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Official US Army training film on countering the T-62


John Kettler

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LukeFF,

You know and I know you're trying to bait me into responding in such a way that Steve comes down on me for violating his direct request regarding posting about certain matters. Not happening! If people want to know anything regarding any of the topics being brought up ref me  I'm not allowed to discuss, PM me.

All,

Now, how about we discuss the CIA intel docs I posted instead of trying to run me through an OT and verboten minefield? Notice no one's uttered a peep concerning them and their various confirmations of point after point I made earlier but no one wanted to accept from me. Did any of you bother to read what I had to dig hard for in the CIA FOIA Reading Room?

Regards,

John Kettler 

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5 hours ago, John Kettler said:

Now, how about we discuss the CIA intel docs I posted instead of trying to run me through an OT and verboten minefield? Notice no one's uttered a peep concerning them and their various confirmations of point after point I made earlier but no one wanted to accept from me. Did any of you bother to read what I had to dig hard for in the CIA FOIA Reading Room?

As much as I have been trying to stay out of this, I think this brings up a interesting background info point on "How to Research for a PC game". 

I am not going to weigh in on the specific argument, except to say I don't think we are going to see modeling of the current ammunition characteristics change dramatically - if for the reason alone that it basically feels about right.  We may see minor tweaks but right now we are not advocating for major mechanical changes to weapon systems (we would like to see some shifts in ammo types but that is another issue).

So as to these CIA documents.  Well first off, as impressive as the CIA is as an intelligence agency (and here movies and media have probably done more to promote the myth than anything), it is in the end a government agency.  Being government means that any information you glean immediately must take into account the broader context, and all of it with healthy grains of salt.

So John's first link I have actually seen before and it basically lays out the "threat" as they understood it in 1984.  It is a "memorandum" and as such is probably one of the better sources one could draw upon.  It really lays out the Soviet "tank position" and is not bad.  My only concern is that I am left wondering if it is a "say nothing new...because" report that sticks to the party line that the current administration wanted to hear...remember it was 1984 and the US was trying to attrit its way out of the Cold War, which turned out to be a good strategy.

The second link I take with a lot more critical eyes.  First off, it is a "thought piece" which the agency clearly puts at arms lengths ("the opinions of the authors"), so this is a trick that gets played all the time.  When one is trying to make a big argument, get some reputable senior folks to write an "opinion piece".  If it works, great.  If it creates blowback we just say "well it was their opinion".  Further, any "thought piece" sponsored by the agency that basically promotes "a modest improvements in intelligence..." (pg 2) set off that little yellow light. Was this real or was it a promotion piece to try and get more CIA funding. 

Then when one starts to dig a bit and open the aperture, I get more odd smells.  This piece was written in the Carter administration and that was not a great time to be in the CIA (we allude to this in the CMCW backstory), or National Defence for that matter.  Finally, the Director of the CIA at the time was ADM Turner ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stansfield_Turner) who not only was a big fan of technical intel (and put HUMINT in the back seat) but was Navy through and through.  This thought piece is very technical - play to the boss - but also very Army who were competing heavily to get their AirLand Battle concept off the ground and fighting for tenuous funding, all after Vietnam. 

In this context that paper really should be taken cautiously.  It does lay out what was a dangerous situation.  We know the US had fallen behind both technologically but also in over all mass, all the while with no offset strategy beyond nukes...not good.  But is it possible that an Army General is over-polishing the threat to simultaneously promote agency and Army funding...absolutely. 

In the end, when researching one has to remember that we can only see snippets of a much larger game being played at the time...and that matters.  Probably some of the best historical references that I found (and used) weren't locked away in TOP SECRET CIA drawers (and trust me, government overclassifies everything) they are in minutes from appropriation meetings: https://www.google.ca/books/edition/Department_of_Defense_Appropriations_for/llZ5mbGatSYC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=US+defence+spending+TOW+missile&pg=PA534&printsec=frontcover

These are not dark assessments, made in the shadows...this is the money trail of what actually happened.  The "truth" is far more mundane in reality and is largely guarded by accountants.

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The_Capt,

As you may recall, I was in the Operations Analysis Department of Hughes Missile Systems Group when things started going sideways on the tank-killing front. In rapid order, we went from TOW (5" dia warhead) to ITOW (same but with standoff probe and extended range to 3750 meters) to TOW 2 (6" diameter with extensible probe, concerning which my brother in the 2/11 ACR on Bradley CFVs was told "If you see one of these, then you're going to war.") TOW 2 wasn't just a bigger warhead, but a fundamentally new one, a double trumpet design with DU liners for maximum penetration and destructive effect. TOW 2 saw the debut of dual beacons, one the familiar xenon optical beacon, the other the all new thermal grid, which we referred to as the waffle iron. It emitted in the 8-12 micron band most WX and could be seen through dust, battlefield smoke, and most WX by the also built by Hughes FLIRs in the FCS. The xenon beacon provided backwards compatibility to earlier optical only systems, but with the extended range and massive hitting power. TOW 2A was the response to the ERA curveball, but the inevitable countermeasures led to a shift to the TOW 2 B and its dual SFFs for attack from above in a very low flyover. 

Though technically a medium antitank weapon because of size, man-portability and tested range (2500 meters), given its ability to kill ANY known tank when designed and do so clear out to 4000 meters, it's fairer to say the Javelin is a lethal cross between the medium and heavy antitank weapon categories. 

Even the most Product Improved LAW was hopeless, which is why LAW was declared obsolete and replaced with the OTS AT4.

The 1984 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study concluded, to the shock and dismay of my bosses, colleagues and self, that only two antitank missiles were still viable in a frontal engagement: Hellfire (which we didn't make) and Maverick (which we did). 

Remember, we did NOT have that Gorman CIA article at all, so our awareness of our vulnerability on one end and their greatly diminished vulnerability on the other end hit us four years after Major General Gorman laid out the horror story, and we didn't get but the barest info from the DSB 1984 Summer Study. Armed Force Journal International did report the incapability of most of our arsenal, including the new DU 105, vs a (presumably ERA equipped) combat loaded T-72.

From where I sit, it seems to me that what Major General Gorman said was the case in 1980 was confirmed in 1984 by the DSB and gone into deeply by the CIA's SMEs at the Soviet Threat Technology Conference in 1985. What we got rid of and what we bought for replacement systems track exactly with the key conclusions of the armor-antiarmor assessments made by the Army and the Intelligence Community.  In turn, would argue that the crash replacement of the Gen One 105 mm gunned Abrams tanks (except for the Marines) with V Corps M1HAs before the Hail Mary attack into Iraq was driven by a keen understanding of both the hitting power and hit survival situation for the Gen One Abrams--even with the DU 105 thrown in on the hitting end. Given these, it's reasonable to assert the US was in quite a fix in the CMCW timeframe, and to the extent it doesn't accurately model that grim reality, may I respectfully suggest changes be made to reflect the true situation?

On a separate note, have talked before about broadband obscurants. Here is a look at various types of obscurants, including broadband ones, in the context of a range of military actions conducted in various threat environments. One of the CIA docs I saw specifically mentioned broadband obscurants in conjunction with the T-64. A true broadband obscurant  works in the visible, IR and radar bands, to include MMW. Think of it as an EM sponge!  The Russians used broadband aerially delivered obscurants during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia to hide what they were doing from our ground and airborne radars. First learned of this from that Hughes colleague I've described who had a CIA sponsor in the OSWR (Office of Scientific and Weapons Research).

https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Obscurants+and+electronic+warfare.-a0276353040

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited by John Kettler
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33 minutes ago, John Kettler said:

The_Capt,

As you may recall, I was in the Operations Analysis Department of Hughes Missile Systems Group when things started going sideways on the tank-killing front. In rapid order, we went from TOW (5" dia warhead) to ITOW (same but with standoff probe and extended range to 3750 meters) to TOW 2 (6" diameter with extensible probe, concerning which my brother in the 2/11 ACR on Bradley CFVs was told "If you see one of these, then you're going to war.") TOW 2 wasn't just a bigger warhead, but a fundamentally new one, a double trumpet design with DU liners for maximum penetration and destructive effect. TOW 2 saw the debut of dual beacons, one the familiar xenon optical beacon, the other the all new thermal grid, which we referred to as the waffle iron. It emitted in the 8-12 micron band most WX and could be seen through dust, battlefield smoke, and most WX by the also built by Hughes FLIRs in the FCS. The xenon beacon provided backwards compatibility to earlier optical only systems, but with the extended range and massive hitting power. TOW 2A was the response to the ERA curveball, but the inevitable countermeasures led to a shift to the TOW 2 B and its dual SFFs for attack from above in a very low flyover. 

Though technically a medium antitank weapon because of size, man-portability and tested range (2500 meters), given its ability to kill ANY known tank when designed and do so clear out to 4000 meters, it's fairer to say the Javelin is a lethal cross between the medium and heavy antitank weapon categories. 

Even the most Product Improved LAW was hopeless, which is why LAW was declared obsolete and replaced with the OTS AT4.

The 1984 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study concluded, to the shock and dismay of my bosses, colleagues and self, that only two antitank missiles were still viable in a frontal engagement: Hellfire (which we didn't make) and Maverick (which we did). 

Remember, we did NOT have that Gorman CIA article at all, so our awareness of our vulnerability on one end and their greatly diminished vulnerability on the other end hit us four years after Major General Gorman laid out the horror story, and we didn't get but the barest info from the DSB 1984 Summer Study. Armed Force Journal International did report the incapability of most of our arsenal, including the new DU 105, vs a (presumably ERA equipped) combat loaded T-72.

From where I sit, it seems to me that what Major General Gorman said was the case in 1980 was confirmed in 1984 by the DSB and gone into deeply by the CIA's SMEs at the Soviet Threat Technology Conference in 1985. What we got rid of and what we bought for replacement systems track exactly with the key conclusions of the armor-antiarmor assessments made by the Army and the Intelligence Community.  In turn, would argue that the crash replacement of the Gen One 105 mm gunned Abrams tanks (except for the Marines) with V Corps M1HAs before the Hail Mary attack into Iraq was driven by a keen understanding of both the hitting power and hit survival situation for the Gen One Abrams--even with the DU 105 thrown in on the hitting end. Given these, it's reasonable to assert the US was in quite a fix in the CMCW timeframe, and to the extent it doesn't accurately model that grim reality, may I respectfully suggest changes be made to reflect the true situation?

On a separate note, have talked before about broadband obscurants. Here is a look at various types of obscurants, including broadband ones, in the context of a range of military actions conducted in various threat environments. One of the CIA docs I saw specifically mentioned broadband obscurants in conjunction with the T-64. A true broadband obscurant  works in the visible, IR and radar bands, to include MMW. Think of it as an EM sponge!  The Russians used broadband aerially delivered obscurants during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia to hide what they were doing from our ground and airborne radars. First learned of this from that Hughes colleague I've described who had a CIA sponsor in the OSWR (Office of Scientific and Weapons Research).

https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Obscurants+and+electronic+warfare.-a0276353040

Regards,

John Kettler

While I don't disagree with the thrust of bits of this post ... how many M1 Abrams did the USMC deploy in Gulf War 1 as your post infers that the USMC deployed that platform?  I'll give you a clue ... not overly many ...

If that was not one of your points then I apologize; however, relating to the M1 upgunning to something more than that wonderful piece of British engineering (the L7 105mm gun) in the 80s was extremely overdue and I doubt that the factors you mention were paramount in the US decision to do so.  The UK ditched the L7 when the Chieftain was fielded ... I may have posted some facts about Chieftains earlier in this thread ...

 

Edited by Combatintman
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46 minutes ago, John Kettler said:

Given these, it's reasonable to assert the US was in quite a fix in the CMCW timeframe, and to the extent it doesn't accurately model that grim reality, may I respectfully suggest changes be made to reflect the true situation?

John,  

   So first off you need to play the game first- you mentioned that you have not really dug into it yet - otherwise how do you really know the extent of what we have or have not modelled?  I don't know anyone who has played the game who feels like the US forces are "over gunned". 

   Next, given the ridiculous overmatch that occurred in 1991 - and here I have eyewitness sources of my own - I am not inclined to believe outlier sources that "US armor was on the brink of extinction!" a mere 6 years earlier...things in defence do not move that fast.  This frankly sound very much like intelligence/military industrial complex "chicken little squawking" for various self-serving reasons, a habit that was seen before.  You were an "insider" within an organization trying to sell things to DOD, you then know this.  Nor do the test we ran on T-72 after the fall of the Wall match up with it being some sort of super-tank that TOWs bounced off of.

   The timeframe of our game was deliberate 1979-1982 as it was literally a tipping point as the US was racing to catch up and re-establish tactical superiority, something they let lag after the Vietnam war.  I think we got the mechanics about right as the US forces are not overwhelming in the least, quite the opposite based on the feedback we have received.  

  I am afraid you would have to show some significant in-game deviation to really make a case here.

Edited by The_Capt
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CMCW timeframe is right on the cusp where the US realized they were in trouble. The game starts out with them firing WWII technology APDS rounds and finishes with them firing depleted uranium APFSDS rounds. Not to mention the transition from TOW to ITOW, from M113A1 to Bradley, and introduction of thermal gun sights.

One gets the impression if the US had invented the T64 they would have talked the tank up as the best thing since sliced bread, and they would have savagely mocked the (let's imagine Russian) M60 series for its flaws. Heck, the US even had an inferiority complex over the PT-76 light tank(!) and spent decades trying to field an American equivalent.

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4 hours ago, Combatintman said:

While I don't disagree with the thrust of bits of this post ... how many M1 Abrams did the USMC deploy in Gulf War 1 as your post infers that the USMC deployed that platform?  I'll give you a clue ... not overly many ...

If that was not one of your points then I apologize; however, relating to the M1 upgunning to something more than that wonderful piece of British engineering (the L7 105mm gun) in the 80s was extremely overdue and I doubt that the factors you mention were paramount in the US decision to do so.  The UK ditched the L7 when the Chieftain was fielded ... I may have posted some facts about Chieftains earlier in this thread ...

 

Combatintman,

The real point of what I was saying is stated here:

https://www.usmcmuseum.com/blog/the-m60s-last-hurrah

The M1IP would see deployment during the US-led coalition to Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Shield in 1990. However, fearing the Iraqis had modern Soviet ammunition for their T-72’s, many units had their M1IP’s (and even M1A1’s) replaced with Depleted Uranium reinforced M1A1HA’s right before Operation Desert Storm was launched.

Between what's said in the above and in the link below, it's important and fair to note The Marines inflicted wholesale devastation (claims of nine DOZEN destroyed Iraqi tanks, a mixed bag of T-55, Type 59 and smaller amounts of no-ERA T-72s. They did this with just over 200 tanks in a four battalion mix of M60A1, M60A3 and, according to this M1A1 (1 battalion). Therese were spitting range engagements, and if the reports are to be believed, Marine tank casualties amounted to one track damaged M60A3. Have no doubt this was possible, but would note that when the US assesses tank viability, the assessment is computed based on something like a 2000 meter engagement range. 

https://mwcs.blogspot.com/2020/01/reserve-tanks-in-gulf-war-1990.html

Have not dug into the game myself, because, following several DL debacles when the pre-orders became available, I still don't have it and assuredly couldn't play it right now if I did, having been in no shape to play CMx2 anything in over a (groan) year. Thus, other than reading the AARs and watching game videos on YT, I have no direct experience of the game. Did indeed spend years in the "belly of the beast", during which I saw people traumatized by the various threat revelations. I don't use that word "traumatized" lightly. For example, at the Soviet Threat Technology Conference I saw at least one guy collapse and have to be removed (there was speculation at the break it was a heart attack, but no one knew for sure) as well as possibly another, but it was in my peripheral vision and I was hanging on every word from the SME. There were enormous loud simultaneous gasps in the auditorium when various bombshells were dropped. There were plenty of times I was dumbfounded, jaws dropped and momentarily not breathing, because of the shock. When I got back to Rockwell, on my department manager's orders, I wrot,e from very good memory aided by memory training, a SECRET + 40 page summary of the entire conference, by subject area. Thst department manager went from a rosy complexion to to a colorless ghost in terms of his face. He was visibly distraught and was clearly emotionally reeling. 

Am not saying there is ANY defect in CMCW terminal effects modeling. What I am saying is that the popular perception and what was being said in the defense journals of the time didn't track at all well with what was known within some military and Intelligence circles going back to 1980, but in any event in 1984 following that DSB study. Given what most of the material of the time was saying, it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect that to bleed into not just CMCW, but other games as well. For example, I was thrilled to get my hands on AHs MBT (published 1989), only to discover that it was designed after and while consuming vast amounts of pro-western military-technical hype. In point of fact, when it came to armor-antiarmor modeling, it bore NO relationship to reality whatsoever, so I gave it to my nephews to play with as they liked. Any Abrams in the game was completely invulnerable frontally to 125 mm Soviet tank fire at all ranges, whereas any Abrams could frontally kill the Soviet MBTs, even the best, to whatever max range was. And this was for, as noted, a 1989 game intended to be set in 1987. 

To be clear, am NOT pushing for ANY change to current CMCW military-technical matters, but have been at pains to show how profound the gap was between perceived situation and what was really the case. How close CMCW comes to depicting our best understanding of that reality seems to be a kind of yardstick through which to evaluate it as a full-blown tactical sim. Your point about BFC not making changes without solid proof of the need for a change makes perfect sense to me. 

Regards,

John Kettler

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6 minutes ago, John Kettler said:

Any Abrams in the game was completely invulnerable frontally to 125 mm Soviet tank fire at all ranges

John, well if we are going to start citing anecdotes…

I met a US Sergeant Major in 1997 who was in VII and at the Battle of 73 Easting.  He told this story of one of his company tanks taking a T72 sabot round to the front at 500ms.  The tank did come to an abrupt halt but the sabot round stuck in the frontal armour “like a dart”.  At the same time they were killing Iraqi tanks at “3 miles”.  

Personally I will take an eye witness accounts over what sounds like intelligence community hysteria to me, I mean c’mon (heart attacks?!) these are just tanks and warfare is a lot more than that. Like if you kill their crappy Soviet logistics and they run out of fuel?  Land mines and DPICM still work, let alone AirPower.  And let’s not forget C4ISR, and the nuclear equation.  If I saw people getting “physically upset” on tank tactical disparity alone, my advice would to stop being amateurs and start thinking about the whole system.

Regardless, M1s in game are tough but not invincible, while that T64B shrugs off frontals like a beast…

 

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2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

John, well if we are going to start citing anecdotes…

I met a US Sergeant Major in 1997 who was in VII and at the Battle of 73 Easting.  He told this story of one of his company tanks taking a T72 sabot round to the front at 500ms.  The tank did come to an abrupt halt but the sabot round stuck in the frontal armour “like a dart”.  At the same time they were killing Iraqi tanks at “3 miles”.  

Personally I will take an eye witness accounts over what sounds like intelligence community hysteria to me, I mean c’mon (heart attacks?!) these are just tanks and warfare is a lot more than that. Like if you kill their crappy Soviet logistics and they run out of fuel?  Land mines and DPICM still work, let alone AirPower.  And let’s not forget C4ISR, and the nuclear equation.  If I saw people getting “physically upset” on tank tactical disparity alone, my advice would to stop being amateurs and start thinking about the whole system.

Regardless, M1s in game are tough but not invincible, while that T64B shrugs off frontals like a beast…

 

Have read accounts about the, ahem, giant darts and wish someone had a pic, for that would be something. Believe the darts were monkey model hardened steel and nothing with tungsten carbide, let alone DU. Incidentally, per Vaeriy Fofanov's site, the Soviets got their DU into the field in 1989, a year before we did. The so-called 120 mm fired Silver Bullet grossly overmatched anything Saddam had. Am somewhat doubtful of the three miles cited, because that's 4,8 kms, and the longest range tank kill ever (tank vs. tank) was a Challenger 1 at 5.1 kms. That said, I've read no detailed analysis of the engagements at 73 Easting, absolutely nothing rising to the level of battlefield engagement reconstruction. From what I can tell, though, the US Army has it analyzed to a fare thee well and fully computerized for use in training. 

No, I'm not kidding about heart attacks. One of the programs I worked was AMRAAM, and the proposal creation was months of all-out effort and madness. We got the five linear feet of proposal out (we won), but right after that the program manager had a massive heart attack and was out for four months. A guy who looked like Santa Claus died from UC in that same hyper stress period. My own father, working in another branch of Hughes, was put through so much stress and insanity on one of his programs that he had a massive heart attack and wound up having emergency quad bypass surgery. At Rockwell, I was such a wreck from dealing with a crazy project leader and impossible deadlines he artificially created (to feel alive) that, all told, was out on sick leave for four months before resigning. Military aerospace ate people alive.

Am perfectly in agreement with you regarding exploitable Soviet vulnerabilities outside of the DF antitank environment, but that was the key to holding on long enough for deep strike weapons and such to do their job, but we didn't really have anything with real reach until the Army fielded ATACMs. Steel Rain MLRS really doesn't have the capabilities of, say, Smerch armed with smart SFF submunitions, and my recollection is that we were largely outranged in tube artillery, too. Laser guided munitions were widely proliferated in the Red Army, too. The very high leverage systems we were counting on to offset Red superiority in numbers were already fielded, in quantity, by a foe whose forces considerably already outnumbered us.

Hope that sooner rather than later I get to DL CMCW and see how the in-game battlefield dynamics work myself. Back when I was able to play CMBS, I did see T-90s stop the first shots from M1A2SEPV3s, only to die instantly from the follow-up shots. From what I know of the T-64 series armor protection, shrugging off frontal hits in the CMCW timeframe seems eminently reasonable, but flank and rear shots will just gobble them up.

Regards,

John Kettler

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So for anyone still interested.  The War thunder forum (these guys are as bad as we are) has a pretty interesting thread on tank ammo performance center on the Gulf War:

https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/446384-m829-and-l26-shell-effectivness/

The Desert Storm report by the GAO (always watch the accountants) is pretty definitive (i.e. the Iraqis were unable to manage a single tank to tank kill, pg 4), it is tragic that your colleagues were having heart attacks over this just 5-6 years before.

Dunno what to tell you John, I would love to see a picture of a Soviet 76mm penetrating the front of an early M1 too.  Regardless, you can see how hard it is to really unpack true performance for some of this.  There will always be outliers but they are just that.  The trick is to make sure we don't take those outliers as the center of the bell curve.

The other thing to watch out for is myth.  I was a young troop commander in central Bosnia in 1994 during the war and there was this lunatic in the hills who would take old JNA aerial bombs and turn them basically into V1s, they made a helluva bang but he could only manage about one every 6 months.  That whole thing got way out of hand with legends of German scientists and V1 stocks armed with mustard gas.

The truth is often stranger but also more mundane at the same time.

desertstorm.pdf

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The_Capt,

Much appreciate the links. 

For the sake of clarity, would like to remind the readers that the vulnerabilities identified by Major General Gorman, by the Defense Science Board and the CIA were all tied to existing fielded US weaponry then, NOT to the products of the billions and billions poured into the get well program weaponry. M1A1HAs rushed from Europe to  were the state of the art US tanks in terms of armor, sensors and firepower, and Saddam's best tanks were, at best, ex-Soviet second tier vs them--if that. In the CMCW timeframe, though, the armor-antiarmor shoe is very much on the other foot, and I've sought to educate people on that score. Am in no way disputing the effectiveness of our veritable super weapons in the Gulf War and did note that at knife fight ranges, the Marines absolutely savaged Saddam's tank force in Iraq using a mixed force of M60A1s, M60A3s and a smaller portion of M1s. Shall leave it to others to put in RISE, +, etc. 

Have not given up on trying to run down that PT-76 HEAT round, but even if I do, I seriously doubt I'll be able to produce the live fire imagery vs the original Abrams armor array. Never saw or heard anything ref the JNA flying bombs. As far as mustard gas, far worse would've been Tabun or Sarin, both invented by the Germans.

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited by John Kettler
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The_Capt Read the complete (and wanted more info) GAO Report and the core text (not all the links) on the WarThunder link. Pretty bleak reading on the amicide and supply fronts. Speaking of amicide, after looking at a number of Russian attack helicopter thermal displays, would say the Russians have a similar plight--being able to shoot farther than they can ID targets from. Things may be better with the T-14 Armata, which has the licensed Thales Catherine TWS. But for CMCW purposes, that's irrelevant. What for sure is true, though, in-game is that the US has a clear night fighting advantage over the Russians because of their total dependence on pretty short range active IR. 

Must say the GAO is very hard to please, rating 90% combat availability as merely Good. Compared to some weapon systems I've dealt with, that's walks on water level combat availability. for example, in the late 70s and early 80s, F-14 availability was 60%, a figure so low that two carriers were needed in order to effectively fight, with one doing nothing but putting up CAP and E-2s, while the other flew strike missions. The next day, the roles were reversed.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

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On 10/9/2021 at 8:46 PM, LukeFF said:

Be prepared for a doozy of a discussion: 

 

God every time I see this it gives me the will to not ball a client out for one more day. Just pure gut laughter every time. 

Edited by Rinaldi
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On 10/6/2021 at 8:42 PM, Codreanu said:

Oh wow, reading this I'm not sure whether to laugh or cry.

My thoughts exactly.  :rolleyes:

@Rice  Suspect I may owe you an apology.  ;)

On 10/6/2021 at 10:56 PM, Rinaldi said:

So glad to see the newer crop of forum members getting to see the three ring circus :)

To be fair, even some of us older forum members weren't aware of all of this.....Jebus!  :o

Edited by Sgt.Squarehead
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  • 5 months later...

Note to self, these posts are from the same guy who wrote on "how hot will ukraine get" that Covid and bio weapons labs in Ukraine are at the heart of the invasion premise for Putin.. 

I find these posts rather jarring and incongruent (and incoherent) with a person who claims their sources are "of highest quality" when the actual post includes clear delusional far right propaganda from some charlatan who want to take your $$ for their "high quality and sourced" intelligence, when it's complete word salad and garbage fear mongering disinformation.

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20 hours ago, hm_stanley said:

Note to self, these posts are from the same guy who wrote on "how hot will ukraine get" that Covid and bio weapons labs in Ukraine are at the heart of the invasion premise for Putin.. 

I find these posts rather jarring and incongruent (and incoherent) with a person who claims their sources are "of highest quality" when the actual post includes clear delusional far right propaganda from some charlatan who want to take your $$ for their "high quality and sourced" intelligence, when it's complete word salad and garbage fear mongering disinformation.

I understand your feeling because sometimes I feel the same but did you really revive a thread that has been dead since last October to throw shade on John? That's not cool. Lots of folks put him on Ignore. That might be the move.

 

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