to take in half the war in Russia, considering how much of it was fought in the Ukraine. I told you that would be appropriate in another thread, and addressed a narrow point you made in passing, that actually did bear on my stated problem. (Can light armor do the scouting, rather than Adam's infantry-first or my armor-first procedure?) But did not settle it - it was relevant only in the sense that it illustrated the difficulty of the problem, since something that might be useful in general terms does not help here.

At no point in this discussion did you engage on the substance of my claims, other than repeatedly telling me and others that I could do things (scout to 200m of trench forts with light armor) that I know for a fact cannot be done and do not work. You wanted to talk about a hundred other things instead, more general, more historical, more whatever. I think the most positive thing you managed to say was that the thread was interesting.

I didn't start this thread to debate everything under the sun with you. You apparently don't enjoy it very much, to judge by your have a nice days and taking personal offense comments and the like. So what were you doing? The first post I get, it was enthusiasm for the overall subject. Great. The second said and I quote "for me the tactical drill changes little". You denied the first premise of the thread. Um, I've got experts sitting here who can't beat infantry with ATRs in open steppe with a full company of tanks because they haven't changed their tactical drill. I can. Anybody can, who does change their tactical drill.

So you tell me you weren't hijacking the thread, denied its premise, and argued dumb positions I knew were wrong that aggressively disagreed with what I was trying to teach people. People who needed to learn something and were interested in doing so. You were flat butting in with irrelevant garbage as to the actual tactics proposed - (I swear I am being charitable - scouting with light armor in this context is pure fantasy, and not changing tactics against the described defense results in exactly the empirically seen failures that prompted the thread in the first place - somebody proposing them was not thinking seriously about what he was saying, but just causally relating an unthinking opinion formed long ago in some other context) - and crossing me as to stated intentions and taught propositions.

In charity, no doubt not on purpose, but in exuberance about discussing such subjects and impenetrable self confidence that you had nothing to learn about them. You clearly thought you had tons to teach everyone about how to fight in steppe, having done some of it in CM. You just weren't paying much attention to the stated problem. You were thinking of the typical ones that occur in steppe scenarios you've played, instead. I spent half my first post explaining that the more realistic situations I was talking about differ from typical CM QBs and scenarios in material ways (far more fortifications, lower loss tolerance, less symmetric forces, etc). But that did not seem to have any impact on your comments.

When I finally got around to answering all of your posts in detail, I just went through them piece by piece and addressed every single point you raised that I did not agree with. Your comments seemed to me to be interfering with reception of my thesis - since you were stumping for no changes in tactical drill, later for no drill book at all, and in between for light armor scouting - and you threw in scads of controversial claims about the actual history and doctrine as well. Russians just ignore minefields, they find them by walking through them. They throw away scads of people to take each field. Germans don't have any PAK in 1943. Expecting those sorts of claims to meet with hearty hear-hears is a rather strange attitude. They are red meat, troll fare. I gave you substantive answers at great length anyway.

You got exactly the treatment your comments deserved.

[JasonC]

Adam - the post was called "Company Command - Infantry Advance Illustrated, Part Two" and appeared in the CMBB forum - a year ago mebe. It shows a pure infantry vs. infantry QB attack by Russian infantry against the AI. It primarily illustrates the standard "advance" drills, as well as a depth and firepower infantry attack.

[JasonC]

Adam - you are right, even with the tanks pushed well forward, the enemy HMGs might be out of full ID distance. They might pin the infantry as it moves, or try to. I addressed that in passing, but it is worth expanding on.

The best thing is if you can send another tank platoon to go make those MGs quiet down, or to spot them if they don't.

The standard fall back thing (since the previous may be impractical for all sorts of reasons - starting with not have more tanks) is to go into ranged overwatch suppression procedures, without expecting them to work all that well, and have the infantry advance by its usual "advancing in open" drill.

What is the overwatch suppression procedure? Tank MGs and foot HMGs back at the start line try to locate the firing MG from its sound contact. They area fire at suspected positions and look for somebody to duck. If they see that duck, then the tanks toss in a mini-barrage of HE, if they have enough to spare for it. An on map gun might help instead or in addition.

The reason this is marginal is you may not find them right away, and the HE thrown is unlikely to be accurate. When they are in a limited number of tree or rough positions this works fine. When they can be in a hidden trench anywhere, it does not work very well. (You can also try on-map smoke rounds in this sort of situation, but again it is marginal).

You also may just pick up spots. HMG stealth at range is not perfect, particularly with many units are looking toward the shooter, have optics, etc. You pick up occasional spots sometimes. But not reliably.

The infantry meanwhile trudges through the open toward the fort the tanks are parked next to, anyway. Unlike the situation without the close overwatch, you aren't terribly worried what any squad infantry in said fort is going to do to them, on top of what the MGs to. And a platoon using advance drills can move across steppe successfully under MG fire (a half squad can't). They do take losses, though.

Will it help to ride the tanks instead? Sure, though some of the time they will get brushed off by MGs. I do ride tanks in these situations, typically anything after the first platoon of them. Some of it repositioning HMGs or other teams, though.

The basic principle is just, if there is enough tank overwatch right where the men are or farther forward, I'm not too worried. The stuff close enough to kill rather than pin is close enough for the tanks to see and murder. New shooters that pin in 10 seconds just don't hurt very much.

You won't be worse off than with the tanks back. And you can be substantially better off. (Because MGs too close to the tanks can be spotted, or stay quiet to avoid it, etc).

[Mad Russian]

So I thought I'd start a thread on tactics in this terrain type.

These are all well understood tactical issues in general terms.

Not to get into a debate with anybody...

What exactly does "grok" mean anyway?

I am learning the hard way that you only lecture and that the rest of the world should listen and not interrupt.

I think the most positive thing you managed to say was that the thread was interesting.

In charity, no doubt not on purpose, but in exuberance about discussing such subjects and impenetrable self confidence that you had nothing to learn about them. You clearly thought you had tons to teach everyone about how to fight in steppe, having done some of it in CM. You just weren't paying much attention to the stated problem. You were thinking of the typical ones that occur in steppe scenarios you've played, instead. I spent half my first post explaining that the more realistic situations I was talking about differ from typical CM QBs and scenarios in material ways (far more fortifications, lower loss tolerance, less symmetric forces, etc). But that did not seem to have any impact on your comments.

It's a shame really that I didn't realise sooner that BFC gave you your own threads and that others are not supposed to post or ask questions in your threads.

You didn't want to discuss tactics as you said. You wanted new gamers to be impressed with how much you know.

I came to this thread because there is a great deal that I can learn about the fighting in the Ukraine and I thought you might have some useful tips on how to do so. Learning the book drill is not one of them. That is older than I am and from what I've seen of fighting in the Ukraine not of much value. You want to claim to have written the book on infantry tactics...now that was rich. Rommel wrote the one for the Germans. Is that the one you are referring to?

When I finally got around to answering all of your posts in detail, I just went through them piece by piece and addressed every single point you raised that I did not agree with. Your comments seemed to me to be interfering with reception of my thesis - since you were stumping for no changes in tactical drill, later for no drill book at all, and in between for light armor scouting - and you threw in scads of controversial claims about the actual history and doctrine as well. Russians just ignore minefields, they find them by walking through them. They throw away scads of people to take each field. Germans don't have any PAK in 1943. Expecting those sorts of claims to meet with hearty hear-hears is a rather strange attitude. They are red meat, troll fare. I gave you substantive answers at great length anyway.

Yes, I have seen your snubs of some of the worlds most respected Soviet force/Eastern Front historians before. I have seen you pass off historically researched and published authors information with terms like, " that is simply wrong" or one of your favorites "horsefeathers". You never offer alternative sources just derision.

You got exactly the treatment your comments deserved.

Thank you for that. I'm sure you feel better now.

I did get my money's worth though. I got the lecture and the correct frame of mind that if I need to know anything about WWII, at any level, for any nation, I have but to ask you.

You need to continue to teach the uninformed. Allow them to be sufficiently in awe of your great wisdom. They all need to be lectured and you are just the man for the job. You lecture very well. You don't discuss or debate well at all.

But then, that is just my opinion and I already know what you think of that...it's simply wrong.

[JasonC]

It is strange to object to experienced players teaching tactical how tos on a tips and tricks forum.

If you want to debate finer grog points about the history of WW II in Russia, the CMBB forum is right over there and I will happily converse with you or anybody else about any of it, without anybody trying to teach anybody anything about how to do things in CM.

If you've got some tip or trick to share with new players, the start a new thread button is right up there on your right.

If something I say in a tips post doesn't work or misses a relevant tactic, you can certainly jump in and point out the mistake. Think about it beforehand, and be right. In CM terms, not historical ones. Expect a skeptical reception.

If what you have to offer is the opinion that nothing needs to be learned about a topic, it is doubtful that is useful to people who independently see a need for doing so. If what you have to offer is taking personal offense at the idea that someone might teach something, then grow up. Knowledge of the most esoteric things exists and is not the preserve of any select anything. A cat can look at a king, and any man who knows is an adequate teacher of anything he actually knows. No approval from anyone else, and no authority, is needed or involved.

And I truly do not care what players new or old think of what I know about CM. I am sure their impressions are largely false, dictated more by how much I write than by how much I know. I do care, however, that with over a month invested by a dozen players in a Kursk campaign, there are serious issues of play balance at stake, in whether proper means of attacking with armor in steppe are or are not generally known.

PC, I'm an intensely practical guy at bottom. I'm not trying to do thirty-eight different things. I'd like to see real tactical relations and basic commander decisions matter in my campaign, not accidents of limited player familiarity with the battle conditions. If you help in that, great. If you get in the way and get stepped on, no reason anybody should care. None of it is about you, nor about me.

[JasonC]

Fair questions. I think the lone tank is much more likely to get whacked by limited defending AT than a platoon is. You say, "as long as there is LOS", but differential LOS is what good ATG placement is all about. Slope or keyhole. You get the same sight picture from a whole platoon together. You are not assured of it with one lead tank and 3 hanging back.

The main reason to put all the tanks close is the overall firepower effect. If you haven't tried it, you may well underestimate it. They pick up the targets fast (some of which may be the way self preservation figures in targeting override decisions), they pin new shooters with MG fire rapidly (ranged MGs against trenches alert, close MGs against trenches pin), they do not have to find the range when they throw the HE. Spotting from 4 tanks with optics and cupolas all close, facing in slightly different directions, is also more likely to pick up ranged spots, in my experience. There is also simple intimidation, against humans. They are much more likely to remain on "hide". (They are right to be intimidated, in my opinion).

Don't settle for the theoretical statement, try it and see how well it works. I do it in CMAK desert fights all the time, it is the standard way I deal with trenches. Your commander who did press with his armor wiped out the defense he faced, pretty much completely. He got a little too close with a couple but that was making up for ragged out infantry and in no way a necessary result of the approach.