STUGGED UP AGAIN

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

My statement still stands. It would be interesting to see any figures you can quote about Tigers being killed by ground attack aircraft.

[Lights paper]Witmann?[Ducks and runs for cover]

[Tarquelne]

Allied pilots claiming more "hits" than the actual number of German tanks in the area certainly sounds bad...

In fact no more than 46 tanks were lost in the operation and of these only nine had been hit by air weapons. That is 9 out of 178 tanks actually used in the area. It is also interesting to see the claims. British and American pilots claimed 252 German tanks destroyed or damaged, the real number was 9...

But 9 aircraft kills out of 46 - almost 1 in 5 - is better than I'd expected from the flyboys. I find that pretty impressive.

Plus - and here's the reason I'm writing now - The pilots claimed 252 tanks destroyed or damaged. The post quoted contained info. on destroyed tanks, but not damaged tanks. That could be a pretty big ommission.

And all those abandoned/"scuttled" tanks... how many were lost due to airpower?

I guess what I'm getting at is that while the 9 in 178 numbers certainly show that airpower didn't result in anything close to the majority of outright tank-kills, but may be leaving out a tremendous amount of information. (Yes, that's a request for more info.)

Assuming you were in a ground-attack Hurricane with 30mm cannon, I'll agree. 8 .303 machine guns aren't going to do alot against a Tiger

Of course, the 9 .303 MG Hurricane was the most feared and effective tank-killer of the entire war.

[ January 13, 2003, 06:26 PM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[SgtMuhammed]

Don't know if we are including heavy bombers in this discussion are we?

[Crazy]

It started with a simple question

Then it got game balance, historic accuracy, etc.

Now it's time for air power, and the one who started this post still hasn't got the answer

[Bastables]

‘The frontal armour of the T-34 could be penetrated only by 5cm antitank shell, within 500m” (Glantz comparing 1941 tanks 1998). S.J Zaloga and James Grandsen 1985 work “Operation Barbarossa” also bear this out.

1 July Major General Morgunov in a “report” to Front military council (after a week of Tank combat) notes that KV and T-34 tank armour needs to be augmented for combat versus German Pak’s and Panzer’s

And the German T-34 combat primer still states front turret penetrations.

Also Rune kindly typed out a reply from one of his family members who served in Tigers and PIIIs (during the early war period). Stating that he does not understand how the myth of the T-34 came about.

Search for topic thread :T-34 and KT vulnerability issue solved (was: narrow turret front).

[ January 26, 2003, 12:45 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Bastables]

No replys? no dodging?

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

And all those abandoned/"scuttled" tanks... how many were lost due to airpower?

I guess what I'm getting at is that while the 9 in 178 numbers certainly show that airpower didn't result in anything close to the majority of outright tank-kills, but may be leaving out a tremendous amount of information. (Yes, that's a request for more info.)

The tanks abandoned due to air attacks are part of the “air kills” score in this case 9 out of 46. All up Air power was responsible for only 6% of the German AFV kills during Normandy (Zetterling) quite comparable to Soviet estimates of 5% in the eastern front, not an efficient tank killers at all.

British Research teams and their writings are terribly fastidious on designations, technical terms and definitions ie the use of the term perforation as opposed to penatration.

Abandoned/crew destroyed tanks were classed as such because their was no other damage other than empty fuel tanks, empty tanks with no signs of combat/ crew rigged explosives, the reports draw attention to the fact that air attacks are easily apparent =Rocket fins, bomb craters and multiple bullet "splash."

[ January 26, 2003, 10:06 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Sublime]

Bastables, your post had many good points in it, and it certainly is true that success on the battlefield doesnt have everything to do with kill ratios *most of the time* (i.e. Erich Hartmann and several other famous German fliers are still highest rated in kills in the entire world) Yet, I think your comparison with the 1941 German offensive and the British campaign in Normandy is flawed. Jasonc got his comments on it right, also the 1941 campaign was at the time one of the fastest flowing, and certainly the largest campaign ever. The Russians took staggering losses, the Germans had numerical superiority in almost all attacks, air *supremacy* months of planning, and a Russian army that had been gutted of its best and brightest. All of these aspects and many more *certainly* had an affect on the kill ratios. Also the British campaign in Normandy was criticized by the Americans as going very poorly and not making much progress at all. Which is true, the British certainly did get anywhere near their timetable. (then again neither did the Americans) The terrain was different, it was later in the war, and they were fighting battle hardened Germans. Also the British did not really have *strategic suprise*. You could say Overlord was strategic suprise but I place it more on the operational level myself as the Axis and Allies were already at war. In 1941 Germany and Russia started off as everything but allies...

Sublime

replies welcome

(dons asbestos suit *cough cough*)

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Sublime:

Bastables, your post had many good points in it, and it certainly is true that success on the battlefield doesnt have everything to do with kill ratios *most of the time* (i.e. Erich Hartmann and several other famous German fliers are still highest rated in kills in the entire world) Yet, I think your comparison with the 1941 German offensive and the British campaign in Normandy is flawed. Jasonc got his comments on it right, also the 1941 campaign was at the time one of the fastest flowing, and certainly the largest campaign ever. The Russians took staggering losses, the Germans had numerical superiority in almost all attacks, air *supremacy* months of planning, and a Russian army that had been gutted of its best and brightest. All of these aspects and many more *certainly* had an affect on the kill ratios. Also the British campaign in Normandy was criticized by the Americans as going very poorly and not making much progress at all. Which is true, the British certainly did get anywhere near their timetable. (then again neither did the Americans) The terrain was different, it was later in the war, and they were fighting battle hardened Germans. Also the British did not really have *strategic suprise*. You could say Overlord was strategic suprise but I place it more on the operational level myself as the Axis and Allies were already at war. In 1941 Germany and Russia started off as everything but allies...

Sublime

replies welcome

(dons asbestos suit *cough cough*)

Germany did not really have utter Surprise in their favour either. Glantz in Stumbling Colossus points out that the Red army was under going rapid growth and expansion in a direct response to growing German military power. Stalin is said to have believed that the German Onslaught would come in 1942.

Zhukov had created and sent to general staff proposals to undertake a pre-emptive strike on the understanding that a German attack was coming. For instance a plan prepared by Vasilevsky in the summer of 1940 posited an attack by 270 inf divs from Germany, Italy, Finland, Rumania and maybe Hungary (by september he'd even factored in an attack by Japan). The biggest problem was Stalin, he would not read the indicators (intelligence) although a "creep up to war" between April and 22 June 1941 was allowed and carried out by the western military districts to be finished in early 1942. The Soviets knew the Germans would be coming, they just did not know when.

Battle hardened Germans? Many of the units used in Normandy and France in general; lacked training, motorisation and ammunition/fuel, quite similar to the conditions faced by the Red army in 1941. Again similar to the situation in 1941 the Germans in 1944 lacked air supremacy and faced a paralysed command structure= 'No sorry Hitler is asleep.' No don't shift the 15 armee, Normandy is just a feint.' I think that broad generalisation between the two campaigns are very apt.

The Soviet military of 1941 did not have to fill out their units with 17 year olds, over aged miners, Foot/mouth and stomach invalids or volunteers from the POW camps. Big difference is in the level of defeat faced by the Germans in Normandy versus the pretty near complete annihilation of the Soviet Pre war Military in the West.

The Panzer Divs were facing the British because the Caen area was considered by both sides to be "good" tank country (These are the western front battles with Panthers/StuGs/Jadgpanzers clocking kills at 1500m and above). This is one of the reasons why the Germans did not undertake sowing the area with mines(They wanted freedom of manoeuvre for their own AFVs).

The British in '44 just like the Germans in '41 brought numerical superiority and months of planning, you know the Western allies had been running with the French invasion idea for a bit of time by then.

Normandy

Allies= 2,052,299 men

Axis= no more than 380,000 men at it's height.

Hitler had been running his own "officer purge" since the failure to take Moscow as well= headless General staff, the suspicious death of Molders after his anti Nazi statements and refusal to continue wearing Nazi paraphernalia(His EKs) Sacking of Corps and Div Genrals and the increasing personal involvement of Hitler at all levels of the military. This only accelerated after the bomb plot.

[ January 27, 2003, 01:07 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Sublime]

Germany did not really have utter Surprise in their favour either. Glantz in Stumbling Colossus points out that the Red army was under going rapid growth and expansion in a direct response to growing German military power. Stalin is said to have believed that the German Onslaught would come in 1942.

Zhukov had created and sent to general staff proposals to undertake a pre-emptive strike on the understanding that a German attack was coming. For instance a plan prepared by Vasilevsky in the summer of 1940 posited an attack by 270 inf divs from Germany, Italy, Finland, Rumania and maybe Hungary (by september he'd even factored in an attack by Japan). The biggest problem was Stalin, he would not read the indicators (intelligence) although a "creep up to war" between April and 22 June 1941 was allowed and carried out by the western military districts to be finished in early 1942. The Soviets knew the Germans would be coming, they just did not know when.

Battle hardened Germans? Many of the units used in Normandy and France in general; lacked training, motorisation and ammunition/fuel, quite similar to the conditions faced by the Red army in 1941. Again similar to the situation in 1941 the Germans in 1944 lacked air supremacy and faced a paralysed command structure= 'No sorry Hitler is asleep.' No don't shift the 15 armee, Normandy is just a feint.' I think that broad generalisation between the two campaigns are very apt.

The Soviet military of 1941 did not have to fill out their units with 17 year olds, over aged miners, Foot/mouth and stomach invalids or volunteers from the POW camps. Big difference is in the level of defeat faced by the Germans in Normandy versus the pretty near complete annihilation of the Soviet Pre war Military in the West.

The Panzer Divs were facing the British because the Caen area was considered by both sides to be "good" tank country (These are the western front battles with Panthers/StuGs/Jadgpanzers clocking kills at 1500m and above). This is one of the reasons why the Germans did not undertake sowing the area with mines(They wanted freedom of manoeuvre for their own AFVs).

The British in '44 just like the Germans in '41 brought numerical superiority and months of planning, you know the Western allies had been running with the French invasion idea for a bit of time by then.

Normandy

Allies= 2,052,299 men

Axis= no more than 380,000 men at it's height.

Hitler had been running his own "officer purge" since the failure to take Moscow as well= headless General staff, the suspicious death of Molders after his anti Nazi statements and refusal to continue wearing Nazi paraphernalia(His EKs) Sacking of Corps and Div Genrals and the increasing personal involvement of Hitler at all levels of the military. This only accelerated after the bomb plot.

Alright.... Well in response to this... I gotta admit you mostly got me.. Hitler had purged a lot of the officers, but not anywhere near the scale the Soviets had.. True. Also you pointed out 'the fuhrer is sleeping' argument and the decision not to shift forces from Calais. While not as chaotic or as badly disorganized as the Red Army command in control in 1941, you do have a very good point in that. But how about the fluid nature of Barbarossa compared to the relative lack of fluidity, just a slow grinding advance by the Brits in '44? The Germans had a lot of ****ty soldiers by 1944 too, in fact a whole lot... And many of their best were already dead, but they also had some excellent units in Normandy at the time. 12th SS Hitlerjugend did admirably, 352nd Inf. did well (though they fought the Americans off Omaha etc... )

Several notable personalities were involved as well including the famed Michael Wittman.

But true the German Army had already advanced very far in its disintegration by that point. What about this though, a major difference between the German defense in Normandy and the Soviet Defense in general in 41 is the airpower. The Germans had superiority/supremacy in 1941 over Russia, but nowhere near the level of supremacy the Western Allies had achieved in 1944, where in essence movement of troops during daylight hours was near impossible, at least on a scale larger than a company, or a platoon if with vehicles. (ok not all the time but even if the planes werent there the fear was prohibiting movement as well) and what about the road networks and terrain in Normandy? Well built up areas, *paved roads* .... Russia was nowhere near this. But again I digress... Im not trying to argue with you or get in a flame match with you, and all your statements so far have shown a familiarity with this that I can only be refreshed by on this forum. And your last post made several points I didnt think of. I still think in the end the operational/strategic situation can have a significant affect on kill rates. Especially in situations like Stalingrad where the troops are starving, surrounded and low on ammo. But I believe using Stalingrad would be going to an extreme, so just enivsion a typical German armored division that has broken through behind Soviet lines in June/July 41. They would be much more likely to achieve kills, especially if they had a fast paced advance, simply because many would not be expecting them, and they would come upon many non combat units (hence easy pickings) and troops not yet ready (by supplies, training, or otherwise) for battle... Anyways Im going to bed, take care, write me an interestin 1 for me to read tomorrow, and goodnight

Sublime

[Abbott]

Just wanted to offer some support to Jason before the BFC and 'fanboys' rough him up too much

The term "Fanboy" is tossed out way to often during board discussions IMHO. Just because folks agree with BFC's position on an issue at times or even often does not constitute being a "Fanboy". I have noticed very often that people who post on these boards agree or disagree with BFC’s position due to their take on the subject at hand rather then BFC’s position on the particular subject.

It's just too easy, and I feel it should be more challenging to dispose of them based upon my limited reading.

I would suggest maybe more research then? However I find your honest claim of limited research refreshing.

The problem I have with people saying things are too easy in the game is that they set them up that way. The only way for the Germans to have had a force composition the same as one encounters in most QBs is if they had waited till 42 to start the invasion. If you want to find out what it was really like then choose forces based on a real TO&E rather than based on what you need to ensure victory.

Bingo!

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Sublime:

Alright.... Well in response to this... I gotta admit you mostly got me.. Hitler had purged a lot of the officers, but not anywhere near the scale the Soviets had.. True. Also you pointed out 'the fuhrer is sleeping' argument and the decision not to shift forces from Calais. While not as chaotic or as badly disorganized as the Red Army command in control in 1941, you do have a very good point in that. But how about the fluid nature of Barbarossa compared to the relative lack of fluidity, just a slow grinding advance by the Brits in '44? The Germans had a lot of ****ty soldiers by 1944 too, in fact a whole lot... And many of their best were already dead, but they also had some excellent units in Normandy at the time. 12th SS Hitlerjugend did admirably, 352nd Inf. did well (though they fought the Americans off Omaha etc... )

Several notable personalities were involved as well including the famed Michael Wittman.

But true the German Army had already advanced very far in its disintegration by that point. What about this though, a major difference between the German defense in Normandy and the Soviet Defense in general in 41 is the airpower. The Germans had superiority/supremacy in 1941 over Russia, but nowhere near the level of supremacy the Western Allies had achieved in 1944, where in essence movement of troops during daylight hours was near impossible, at least on a scale larger than a company, or a platoon if with vehicles. (ok not all the time but even if the planes werent there the fear was prohibiting movement as well) and what about the road networks and terrain in Normandy? Well built up areas, *paved roads* .... Russia was nowhere near this. But again I digress... Im not trying to argue with you or get in a flame match with you, and all your statements so far have shown a familiarity with this that I can only be refreshed by on this forum. And your last post made several points I didnt think of. I still think in the end the operational/strategic situation can have a significant affect on kill rates. Especially in situations like Stalingrad where the troops are starving, surrounded and low on ammo. But I believe using Stalingrad would be going to an extreme, so just enivsion a typical German armored division that has broken through behind Soviet lines in June/July 41. They would be much more likely to achieve kills, especially if they had a fast paced advance, simply because many would not be expecting them, and they would come upon many non combat units (hence easy pickings) and troops not yet ready (by supplies, training, or otherwise) for battle... Anyways Im going to bed, take care, write me an interestin 1 for me to read tomorrow, and goodnight

Sublime [/QB]

I’m quite certain that I don’t have the foggiest what your point is at all. You come on to tell me that JasonC is “right” in a debate that takes place in another thread and if I remember correctly has me stating that argument to someone other than Jason. You then support my argument with statements that the Anglo-Americans in Normandy held more advantages than the German army of 1941: greater levels of air superiority and the fact that the German defence in Normandy forced a plodding attritional battle inspite of the wide numerical, supply and firepower disparity.

Well-paved roads would help the heavily motorised Anglo-Americans more than the rail reliant Germans. The Big thing with the Germans is they scored more kills either on offence or defence; being on the offence merely multiplied the Germans army’s ability to inflict casualties.

1941

German Losses 831,050

Russian Losses 4,473820

Ratio Soviet: German 5.38

1942

German 1,080,950

Russian 7,369,278

Ratio 6.82

1943

German 1,601,445

Russian 7,857,503

Ratio 4.91

1944

German 1,947,106

Russian 6,878,600

Ratio 3.53

The ratios close yet do not invert. These are all my old arguments, at least bits and pieces.

So again we seem to agree, so what's the point?

[Sublime]

There isnt really a point. Thats why I said I agreed with you in the second post. In fact to be completely honest I wanted I was bored and wanted to have a historical discussion with someone who knew what they were talking about and could throw around figures like that

Sublime

[Jarmo]

Originally posted by Bastables:

No replys? no dodging?

LOL, good points earlier, but maybe a teeny bit confrontative now?

We wouldn't like to get this thread locked up would we...

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Jarmo:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bastables:

No replys? no dodging?

LOL, good points earlier, but maybe a teeny bit confrontative now?

We wouldn't like to get this thread locked up would we... </font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Sublime:

There isnt really a point. Thats why I said I agreed with you in the second post. In fact to be completely honest I wanted I was bored and wanted to have a historical discussion with someone who knew what they were talking about and could throw around figures like that

Sublime

Why do you pick Bastables then?

[Bastables]

He’s right why bother picking on the Peng threads wayward Pusdo-grog and official Kiwi?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Bastables:

He’s right why bother picking on the Peng threads wayward Pusdo-grog and official Kiwi?

No surprise - I am always right

[JasonC]

Hortlund - sure, that is why the aces said "aim for the turret ring". But CMBB models practically all hits on the turret fronts as kills. If 1/3rd were, I'd have little problem with it. 1/3 turret, 1/3 penetrate would still let "hail fire" kill them, but make confrontations without high odds in expected number of hit terms unpleasant. That would be enough to make for realistic tactics.

I don't think uniform turret sizing is the main problem, though, because by area dead on, the turret is about 25% of the T-34. Lower than 30% but pretty close. Quick and dirty approximations about such things are good enough to serve. It is the tracks that are underrepresented, rather than the hull. It is possible the "hull down" turret hit chance is on the high side. But the hit chance falls to compensate, so any error in kill rate there is "second order".

The main problem is just that instead of 1/3 or 1/2 of turret hits doing anything, in my tests I had only 1 ricochet, and that was due to side angle. The best "curved" did was make some full penetrations partial ones. Mostly it acted like a less reliable version of "30 degrees".

Bastables says he doesn't know where the myth of the T-34 came from. Silly people who didn't know what they were talking about, probably, like Heinz Guderian and the doctrinal commanders of German panzer forces.

As for the sidetrack of Normandy, I thought the subject came up supposedly to show that operational success did not lead to better tank kill ratios that superior guns and armor, or in a roundabout way was again arguing that "they never could have done it if the T-34 was that good". It was not about whether Germans are studly, or about planes.

The Germans did not outscore the Americans in tank loss terms, from Normandy to Lorraine, despite 1/3rd or so Panthers etc against Sherman 75s. And while the Germans certainly outscored the Russians in 1941, very heavily, it was the T26s and BTs they annihilated. Maintenance losses (captured in depots, etc) and guns undoubtedly accounted for many of the mediums.

The Russians lost 3000 tanks at a time in some of the larger pockets. Which might seem a mystery (why didn't they break out instead?), until you see their reports that 95% of the fleet needed some sort of repair on the day of the invasion. "Abandoned", "blown up by crew", "captured" - that is what non-operational tanks, the half or more under repair in any given week, become in the statistics when the front moves 300 miles.

On the difference between facing 1941 Russians and 1944 Germans, it is not that the latter had no problems. It is that they had sound combined arms doctrine, and the former did not. There is a big difference between an opponent with green troops but sound doctrine and idiotic doctrine. And the Brits faced more all told over a thousand tanks, on a front of a couple dozen miles. The force to space was enourmously higher in Normandy.

Look at what happened when the Russians did manage to use the heavies in mass, like Kleist early and Guderian in front of Tula. They still got around them in a week or two, because the rest of the front could not match those local and temporary successes. Changing the axis of advance was the primary solution applied.

Sorry for the delay getting back to people - I thought this thread had died out.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Bastables says he doesn't know where the myth of the T-34 came from. Silly people who didn't know what they were talking about, probably, like Heinz Guderian and the doctrinal commanders of German panzer forces.

Nice dodge attempt, it was Rune’s Uncle a Panzer crewman who fought as a gunner in PIII's versus T-34s who states he does not know how the “T-34 myth” came about. He’s even worse he states that they only found that they could not kill the T-34 above 1000m in PIII’s.

Lets take a look shall we?

“I have debated posting this, because some of you don't know me. Those of you that do, may recall I have an uncle who served in a Tiger unit at the end of the war, but did serve in Barbarossa. When this first popped up in another thread, i debated asking him about this, as he is a private man and only talked about the war ONCE since I have been born, and those who have been here a while, recall my posting about the naviswhatchamacallit, and him using it three times. The way this works, is i send a series of questions to my mom, who translates it to German [unfortunately, i neither read nor write it] who then gets the reply and translates it back to English for me [well the best she can, some technical terms are hard for her to translate]. To those who asked before, no, he has not stated what unit he was with...and I will not push the point, the man is 86 and deserving of some peace.

Question:

Was the T34 tank a tank to be feared?

Answer:

Absolutely not. The tank itself had problems and at least in the units I was in, was not feared at all. I have no idea where this myth came from, other then the sheer numbers of [unknown word] that would be sent against you.

Question: Before you served on the Tiger, did you destroy any Russian Tanks?

Answer: Yes. During the beginning of the invasion of Russia I served as a gunner on Panzer IIIs, several versions, the Russians had several early types, none of which were particually effective.

Question: Did you destroy T34s in other then Tigers?

Answer: Yes, the Russian tanks were used piecemeal [not sure of translation] and the few times they were in numbers, were destroyed easily by us, or our Antiaircraft assets. [Rune: I assume he means 88s]

Question: Could a early Panzer destroy a T34 from the front?

Answer: There were many types of T34s. We taught ourselves to shoot at the weak points. However, the gun [casing?] was weak and easily penetrated by the short and long barrel Panzer IIIs. {Rune:I assume 50mm] I have some photos still of some of the kills, taken after the battle.

Last Question: Any long range kills?

Answer: Not sure what you are asking. If you mean in the Tiger, it was a poor crew that could not kill within 3 shots at 2000 meters. There were very few poor crews in the Unit. We were taught from early war to destroy at a distance. We adapted when we found we could not destroy the T34 above 1000 meters. [i assume he meant in the Panzer IIIs]

Again, I debated posting it, but I do think it has good information. Believe it, or ignore it, that is up to you. I am lucky he answered at all, as he does not like to speak of the war at all.

Rune.”

Bit of a different picture from Guderian who was trying to cover up a defeat that funnily enough was inflicted because most of the time the T-34s kept at around 1200m from the Panzers. I’m guessing though that like other information you’ll take Runes option of ignoring it or maybe even trying to shade it. This all agrees with the Panzertruppens anti T-34 primer. The Front Turret penetrations at close range, with long range being 1000m plus going by Runes Uncles understanding of “long range”.

It didn’t help them at places such as two days at Singling where Vet 11Pz Div exchanged 3 Panthers and one JadgPanzer for +25 Sherman’s did it.

Colonel Poluboirov (Chief of North Western front Armoured Directorate) States otherwise on the question of mechanical breakdowns. “The parlous technical operating conditions of the older tank park (T-26 and BTs).” In line with other mechanised commanders reports technical troubles seem to be most vexing with the older vehs not with the T-34 and KVs.

But again I’m not interested in bantering about operational concerns and you’re pick and mix cherished beliefs on them, only in your initial incorrect appreciation that 5 KwK cannot penetrate the front turret/matlet of the T-34. Stay on topic Jason.

[ January 28, 2003, 04:38 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[JasonC]

The problem is that it is simply too ambiguous, it agrees with your interpretation and also with my interpretation, because it does not specify dates and periods and types for every particular comment. You can infer the dates you want for your reading, I can infer the dates for mine. As follows -

"Was the T34 tank a tank to be feared? Absolutely not."

He is a Tiger driver. So far, early war has not been specified. The T-34 was no terror to Tiger drivers, or for that matter to anything after the Pz IV long.

The next question tries to specify, I don't mean from the perspective of Tigers - "Before you served on the Tiger, did you destroy any Russian Tanks? - Yes. During the beginning of the invasion of Russia I served as a gunner on Panzer IIIs, several versions, the Russians had several early types, none of which were particually effective."

Notice, this answer speaking of ineffective Russian types early in the war, does not specify T-34s. On the contrary, it is about "any Russian tanks" he destroyed prior to serving in Tigers. He does not say, "early models of T-34s", but "several early types" - of tanks, I read - "none of which were particularly effective". This response *does* refer, in particular, to the earliest period of the war. It does not say it refers to T-34s.

The next question tries but fails to specify the cross between the two - early war encounters with T-34s. And he hears it properly, but the phrasing lengthens the period to which is applies - "Did you destroy T34s in other then Tigers?" Other than Tigers, of course, refers to the entire time until he got one, not just early 1941. Since few were deployed until 1943, that covers a lot of ground, and a lot of upgunning.

"Yes, the Russian tanks were used piecemeal [not sure of translation] and the few times they were in numbers, were destroyed easily by us, or our Antiaircraft assets. [Rune: I assume he means 88s]"

This may refer to 1941 in particular, but it needn't. He says not just that T-34s were used piecemeal, but that Russian tanks were as a whole. Russian doctrine made their tanks ineffective in the early war, he is saying. A few times in numbers - but he does not specify T-34s here, and he refers to 88s. The weapon is not specifically a 1941 Panzer III, the date is not specifically 1941, the target is not specifically a T-34. But this is in fact as close as he comes to saying what you want him to be saying.

In addition, I note that here he seems to be talking about the entire German panzer force, in his "we". Not about his own experiences in particular. It is entirely possible he never encountered a T-34 in 1941, personally. His first answer to the 1941 question responded about their early types. When specifically asked about T-34s that early, he responds with a point of general history about poor Russian tactics and means the Germans - in general - had of dealing with them.

Next we finally get the direct question - though unfortunately the phrasing still extends the possible period referred to - "Could a early Panzer destroy a T34 from the front?" Note, it is "an early Panzer". Previously, the only period division referred to in the conversation is "before Tigers" and "after Tigers".

"There were many types of T34s."

This suggests the answer was "no" for some types of targets and shooters, and "yes" for other types of targets and shooters. But it does not specify 1940 models etc.

"We taught ourselves to shoot at the weak points. However, the gun [casing?] was weak and easily penetrated"

So they are aiming at particular weak points. And he says "the gun" - gun damage. Does he say "anywhere on the turret front", does he say "at 500m"? He does not. But we don't even know what gun he is talking about firing at them, as the sequel shows.

"by the short and long barrel Panzer IIIs. {Rune:I assume 50mm]"

But it is an assumption. There are short 50 Pz IIIs, their are long 50 Pz IIIs, as the mix of 1942. And there are long 50 Pz IIIs, and short 75 Pz IIIs (at a time when HEAT had become available) in 1943.

He may mean that the short 50 Pz III easily penetrated the gun mantle of the 1940 model T-34 - plausible enough to me, but not equal to every front turret hit being a kill. He hasn't specified the range, either.

His comment about multiple types of T-34 may mean that the short 50 could no longer do this against the thicker turreted 1942 model T-34s - but the long 50 could - again, plausible enough to me.

He doesn't actually say, however, that the kills were by short 50, only by "short Pz III", which is ambiguous, since the Pz III aka pre-Tiger period stretches from the day of the invasion to 1943, during which times the Pz III went from short to long to short again.

"Any long range kills? - Not sure what you are asking. If you mean in the Tiger"

I thought he was asking if the T-34 could be KOed at long range by short 50 Pz IIIs. But the answer is, apparently, the Tiger could kill T-34s at long range, which for a Tiger meant 2 km. That is "long range". He does not say there were "long range" kills of T-34s by Pz IIIs. Instead he says - "We were taught from early war to destroy at a distance." Against thin Russian types, and with superior German optics and rates of fire. That was the lesson left by 1941, I read. Then "We adapted when we found we could not destroy the T34 above 1000 meters." But he does not specify, "in 1941", or "with short 50s". With long 50s against improved turrets aka in 1942, this statement is true.

My reading, then is as follows -

In 1941, he serves in Pz IIIs with short 50s, encountered Russian lights, dueled at range and won easily. Russian tanks engaged in small numbers and were easy to handle because of it.

Occasionally masses of lights coordinated with each other, and were beaten easily by massed and superior German tanks. Occasionally massed heavies were used, and 88s were brought up. Perhaps his unit encountered small numbers of T34s and overwhelmed them with hail fire or close turret hits, but none of that needs to be assumed.

In 1942, he was still serving in Pz IIIs, which now acquired long 50s and were mixed in his experience. They faced T-34s routinely now, not early war unuseful types. They aimed for weak points. Long 50s could destroy them out to 1 km.

In 1943, he switched to Tigers, which easily destroyed T-34s out to 2 km. The rest of the Panzer force by now outmatched the T-34. Only its numbers were impressive any more.

In none of which is there a word I disagree with, or that contradicts any of my opinions. I realize it is possible to read it as saying "short 50s easily penetrated T34s out to 1 km". It just doesn't actually say that, so reading it that way is reading it in. The statement is simply too ambiguous about weapons, targets, dates, and ranges, to be evidence on the question, either way.

[Bastables]

"Gun casing"= Mantlet. Perfectly in line with the anti T-34 primer in that "strikes against the mantlet penetrate and break the weld seams. He's talking about aiming at weak points and that the mantlet itself is a "weak point" and will fail when hit. In line with Glantz and Zolga statements that the front Turret is penetrated by the 5cm gun of 1941 at 500m.

Lets take a look at army shorthand designations

PIII Kurz/kz “short”= PIII 5cm KwK

PIII lang/lg “long”= PIII 5cm KwK39

PIII 75 = PIII N 7,5cm

The only Pz units that deviated from this title system were the Armour regt of DAK fighting in Nth Africa, which referred to the PIV/PIII lang as specials (Maybe aping the Brits designation of long gun PIII/PIVs as Specials?) or shorthand PIIIsp, PIVsp but the PIII N were still recorded titled as PIII(75).

Lets look at it again

Question: Could a early Panzer destroy a T34 from the front?

Answer: There were many types of T34s. We taught ourselves to shoot at the weak points. However, the gun [casing?] was weak and easily penetrated by the short and long barrel Panzer IIIs. {Rune:I assume 50mm] I have some photos still of some of the kills, taken after the battle.

Notice training to aims at weak points then goes on to state “however, the gun [mantlet] was weak easily penetrated by both kurz and lang PIII. You can continue interpreting it in what ever manner you feel Jason, I love the change in your mind from mantlet penetrations to gun hits, wilfully ignoring that gun hits won’t result in penetrations. Nice dodging.

[ January 29, 2003, 01:20 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[JasonC]

Does he say "at 500m" or "at 750m"? He does not. Assuming he is saying the mantlet, and assuming the shooter is 50L42, fine. Obviously the gun is also a metal object that it is possible to penetrate; I was only pointing out the ambiguities in the statement to show how little can be concluded from it. In fact, to figure out what it means you have to appeal to another source; Rune had to guess and fill in the sense he assumed was meant.

It says the same as the training document, I agree, that the 50L42 can penetrate the gun mantlet, without specifying at what range it can do so (neither does that document), and while also saying the same gun is only effective against the T34 at close range, thus the elaborate closing procedure.

The gun mantlet remains a weak point covering a few percent of the tank's area; he calls it a weak point they were trained to aim for, and never says anything about every hit on the turret front going in. He just doesn't say what you need him to say, that 50L42 routinely killed T34s with any front turret hit out to 500-750m. Which it does in CMBB.

His report does not say that, the Panzer troop report does not say that, the Panzer regiment reports do not say that. You hear it in any or all of them simply because you expect or what the conclusion to be true. That is not evidence. Everything each of your sources says fits weak point penetrations at close range.

I am arguing, remember, for a random determination of the effective angle of curved armor, with a mean of 45 degrees. The effective angle would be as low as it is now a third of the time. Please explain to me how the mantlet theory justifies almost all, rather than around a third, of 50L42 hits on the turret front penetrating out to 500 (your figure) or 750 (CMs effect) meters. Are you saying the mantlet is the entire turret front?

My evidence the other way, from doctrine, reports of people like Guderian, remain dismissed without explanation. Your explanation for the reason they were supposed to close to short range fire from the flanks instead of medium range from the front is that the close flank method was the easier of the two. Which is preposterous. Have you thought of a better reason by now, why they went through all of that rigomorole in the training document, when "duel hull down at 500m" was the "real" (CMBB) answer?

I am also still waiting to hear how the 37mm penetrated T34 turret fronts.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The gun mantlet remains a weak point covering a few percent of the tank's area; he calls it a weak point they were trained to aim for, and never says anything about every hit on the turret front going in. He just doesn't say what you need him to say, that 50L42 routinely killed T34s with any front turret hit out to 500-750m. Which it does in CMBB.

Looks to be more than a few % that can easily be covred by the CM 1-2% chance of a weak point penatration.

The mantlet grows even bigger as armour quality falls in 1941/42. Remember this is compounded by the inherently weaker cast armour of the T-34 front.

PaKs (3,7cm) used to be seen as short range weapons before and during the Spanish civil war, to this end the PaK sights used to stop at 900m. 900m plus was considered long range at the time. Considering that it was the German army I think it's safe to say that Military jargon such as "short range" does have specific meaning. Rune's uncle specifies training for "long range" engagements in 1941 yet they were unable to penetrate at "long range" which was specified as 1000m.

He states that they were trained to aim at weak points but that the whole mantlet acted as a weak point.

Guderian faced a drubbing by an enemy that kept his T-34 and KV at +1200m engagement ranges. The Panzertruppen inspector (Not Guderian he was a corps commander at the time) recognised that frontally charging enemy tanks was a wasteful exercise when enemy tank guns could hit and kill before the Panzers could close the range. The T-34s of Kursk highlight this expensive lesson when carrying out closing charges versus PIV lang and Tigers. It's also interesting to note even when PIV langs could kill T-34 at long range, Panzer commanders where still advised to gain the flanks of Russian formations.

It's even more enlightening when "combat trials" with T-34 placed at 30deg oblique angles show the 7.5cm PaK 40 only penetrating the front of T-34 at 800m.

If you place the T-34 at 30deg Oblique angles to PIIIs in CMBB the turret armour defeats the 5cm rounds. Identical to combat trials that place the T-34 at 30deg oblique angles.

It's pretty simple Jason, you state that the front turret is proof versus 5cm KwK. Combat vets, regt reports and your own misunderstandings of the context of Guderian defeat and "combat trials" are against you. You factously start bringing up if/when/where 3,7cm penetration that have nothing to do whether the 5cm KwK can penetrate the T-34 front turret. Not only that even after I've brought forward my arguments versus "Combat trials" and Guderian explanation for one defeat you keep on leaping back on asking for counter points apparently ignoring previous statements and arguments.

The 45deg pulled out of your arse baseline figure would also have the Panther and T-34-85, T-34 M42/43 front turrets (never mind other curved AFV armour) become unrealistically stronger or is this a special power restricted to early T-34s?

[ January 29, 2003, 07:53 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Ex Bellator]

It might be fatuous but I just had a Skoda's 37mm gun kill one of my T-34s last night. A front turret penetration and instant 'Knocked Out' result from 580m :eek:

Even my opponent apologised for it.