Revisiting Stalin's purges of the Red Army

[John Kettler]

Most of us are broadly aware of Stalin's purges of the Red Army and their devastating impact on Soviet combat performance when the Germans invaded and for quite some time thereafter, but what if it wasn't quite that way? What if the numbers are enormously exaggerated? What if the truth was cloaked and then and largely remains so now, at least, here in the West? A Texas A&M history professor, Robert Reese, a SME on the Soviet military under Stalin and author of four books on that topic, takes a hard look at what really happened, how bad it was, who it affected, how, why, reporting biases, already existing officer shortfalls, training deficiencies and more. The true picture is far more complex, convoluted and nuanced than the cut and dried depiction we're used to encountering.

https://www.historynet.com/stalin-attacks-red-army.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[Erwin]

Always interesting to read a new interpretation of history.  Thanks...

[SimpleSimon]

One of the most understated issues was that the Red Army-like every Army of the interwar period-was in the middle of a huge re-armament program. Aside from the obvious dangers posed by Fascism, observations from the Spanish Civil War, especially the debacle in Finland all made it clear that the Red Army was in a lamentable state in the 1930s. Stalin just gambled that Hitler was more rational than he was, believing at one point during the opening of the invasion that Hitler didn't even know it was happening-that a group of rogue German Generals were behind it! Sounds familiar doesn't it? 

The author of this article crucially points out the often unstated degree of consent and even collaboration there was to be found inside the rank and file of the nation for Stalin. No authoritarian-even totalitarian-could truly rule without some degree of cooperation, Stalin was just really good at masking how much of that there really was, and as a result-it was hard to trust peers and colleagues.

The whole event was definitely bad for morale and squashed a lot of interest officers might've shown in low-level initiative. If this would've enabled the Red Army to suffer Barbarossa a bit better i'm unsure, but initiative and independence among Junior Officers was never much valued in the Red Army. The twisted byzantine political games of Stalin's Soviet Union implies to me that the whole purge might well have been orchestrated just to take down one guy-Tukhachevsky-we will never know for sure, that's just my own observation. 

Edited April 9, 2021 by SimpleSimon

[John Kettler]

Erwin,
 

You're welcome.

SimpleSimon,

A most cogent reply! Now let me. Give you a perspective on the Cold War Red Army (circa mid 80s) take on initiative "Initiative consists of the exact and precise execution of the commander's plan." 

Regards,

John Kettler

[SimpleSimon]

Which is an interesting observation John, sounds like the precise opposite of what the word means in the West. The way western Armies are configured Officers are usually given more latitude in determination of how exactly they should proceed-and I do not always think that this degree of individual initiative is always warranted or desirable either...

One interesting product of the Red Army's rearmament initiative of the 1930s was the SVT-38 which later went on to become the SVT-40. Originally the weapon had been slated to replace the Mosin but the invasion caused production to halt before resuming again as the SVT-40. It does not sound like Soviet infantry really liked either rifle much. Sub-machine guns were preferred for assaulting and as far as rifles went yeah the Mosin was a relic but it was also very rugged and valued by marksmen for its accuracy. The SVT-40 was more or less revised production variant of the SVT-38 which was better designed. (The SVT-38's construction involved things like an awkward 2 piece stock and other bits meant it came out heavier than period battle rifles.) Both guns needed to be heavily built in order to contain the infamously high operating pressure of the 7.62x54R round. This is a big reason why the SKS and AK couldn't have appeared pre-war. They were built around a much lighter round and didn't need so many heavy parts.

This rearmament programs timing was poor-but since it also led to weapons such as the T-34 and KV-1 the only real mistake may have been that it started too late. If Stalin had foreknowledge of the invasion down to the date of attack it still wouldn't have been wise to cancel the program but what if he had? What if all the Soviets had were the T-26 or I-16? 

[LukeFF]

On 5/3/2021 at 4:50 AM, SimpleSimon said:

One interesting product of the Red Army's rearmament initiative of the 1930s was the SVT-38 which later went on to become the SVT-40. Originally the weapon had been slated to replace the Mosin but the invasion caused production to halt before resuming again as the SVT-40.

Production of the SVT-40 began a full year before the Germans invaded.

On 5/3/2021 at 4:50 AM, SimpleSimon said:

The SVT-38's construction involved things like an awkward 2 piece stock and other bits meant it came out heavier than period battle rifles.)

An SVT-38 (and an SVT-40, for that matter) weighs practically the same as an M91/30.

On 5/3/2021 at 4:50 AM, SimpleSimon said:

Both guns needed to be heavily built in order to contain the infamously high operating pressure of the 7.62x54R round.

Not sure what you are trying to convey by saying "heavily built", but ultimately the main reason why the SVT-40 was dropped is because it took far less time to churn out Mosins. Not being an easy weapon to maintain in the field and accuracy issues didn't help it, either:

Translation:

Quote

 

Description of the issue:

Proving grounds and battlefield tests of self-loading sniper rifles developed by factory #314 based on approved and prototype blueprints revealed unsatisfactory shot groups, and significant deviations of the first and second bullets from the dispersion ellipse.

Both drawbacks are caused by design flaws in the rifle and scope mount.

Attempts by the factory to improve groupings with small design proved fruitless, as reducing dispersion and preventing the 1st and 2nd bullet from deviating too much requires significant changes to the rifle and scope mount.

Since, currently, the 7.62 mm model 1891/30 sniper rifle with the PE scope is being manufactured, and a scope mount for the PU scope for the same rifle is under development, it is reasonable to cease production of 7.62 mm self-loading rifles with the PU scope, provided that proving grounds trials of the model 1891/30 rifle prove satisfactory.

Decisions of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army:

1.Finish trials of the PU scope mount for the model 1891/30 sniper rifle no later than August 20th, 1942.
2.If results are positive, cease production of self-loading sniper rifles starting on September 1st.
3.If the self-loading sniper rifle is removed from production, increase production of model 1891/30 sniper rifles.