Russian Armed Forces Doctrine - Sources?

[THH149]

A question I have is what sources are good for descriptions of Russian (not Soviet) military doctrine  - operational and tactical operations?

By Russian i mean post the fall of the Soviet Union, so after 1991.

A google search turns up either to much rubbish or to little useful material.

Thanks

THH

[cyrano01]

This dates back to 2017 but it might be a decent starting point.

 

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf

[THH149]

Very interesting, thank you so much.

I wanted to attach an article as a returning gift, but I'm only allowed 13kB! sorry!

[fireship4]

Firstly links which should fit you bill exactly, especially the first one:

  "The Russian Way of War" (2016):  https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf

  "Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook" (2016):  https://www.multibriefs.com/briefs/rcaa/Russian_New_Generation_Warfare_Handbook.pdf

  "The Tanks of August" a set of essays on the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 (2010): https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/119867

  "'Lessons Learned' from the Russo-Ukrainian War (2015):  https://prodev2go.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/rus-ukr-lessons-draft.pdf

  "Learning Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict (2019):  https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/NS-D-10367-Learning-Lessons-from-Ukraine-Conflict-Final.pdf

  "Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine" (2017): https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1498/RAND_RR1498.pdf

 

Secondly stuff that might be a little outside it:

  "Russia Military Power" (2017):  https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military Power Publications/Russia Military Power Report 2017.pdf

  "Cyber War in Perspective, Russian Agression Against Ukraine" (2015):  https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CyberWarinPerspective_full_book.pdf

  "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" (1996), based on "Combat Actions of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan" (1991), translated into English with additional commentary, was for internal use by the Russian military/military academia to learn lessons from the war, with information gleaned via interviews of military personell.  It might be a useful primer on the problems they were trying to solve as they transitioned into the Russian Federation: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a316729.pdf

  "The Other Side of the Mountain" (1996, with thanks to Sgt. Squarehead for the suggestion), companion to the above book told from the Mujahideen perspective, again from direct interview and personal experience:  https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a376862.pdf

  "The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military" (2013):  https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA599655.pdf

  "Russian Forces in the Western Military District (2020, posted in the forums recently by Ikalugin):  https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2020-U-028759-Final.pdf

  "Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine" (2019):  https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Russias-Military-Strategy-and-Doctrine-web.pdf?x30898&x87069

Edited December 25, 2020 by fireship4
Two list additions & clarity.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

Now that's a comprehensive list. 

I seem to recall that there is a second part to "The Bear Went Over the Mountain".

[fireship4]

You're right, thanks, I didn't know (or forgot), there is a companion book "The Other Side of the Mountain", telling the Mujahideen side, the authors (one of whom helped edit the other book and who was a Colonel in the Afghan army, taught students who were part of the Mujahideen, fought himself, and was now working as a journalist) having travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to interview the Mujahideen at the behest of the USMC.  Different times!  I suppose this little book was widely distributed amongst those heading out to Afghanistan circa 2001...  anyway I will add it to the list above.

 

EDIT: Yes I found it in my unsorted literature folder as well, it seems I stuck it there 10(!) years ago and never read it.  In fact to be honest "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" is the only one I had more than a cursory look at.

Edited December 25, 2020 by fireship4

[fireship4]

The book "The Russian Way of War" I mentioned above references a document on a Russian hosting website "Motor Rifle (Tank) Brigade in Basic Combat" (2011) as a source, and it seems to have been drawn on a lot, with text translated and copied and the images redrawn, though it seems not to be a entire 1:1 copy (I noticed one drawing omitted after a quick look, and the book seems to draw from other sources).  The original, again on a Russian website (beware), I link via (much worse) website translation by Google: https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&u=https://studopedia.info/1-67757.html&prev=search

[ikalugin]

4 hours ago, fireship4 said:

Firstly links which should fit you bill exactly, especially the first one:

  "The Russian Way of War" (2016):  https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf

  "Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook" (2016):  https://www.multibriefs.com/briefs/rcaa/Russian_New_Generation_Warfare_Handbook.pdf

  "The Tanks of August" a set of essays on the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 (2010): https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/119867

  "'Lessons Learned' from the Russo-Ukrainian War (2015):  https://prodev2go.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/rus-ukr-lessons-draft.pdf

  "Learning Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict (2019):  https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/NS-D-10367-Learning-Lessons-from-Ukraine-Conflict-Final.pdf

  "Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine" (2017): https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1498/RAND_RR1498.pdf

 

Secondly stuff that might be a little outside it:

  "Russia Military Power" (2017):  https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military Power Publications/Russia Military Power Report 2017.pdf

  "Cyber War in Perspective, Russian Agression Against Ukraine" (2015):  https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CyberWarinPerspective_full_book.pdf

  "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" (1996), based on "Combat Actions of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan" (1991), translated into English with additional commentary, was for internal use by the Russian military/military academia to learn lessons from the war, with information gleaned via interviews of military personell.  It might be a useful primer on the problems they were trying to solve as they transitioned into the Russian Federation: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a316729.pdf

  "The Other Side of the Mountain" (1996, with thanks to Sgt. Squarehead for the suggestion), companion to the above book told from the Mujahideen perspective, again from direct interview and personal experience:  https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a376862.pdf

  "The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military" (2013):  https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA599655.pdf

  "Russian Forces in the Western Military District (2020, posted in the forums recently by Ikalugin):  https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2020-U-028759-Final.pdf

  "Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine" (2019):  https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Russias-Military-Strategy-and-Doctrine-web.pdf?x30898&x87069

Sadly the quality is, ehem, not uniform. And in some cases it is real sad, ie the DIA paper.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

8 hours ago, fireship4 said:

(one of whom helped edit the other book and who was a Colonel in the Afghan army, taught students who were part of the Mujahideen, fought himself, and was now working as a journalist)

That may be the guy I (very loosely) based 'Abdul Gul' on in my CM:A Blue campaign.....It's a while since I looked at it TBH.

[fireship4]

9 hours ago, ikalugin said:

Sadly the quality is, ehem, not uniform. And in some cases it is real sad, ie the DIA paper.

The 2017 document is supposed to be the spiritual successor to "Soviet Military Power" which was first published in 1981 as a public document for stated purpose of informing them as to the balance of power, and seems much more in-depth.  The last long (164 pages) version I found was SMP1989:  http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/May/SovietMilPower1989.pdf, with SMP1990: http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/May/SovietMilPower1990.pdf being a bit shorter, and the 1991 version being renamed "Military Forces in Transition":  https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/3/137881/0300_Military_forces_in_transition_1991_ENG.pdf and running in at 65 pages.

If you could be a little more specific with your criticism we might learn something.  When I first saw it on the forum we had a little discussion and it seemed to me to be a bit light on detail.  I remember thinking that it lacked anything about tactical nuke doctrine, which had been mentioned elsewhere as something they had differences in doctrine on. 

Orders of battle at a low level like in "The Russian Way of War" linked previously are probably the closest in form to what was asked for - the sources linked within may also be useful.  For higher level orders of battle I found another publication called "Russia's Military Posture: Ground Forces Order of Battle": http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf

Edited December 25, 2020 by fireship4
Form.

[ikalugin]

It is poorly/lazily researched in general. Examples below:

1) GRU was reformed before 2017 and no longer existed under this name.

2) Those are nominal figures, note the nature of the 2016-2017 change.

[THH149]

Thanks everyone for helping me out, I have a great insight into Russian thinking about war at many levels.

I was interested specifically in reading some of the doctrine around attacking as Russian (maybe it applies to Syria too!) of endeavouring to attack with a 3:1 combat ratio (don't Western countries try to do the same?) and heading that attack with tanks, followed by infantry dismounts then BMPs, helped by significant artillery support etc. 

So it would seem the lead tanks are significantly disadvantaged vis western forces. Maybe T90s are suitably protectes but other types would find it hard going if they tried to act as heavy tanks eg like Jagdpanthers in a WWII german attack. 

I wonder if that finding was correct and what doctrine would be more successful (maybe infantry first as scouts to identify targets and tanks/BMPs are direct fire support?), so that's a neat puzzle to think over in CMBS and CMSF2.

I was also surprised to read that Russian forces have ground to ground radar at the platoon level, both attached to weapons and networked (syrian arab army was doing that in 2016), and wondered whether/how CMBS represents that maybe by better spotting?

Thanks again everyone

THH

[ikalugin]

3  to 1 is the norm driven by historical experience and lanchester laws.

That said the ways you achieve 3 to 1 norm (or better) are varied, you could reinforce, you could use a strike or deception measures to reduce the enemy force or... you could reduce attack frontage (concentration of effort), etc.

[MikeyD]

The west has its own problems. I recall the NATO march into Kosovo in 1999. The US route was entirely dependent on which bridges were able to hold an Abrams crossing it. The US march was embarrassingly slow and clumsy. They looked on with envy at Canadians scooting around up front of the line in their Coyotes (LAV-25s), meeting Russians in the BTR-70s coming from the other direction. The Kosovo invasion was basically the birthplace of the Stryker program

[Sgt.Squarehead]

That nearly got a bit out of hand at Pristina IIRC. 

[HUSKER2142]

On 12/28/2020 at 10:41 AM, MikeyD said:

The Kosovo invasion was basically the birthplace of the Stryker program

It's interesting, is there any material to read in the public domain ?

[MikeyD]

All my info is from my ooooold memory banks. I recall Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney (remember him?) quickly holding a fighting vehicle 'beauty pageant' of a wild assortment of vehicles for the title of 'Interim Fighting Vehicle' and the Swiss Mowag Piranha coming out on top. Its ironic that it was a competition for an 'off-the-shelf' vehicle because the Pentagon then changed EVERYTHING on Piranha to turn it into Stryker. Changed it so much that it no longer fit the specs for the competition! When Stryker appeared in Iraq in 2006 it was fresh off operational testing to see if it worked as advertised.

[MOS:96B2P]

I found the below, on GrogsHead,  that might be interesting.

 

[Erwin]

Very interesting to see how much frontage space a company and above attack requires.  A company attack would require a frontage of about 1000 meters.  Few scenarios have maps that allow that.  Most CM maps are only suitable for one or two platoons.

[fireship4]

According to "The Russian Way of War", a first-echelon motor-rifle company with attached tank platoon has a frontage of up to one kilometer and narrows to 500m in the breakthrough sector.

 

[Sgt.Squarehead]

13 hours ago, fireship4 said:

and narrows to 500m in the breakthrough sector.

Sounds like the bit we're usually in. 

[fireship4]

I tell you what, I don't envy any BTG commander going up against dug in infantry with Javelins.  A full battalion of artillery (18 155mm) tubes is not enough, lacking MLRS, the tanks would have to storm forward or sit back as their spotting won't do, smoke would have to be used liberally, or troops would have to creep foward and be mortared.  Company mortars would have to be called in by platoon commanders for the most part, since there is one spotter per battalion.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

Yeah, but real Russians wouldn't be even slightly lacking MLRS. 

[ikalugin]

2 hours ago, fireship4 said:

I tell you what, I don't envy any BTG commander going up against dug in infantry with Javelins.  A full battalion of artillery (18 155mm) tubes is not enough, lacking MLRS, the tanks would have to storm forward or sit back as their spotting won't do, smoke would have to be used liberally, or troops would have to creep foward and be mortared.  Company mortars would have to be called in by platoon commanders for the most part, since there is one spotter per battalion.

Fires are normally controlled by forward deployed artillery officers, hence why separate spotters are rare.

In a high intensity war BTG is actually going to be a rare unit, but other mission orientated groupings (ie forward detachment) are going to be more common. So you are likely to expect a battalion sized force on a chosen (by the attacker ofc) axis to have commanding officers from the regimental/brigade/division artillery group with links to their artillery assets.

But hey, BTGs are an easy buzzword term to fetishise, especially if you are only thinking in tactical terms.

Edited January 22, 2021 by ikalugin

[fireship4]

3 hours ago, ikalugin said:

"Fires are normally controlled by forward deployed artillery officers, hence why separate spotters are rare".

Ok, good to know, but it seems what I said holds true at least for the battion mortars, unless the forward spotters are attached to the battalion.  I presume they are attached to brigade artillery though, and that brigade fires are (at least in the main) planned on an objective and as part of an offensive, not used to respond to recently spotted targets.

 

3 hours ago, ikalugin said:

"In a high intensity war BTG is actually going to be a rare unit..."

Yes I remember someone (possibly you) saying that in a "proper" war battalions as part of brigades/divisions would be used and not BTGs, and I have kept that in mind, and imagine anyone in the field understands this.

However it should be considered that (as far as I have read) BTGs may not be there only because they work well in specific conflicts, but because Russia may have trouble maintaining brigades/divisions throughout long conflicts (during which troops must be rotated home).  This may mean that BTGs would be used more often in more types of conflicts outside total war.