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The German tactical system


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After reading the very interesting thread provided by JasonC regarding the Russian tactical system, I thought it would be interesting if now the German tactical system was analyzed, so it could be compared with the Russian one.

I don't know enough about the respective tactical systems myself, so I thought I would begin a thread about the German tactical system, where some more knowledgable persons could contribute their understanding of the system and hopefully create a thread with as much depth as JasonC's Russian variant.

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Check out the US War College Docs on the time period

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=352

This is the US Army Handbook on German Forces. Chapter IV deals with Tactics.

You can also access a lot of related materials at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/DL/chron.htm#AWorldWarII19391945

Included is a multi-volume edition called Combat Lessons, which is front-line anecdotes and tactics employed. A lot of it is useful for CM, and all of it is interesting historically.

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I assumed most people knew it.

The basis of the German system was the division and the kampgruppe. The KG was the tactically relevant unit, the division was the combined arms bag of assets that created and tasked them. KGs were generally formed around a regimental commander and his HQ. Assets were then added to give it all the arms needed to fufill its intended mission or role. At a minimum this might mean an infantry regiment with attached 105mm battalion and a company of PAK - at a maximum it could means 2/3rds of a Panzer division operating on a single axis of advance. Cross attachments were generally at the level of company or battalion.

The corps organization was important operationally for the panzer forces, with a single panzer corps of 2 PDs and 1 motorized infantry generally operating on a single direction and point of main effort for breakthrough purposes. (Later in the war, the motorized division might be Pz Gdr or might be missing entirely. On the other hand, a Tiger battalion was typically added at corps level). Once through the line they could spread to encircle things, but usually just trailed the motorized infantry behind them as a containing wall for anything pocketed, the PDs going straight on.

They placed great emphasis on using armor offensively and on concentrating it, and they were the first to understand the need to support it with all arms - motorized to keep up and organic to the PD to ensure effective command and cooperation etc. Later in the war the offensive emphasis on the use of armor became something of a problem, as they would throw half or more of the available assets away in grandious counterattacks. They were always seeking scale, thinking armor produced its essential effects only in corps sized quantities or upward.

The infantry started with conventional triangular formations and 2 up 1 back deployments. This was found to be a luxury and they soon went to much flatter deployments, with typically only a single line of reserve battalions, or sometimes only a single reserve battalion in a division sector. The companies could be 2 up 1 back or all on line. But they stopped layering regiments, let alone divisions.

The heavy weapons network (HMGs, mortars, IGs and PAK, light Flak) and coordinated artillery were considered the backbone of positional defenses. The bulk of the infantry was used very aggressively even on defense, with instant local counterattacks by a single sub-echelon the standard response to anything. A company would send a platoon, a battalion would send a company, etc. It wasn't always from reserve - they'd be delivered laterally too, or by pulling a unit out of the line rapidly, leaving only a screen and the weapons.

This could get expensive, and units actively fighting were step reduced up to 3 times and still left in the line. They would be folded into KGs of a more intact division, or just one with an effective staff and prior responsibility for the sector. The staff daily rated all infantry type battalions for manpower strength, with the stronger ones earmarked for offensive roles, including the counterattacks. The idea was the squad MGs defended while it took rifle and grenade numbers to attack.

Artillery fire was coordinated by artillery regiment HQs, supplimented by special Arkos frequently built around one. These provided the surveying, target location, plotting and mapping, and FO pools, and centralized ammunition logistics. Sometimes a single regimental Arko would be given the fires of an entire corps, e.g. to meet a critical attack.

But normally there was considerable use of "dedicated support", downward. A battalion of artillery would be assigned to a given KG and physically located with it, and individual batteries might be dedicated to individual battalions or front line companies. The artillery battalion was the main unit of support for field stuff, but larger guns were parcelled out by individual battery.

There was a clear doctrinal subordination of the artillery and its role was thought of as helping a specific maneuver unit survive its battles, hold its ground, or take its objectives. Not e.g. inflict maximum losses on the enemy or achieve corps or higher objectives by reshaping the operational battlefield etc.

Maneuver element commanders at division were in the drivers seat. Higher HQs demanded things from them, sometimes ridiculously impossible things, criticized and threatened. They generally did not micromanage, though later in the war there was a byzantine level of procedure over the commitment of serious reserves etc.

To give an idea how aggressive they were about this stuff, a German army level commander counterattacked a superior enemy force incessantly for 2 weeks, scraping together all available armor in the theater, until there were less than 30 running AFVs left in his army. He then went over to the tactical defensive. He was upbraided by his superior for his lack of offensive spirit and threatened with sacking.

The PDs in the Heer formations were very light on infantry. In the early war they were top heavy with quite light tanks, but the number of tanks was reduced as their weight increased, making for a more managable tank infantry ratio (around 1 to 2 in organization size terms). The infantry portion fought very "flat" to make up for it (meaning, all on line, no reserves), and the other infantry type assets of the division (recon, pioneer) were frequently pressed into service as additional infantry weight.

PDs with less infantry than a typical ID could have defensive sectors twice as long. They were expected to make up for low numbers with mobility, by screening less active sectors thinly and marching the others to the sound of the guns. The armored KG would act as "fire brigade" to restore any broken section of the front, by backstopping or more often by local counterattack.

Armored KGs within PDs were typically formed from the modest armored portion of the Pz Gdrs, a single company or battalion, plus the recon battalion and sometimes a single company of armored pioneers. These all had numerous gun armed light vehicles in addition to troop carriers. These would then work with the bulk of the panzer regiment, though one battalion or 2 companies of the panzers might be attached to a different KG.

The result was a typically a sub-formation with N tanks, 2 N light armored vehicles, and not much in the way of dismounted infantry. A single artillery battalion was usually attached, SP late in the war, motorized before then. A battery of 88 Flak and a company or so of light was also typical. It was meant for exploitation and for strong attacks well localized in space. It tended to take up a lot of road space, though, and when attacking from march only a portion would typically manage to engage.

The remainder of the PD was a motorized infantry KG or two with modest tank, StuG, or Marder support, which was used to hold stuff or to accomplish infantry missions related to terrain (river crossings, night infiltration, woods or block clearing etc).

The attack method was almost uniformly "envelopment". Meaning, the attacking formation sends one subelement at the defenders to fix them in front, but it only feints, and the main body then swings around one flank or the other. The flank attack typically takes a narrow route, not a wide wheeling line. All the emphasis is on speed and achieving tactical surprise. This is true even of infantry attacks - the local counterattacks even in an infantry defense still conform to this pattern, except the existing defense acts as the fixing screen.

When infantry formations were called on to act offensively in operational terms, they were generally bolstered by assault guns, particularly later in the war. These typically went wherever the infantry main body did and did not attempt independent maneuver. They fired from range on targets directly ahead from well within the infantry main body. Strong artillery support was also considered sufficient to enable plain infantry to act offensively, particularly in any sort of terrain (other than open I mean).

On the attack, artillery fired short but violent prep fires of typically 30 minutes duration. Most of it lifted by the time of the actual maneuver element attack. It would be resumed if the maneuver attack failed, on hold outs etc. Most of the artillery was aimed at front line enemy units with direct damage as the goal. Small batteries of longer ranged guns - 170s, 150 guns rather than howitzers, 105 guns in each PD - did counterbattery work and interdiction fire at routes and bridges etc - but in quite low numbers. They relied on good signals intelligence to pinpoint enemy batteries.

Offensive infantry tactics emphasized close approach and the use of explosives. MGs and mortars gave covering fire, infantry worked forward by hopefully unexpected, flanking routes, and then grenades or demo charges were used on each enemy position in sequence. Only modest numbers are delivering these at any one time. The main body provides a "well" from which additional grenade parties are drawn, maneuvers to grab more ground, cuts up retreats with its LMGs, provides more cover fire with those and rifles, etc.

The Germans understood the role of cover fire to be blinding the enemy and allowing maneuver. They did not expect ranged fire to demolish enemy positions. Actual destruction was to be achieved by encircling a position or moving maneuver elements to point blank with it and overrunning the position.

The Germans placed more emphasis on night infantry action than the western allies but considerably less than the Russians. They also got better at it as the war progressed. Night infantry fighting was predominantly a matter of stealthy infiltration, sometimes supplimented by grenade and SMG raiding or trying to induce the defender into panic firing at thin or non-existent targets. The main effect was sought by having a unit in place and dug in by the following morning, able to interdict new areas by ranged fire. They also used armor offensively at night in "coup de main" actions, episodically.

All are in keeping with the dominate tactical emphasis on surprise.

The Germans were generally past masters of combined arms tactics. The performed considerably better than any other army at the lowest scale, throughout the war. This was about half good doctrine and training and the other half excellent low level leadership. Equipment had essentially nothing to do with it.

As for more operational stuff, they did well early against poorly prepared adversaries but suffered more and more as that unpreparedness evaporated and the weaknesses of their own operational doctrines and practices became more important. Those weaknesses included overcommitment to offensive action, little use of reserves, disunity of command and second guessing by superiors, blind arrogance, unrealistic demands on subformations, and shoddy to criminal replacement, relief, and logistical practices.

They were clearly outplayed at the operational level and above from the fall of 1942 on, on every front. That they continued to perform well anyway shows it was tactical abilities and not higher leadership, regime or senior army, that were responsible.

They also benefited from highly trained and professional staff work in a few key areas. Motorized formations simply ran on time with every need foreseen and met. They attrited in runners, but they never simply broke. The rail supply and repositioning system allowed divisions in France to be in action in Russia within one week. While political direction to mobilize the economy was notoriously slow, once it was ordered Speer-directed industry matched Russian industrial and weapons production despite serious allied bombing.

A lot of loose and wordy emphasis has been put on the German integration of air power to their offensive doctrines as supposedly essential to "blitzkrieg" (a western journalist term, not a German military one, incidentally). It is pretty much all bumcomb. They started the war with a better airforce than any of the other major powers because they were preparing for war while the others weren't, or weren't as serious about it. But this edge rapidly evaporated, and by 1942 it had been reduced to parity. By 1943 it was gone and the allies had the edge.

The use made of it was mostly armed recce - attack planes and fighter bombers fly out over the enemy countryside and shoot up stuff they see. Air strikes could be requested on specific locations and delivered the next day - that was the planning cycle. Medium bombers at altitude went after whole enemy cities and were the lion's share of the actual bomb throw-weight. Air brought very valuable operational intel and it spread confusion and alarm, but its physical effect on major ground formations was trivial. The bomb weight and accuracy just weren't there.

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Originally posted by JasonC:

A lot of loose and wordy emphasis has been put on the German integration of air power to their offensive doctrines as supposedly essential to "blitzkrieg" (a western journalist term, not a German military one, incidentally).

That is not quite correct. The term was used in German military writing from the early-mid 1930s, well before the famous journalist used it in relation to Poland. It is however correct to say that Blitzkrieg was not an official doctrine.

All the best

Andreas

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That is not quite correct. The term was used in German military writing from the early-mid 1930s, well before the famous journalist used it in relation to Poland.
Thats interesting. Every source I have read (which isn't actually too many) identifies that the western journalist was the first to coin the term, and that the Germans never actually used it. Thanks for bringing that to our attention Andreas.
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Yeah, one of these things. Someone in the dim and distant past wrote it, presumably someone not being able to speak German, and/or unwilling to actually do a bit of research, and it was then quoted so often that it is now The Truth. Friesner in 'Blitzkrieg Legende' thankfully clears that up. He speculates IIRC that the journalist probably came across the term through reading on of those German papers.

Jason is however fully correct that it never denoted any type of doctrine, no matter how hard many people ignore that.

All the best

Andreas

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