Varying Quality

[BloodyBucket]

So, I guess the next question has to be, was there an Army and a Corps formed in Canada, and then transported to the fighting, or should the units in question be formed in England with resources gained from Cananda? And if the cooperation between England and Canada was so close, shouldn't the units be different only in name?

Are the other Commonwealth forces in the same category?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by BloodyBucket:

So, I guess the next question has to be, was there an Army and a Corps formed in Canada, and then transported to the fighting, or should the units in question be formed in England with resources gained from Cananda? And if the cooperation between England and Canada was so close, shouldn't the units be different only in name?

Are the other Commonwealth forces in the same category?

Or should the player be given the choice - as was present historically - of having a completely independent Canadian Army? Canada could have done this, but it would have been an enormous expenditure of resources, and would still have required permanent lodgings in Britain for the logistical tail of the army.

Canada actually had two corps in Europe in WW II, and it was felt that the creation of a corps headquarters in Italy was a large problem. General ELM Burns wrote a book about manpower in the Canadian Army in WW II, and pointed out the large allotment of men in non-combat roles that the creation of I Corps headquarters entailed. These men could have been used as infantry reinforcements during the so-called reinforcement crisis of November 1944 - when the decision was made to use draftees overseas.

The funny thing is that the British didn't want the extra corps headquarters in Italy in any event. It simply added another layer of bureacracy between 8th Army headquarters and the Canadian divisions fighting there.

It was also unnecessary tactically, as only two Canadian divisions were there to be commanded by the new corps headquarters; the divisions could easily (and were, for a time) be commanded by a British corps.

The point being, that if the Canadians are allowed to have their own army seperate from the British, their level of resources would probably allow for only a 2 or 3 division corps, with the men that would have gone to the 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions in real life going instead to all the required logistical and support units.

Probably not worth the effort on the part of the designers, but would be an added notch of realism if the option were there. The question then becomes - what incentive would the Allied player have for wanting an autonomous Canadian Army? I would suspect there wouldn't be one - except perhaps to free up British troops for combat.

[ May 05, 2002, 09:26 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ancient One:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by SuperTed:

So, the minor allies will be largely ineffective, as they should be.

Even the Canadians? :eek: Historically, Canadians were the highest quality troops the Allies had.</font>

[SuperTed]

Originally posted by BloodyBucket:

...Are the other Commonwealth forces in the same category?

BB,

Canada is the only Commonwealth nation represented by its own units (and a small corner of the map). The other forces are part of the British units.

[ May 05, 2002, 11:05 PM: Message edited by: SuperTed ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

Poorly in Normandy?! And here I thought you were a Grog. I think you had better define poorly here because quite a few will (or should take offence to that).

Only a fool takes offence to the truth.

Operation Spring comes to mind. Looking at just the 5th Bde front, My own regiment failed to secure the start line, and the Black Watch suffered 310 casualties in a single day attacking Verrieres Ridge frontally. Hardly a shining moment. Hill 67 is another example; the Calgary Highlanders, in their first battle, set up on the forward slope of a hill rather than the reverse slope; they held their ground, but the regimental historian rightly criticizes them for their poor layout and bad communications. Again, this is due to inexperience, but really - what had they been doing in England for 4 years if not learning the basics like this?

Failure to close the Falaise Gap is another. Canadian commanders admitted they performed poorly due to inexperience. I know you don't claim to be a grog, but you may want to read Stacey on this, he has a telling and oft-quoted statement by a Canadian general to that effect.

The Canadians were not completely terrible in Normandy, they just weren't better than anyone else as was claimed in the original post. They did very well on D-Day itself, and were limited tactically by what they could do due to terrain and the high quality of enemy formations in front of them thereafter. That they managed to hold their front at all is indicative of their bravery, but unfortunately their claim to tactical skill really didn't exist or show itself until Goodwood, and especially Tractable where the new APCs were used to good effect. It certainly wasn't in evidence at Point 195 when the BCR was detanked after they stopped in exposed positions on the wrong hill.

The Canadians in Normandy were a mix of good and bad - "Keller is Yeller", poorly implemented Artificial Moonlight and the string of sacked battalion and brigade commanders representing the bad, and the brief shining moments of success representing the good. They were really much better by the time of the Rhineland - once the "hey-diddle-diddle, straight-up-the-middle" school of thought showed itself to be faulty.

They were still making stupid and costly frontal assaults in the Scheldt fighting in October - such as Walcheren Causeway, or Black Friday at Woensdrecht. Or perhaps that problem was endemic only to 5th Brigade? Their history is the one I know best, but if you say there are others here who can argue that the Canadian Army was truly better than any British or American divisions (in Normandy or elsewhere), let them speak now.

Ask yourself this - was any Canadian Division capable of performing as well as 101st Airborne at Bastogne? I say yes, but that is precisely the point - the Canadians were no better or worse than most British and American divisions. They were all equally brave, and all saw vicious fighting. 28th Division in the Hurtgen saw fighting just as awful as 2nd and 3rd Divs in the Scheldt or Rhineland fighting.

Why some Canadians feel the need to hold our army up as some superior entity is beyond me. It was certainly true in the Great War, but not in 1944-45. Don't get me wrong - they were very, very good - especially 1st Division in the Med - but not so good that they outshone the best of the British or Americans.

[ May 05, 2002, 01:22 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

How are you defining "National Command Entity"?

First Canadian Army was a sub-formation of 21st Army Group, and was not even operational until August 1944. All Canadians in Normandy were under command of the British 2nd Army during the months of June and July. Since the bulk of the fighting in Normandy occurred in these months, why would you say the Canadian Army was given strategic tasks? They were under British control during the entire period. Crocker was their Corps commander IIRC until July, when operationally, they came under control of II Canadian Corps. 2nd Canadian Div didn't even land until 4-6 July 1944, so for the entire month of June, only one div and an armoured bde were ashore. Is this strategic?

If we want to talk grand strategy, Prime Minister Mackenzie King was never invited to the major conferences with Russia, Britain and the US. I think they were invited to Quebec simply because they were hosting, but I would need to check my sources on this. Canada had NO say in matters of grand strategy as far as I know; they went to Normandy where and when they were told.

Do not get me wrong; Canada was essential to Allied victory - we made 60 percent of all Bren Guns, provided training grounds for the majority of RAF, RCAF, RAAF and RNZAF pilots and aircrew, performed yeomen duty on the North Atlantic Run, and were famous for high quality war materiel production (especially uniforms and web equipment - compare Canadian web to Indian and you will see what I mean). But even though the Statute of Westminster let us debate whether or not we would go to war in 1939, it had little to do with autonomy of Canadian units in the field.

While there was real and great pressure for Canadian commanders to have command of Canadian troops in the field, and Canadian generals were permitted to refer specific questions to Ottawa, they were still subordinate tactically and operationally to the British.

I am no expert on Montgomery and his dealings with the Canadians - I do know he was peeved when Crerar missed a briefing at 21 Army Group HQ in favour of attending the Dieppe memorial service on 3 Sep 1944. The Canadian Army in the field, once activated, may have operated with a fairly free hand under Monty, I honestly don't know - but in terms of a wargame command structure, how much should that be allowed to affect gameplay? I would say that for all intents and purposes, the Canadian Army was simply a subunit of the British force as a whole. While political considerations demanded the Canadian divisions fight together, this was not set in stone and could have been different had Andy McNaughton not been in command in Britain in 1939-1942. Some generals called for the Canadian divisions to be split up and sent to Africa to fight with their Commonwealth cousins in the desert. Again, this was all purely political, and in terms of a wargame, what incentive does a player have for keeping the Canadian Army together?

[ May 05, 2002, 12:35 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by The_Capt:

Poorly in Normandy?! And here I thought you were a Grog. I think you had better define poorly here because quite a few will (or should take offence to that).

Only a fool takes offence to the truth.

Operation Spring comes to mind. Looking at just the 5th Bde front, My own regiment failed to secure the start line, and the Black Watch suffered 310 casualties in a single day attacking Verrieres Ridge frontally. Hardly a shining moment. Hill 67 is another example; the Calgary Highlanders, in their first battle, set up on the forward slope of a hill rather than the reverse slope; they held their ground, but the regimental historian rightly criticizes them for their poor layout and bad communications. Again, this is due to inexperience, but really - what had they been doing in England for 4 years if not learning the basics like this?

Failure to close the Falaise Gap is another. Canadian commanders admitted they performed poorly due to inexperience. I know you don't claim to be a grog, but you may want to read Stacey on this, he has a telling and oft-quoted statement by a Canadian general to that effect.

The Canadians were not completely terrible in Normandy, they just weren't better than anyone else as was claimed in the original post. They did very well on D-Day itself, and were limited tactically by what they could do due to terrain and the high quality of enemy formations in front of them thereafter. That they managed to hold their front at all is indicative of their bravery, but unfortunately their claim to tactical skill really didn't exist or show itself until Goodwood, and especially Tractable where the new APCs were used to good effect. It certainly wasn't in evidence at Point 195 when the BCR was detanked after they stopped in exposed positions on the wrong hill.

The Canadians in Normandy were a mix of good and bad - "Keller is Yeller", poorly implemented Artificial Moonlight and the string of sacked battalion and brigade commanders representing the bad, and the brief shining moments of success representing the good. They were really much better by the time of the Rhineland - once the "hey-diddle-diddle, straight-up-the-middle" school of thought showed itself to be faulty.

They were still making stupid and costly frontal assaults in the Scheldt fighting in October - such as Walcheren Causeway, or Black Friday at Woensdrecht. Or perhaps that problem was endemic only to 5th Brigade? Their history is the one I know best, but if you say there are others here who can argue that the Canadian Army was truly better than any British or American divisions (in Normandy or elsewhere), let them speak now.

Ask yourself this - was any Canadian Division capable of performing as well as 101st Airborne at Bastogne? I say yes, but that is precisely the point - the Canadians were no better or worse than most British and American divisions. They were all equally brave, and all saw vicious fighting. 28th Division in the Hurtgen saw fighting just as awful as 2nd and 3rd Divs in the Scheldt or Rhineland fighting.

Why some Canadians feel the need to hold our army up as some superior entity is beyond me. It was certainly true in the Great War, but not in 1944-45. Don't get me wrong - they were very, very good - especially 1st Division in the Med - but not so good that they outshone the best of the British or Americans.</font>

[Holyman]

GUYS!

The war is over...

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

What you fail to mention is the fact that these Canadian disasters were in fact in the face of some of the hardest SS Div the Axis could throw at us. I will dig out some references but maybe you know,,how many Divs did we face off in and around Caen vs the US front. Now let's throw dysentry and miserable weather into the mix and I think the estimation of our troops may go up a notch.

PanzerLehr was in action against our allies in theatre, also, as well as some decent German para units. Canada had exactly one division in the line in Normandy during June, and the first half of July. They spent most of that time in static positions. That the enemy outnumbered them may excuse their lack of drive, but it doesn't give us the right to use it as "proof" that Canadians were superior fighters to the British or Americans.

Your reference to dysentery and weather makes no sense - it affected all the combatants equally. You are making the same mistake most amateur (and probably a lot of the professional) historians make - you mix your hero worship of Canadian vets in with an objective view of their abilities, capabilities, and operations. Ignore the fact that they were tired, cold/hot, hungry for decent food and far from home - that counts for nothing since it applies to all the soldiers in Normandy.

May I suggest you read Blackburns "Guns of Normandy". He was on the ground and did a hell of a lot of research after the War into our performance in Normandy.

I've read the entire series twice. Did you have specific points to make? I'd be more interested in German assessments of Canadians in Normandy - Blackburn doesn't count as impartial.

Now were we better than all the other units..I don't think so either but I would put poorly as a broad stroke brush on our performance in the Normandy Operation.

This is the point I was trying to make - we were no better and no worse. As for using "poorly" as a broad stroke - you may be right, but you've presented absolutely no evidence as to why. Let's have some examples.

As to National Comd Entity..you are of course right it didn't come into being until Aug 44 but do you think that the sion might have been made a little earlier than that. The fact that we had a Canadian Army (though subordinate) which had units of other nationalities (Pole and Brits) under our command, we were given Operational Objectives and a role.

The 51st Highland Division was given operational objectives and a role too. Should Scotland be considered a seperate National Command? I doubt that "Canada" had any kind of role in operations in Normandy beyond the normal chain of command - certainly the Canadian government played no role in the development of operations. That being the case, what difference did it make if Crerar was Canadian or British? He would have done things just the same - I am speaking again in game terms, here. The Canadian formations in Normandy were Canadian in name, and had Canadian commanders. But so what - they were still part of the British 21st Group of Armies, and answered to Montgomery. If Monty wanted them to take Dieppe, they took Dieppe. If Monty wanted them to assault cross the Seine, they did so.

The word "Canadian" does appear and that in itself is a major step.

Step towards what? Towards postwar autonomy perhaps, but it didn't count for much realistically speaking in WW II. Crerar could not, for example, launch major offensives without Monty's approval. Monty's concerns were - clearing territory to the Seine, then clearing the Scheldt to open Antwerp, then clearing the Rhineland, and finally crossing the River. First Canadian Army was an integral part of all those operations. First Canadian Army had no choice in the matter.

Now I have no idea what the impact is suppose to be on SC nor am I preaching that we should be given more of a role but let's not downplay our contribution to Dieppe and a bad performance in Normandy which seem to be the way this thread is going.

I agree completely - I just think that in game terms, the Canadians should be, as they were historically, simply a component of the British 21st Army Group.

The board game Third Reich had historical variants tied to politics - a neat one might be for an autonomous Canadian Army as I have discussed previously, or another variant where the Canadian government refuses to split the Army, forcing all 5 divisions to fight in the same theatre.

We were not Major players but players none the less.

We were major players in the economic sphere, in training aircrew, and in the North Atlantic. We were important players, too, in the ground fighting in Italy and Northwest Europe. But we had no voice in strategy, and little in operations. First Canadian Army conducted some very effective operations, towards the end of the Normandy campaign and through to the end of the war - but those operations were set out for them by Montgomery, even if the operational planning was left to them. Yes, the Canadians ordered around Polish, Czech, British and American divisions frequently, but they used what was assigned to them by Monty (and for the most part used them well). But they were under Montgomery, and ultimately Eisenhower, not the Canadian government as far as operations in the field.

[ May 05, 2002, 03:56 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[BloodyBucket]

It seems that if Canada wasn't on the SC map, then Canadian forces would be treated as any other Commonwealth forces. Since Canada (at least a bit of it) IS on the SC map, the decision to have Canadian units was made, and have them arrive when purchased in Canada (at least, I think they show up in Canada).

It seems that the lack of HQ support for the two Canadian units is more a matter of uniformity than a real decision, since other "minors" are without HQ. If a change could be made that would allow Canada to use English HQ without too many programing difficulties or play balance issues, that would be the way to go.

[The_Capt]

Micheal,

Well first of all I think you would have to establish just who you feel is impartial.

As to performance, I think the burden lies with you to prove they did perform poorly not the other way around. As just about every historical reference I have read or been forced to read demonstrates again and again that the Canadian troops preformed well considering who they were facing and the conditions they were fighting. You sound like Jarmowitz, spouting off a load of armchair generalizations (nice pun) but I have yet to see you show me how the overall performace was poor or even a benchmark to judge them by.

You are of course right the conditions were tough all over and I have no problem saying our troops preformed as any decent Allied force with some very good units and some less so. But one has to be careful not to go too far down the "truth track" and begin to make judgements about performance which are unfounded and amateur in analysis.

I think we are agreeing loudly. I was not saying we were superior in any way. But in trying to prove your point you have cast them in an inferior light.

I think Blackburn does a good job of connecting what was happening in the trenches with the bigger picture. His points are quite to the point we (The Canadian and Brits) faced the bulk of the Axis furor in Normandy against some very experienced Divisions (2nd and 9th SS had just come back from the East Front). And that coupled with very poor conditions and tough terrain made for a very hard slog WHICH our troops preformed admirably. Since you have read the series twice I trust you remember the same.

As I said I really can't speak to the game as I haven't seen it. But a National Army Comd named for a nation commanded by nationals..even a subordinate one does not merit "just another bunch of Brits" in my books. Now whether that has an effect on a game, I cannot say but again your gross generalizations really do get under my skin.

[Michael Dorosh]

Warren, I've given several specific examples of poor Canadian showings in Normandy. Perhaps you misread me.

Operation Spring, especially 5 Bde. Black Watch lost 310 men out of 325 that crossed the start line during the assault on Verrieres. I believe this was also the op with the poorly orchestrated use of Artificial Moonlight that cost the Third Div/North Novies dearly, to which I allude to above.

Point 195 - the British Columbia Regiment was wiped out after stopping on the wrong hill.

Hill 67 - Calgary Highlanders deployed poorly and suffered from poor communications in their first battle. They held out, but it was indicative that their state of training in England was not good - and that many battalion commanders still needed experience, or even dismissal.

General Keller - described as cowardly by some, certainly as nervous, the 3rd Division was characterized after a couple of weeks in Normandy as "strung out and in a high state of tension, much like their commander." (I am paraphrasing a well known quote, which I haven't the wherewithal to look up right now).

The biggie - failing to close the Falaise Gap and allowing the escape of large portions of the German 7th Army (albeit without equipment).

You have yet to provide a single specific example of something the Canadians did right in Normandy. I'll concede D-Day. What about afterwards? I'm not saying there weren't any, I am saying you haven't provided any evidence of such.

Who is generalizing? But really, isn't the point in contention that in general the Canadian Army performed poorly? How do we discuss that without generalizing?

I've given some specific instances that might support the theory Canadian formations performed poorly as a whole in Normandy.

You have twice now referred to the opposition by several anonymous but really good German formations as somehow evidence that the Canadians did not perform poorly. It's a bit of a non-sequitur. If you think the Canadians performed well, can you provide some specific examples? You've done nothing but generalize.

Yes, I think we do agree loudly that the Canadians were not head and shoulders above, or below, anyone else, which was indeed my point to begin with. But I would like to see specifically where your belief that the Canadian Army performed well in Normandy comes from.

[ May 05, 2002, 06:11 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Ancient One]

Well, I've been thinking about the role of Canadians in Strategic Command. I've come to the conclusion that if the intent was to have some UK units represent Canadians fighting overseas, and to have the Canadian army and corps that begin in Canada represent "home defence" forces consisting of second rate troops, then it actually makes good sense.

[RCHRD]

Yes, the British certainly did have a material advantage over the Italian Navy. Radar, for one. See: 'Battle of Cape Matapan'.

[BloodyBucket]

This might be simulated in SC by having the English having more radar research points than the Italians.

[Titan]

w

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Warren, I've given several specific examples of poor Canadian showings in Normandy. Perhaps you misread me.

Operation Spring, especially 5 Bde. Black Watch lost 310 men out of 325 that crossed the start line during the assault on Verrieres. I believe this was also the op with the poorly orchestrated use of Artificial Moonlight that cost the Third Div/North Novies dearly, to which I allude to above.

Point 195 - the British Columbia Regiment was wiped out after stopping on the wrong hill.

Hill 67 - Calgary Highlanders deployed poorly and suffered from poor communications in their first battle. They held out, but it was indicative that their state of training in England was not good - and that many battalion commanders still needed experience, or even dismissal.

General Keller - described as cowardly by some, certainly as nervous, the 3rd Division was characterized after a couple of weeks in Normandy as "strung out and in a high state of tension, much like their commander." (I am paraphrasing a well known quote, which I haven't the wherewithal to look up right now).

The biggie - failing to close the Falaise Gap and allowing the escape of large portions of the German 7th Army (albeit without equipment).

You have yet to provide a single specific example of something the Canadians did right in Normandy. I'll concede D-Day. What about afterwards? I'm not saying there weren't any, I am saying you haven't provided any evidence of such.

Who is generalizing? But really, isn't the point in contention that in general the Canadian Army performed poorly? How do we discuss that without generalizing?

I've given some specific instances that might support the theory Canadian formations performed poorly as a whole in Normandy.

You have twice now referred to the opposition by several anonymous but really good German formations as somehow evidence that the Canadians did not perform poorly. It's a bit of a non-sequitur. If you think the Canadians performed well, can you provide some specific examples? You've done nothing but generalize.

Yes, I think we do agree loudly that the Canadians were not head and shoulders above, or below, anyone else, which was indeed my point to begin with. But I would like to see specifically where your belief that the Canadian Army performed well in Normandy comes from.

Micheal, so let me get this straight. In order to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt to you and the world that the Canadians performed well all I need do is;

a. Show one Operation and 2 incidents where the Canadian performed well plus one

b. Show 2 Canadian commanders who did a good job and

c. Show that the closing of the Falaise wasn't a total failure.

Wow I think you have invented an interesting an revolutionary method of analysis. OK I will dig into the books and get your examples, hell if I can get a couple of instances where they did an outstanding job does that show they were in fact elite?

Now well I am digging around the books for historical minutia I would ask you this...You say the Canadians performed poorly...I say they did just fine. It takes more than a few isolated incidents to prove you point (although you would sail through staff college with that method). What you really need to do is show us all here just how things could have been done better.

How would General Dorosh have handled the situation. I'll even remove the requirement to put the responsibility for the lives of thousands of men, the fate of the free world in your hands, overwhelming fatigue and Fog of War which the men whom you are so judging had to live with.

I would like to show me just how you would have led the BCRs to the right hill and saved the day. All Worthington paid was his life, I am sure he would like to hear how you could have spared him, his Regt and the Algonquines this obviously easily solvable puzzle.

I would argue that there is a hell of a lot more to a military operation than stale casualty numbers. And I think you have failed to look at just what these troops were facing when they did what they did. I also think you will fail to demonstrate that you or anybody could have done much better. So tell me again just how the Canadians did poorly in Normandy?

[Mr. Clark]

Originally posted by Ancient One:

Well, I've been thinking about the role of Canadians in Strategic Command. I've come to the conclusion that if the intent was to have some UK units represent Canadians fighting overseas, and to have the Canadian army and corps that begin in Canada represent "home defence" forces consisting of second rate troops, then it actually makes good sense.

This was what I was thinking too.

It seems like everything is basically OK as they are in SC.

[Elmo]

Why do I keep getting an image of two pit bulls fighting over a pork chop?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Elmo:

Why do I keep getting an image of two pit bulls fighting over a pork chop?

I'm no pit bull, just genuinely interested in the question of how the Canadians did in Normandy. Unfortunately, Warren is not an historian and really doesn't seem to have much respect for them. I am not a General and don't claim to have any tactical answers, but I am also not blinded by hero worship.

I'm not sure I understand Warren's reaction - he browbeats me for being too general, then when I provide specific examples of what I am talking about, he balks at the fact he might have to do the same and then all of a sudden claims that you can't use specifics to prove one way or another whether Canadians performed well or poorly in Normandy. How very odd.

Here is an email from my friend Russ Benneweis who is actually better at operational history than I am:

That was an amazing interesting thread. Before I give my thoughts, I want to make it clear that you know that when it comes to a

champion of the Canadian fighters, nobody gets on a soapbox like me. But over the years my blind devotion has been tempered by readings and serious contemplation. I would consider the 1st Div. every bit the shock troops that the Canadians were in WWI. Vokes was a ****ty tactician, and that brought them back down to earth in a hurry. Once the 5th Div. got their collective feet wet and

Bert (the Best) took over they were absolutely first rate troops. You were absolutely right in your assumption that a Corps in Italy

was a huge mistake. Plus Burns and Foulkes were terrible commanders. I would rate the 1st Div. as above average in the Allies and

the mighty maroon machine as equal to the good Brit. and U.S. divisions.

NW Europe. I don't think the 2nd ever recovered from Dieppe. Poorly led in Normandy, Foulkes was a disaster. They did much

better when Matthews took over. They didn't work as well with the supporting arms as did the 3rd Division. When I think of the

futility of the Foret de la Londe fighting it makes me sick. There's no knocking the bravery of the Canadians in the 2nd, but they

were just very poorly led. The Rileys were strong (well led) and so were the Calgaries (Ellis), but the french regiments were so

understrength that they had a hard time of it. I don't think much of Megill.

The 3rd was an incredibly brave unit. The 7th Brigade was probably one of the strongest brigades in the theatre. I can find quotes

by senior british officers to back this statement up. Rocky's 9th Brigade was tougher than hell. I would rate the 3rd very highly.

But again I agree with your statements on Keller. He probably kept them from being one of the elites of the army in NW Europe.

But even more of the blame should be placed higher up. The 4th was somewhere in the middle of the army. So that dovetails nicely

with your statements.

The armoured brigades - The 1st was one of the best and the 2nd was somewhere in the middle.

I disagree strongly that the Canadians were to blame for the rate in which the Falaise Gap was closed. I put the blame on Bradley,

and the 1st (I think it was the 1st or maybe the 2nd) French Armoured Division. Brad stopped Patton at Argentan, with practically

no opposition in front of him while the Canadians continued to batter their way south against heavy oppostion. Patton could have

gone all the way to Falaise and closed the gap four or five days earlier. Carlos D'Este, an American historian, stated this in his book

Decision in Normandy. The French could have helped the Poles, who were magnificent, and the 4th Armoured at Trun and

Chambois, but chose to f*$# off towards Paris instead. There were some disasters in Normandy, but you can't pick those out and

classify the entire campaign as a disaster, while forgetting such successes as the D-Day landings, the destruction of the 12th SS,

Operation Charnwood (the Canadians did very well here). Don't forget that while Atlantic and Spring were disasters, Totalize could

have been another Vimy if Simonds had foregone the 2nd phase bombing and drove straight to Falaise. Tractable would have been

a great success if Simonds hadn't realized that the Laison River was a terrible tank obstacle. Also, Kitching didn't use the Artillery

alloted to him. Crerar was only good as a creator of paper work and chicken **** by the book rules. Simonds was creative. The Canadians were completely let down by the leaders, and Canada is completely to blame for this, as we totally abondoned the army between the wars so of course its going to go to hell. There was a complete void of excellent stand-out leaders in the Canadian army. Hell, Crerar hadn't ever led a battalion in action, when he took over the Canadian Army. Yikes. I think the troops

themselves were equal to the Brits and Americans and maybe, no probably, slightly superior. After all, we should have been, as we were entirely volunteers.

I am a big champion of what Canadians did in WW II, but the kneejerk "we were the best rah rah" stuff doesn't do anyone any good, and makes me as a Canadian look foolish since the rah rah postings of others do reflect on me.

The question of the Canadians in Normandy isn't confined to two posters on this board, historians have been debating it since 1944. Rightly so, it's a fascinating and important subject.

And if anyone makes a general and vague claim such as "Canadians were the best" or "Canadians performed well in Normandy" they had best be able to back it up - that is what boards like this are for.

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Elmo:

Why do I keep getting an image of two pit bulls fighting over a pork chop?

I'm no pit bull, just genuinely interested in the question of how the Canadians did in Normandy. Unfortunately, Warren is not an historian and really doesn't seem to have much respect for them. I am not a General and don't claim to have any tactical answers, but I am also not blinded by hero worship.

I'm not sure I understand Warren's reaction - he browbeats me for being too general, then when I provide specific examples of what I am talking about, he balks at the fact he might have to do the same and then all of a sudden claims that you can't use specifics to prove one way or another whether Canadians performed well or poorly in Normandy. How very odd.

Here is an email from my friend Russ Benneweis who is actually better at operational history than I am:

That was an amazing interesting thread. Before I give my thoughts, I want to make it clear that you know that when it comes to a

champion of the Canadian fighters, nobody gets on a soapbox like me. But over the years my blind devotion has been tempered by readings and serious contemplation. I would consider the 1st Div. every bit the shock troops that the Canadians were in WWI. Vokes was a ****ty tactician, and that brought them back down to earth in a hurry. Once the 5th Div. got their collective feet wet and

Bert (the Best) took over they were absolutely first rate troops. You were absolutely right in your assumption that a Corps in Italy

was a huge mistake. Plus Burns and Foulkes were terrible commanders. I would rate the 1st Div. as above average in the Allies and

the mighty maroon machine as equal to the good Brit. and U.S. divisions.

NW Europe. I don't think the 2nd ever recovered from Dieppe. Poorly led in Normandy, Foulkes was a disaster. They did much

better when Matthews took over. They didn't work as well with the supporting arms as did the 3rd Division. When I think of the

futility of the Foret de la Londe fighting it makes me sick. There's no knocking the bravery of the Canadians in the 2nd, but they

were just very poorly led. The Rileys were strong (well led) and so were the Calgaries (Ellis), but the french regiments were so

understrength that they had a hard time of it. I don't think much of Megill.

The 3rd was an incredibly brave unit. The 7th Brigade was probably one of the strongest brigades in the theatre. I can find quotes

by senior british officers to back this statement up. Rocky's 9th Brigade was tougher than hell. I would rate the 3rd very highly.

But again I agree with your statements on Keller. He probably kept them from being one of the elites of the army in NW Europe.

But even more of the blame should be placed higher up. The 4th was somewhere in the middle of the army. So that dovetails nicely

with your statements.

The armoured brigades - The 1st was one of the best and the 2nd was somewhere in the middle.

I disagree strongly that the Canadians were to blame for the rate in which the Falaise Gap was closed. I put the blame on Bradley,

and the 1st (I think it was the 1st or maybe the 2nd) French Armoured Division. Brad stopped Patton at Argentan, with practically

no opposition in front of him while the Canadians continued to batter their way south against heavy oppostion. Patton could have

gone all the way to Falaise and closed the gap four or five days earlier. Carlos D'Este, an American historian, stated this in his book

Decision in Normandy. The French could have helped the Poles, who were magnificent, and the 4th Armoured at Trun and

Chambois, but chose to f*$# off towards Paris instead. There were some disasters in Normandy, but you can't pick those out and

classify the entire campaign as a disaster, while forgetting such successes as the D-Day landings, the destruction of the 12th SS,

Operation Charnwood (the Canadians did very well here). Don't forget that while Atlantic and Spring were disasters, Totalize could

have been another Vimy if Simonds had foregone the 2nd phase bombing and drove straight to Falaise. Tractable would have been

a great success if Simonds hadn't realized that the Laison River was a terrible tank obstacle. Also, Kitching didn't use the Artillery

alloted to him. Crerar was only good as a creator of paper work and chicken **** by the book rules. Simonds was creative. The Canadians were completely let down by the leaders, and Canada is completely to blame for this, as we totally abondoned the army between the wars so of course its going to go to hell. There was a complete void of excellent stand-out leaders in the Canadian army. Hell, Crerar hadn't ever led a battalion in action, when he took over the Canadian Army. Yikes. I think the troops

themselves were equal to the Brits and Americans and maybe, no probably, slightly superior. After all, we should have been, as we were entirely volunteers.

I am a big champion of what Canadians did in WW II, but the kneejerk "we were the best rah rah" stuff doesn't do anyone any good, and makes me as a Canadian look foolish since the rah rah postings of others do reflect on me.

The question of the Canadians in Normandy isn't confined to two posters on this board, historians have been debating it since 1944. Rightly so, it's a fascinating and important subject.

And if anyone makes a general and vague claim such as "Canadians were the best" or "Canadians performed well in Normandy" they had best be able to back it up - that is what boards like this are for.</font>

[BloodyBucket]

While I have no knowledge of the relative merits of the Canadian forces in WWII (sadly, as it sounds fascinating and I should fix this), I do know that I grew up assuming that GI Joe was the best soldier on the planet, and could outfight ten Germans easy. After all, my dad was one of those invincible heroes.

When I got wise to the truth, that he was in a division that was ripped apart for army political reasons before being sent into combat, led by a very brave but barely competent (some say alcoholic) general in the divisions most famous battles, ill served by a terrible replacement system, often outfought on a tactical level by the Germans, committed to ghastly frontal attacks by officers who should have known better, and finally smashed due to intelligence blunders, my respect for him, if anything, went up.

Can't say the same for the army.

[ May 06, 2002, 11:32 PM: Message edited by: BloodyBucket ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Warren, you certainly do have an interesting debating style yourself. You are convinced the Canadians performed well in Normandy, but admit to having no understanding of the campaign or any familiarity with the common perceptions of any of the Canadian commanders on the ground. At least, that is why I presume you must now look this stuff up in a book.

You're taken the position the Canadians did well, but you have no idea why you feel that way.

Generally not a good idea to take a position on something publicly unless you have a solid grasp of what it is you are trying to say.

I included my friend Russ' comments because he does refute some of what I say. I thought it might stimulate further debate on this fascinating subject. I never said I agreed with him. Apparently you have no opinions on any of these issues - and now feel the need to hit the books in order to form an informed one?

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Warren, you certainly do have an interesting debating style yourself. You are convinced the Canadians performed well in Normandy, but admit to having no understanding of the campaign or any familiarity with the common perceptions of any of the Canadian commanders on the ground. At least, that is why I presume you must now look this stuff up in a book.

You're taken the position the Canadians did well, but you have no idea why you feel that way.

Generally not a good idea to take a position on something publicly unless you have a solid grasp of what it is you are trying to say.

I included my friend Russ' comments because he does refute some of what I say. I thought it might stimulate further debate on this fascinating subject. I never said I agreed with him. Apparently you have no opinions on any of these issues - and now feel the need to hit the books in order to form an informed one?

Well actually Michael some of us have this thing called "life" which keeps getting in the way of more interesting pursuits. I also have "admited" nothing about my knowledge of Normandy.

Having taken numerous history courses, read a fair amount of books, seen more than a few documentaries and spoken to a number of Veterans, my impression and recollection is that Canadians did do well in Normandy. That and the fact that our troops did in fact win would seem evidence enough.

Now unfortunately I have had to do many things which have kept and still keep me from the encyclopedic knowledge which Grogs like yourself have, so in order to properly present my postion I feel it neccessary to hit the books and dig out those long lost facts which have formed the overall opinion in my brain.

Or perhaps you feel this is some sort of "nerd Kung Fu" and my inability to spout off the number of buttons on a battle blouse weakens my position. I would argue that you with your encyclopedic knowledge have still made a grossly unfair judgement of the Canadian performance in Normandy.

You may take my need to research as a sign of thoroughness rather than ignorance. I am still wondering what your excuse is...

I will throw one point which I have enough ammo on so that you may chew upon it.

Leadership. You have listed one General who failed to be up to the task at hand and somehow this equates to poor leadership of the entire Canadian effort.

I would like to point out that the horrendous casualty rates among the Bns (176% when all was said and done) which meant that unit cohesion was none -existant. Massive losses in officers and men meant that relative strangers were placed into units and forced to work as a team.

This fact combined with the very poor conditions, as we both agreed upon, would have made leadership a monumental task. all Bn COs, Bde Comds etc would have had to rely on is the individual training and discipline of each soldier.

Units did not have time to gel. Yet in light of this the 2nd and 3rd Division not only held together but still beat a well trained and experienced foe, who through the bulk of his forces at him.

I think the point you and most "armchair generals" fail to realize is that Canadian performance should judged "well" because it managed to succeed at all. I cannot stress enough just how large an impact these losses would have had on Operations.

Now the next arguement will no doubt be that all those casualties "were in fact a sign of the poor performance in the first place". I will continue to work on that while you draft your masterwork of Operational and Tactical analysis on how these bumbling Generals could have done better..because after all if in your opinion they did do poorly it would seem to me that you have the DS solution as it were.

[Michael Dorosh]

DS solutions aren't of interest to me; the fact that I can or can not come up with better solutions to tactical problems in Normandy is irrelevant to the question of how well, or poorly, they performed there.

Specific criticisms you may be able to relate to, aside from poor leadership, was the emphasis spent on Battle Drill. English discusses this, and I think Bercuson talked a bit about this also. Battle Drill, as you know, was just that - specific drills that sections or platoons could perform in certain situations. It was not a flexible way to train troops. Battle Drill Training, on the other hand, incorporated the teaching of Battle Drill in a realistic and

challenging fashion - the drills themselves (which could, and were, taught on the parade square) were

incorporated into demanding field training - speed marching, obstacle courses, and the like. Many vets point to Battle Drill Training as being much more demanding than actual combat, and a very effective way of preparing them for combat.

Other vets disagree - saying things to the effect of "why did they make us run all over and kill ourselves like that? We never did anything so stupid in action."

B.L. Montgomery - the man ultimately responsible for molding the Canadian Army, since we had neglected our forces so badly between the wars, and Montgomery was a top notch trainer of men - had criticisms regarding Battle Drill also. He very rightly claimed that the drills Canadian soldiers were practicing were great, but were

doing nothing to teach units how to fight as units. John English seems to agree IIRC that unit collective training was poorly carried out, and this had its effects in Normandy.

Ask yourself, Warren - you are a junior officer in a Militia unit - how well would your weekend exercises prepare a formation to operate in a war? The emphasis paid on individual and unit training was done at the expense of formation (bde, div, corps) training. Russ alluded to the poor co-ordination of arms in Second Division. All of this should have been sorted out better in England, though the point about leadership is worthy of discussion on its own. Naturally dress reheasals can only carry you so far, though.

It would seem the modern Canadian way is to say "everything's fine" and not worry too much about the shortcomings in the army. Your comments, Warren, are indicative of this. I say that's not good enough, and it wasn't good enough in 1944. Stacey made the comment that regimental officers in the Canadian Army paid little attention to training in England, thinking that everything would be fine when it came time to do it for real. It wasn't.

Perhaps I'm simply reading you wrong, but you seem to imply the Canadian Army could not have done any

better in Normandy. That isn't the same as erforming poorly - you can perform well and still have room for improvement, as we both know. Are you saying that the Canadian Army performed well in Normandy and had no room for improvement? I should like to think that the 325 Black Watch men who went up Verrierres would disagree with you...

You may be right about Worthington, but perhaps you can point me to a creditable source that discusses that debacle in detail? You imply that there was nothing that could have been done to prevent the disaster that befell them. By extension I presume you include all the other disasters (Verrieres, Foret de la Londe, etc.), and chalk it up to fog of war, rather than poor leadership, planning and preparation?

Don't get me wrong - there were some disastrous battles in which there was no alternative to heavy casualties. Buron comes to mind; HLI suffered 262 casualties there in one morning during Charnwood in July 44. But it was their first assault, they were facing fanatics of the 12th SS Div, and they ultimately won, even holding out against a

strong counterattack by Panther tanks after the village was secured. Of course, there was a learning curve involved - I would contend that Allied troops didn't pass the learning curve fast enough and while individuals performed superbly, we have to look at their performance there from a detached viewpoint and access it in coldly military terms. If that makes us "armchair generals" so be it. You will be one yourself when you get back from the library and report your findings.

EDIT - by the same token, it is possible to win a battle and still have performed poorly. The Germans in Normandy did not lose because of the tactical prowess of the Allied armies; it was a combined effort - including heavy bombers, tactical aircraft and naval artillery on the Allied side. Weight of numbers had something to do with it too, by August. Using the fact that the Allies prevailed as proof that the Canadian forces - only one very small factor in the entire equation - performed well just defies logic.

[ May 08, 2002, 02:45 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]