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The Russian Way of War


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Hey all,

Maybe this has already been posted somewhere on here before?  Anyway, just stumbled across this and have found it really informative and interesting.  I've been really enjoying both Black Sea and Cold War lately and loved the MRB tactical training scenario in getting to actually employ the Soviet Doctrine of the time and see how it actually works in practice!  It made me wonder how different their doctrine is now as related to the Cold War.  Well, here you go!

 

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf

Edited by Phantom Captain
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I would love to see training scenarios for Black Sea but while this resource is a good starting point I do worry its not quite up to date enough to deal with drones, precision artillery and ATGMs are much more lethal but armour defenses so different and so much more complex ....

Does anyone have insights into new model army doctrine .... In ukraine fighting the battle seems to be over once a few dudes or a vehicle dies, and I wonder why that is - maybe all guns are now trained on that battlefield it become too lethal to be seen?

THH

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  • 2 weeks later...
On 8/29/2021 at 4:18 AM, THH149 said:

In ukraine fighting the battle seems to be over once a few dudes or a vehicle dies, and I wonder why that is - maybe all guns are now trained on that battlefield it become too lethal to be seen?

Because this is low intensity conflict with some middle-intensity flashes. Mortars, artillery, MLRS do main work. Direct clashes usually of the level platoon-company with support. Engagements battalion vs. battalion or BTG vs. BTG level probably took place only several times (as i can recall now - Georgiivka, Luhansk airport final assault, Mariinka in 2015, maybe some other). There was no solid front line until the mid of 2015.

There is no Soviet WWII tactic on both sides - do not count the losses. Soldier's lifes matter from both sides, especially in such "hybride war", when both sides because of political reasons can't recognize belligerency and forced to act in some frames. Modern people have something to lose, unlike their ancestors. You can't now to throw the lines of soldiers on enemy machine-guns, armored vehicles and tanks. In 2014 Russians had not so big losses during invasion on Luhansk direction, but organized and fierce resisstance of Ukrainian troops forced them to stop advance, though they had full superiority. They consider their level of losses and, most importantly, level of motivation falling exceded allowance level, apropriate for current level of conflict. If this was full-scale warfare, maybe they would advance further - who knows?..

Many mobilized poor trained servicemen on Ukrainian side in 2014-2015 (as a rule in mech.brigades only one of three battalions had more of contractors-regulars) -they often had low motivation and couldn't fight under enemy fire (though, much depended on the commanders and contractors/motivated soldiers core of unit). Also the enemy side in 2014 had a lack of heavy equipment and often couldn't withstand directly even with low-motivated UKR army. So, many factors played in the question "when the battle is over?" 

Edited by Haiduk
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On 8/29/2021 at 2:18 AM, THH149 said:

I would love to see training scenarios for Black Sea but while this resource is a good starting point I do worry its not quite up to date enough to deal with drones, precision artillery and ATGMs are much more lethal but armour defenses so different and so much more complex ....

Does anyone have insights into new model army doctrine .... In ukraine fighting the battle seems to be over once a few dudes or a vehicle dies, and I wonder why that is - maybe all guns are now trained on that battlefield it become too lethal to be seen?

THH

The Russian Way of War is a good primer on the changes to the Russian army since the Cold War, and does a good job of informing CMBS.

The various "Lessons Learned" essays coming out Ukraine also include a lot of points that you could glean by playing CMBS, particularly around how drones are best used for Russian forces (pre-planning massed fires, rather than the point-destruction that the US leans towards).

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I found this document to be pretty interesting and informative on this topic:

https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG-RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf

Apologies in advance if this was already posted here or elsewhere, I think it addresses the specific ask for this topic thread. 

Now if only there were more missions and campaigns to play...

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On 9/7/2021 at 2:45 PM, Capt. Toleran said:

I found this document to be pretty interesting and informative on this topic:

https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG-RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf

Apologies in advance if this was already posted here or elsewhere, I think it addresses the specific ask for this topic thread. 

Now if only there were more missions and campaigns to play...

Really interesting, thank you!  

Ha, agreed!

 

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  • 1 month later...

Unless major fixes have been implemented, it appears that Russia's effort to shift strongly to UGVs ran badly aground in Syria when the URAN-9 in combat trials there ran into a host of difficulties that make normal teething troubles seem like small potatoes in sensors, suspension, FCS, data links and more. If they can get URAN-9 to work properly, then they may be able to shift, as planned in 2015, as much as 30% of their DF firepower by 2025 to UGVs (URAN-9  costs 1/5 of a T-90). URAN-9 is almost contemporaneous with CMBS. This article first appeared in January 2019. URAN-9 was in Syria in 2017, the same year as this video was posted. In the vid, URAN-9 is covered in depth starting at 4:45. The coverage is amazing, including man-portable control and dedicated multi-station UGV control vehicle, factory visit and more. Unfortunately, it's in Russian, and there are no English subtitles.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/russias-uran-9-robot-tank-was-disappointment-syrian-combat-testing-192048
 



Regards,

John Kettler

Edited by John Kettler
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