Canister 45mm tank rounds

[JasonC]

SO - I allowed a range of 7500 to 10000 for VII corps. Since 3-4000 survive fighting for the French and 2000 are captured, the actual hits are 1500 to 5000 with 3000 the figure that will minimize the expected error. Those losses are from long range shot for an extended period, recorded by all concerned (not "maximum possible" - the Russians had 460 guns and I only include the 150 known to bear on their position), plus the short range canister (from 72 of them), plus the infantry attack (by 5000 men, carrying straight through their positions and accounting for the prisoners).

The reason coming into sight within canister range matters is it means the positioning of the men and their formations and attitude etc were all unprepared to receive the fire they did receive. Normally infantry would approach to within canister range first with a skirmish screen in open order, whose fire would try to drive the gunners away from their guns. Making use of available cover etc. Formed would use dead ground, observe the line of previous shots and avoid those locations, etc. None of these usual means of dealing with artillery applied. The incident was clearly an outlier in its direct fire effects, and these factors help explain why it was an outlier.

Nevertheless, the charge and the prisoner haul and the large numbers who rallied back in French positions, all present a quite different picture from the typical one liner about a corps being practically annihilated by artillery fire. Instead they suggest they were disordered enough by it that they could not withstand the Russian infantry's charge. The fact that formed beats disordered in infantry fighting is easily the most important and best established of the whole era.

So, they blunder into a more vulnerable than usual situation, they get decimated, rear ranks start to run while front ones are ragged and in chaos, then infantry charges into them and they can't stop it. Some are shot down by that charging infantry, many more surrender to it, and more still run for their lives in rout. Yes the artillery fire was decisive in this, but as breaking the ice, starting the ball rolling. Not as inflicting all the losses, which were a significant chunk of the modest portion of the French army engaged, but nothing like a whole corps.

As for Borodino, the French storm the fleches alone half a dozen times just in the morning. Cannon fire never stops them. Every time they have to be ejected by fresh Russian reserves thrown into the position. The French grand battery bearing on the position approaches 100 guns. But never sweeps it clear, it always takes infantry attack. The position had reverse slope aspects, and each side rapidly dominated its own side of the hill, so to speak. But the real fighting took place as trades of pushes by fresh reserves.

Meanwhile, the fight on the French right was an infantry affair that lasted all morning. Skirmishers were in contact in the outlying positions in front of the great redoubt all day. When the French finally cleared the fleches position and attached the next, they did so with formed infantry that smashes thinner skirmish lines, and with repeated cavalry charges. This is not a battle that can be called simply an artillery duel, nor was it boring. Maneuverists who do not understand frontal attack on attrition principles can't see any of their favorite sweeping flanking operations and so fail to understand the battle, or focus excessively on minor actions on the wings - but that does not mean artillery did most of the fighting in the center. It didn't. The fight there was decided by exhausting fresh reserves, which is not something one can accomplish if the other guy only has to line his front with cannon to hold.

What is always conspicuously missing in the dramatic accounts of contemporary commanders is how all the time was actually spent. They focus on the most arresting passages - if which they usually figure prominently themselves - but rarely explain why tactical process A took 2 to 4 hours, instead of the 5 to 10 minutes that suffice for the part they retell. Because entire corps of infantry are described as "hotly engaged" by balancing forces of the enemy, for periods that long. In practically every battle. But there is not the remotest possibility the men were literally standing at 70 paces in close order happily blazing away as fast as they could reload, for such time periods. They'd all be dead in ten minutes, and out of ammunition in half an hour if for some unexplained reason they survived.

What was clearly happening instead is that only small portions were engaged - crusts of men in open order or using cover - firing at ranges that were sometimes quite long by wargame standards for Napoleonic renditions. And still inflicting considerable harm (and disorder) on each other, but in a wearing, outlasting fashion. One does not see a division that can line its frontage give way in 20 minutes just because there are two opposite. Instead they lock, stalemated, and it takes hours for the scales to turn. Why? Because both can line the frontage and make it too dangerous for men to approach too close, and they then do not approach too close, but instead fire. Not something the commanders play up, because not a wanted behavior - but clearly present in battle after battle.

You want examples? At Arcola, the French infantry refused to cross the causeways because Austrian musketry and a few cannon had a clear field of fire over them, half a mile long. Instead both sides fired at each other from behind dykes for the better part of three days. The Austrians lost half again as much as heavily as the French, despite better terrain and equal numbers. Probably because they were more willing to stand in ranks in close order, frankly. At Rivoli, the leading French corps was engaged in infantry vs. infantry combat from dawn until 11 AM without relief or interruption. What were they doing? They were skirmishing across a ravine.

At Austerlitz, the morning fight for the villages lasted two hours, from 7 to 9 AM. What do you think they were doing? Soult secures the Pratzen by 9:30 AM. He stayed in heavy action there until early afternoon, with continuous heavy action from 10 to 11 in particular. A little farther left it stayed hot clear to noon. The Russian Guard renewed the fight at 1 PM. Charging from 300 yards (why, if no one was firing yet?), they readily broke the first French line but were then disordered enough to be readily stopped by the second. See-saw commitment of cavalry ensued clear to 2 PM. Lannes and Bagration were in sustained infantry contact from mid-morning on, with firing on that flank only ceasing around 4:30 PM. On the French right after mid morning, 8000 French held off 4 times their number of Russians for hours, without giving ground or ever being free from fire. Then there is all the talk of "pressing" the cut off Russian left, which takes to late afternoon and (against increasingly disorganized stragglers) into evening. Why? What are they doing all that time? It takes only 20 minutes to fire off every round carried. They were skirmishing a few ranks at a time, that's what.

But you want Borodino in particular. OK. Davout begins the first attack on the fleches by 6 AM. He is pushed out of them again at 7 AM. Eugene has meanwhile also pushed past the village and been repulsed for the first time. The Poles are stopped at first by musketry from the woods to their north. They skirmish there indecisively for two hours. Davout is supported by Ney in the Fleches fighting as early as 8 AM, and cavalry tries by 8:30, with conscipuous lack of success. Russians are firing from the woods, in addition to trading blows with reserves in the fleches area proper.

They regroup and doubtless shell in the meantime, but try again with 3 corps of infantry in the center at 10 AM. Davout was already wounded, Ney was wounded no less than four times. The Russians throw in reserves again, result see-saw fighting again, but the French keep the ground this time. Cavalry attempts to exploit farther, however, fail, running into Russian squares, their musketry, and cannons once beyond the fleches crest. Diversions cause delay after that, as the French prepare to hit the center with infantry again. They go in at 2 PM, with cavalry hard behind them. It clears the Redoubt, and the infantry occupies it. But it takes an hour. Then both sides' cavalry clash on the Russian side of the hill, and the Russians reform on the next ridge back under the cover of that action.

Thus infantry was skirmishing for hours on the left, then fighting in close contact there. On the right, for an hour or more in the morning, and a relatively brief diversion in the afternoon. In the center is the real prolonged infantry fighting - 6 to 7, 8 to 8:30, 10 to noon, and again from 2 to 3. 4 and a half hours within range of enemy forces.

Estimated infantry rounds fired for the day as a whole, both sides combined, run 2 million. And all told, both sides combined lose 75,000 men. Meaning more than 25 ball are fired per man hit, even if muskets got almost all of them, which they did not. More like 35-40 for the portion they probably did cause.

Anybody think formed vs. formed at melee distances, muskets can miss 34 out of 35 times? Anybody think it takes 4 and a half hours for the average man to get one hit on an opposite number at 70 paces? Ergo, they weren't all shot formed vs. formed at melee distances. Most were shot much farther, and at much tougher targets.

[ February 25, 2006, 06:50 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Guest Mike]

Many good points raised, but Borodino was not the only battle in history. the 7 years war is replete with infantry lines standing and exchanging musketry at what sems suicidally short range - and not being utterly destroyed.

Do you think that musketry changes so much from then until 1812?

Your final conclusion only follows if you accept your premis that musketeers couldn't possibly have missed as much as 99% of the time at 30-40 metres range.

And yet we know that formed musketeers didn't aim, remember, they were lucky if they levelled properly, and as you noted yourself, the smoke from all that black powder would mean they might iot even see their targets 30-40 yards away.

At Iena Prussian lines stood and fired volleys at French Skirmishers for quite some time until the combined effect of the skirmishers sniping weakened their morale so they collapsed at the approach of the columns.

Incredulity is insufficient reason to dismiss numerous independantrly attributed examples of very low rates of lethality per musket shot fired.

In this respect the combat results are not so different from the Athenian ambush of a Spartan Mora (Regiment - maybe 600 men) outside Corinth, possibly witnessed by Xenophon who wrote about it, and also the actions on Pylos in the Pelopnessian war - in both cases the Spartan were harrassed by light skirmishers who they were unable to do any damage to, and then broke when formed heavy infantry approached.

That Russian infantry captured thousands of French infantry at Eylau does not remove anything from teh division being "destroyed" by artillery - even by your account it was so disorganised as to be unable to offer any resistance, and that is a good definition of "destroyed" IMO.

[JasonC]

Yes a lot changed from the seven years war. The revolutionary armies brought about a complete change in tactics, which is why they won against professional militaries despite lousy training. Institutionalized by Napoleon's reforms, that created the tactical revolution that swept Europe. Everyone else then learned the lessons, most of them the hard way. (The Brits had a little prior experience of the importance of light infantry from colonial fighting).

What happened with the revolutionary armies is not everyone was willing to close with the enemy. Crowds hung back. An active fringe were willing to risk themselves to fire. Nobody seriously planned it that way, and the pros of Europe were all shocked that the French rabble outperformed their discipline. They had discovered that skirmishing is a superior form of fire combat. The reasons are easy enough to understand, as a matter of mere physics.

If two forces line their frontage with men with muskets, one of them in close order and the other in open order, the more close order ones fire many more rounds per unit time. But they have a correspondingly smaller target to hit, since virtually all the rounds are effectively unaimed, "area fire". The hits achieved are therefore an almost linear function of shots taken times exposed area for the enemy. And exposed area for the enemy goes up directly with numbers, as you fill in open order to close.

Thus, 5 times the men standing shoulder to shoulder, firing 5 times the shots, do not get 5 times the hits per unit time, against 1 times standing in open order. They get the same number of hits per unit time. And they get it from more shots taken - that is, the per shot accuracy is less. A thin skirmish line and a thick wall to wall line of muskets trading fire, therefore both tend to bleed at the same rate. And the skirmish line, if regularly fed fresh men to replace its losses, can keep it up much longer before ammo gives out.

Wall to wall muskets might achieve a greater morale impact from individual volleys. And they can certainly trade their way through any unsupported skirmish screen, or make it give ground, if they are willing to trade blood for blood to approach and do so. But they do not cause more hits per unit time. And they spend more ammo getting those hits, thus have less "wind" to keep it up.

That was the discovery made by the revolutionary armies. When discipline was added as well, with men specifically told off to skirmish for the rest of the formation, the best of both worlds was achieved. Columns held ground and fed skirmish lines. Skirmish lines engaged in fire combat.

Forces that tried to stand in close order against skirmishers fell apart for a reason - they could not shoot them down faster and they could not keep it up as long. As this sunk in, as ammo grew scarce, and as losses from previous fire accumulated around them, closed formations in long-term fire against skirmishes lost their cohesion. And became vulnerable to assault by still coherent columns emerging from behind the safety of their skirmish lines - with full ammo pouches, unfouled muskets, and rested men.

And I am not discounting low accuracy per shot I am insisting upon it. But objective firepower tests show that unaimed muskets hit targets the size of formed close order infantry, as often as 25 to 40% of the time, as the range fall to 70 yards or so. This fits the high causalties and instant morale collapse regularly reported from the closest infantry brushes. But it does not fit the overall stats of total losses. Ergo, such brushes were not the sole nor the principle means of infantry combat in the Napoleonic period. Most shots occurred either at skirmishers, or from them, or both. And frequently at quite long ranges.

The skirmisher's edge tells over time - he has no reason to risk very high probabilities of being hit by concentrated volleys by approaching formed too close. Self preservation tells him to stay far enough away that even whole lines firing in his general direction have a high chance of missing him. In return he accepts a high chance of missing even the large target the formed present to him. But it doesn't matter. He doesn't have to hit with 1, or 2, or 3 shots. He has 60 ball in his pouches and plenty of spare flints.

As for reports of "blazing away at 40 paces for hours", blazing away for hours happened, and blazing away at 40 paces happened, but the conjunction did not. That is the thesis, and there is no way to reconcile the ammo expended and men walking away unscathed, that denies it. Nor does it contradict any plausible tactical account.

And the point of the Eylau example is that destroyed meant on the order of 1000 men hit by artillery fire, plus infantry attack and rout, not 10000 actually hit by artillery fire. Also, they destroyed was more like half destroyed, and it wasn't just the artillery that did it. Since we started on the subject due to representations of shrapnel effect in CM, that kind of matters. The objection is of course that C ammo is grossly overmodeled in CM, in part due to misconceptions about the effectiveness of earlier counterparts. When in fact, artillery went from causing 12% of wounds to causing 70% of wounds, when it stopped being canister and started being HE.

[John Kettler]

Some comments.

Shrapnel is NOT the same as canister. Shrapnel is best thought of as firing a small cannon to a set range, a cannon which then itself spews bullets. Canister is essentially a BIG shotgun shell, which functions via muzzle action. Major difference! That the two types were a) separate and distinct and both were in the Soviet inventory is shown by this ammunition nomenclature table.

http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=140&Itemid=64〈=en

Further, according to the following formerly Secret order from Zhukov, shrapnel is twice (2 x) as effective as point detonating HE against troops in the open. This flies squarely in the face of JasonC's assertions regarding poor killing power of shrapnel. Stalin evidently thought otherwise!

http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=123〈=en

The Borodino (and related) discussion is fascinating, so much so that I suggest copying all the Napoleonic stuff to the HistWar: Les Grognards

Forum. Am sure the troops there will find it engrossing. Besides, the place could use some new posts!

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

We all know that the rounds are different. The problem is, the game shows C round canister when the T-34s actually carried shrapnel.

As for "twice as effective", they probably thought so, but it isn't remotely true.

"During the initial stages of World War I, shrapnel was widely used by all sides to attack massed advancing troops in the open, but later dropped and the high explosive shell became the predominate nature of 'explosive' shell used. The dropping of the shrapnel shell from use was due to the advent of trench warfare"

A common conception and true enough at the transition point. Later, there is another reason as well, and shrapnel becomes useless as a round design.

"...the shrapnel was unable to cut the barbed wire entanglements in no man's land, crater the ground, or to defeat troops under cover, all of which were required as a precursor to an attack."

But more importantly, as HE improved it becomes more effective to carry more of it along, than to waste the weight hauling metal.

"With the advent of relatively insensitive high explosives which could be used as the filling for shells, it was found that the casing of a properly designed HE shell fragmented so effectively that additional shot was not required. For example the detonation of an average 105 mm shell produces several thousand high velocity (3-5,000 fps) fragments..."

Note that the velocity achieved by shrapnel pellets was only about 700 fps, due to the much smaller explosive charge. No field gun shrapnel shell carried thousands of ball.

"By 1941 British research determined that the best size for an anti-personnel splinter was under 1/25 oz". Detailed operations research on actual wounded showed that WW I era estimates of the energy needed in a fragment to cause a serious enough wound to cause evacuation, were overestimated by more than a factor of 10.

In other words, much smaller splinters driven 4 to 7 times as fast, are much more efficient wounding agents than heavy ball driven at only pistol ammo speeds, laboriously carried all the way to the target. That is why everyone else gave them up.

[Guest Mike]

Jason wrote:

And I am not discounting low accuracy per shot I am insisting upon it. But objective firepower tests show that unaimed muskets hit targets the size of formed close order infantry, as often as 25 to 40% of the time, as the range fall to 70 yards or so.

AFAIK tests giving such results were against paper targets on a range in ideal conditions, and are discounted as simulations of battlefield performance by modern analysis.

[JasonC]

Pick any alternate conditions you like, you won't find a factor of 20 in them. Not against formed, not at 70 yards. Most shots were not taken at ranges that low or targets that good. If they had been, either nobody would have walked off the fields alive, or the ammunition expended would have been only a tenth what we know it was.

[Guest Mike]

You are correct that most shots were not.

But some were. And in some cases we have fairly exact results - such as at Albuera, and they give us nothing like the theoretical hit rates.