Books on the British/Canadian experience in Normandy

[Redwolf]

Anything particularly good available as Kindle?

Having a hard time with my boxes full of paper books.

[DesertFox]

Marc Milner, Stephen Napier, John Buckley, everything by Terry Copp and Mark Zuehlke. All available for Kindle.

[LongLeftFlank]

I mentioned this over on another thread, but this thesis paper is a great read for those interested in the British "PBI" experience in NWE, although it is not confined to Normandy: 

From D-Day to Bremen with the `Unspectaculars'- the roles of the infantrymen of the 2d East Yorkshire Regiment, 8th Brigade, 3rd Division [2007]

The Schaddenhof Farm siege of Feb 1945 would make a terrific scenario ("Banger's Here!") for a future CMFB British module. Detailed map in the PDF. 

Would even make a nice miniseries: "The Unspectaculars", complete with its true-blue British schoolboy hero, Major "Banger" King (although WokeBeeb would likely take some liberties with that 'bachelor' thing. Well, who knows?).

History

The East Yorkshire Regiment had a long and illustrious record of service, dating back to 1685, when it was known as the 15th Regiment of Foot. The regiment's battle honours include General Wolfe's success at the Heights of Abraham in Quebec, Canada in 1759. Subsequently, ten officers of the 15th went on to become governors of provinces in North America. During the American War of Independence the troops gained their nickname of the `Snappers' when, at the battle of Brandywine in 1777, their ammunition ran short. Lt Col Bird ordered that the remaining ammunition be handed to the best shots, while the rest of the soldiers `snapped' (fired small blank charges of powder) to give the impression they could still fire effectively. 

...Waiting on the beach at La Panne for their [1940] evacuation, the soldiers of the 2d Battalion incurred around eighty casualties.

Cadre

...The majority came from working-class families, with jobs ranging from millworkers to miners, brewery workers to butchers. Only one who was not an officer, stayed on for further education past the age of fourteen.

...Montgomery insisted that all commanders took training seriously, with emphasis on the practising of battle drills, a concentration on realism with the use of live ammunition, and the opportunity, where practicable, to rehearse operations in advance. He keenly advocated battle drills as a way to speed up the prosecution of operations.

"We were introduced to live ammunition and being fired at, and the Bren gun was on a fixed line. It couldn't move, and it was firing about three feet above the ground, and you came to this place and there was a big sign and it said "crawl or else". Of course, these three lads went straight out, straight into the machine gun fire and were cut to pieces."

There was also ample opportunity for house-to-house fighting to be practised including the technique of `mouseholing' whereby soldiers learnt `tunnelling from one house to the next when we couldn't go out. You knocked a hole through the wall'....  Specialist street fighting skills were practised in Glasgow.

Sword Beach

"The next thing, the ramp dropped, the steel doors were opened and a machine gun fired up the middle of our landing craft, hitting a lot of the chaps. We were up and out. Capt. McGregor was shouting everyone out and we were all slipping on the vomit and the blood."

`The Commandos who followed us were surprised at the mortality rate and put it down to inexperience. This wasn't the case. We had been well trained. But heavy artillery and machine gun fire was pouring down on us. There just wasn't anywhere to go'.

Two-thirds of [one] platoon became casualties in the initial landing, leaving just eleven men available to advance inland.

The Sharp End

The casualty rate among the young Canloan officers was very high. Of the original 673 Canadians involved in the scheme, 20 per cent were killed and a further 50 per cent wounded, principally in Normandy; junior officers in particular, faced the attendant risks of `leading from the front' 

It was increasingly recognised that some recruits would not be suitable to withstand the rigours of active service in the front line. Despite this, the increasing need for manpower overrode the warnings of the Army psychiatrists. 

In the battle of the Chateau de la Londe, Lt Fetterly sent back a former wrestler who `kept at me to turn back before we all got killed. As he was useless, I told him to take back the two wounded. He took one under each arm and actually ran carrying the two'. 

Stragglers from another battalion which was taking heavy 
casualties, attempted to retreat through 2d Battalion lines. After [Major] Crauford ordered the men to return to their unit, a nearby soldier remarked: '"they didn't get away with it with you Sir!" and it occurred to me then I had been dead right. The good soldier doesn't want to see the scroungers get away with it.' 

'You didn't get any proper sleep. You were in a slit trench with another chap and you'd grab an hour or two and then he would. There was nowhere to sit. You just got your head down as best you could'. The ability to dig a slit trench quickly was essential. Often the interviewees would dig more than one trench a day - as soon as the soldiers stopped, it was the first duty that was performed. 

Maintaining a constant high level of patrolling is a feature of [CO] Lt Col Renison's memoir. Patrols varied according to their purpose, whether for reconnaissance, or to protect the position (a `standing' patrol) or to demoralise the enemy by engaging them, and in doing so, perhaps capture a prisoner for intelligence (a `fighting' patrol). Their different purpose would determine how many men went, and what weapons would be carried.  'Every time you went out you'd wonder if you were coming back'. [But]`it meant that next day you could get your head down without being disturbed for five or six hours'.
For the 2nd Battalion, the strain that resulted from being in action became apparent by the end of June. German troops counterattacked and `some of our bomb happy crowd beat it'. 

Eric Cooper-Key of the Royal Norfolk Regiment revealed that after two months, when his battalion had been turned over with 100 per cent casualties, he was content if he, his platoon commanders and sergeants and perhaps half a dozen men of his company, reached the objective in an attack. The rest would appear over the next twenty minutes or so following the worst being over. 

'We set off to clear a small wood. Chris Lochran said "Do I have to lead you buggers everywhere? " and I took umbrage and said "No bugger has to lead me, I can lead myself. But he's getting paid for doing the job". So Chris Lochran said "If you get paid will you bloody well do it? " and I said yes. So I was section commander just like that.'

[But] it is clear that displays of initiative and leadership from the ranks were not commonplace. The argument that certain men will display leadership abilities, regardless of rank, reflects John Keegan's idea of the `big man', the person who can wield power over the others and who is a `key figure in the way battles work'. Such `big men' are the ones who bring battles alive and who encourage others to follow them, yet may not hold any rank at all, indeed `authority may disapprove of him and his comrades may even dislike him'. 

One section commander remembered calling to his section to follow him into a wood. Having advanced quite some way, he discovered that no-one had followed him and he was making the advance single-handed. 

Banger

The ideal military leader is one who manages to combine excellence as a task-specialist with an equal flair for the social or heroic aspects of leadership.
Major Charles King (DSO & Bar), company CO and later Battalion 2IC, a prewar regular officer known throughout the battalion as `Banger', inspired men within the battalion, and also the 3rd Division, with his bravery, energy and inspirational leadership. An able and witty raconteur, he wore his hair overlong and his hat off the regulation line. "`Banger" was father, mother, big brother, you name it, all rolled into one'.
On D-Day, King read extracts from Shakespeare's Henry V to his men aboard the landing craft. Later, King wrote to return money he had removed from his batman's wallet for safekeeping, `plus something to have a drink with me when you get out of hospital'. 
After crossing the Escaut canal, `King had gone across and taken the battalion objective. He'd gone miles ahead and was holed up in a farmhouse'.
Lt Fetterly complained to `Banger' that he had taken patrols out four nights in a row in Holland. The Major asked Fetterly to take that night's patrol as `you Canadians have that Indian blood in you' and then gave him time off.
Major King understood fear; before sending out a patrol he would brief the NCO and `as soon as you went in he'd have the rum bottle out and he'd put you in the picture'. 
If `Banger' came to see you and you were under fire, he would never get down. He'd get down on one knee but never lie down.
After one patrol, King threatened a soldier that he would shoot him if he behaved in the same way again. He then told him that he would receive the backing of the other men in the patrol to do so: `if you let them down they won't object to you being shot'.
King's charmed life ended on 15th April 1945 when his jeep ran over a mine.

Signalling to the tanks, particularly regarding ceasefires, was most successful using the phosphorus smoke from the 77 Grenade.

The Overloon and Venraij battles were a prime example of battalions and at a higher level, brigades, working together to successfully take their objectives. It was usual procedure for Divisional level attacks to involve two Brigades while the other was held in reserve, allowing the men of one Brigade to have some measure of rest, while all the battalions involved in the two attacking Brigades, worked in concert.

Overloon

[13 Oct] 2nd Battalion's leading companies, `C' and `D', were held up by the enemy in the `dog-shaped' woods, while suffering shelling and mortar fire. Although each of these forward companies had a troop of tanks in support, the armour, which also included flame-throwing Crocodiles, faltered due to the high number of mines.... `D' Company reached the south-west corner of the woods by 2pm but could not advance further, as they had lost their officers and CSM, and were being commanded by a corporal.

"Once on the move I only went to ground when under extreme small arms fire, hit the ground, roll over, or crawl to a good position and begin to fire, then move by ones, and groups, always covered by withering fire of the others. It was the only way, otherwise one could have stayed there all day, or weeks, like the 1914-18 war."

Operation AINTREE

[Venraij, 16 Oct] Three supporting tanks of the Coldstream Guards became bogged down in the mud. 2nd Battalion came under Nebelwerfer fire and did not set off until 5pm, waiting for the Suffolks, who were held up by heavy mortar and machine gun fire, to advance. From Venraij, the battalion area was under [enemy] observation.
`B' Company crossed the stream and headed left, followed by the rest of the Battalion. Progress was slow as the tracks were difficult to follow and sniping in the vicinity `made people rather jumpy in the dark'. 
The following day the attack on Venraij continued, with `C' Company on the left, heading for a road junction towards the north-east of the town, and `A' Company on the right, making for the church and market square. `D' Company would follow `C', to cover the gap between the two forward companies. This is the classic set-piece battle with two companies forward, a procedure that Hastings argued too much reliance was placed upon.

Brigade was informed of the good progress being made, but the battalion was told to wait.... As it started to become dark, `D' Company, under Capt Reg Rutherford, had also reached the town and decided to push on past their objective, reaching the town centre before any other troops of the battalion, in the knowledge that `A' Company had become held up before the market square. During the night German patrols continued to enter the town and `D' Company troops found themselves engaged in continued fighting until 4am.

The Breaking Point

Battle exhaustion cases were high [1:2] in proportion to wounded during the battle for Venraij. [Exhaustion was both mental and physical:] `cold and wet weather, inability to dig proper slit trenches due to the waterlogged ground; a prolonged battle with not very much progress and the continual fear of mines'. Around three-quarters of the exhaustion cases were `returned to unit' following proper care.  [Other factors included] loss of Company Commanders with no real leaders to take their place, and a lack of `esprit de corps' within the troops, particularly relating to the arrival of new reinforcements.

At the end of January 1945 freezing conditions in the Maas area had necessitated calling a temporary halt to offensive action. The men had time to live together in their sections without the relentless turnover from casualties and had therefore formed closer bonds, so that `each section had got its team spirit'. The section, rather than the company or battalion, was considered in the same light as a family. Each man had at least one `mucker' that he would dig-in with and with whom he would share a trench.

Schaddenhof Farm

Operation Veritable `was a killing match; slow, deadly and predictable', as the Germans defended tenaciously. Infantry of the Battalion worked alone in their area, supported by the artillery. 

[Schaddenhof Farm, 27-28 Feb 1945, map] One platoon waded through the Mühlen-Fleuth to capture the garrison at Schaddenhof. The Germans counter-attacked, with tanks and infantry and panzerfausts which fired directly at the farmhouse walls. The only armoured support was provided by the tank of the artillery forward observation officer. 
The Germans attempted to cut off `C' and `B' Companies by infiltrating the woods between the farm buildings and the bridge and the dwindling ammunition made the situation desperate for the forward companies. Peter Brown threw a potato at a German soldier, fooling him into thinking it was a grenade, at the height of the battle.
The Germans entered the outbuildings and called on the battalion to surrender. The forward platoon of Lt Glew had to withdraw to the farmhouse after being attacked by paratroopers [who] `all looked to be about 7 feet tall. Whether they were drunk or drugged I don't know but they appeared to just keep coming forward without trying to take cover'.
The isolation of the two forward companies was compounded when the Germans attacked the Middlesex heavy machine-gunners in the copse near the bridge and drove them out. 
Major King's timely arrival in a Bren carrier with ammunition for C company, having driven through a German-held area, was confirmed by wireless with the brief message: "Banger's here"'.  Two of the most seriously wounded men were then evacuated in the carrier on the return journey. For his actions, King was awarded the bar to his 
DSO.
The efforts of the entire Corps artillery was called for, and by shelling right up to the farmhouse walls, they managed to hold off the German attacks.
83 German dead were recorded in the area in front of `B' and `C' Company positions and around 150 POWs were taken. By the following morning nine officers of the battalion and 147 soldiers had been killed or wounded.
The Divisional Commander named the bridge `Yorkshire Bridge' in honour of this battle.

From Normandy to Bremen the 2nd Battalion suffered 1072 dead, wounded or missing, a complete turnover of the rifle companies by two and a half times. This is clearly a high rate of loss, although not an exceptional figure for an infantry battalion of this period.

[Sgt Joch]

On the Canadians in Normandy, I would recommend Terry Copp's "Fields of Fire" which covers the june-august 44 period. He also has a second book "Cinderella Army" which covers the sept. 44-may 45 period. I have read both and use them regularly for reference.

As to why the Canadians suffered more casualties than the other CW forces in Normandy, roughly 20% more as I recall, there are many theories. The one put forward by Copp, which I think makes the most sense, is that Canadian officers had an inferiority complex regarding Monty and the British, partly the "colonial" mentality and partly the fact that Canadian forces had been stuck in Britain for years training while British/CW forces had been fighting in North Africa and Italy. There was also the stain of Dieppe to overcome. Because of all that Canadian forces volunteered for all the tough operations which inevitably led to higher casualties. The British, who were facing a very severe manpower/replacement crunch were very happy to let the Canadians take the lead.

[DesertFox]

28 minutes ago, Sgt Joch said:

As to why the Canadians suffered more casualties than the other CW forces in Normandy, roughly 20% more as I recall, there are many theories.

To the Last Canadian?: Casualties in the 21st Army Group

 

Terry Copp, Wilfrid Laurier UniversityFollow

 

Abstract

In Normandy, Canadian infantry divisions suffered a higher rate of casualties than British divisions engaged in similar operations. These figures have been used by some historians to prove Canadian failure on the battlefield. However, by using statistics gathered by operational research scientists during the war, this article shows that the “considerably heavier casualties” suffered by the Canadians in Normandy and beyond were the product of a greater number of days in close combat with the enemy, not evidence of operational inexperience or tactical failure.

To the Last Canadian?: Casualties in the 21st Army Group (wlu.ca)

 

Edited May 19, 2021 by DesertFox

[Peachy]

I recommend "The Guns of Normandy" by George Blackburn - a memoir of his time in the Canadian Artillery in Normandy but actually much more than that and really more about the Normandy combat experience. Its a thick book.