An Expanded C2 System

[DougPhresh]

Command and Control

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The concept of moving and acting on information is called Command and Control, or “C2” for short. Arguably, C2 is the single most important aspect of a combined arms force operating in the field. Its ability to pass information up and down the Chain of Command largely determines that force’s opportunities and the options available to it.

As it stands now, I am generally happy with how C2 works in CM. I think this is a flexible system that conveys how units communicate and how that connection is maintained in action. As a refresher, from the manual:

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Visual Contact (units within LOS of each other)

Eye Contact - close proximity

Eye Contact - distant

Audio Contact (units able to hear each other)

Voice Contact

Radio Contact

Crucially, C2 does three essential things:

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There are three primary benefits of good organization and communication: spotting of enemy units, calling for support, and maintaining discipline.

The Problem Of Frontage

However, playing Red Thunder in anticipation of Fire and Rubble, I've noticed that with the current system, some units - Russian and Italian units in particular - cannot communicate over their assigned frontages due to lack of radios. I agree that these units did not possess many radios, and obviously that imposed limitations compared to German and especially American formations where radios were plentiful.

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The more types of C2 links units have, the better chance they have of maintaining connections. Just remember that not all C2 methods are of equal quality. Range is quite important because the farther away units are from each other the greater the chance they will experience breaks in communications. The inherent fragility of the method is also important since some are inherently more robust.

All units have the opportunity to establish Eye and Voice Contact, but to do so means keeping units fairly close and in plain sight (LOS) of each other. These are the most reliable, robust forms of C2 possible. Unfortunately, from a tactical standpoint, having units bunched up is generally not a good idea, nor is it even necessarily physically possible.

Radio Contact is the most basic technological means of overcoming these problems, however, radios are tricky things to operate effectively as distances increase, and good radios are quite expensive. CMx2 includes two major types of radios: small handheld radios, and large backpack radios.

In CM this often leads to deploying Russian and Italian formations in open terrain or bunched up to facilitate communication, or covering the proper frontage without C2 links which leads to greatly reduced effectiveness, and in Iron mode a huge headache.  However, since these are the frontages assigned historically, there must have been a way to command and control dispersed formations.

Solutions

The crux of the problem is this -  forces without radios were capible of spotting of enemy units, calling for support, and maintaining discipline over that frontage wheras in CM right now they are not. Doing some reading on this matter, I quickly discovered that rather than simply not communicate, units of all nationalities used runners and field telephones, where possible as well as coloured flares and smoke. There are obvious downsides to these methods of communication compared to those already in the engine.

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But radios were expensive and (compared to today) rare. While the US forces made a deliberate effort to try to provide radios usually at least down to the platoon level, many German formations only possess a radio for the main Company HQ, or have one reserved for specialized Forward Observers. Some forces with more outdated technology, such as the Royal Italian Army, did not have any radios in their infantry formations at all, instead relying on pre-established field telephones, and messengers carrying written orders for communication.

Players will probably learn quickly that paying attention to where the radios are on the battlefield is going to provide a crucial element on the road to victory. Without a radio nearby, that group of on-map mortars is pretty much limited to only firing at targets within sight. Without a radio, that platoon commander who loses sight of his Company CO is effectively out of the loop with higherups.

I am not arguing that they were able to complete the three essentials tasks of C2 as well as radio-equipped units, but there were methods of fufilling the 3 essential C2 tasks within a battalion over an area of 1000m x 1000m to 2000m x 2000m without radios.

Field Telephones

Using a radio is more reliable and preferable to field telephones that are vulnerable to enemy fire, especially shellfire. Wire takes time to set down and that task is usually accomplished by dedicated signalmen who are in the HQ and Service units abstracted in CM. Notably, Field Telephone links to FOOs are already abstracted in game. This C2 method is the most promising improvement as information is shared over a field telephone much the same way as a radio, it would simply be a new class of audio contact with slightly different mechanics. Field Telephones spot, call for support and maintain disciplene exactly as radios do. In game terms this method of communication presents a problem with regards to the level of abstraction.

On-Map

On the more granular end of the spectrum, one solution would be having signals teams with "Telephone Line" Special Equipment and the order "Deploy Wire" , an order working similar to Mark Mines or Linear Fire Mission initiated drawing by a glowing red C2 link (compared to the green fire mission line) on the map. The team would then move along the route of this line and upon reaching the end point a C2 link would be established between the HQ at the point of origin and the HQ at the destination. I'm not sure of the best way to do this as far as the speed, pauses, taking cover etc.

The rationale for the red line comes from the Engine Manual:

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By using the hotkey ALT-Z, C2 links will be represented on the battlefield by lines connecting units to their parent HQs. A bright red link indicates a strong C2 connection, usually both visual and audio. A slightly darker red link indicates a weaker C2 link, which is usually usually just visual contact. A dark link means there is no C2 contact, and the unit is out of command with it’s parent HQ.

Obviously this is not without risk:

Abstracted

A method of abstraction would be to create a C2 link between HQs that have not moved for a certain period of time. This could be done either automatically or through an order. After the appropriate amount of time, the unit panel would show Audio Contact - Field Telephone. In terms of implementation this is no different from moving units having the radio links disrupted as now, only with a longer time to reestablish the link. This is a simple and effective way to simulate Field Telephones, does not require the player to babysit linesmen, and allows for the echelon units to remain abstracted.

Pre-Existing Links and Vulnerability

In either case, I believe that at the start of the scenario, all HQs should be connected by Field Telephone. For prepared and even hasty defense this is an obvious part of occupying a position. In fact, I would suggest that the defending side in attacks and assaults be able to link teams or sections to the Field Telephone, representing OPs. Gun positions (on-map Artillery teams and their HQs) and bunkers should also have Field Telephone links.  For the attacking side, an attack would usually not cross the line of departure without firm communications links. Since CM simulates events after units have departed from the form up point, it makes sense to have the comms in place.

Regarding the vulnerability of lines to fire, I would suggest that a certain level of shell impacts (or maybe craters of a certain size) in action squares containing Field Telephone lines have a chance to cut the line. This chance would be lower for the defending side in assaults, where the line would reasonably be buried. Once a line is cut, either a team would have to be sent out in the granular model, or it would take time to reestablish the link in the abstracted model.

Artillery Comms

Field Telephone links between artillery teams and their HQ and the artillery HQ and higher (On-Map Battalion HQ for organic artillery) should be established upon the completion of deploying the artillery. This is a routine part of arriving on the gun position and the battery is not considered to be in action until each gun has a link to the CP and the CP is plugged into the net. The main advantages of this improved C2 system for artillery is that On-map artillery is more responsive to calls for fire, and the dreaded "out of contact" no longer appears when the battery should reasonably be in communication with FOOs and the supported HQs. The other advantage is that realistic dispersal of on-map artillery units can be simulated. Gun positions are sited and deployed specifically to reduce vulnerability to counterbattery fires. Even when CB threat is low, spacing for a howitzer battery is usually 150m x 150m.

Runners

Runners were often used where field phone and radio links could not be established. This form of communication had numerous downsides:

1. The runner could be killed
2. By the time the message was received the situation may have already changed
3. The first two problems also applied to any reply sent by the recipient.

As far as CM goes, I think there is room for debate over whether runners pass the test of what constitutes a reliable C2 link. The information is not relayed in real-time, and may not even be useful in game terms. Orders like "attack that hill" are sent from the player directly to units and do not have to originate at Battalion HQ, relayed through Company HQ and passed down to the platoons. What about the three C2 tasks in CM?

Spotting By Runner

Because of the delay in using couriers, any spotting reports by runner would have to be the silhoutte and question mark for previously spotted units and sound contacts. Written messages would be reasonably accurate at the time they are sent, but couriers relaying messages by voice could be expected to make mistakes. Either way, this is not a good way to pass along spotting information. Even if a runner left Platoon HQ with the message "there is a tank at that crossroads", since there is no guarantee the tank will be there when he arrives at Company HQ, Company HQ would have the unknown contact icon, and dissenimate that up to Battalion and down to the other Platoons. Still, it is better than nothing.

Calling For Support By Runner

Calls for fire would have to be unspotted because issuing corrections by runner is not feasable.  However, runners might be a way to call for an emergency mission with a long delivery time. The HQ would place the target point and wait for the runner to give that information to the next highest HQ. The quality of that HQs link to higher would be a factor in the delivery time. In cases where the Platoon and Company are connected to Battalion only by runners, this is a very long wait and there is an argument to be made that calls for fire can only be passed by runner up one rung of the chain of command. The fall of shot should be about the same as for any emergency mission because where couriers might be at risk for "a game of telephone", I would assume a written message with a grid square reference is provided.

Maintaining Discipline By Runner

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Lastly, maintaining C2 is important for keeping unit cohesion intact. Units tend to get jumpy when they don’t know what the friendly units around them are up to, or where their superiors are, or what the enemy might be trying to do at that moment. Without C2, the imagination can run a bit wild, so to speak, and the unit may be imagining the worst scenario. Perhaps all its buddies withdrew and forgot to tell it to pull back? Maybe the HQ was wiped out and nobody higher up knows about those tanks coming down the road, and therefore no help is on the way? Well- disciplined units hold up better under these circumstances, of course, but every unit has its breaking point. If it has contact with its fellow forces and feels supported, things are less stressful.

I believe that this is the most effective use of messengers and where the stongest case can be made for their inclusion. Where there are numerous, glaring downsides to spotting and calling for support by runner, it is perfectly reasonable to be able to tell Battalion HQ "A Company has arrived on the objective" or for Company HQ to send a runner out to find where the hell 2 Platoon wandered off to.

Liason Vehicles

There might be a use for the many jeeps and light vehicles that accompany HQs as they were and are used as liason vehicles. Vehicles carry messages much further and faster than runners. I would rather not draw move orders for the Battalion XO team in their Jeep to the company HQs and back to Battalion HQ but simulating or abstracting this role could make taking the Kubelwagons, Humvees and Jeeps along with the infantry battalions useful. During unit selection, maybe the light vehicles could have an on-map/off-map option similar to artillery. On-Map liason vehicles would act like they do now - mostly as transport for HQ teams. Off-Map liason vehicles could increase the speed at which C2 links are created by runner between HQs so equipped. 

On-Map

I don't see a way to do this on map that isn't a huge headache. Scourage of War has a great messenger system for the Napoleonic Wars and American Civil War but having courier present on-map in CM adds a tremendous ammount to the players workload for no real payoff. Tracking individual soldiers moving around, or worse ordering them around is just not a good idea when abstraction can accomplish the same goal, better.

Abstraction

Similar to field telephones, an abstracted runner system would fit in nicely with the existing C2 systems without adding to the player's workload. This would be done by a weak C2 link (dark red) being created between stationary units and HQs after a certain amount of time. The time could be calculated from how long a troop using the Quick command would take to cover the distance to the HQ. In formations with liason vehicles, this speed could be increased. Possibly it could be how long it takes to get to the HQ and back, to establish two-way communications. This C2 link could never be better than weak, and would have restrictions to the spotting and fire support available, as mentioned above. Crucially, it would allow for the green icon on the unit panel indicated links to the chain of command and the diciplene that comes from that.

Visual Signals - Flares and Smoke

Pyrotechic signals were widespread in WW2 and are still in use today. These signals allow for communication without radios over a wide area. In WW2 titles and modern titles with Electronic Warfare conditions, this is crucial. Visual signals share some of the downsides that runners do - they are not really reliable two-way C2 links, so much as they are ways of communicating some information and providing some commands. The limitations are:

1. The recipient must see the signal
2. The enemy may also see the signal
3. Weather and visibility conditions generally greatly impact this form of communication

Beyond being limited in what you can say with smoke or a flare, your message is subject to the wind and the enemy can see it too.

In terms of fufilling the three C2 tasks, I will use the WW2 pyrotechnic signals on the Eastern Front as an example:

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Defence/retreat, Recon, Attack, Air spotter, Targeting, Misc, Flare
Red Army: Orange, Green, Green/White (Yellow smoke), Red, Red, Green/White (Yellow smoke), White
Germany: Red, Green, White (Yellow smoke), Violet, Blue (Black line), Orange, White

Spotting by Visual Signal

Marking targets by smoke is one of the best uses of pyrotechnics. This is different from calls for fire and a simple radio procedure would be "Enemy troops moving in the open, reference 100m south of red smoke". In game this could simply be a command similar to pop smoke or target smoke that deploys coloured smoke (as opposed to WP). One way this could work is that units with C2 links to the unit that deployed the smoke would get increased information sharing of enemy units within a radius of the smoke spotted by the originating unit. This would work somewhat like a TRP:

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A special situation is the targeting of an enemy unit near a TRP (Target Reference Point). In CMx2, these double-function not only for artillery sup- port fire, but also as “ambush markers”. Soldiers targeting an enemy unit near a friendly TRP are much better at estimating the range correctly.

1. 1 Platoon has visual contact with 2 Platoon and A Co HQ.  
2. 1 Platoon spots enemy troops
3. 2 Platoon has not yet spotted the enemy, and the information has not yet been shared by C2 within A Co
4. 2 Platoon has light blue or grey LOS to the target
5. 1 Platoon deploys coloured smoke, either near the enemy or near a reference point that A Co and 2 Plt can see
6. Within a radius of the smoke, 2 Platoon now has improved spotting information on the enemy, and the bonuses that come with a TRP

Expanding on this, units without a C2 link to the originating unit could possibly still recieve spotting information and the TRP bonus if they have LOS to the smoke. The rationale for this is having a pre-determined signal such as telling the Battalion Fire Support units, let's say MG Company "If you see red smoke, keep an eye out". This would not be the same as having the reference information passed along to them so they wouldn't know to look 100m south of the smoke straight away, just to look in the area. Maybe they could get the vauge contact floating icons.

Signaling contact with the enemy by flare is straight forward. In terms of how it would work in-game, I'm not really sure since all units start the scenario stood-to and don't need to wake up or otherwise prepare for action. Possibly a flare on contact with the enemy would pass the vauge contact floating icons from the OP to all units that can see the flare. This would help make forward OPs useful even when they are beyond regular C2 links. Of course they would also have field telephones as part of a prepared or even hasty defense. Since flares do not take time to ready, they could be used by advancing scout teams to report contact without radios, and without waiting for a phone link to be established.

Calling for Support by Visual Signal

Very common and simple. The easiest way to do this would be to treat smoke as a temporary TRP with some limitations:

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Target Reference Points are special points on the battlefield which have been “pre-registered” in advance for a support strike. This means that the exact location and distance to a TRP is known to both the spotter and the firing element.

Artillery strikes targeted near a TRP (within 50m) do not require LOS from the spotter, do not use or need spotting rounds, and have a near-zero preparation time (however, the “communication” time is unaffected, so don’t expect battleships or corps-level rockets to be on hair-trigger readiness due to a TRP).

First, The spotter is not the unit that deployed smoke, any grunt can throw a C8.  The smoke helps the FOO do their jobs, much like a TRP and like a TRP lets them fire at targets they can't see, from working off one they can -  the smoke. The idea is that in a slightly larger radius than the 50m of the TRP,  the spotter is able to target strikes even without LOS to the target, as long as they maintain LOS to the smoke. This is just a slight expansion of an already existing system:

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Note: Spotters for indirect support weapons (as well as on-map mortars) are able to target areas slightly outside of direct LOS under certain circumstances, such as when firing indirectly over a tall wall or just behind the crest of a hill.

Unlike a TRP the smoke is not pre-registered so there would still need for adjustment. This is made easier because the location and distance now have a useful reference for the spotter and/or firing element/firing element HQ. The procedure is then to spot rounds onto the smoke, and with that registered, you simply adjust off and voila - you can hit targets you can't see from the OP fairly accurately. Preparation time and communication time would be the same as a regular fire mission.

In instances where the FOO can see both target and smoke, and ideally when they are close together (within the MPI or acceptable firing template for the given tube), smoke would simply allow for quicker adjustment of spotting rounds. It's much easier to make sure your rounds are impacting in a given dispersal around a column of orange smoke than an oddly shaped rock!

Flares could be used to call down FPF if a unit is being overrun. I suppose this would either trigger an emergency mission on top of the unit signalling, perhaps ahead of them, or on a TRP. Of course in this situation, TRPs already do most of the job.

Air Support and Smoke

This one is tricky because CAS is very different between WW2 and the modern titles and procedures vary between nations. Whereas NATO troops now can pop orange smoke an have an A10 deliver a gun run, being the air boss for Tempests in North-West Europe was a different story, and VVS operations were different even from that. 

Hopefully our resident JTACs and historicans would figure out implementation on a nation by nation, title by title basis. Generally, I would guess that smoke should shorten delivery times for air support or allow for requests for air suport from units that otherwise wouldn't be able to, maybe give a bonus for target acquisition and accuracy likea TRP. I'm not sure if this works for the roaming IL-2s and Stukas in Red Thunder, but I'm not sure how to get results from air support in that title anyway.

For modern titles, are NATO assets handled as stikes, FAC/On-Call CAS, Pre-Plan CAS, or General CAS? How do the Syrian Arab Air Force or Russian Air Force conduct CAS? I'd like to have a simple rule like "pop orange smoke or red flare and attack aircraft comes in" but it may not be that simple. For NATO in Black Sea and Shock Force 2, certain coloured smoke or even WP smoke (with C2 contact to the air boss in the case of WP) should be enough to get On-Call Aircraft on target.

Maintaining Discipline By Visual Signal

Visual signals can communicate simple messages between units and HQs. In a reversal of runners, visual signals are good for calling for fire and drawing attention to the enemy, but not very good at passing along information. In the WW2 example above, Defend/Attack/Recon can be communicated by visual signal, but the player is able to directly give these orders in CM. HQs signalling by flare or smoke when they have achived their objective could speed establishing C2 links with higher HQs by other means. The rationale for this is that at least now Battalion HQ knows to send out runners for the next set of orders and the runners and linesmen know where to go. Seeing smoke that indicates the platoon has arrives on the hilltop, while valuable is not exactly a C2 link with Company HQ by itself. 

Conclusion

The C2 system created for CM is generally fairly useful and robust. However, as CM expanded beyond Shock Force and Battle for Normandy, more forces have been added that lack radios.

In Fortress Italy, Italian Forces have a myriad of problems so C2 may have been overlooked. As CM has evolved, the Italian Forces in FI have been left behind, lacking AA and AT rifles, even though these weapons exist mounted on the AS.42 or heavy AT guns even though the Semovente da 90/53 is present, mounting the Cannone da 90/53. In a game spanning 22 months, Italy's 3 are an afterthought. Low morale and poor training for Italian troops probably go a long way to hiding how much the C2 system hurts them. An Italian battalion with unwieldy rifle squads, few radios and heavy weapons (even if the missing Italian equipment at the battalion/regiment/divison level was modelled) would not be a winning formation, even with its C2 links recreated. However, should CM go to the Western Desert, or follow the struggle between the RSI and partisans through the end of the war, any second look at Italian forces should include revisions to communication without radios.

The frontages on the Eastern Front and lack of radios within a typical Soviet TOE have shown the flaws with the existing C2 system. Unlike the Italians, the Red Army is the star of the show in a CM title, and historically a war-winning force. There are of course in reality several disadvantages to a lack of radios. However, because in CM communication over distances is simulated as "Radios-or-Nothing", to not have radios is to have no way to maintain command or control over a distance, which was not the case.  Red Army battalions in CM suffer from many penalties for operating without radios, when in reality a battalion would occupy a 2000m x 2000m footprint. Were their communications as good as that of the American battalions with radios? No of course not. They were able to spot enemies, call for fire and maintain diciplene over that frontage however, the three essential tasks of C2 .

The broken terrain of Belorussia, and presumably soon to come in Poland, East Prussia and all the way to Berlin make relying on visual contact over distances unfesable, and compressing units to establish the existing C2 links suicidal. Field telephones, an abstracted liason/runner system and visual signals will allow Soviet formations to operate as they should. Soviet C2 may have been rigid and inflexible, but it worked and did so without radios.

Finally, expanded C2 systems do not only aid forces without radios, they provide additional links and tactical possibilities to all forces. In the WW2 titles, the Western Allies and the Germans made extensive use of field phone and visual signals. Linking forward outposts by phone to HQ is valuable for the Germans who find themselves on the defensive, often in prepared positions. The ability to call for fire or air support with smoke was useful for the Allies and they advanced on all fronts. In modern titles, smoke indicating targets is a common practice for NATO forces, and in the face of Electronic Warfare, field phones provide reliable communications for Ukrainian, Russian, Syrian and NATO forces. A Canadian mortar battery, even in 2020 is linked to battery HQ by field phone.

 

[Thewood1]

Maybe take a look at how Graviteam games do it.  The explicitly model cable and signal people in defensive setups.  And they use colored smoke as a signaling method also, especially for offensive operations.  The games have a pretty tight C2 representation, that might be a little too detailed, but they have various options you can turn off.

[Thewood1]

Here is a part of the Graviteam game manual.  I think this gives you a starting point as to what's possible.

[Freyberg]

A lot of interesting stuff there. It would be nice to have other forms of communication explicitly represented, as long as it didn't get complicated to play.

[Bulletpoint]

15 hours ago, DougPhresh said:

In CM this often leads to deploying Russian and Italian formations in open terrain or bunched up to facilitate communication, or covering the proper frontage without C2 links which leads to greatly reduced effectiveness, and in Iron mode a huge headache.

What makes it a headache in Iron mode? It's not like you lose control of the units if they are not in C2...

[Bulletpoint]

15 hours ago, DougPhresh said:

The crux of the problem is this -  forces without radios were capible of spotting of enemy units, calling for support, and maintaining discipline over that frontage wheras in CM right now they are not.

You can call (off map) artillery support without being in C2 contact. It's assumed that there's a field telephone link.

[John Doe]

I don’t think you could probably have C2 modeled more than it all ready is, ei moral effects and info sharing, in this type of game. That is in a game where you must control and therefor see everything there is no meaningful fog of war- friendlies can never be lost of the chain of command broken. Furthermore, if there was order delays or out right unresponsiveness there would be a lack of autonomy that would realistically be chalked up to initiative. There is a certain ambiguity in the category each units actions Fall into; is that squad retreating because their squad leader decided it so or because A commander ordered it? Even if we ignore these issues the situation remains muddled. A flare ordering a ‘retreat’ or a ‘rally’ or anything other than ‘enemy’ cannot be translated into game terms at all. Same with whistle commands such as ‘flank left’ ‘right side tuck in’ and ‘attack’ what would this allow for a “fully flushed out C2 system” 

It is sad because Efficiently commanding men is one of the most engaging and satisfying tasks one could have. Setting conditions and contingencies to all the people around oneself is crafting a system that can respond and react all while not losing Jim in the fog of war of communications. 

I am all for a more C2 restrictions but I am not sure myself how that would translate into combat mission. On the state of how CM is now, I think is comment sums up my views well:

On 1/27/2020 at 4:15 AM, Bulletpoint said:

What makes it a headache in Iron mode? It's not like you lose control of the units if they are not in C2...

their really is not any reason to sweat C2 links unless you are using artillery imo.
 

Anyway, Please excuse the errors, I wrote this while tired.

[Erwin]

As you guys are very good with C2 questions:  I have had a scout or HQ unit see a target.  I put an ATGM team right in the same action spot thinking that the HQ or Scout will communicate the target location.  However, after several minutes, the ATGM still cannot see the target or at best only has intermittent LOS and will not shoot.  One would think that the Scout or HQ could easily tell the ATGM team where the enemy tank is.

Have done this for 3 different scout-HQ/ATGM double teams in one scenario I am currently playing so I know this apparent C2 failure is not an isolated incident.  Full disclosure:  This is in CMSF1 as am trying to complete some saved games from long campaigns that I do not want to replay in CMSF2.  (Does CMSF1 has worse C2...?)

 

[DougPhresh]

In pure game terms the reason I think changes are important is pretty straight forward: For the Russians moving forward into Fire and Rubble and any hypothetical Afrika Korps title with Italians, those nations are suffering from C2 over distance being limited to radio.

[Bulletpoint]

5 hours ago, Erwin said:

As you guys are very good with C2 questions:  I have had a scout or HQ unit see a target.  I put an ATGM team right in the same action spot thinking that the HQ or Scout will communicate the target location.  However, after several minutes, the ATGM still cannot see the target or at best only has intermittent LOS and will not shoot.  One would think that the Scout or HQ could easily tell the ATGM team where the enemy tank is.

One unit cannot spot for another unit, even if they are very close. I had tank riders spot an enemy tank, but the tank they were riding on could not spot the enemy, even though it was unbuttoned. One would think the tank riders would just point and say "it's over there".

However, units will of course share a contact marker with their buddies close by. This increases the chance the other unit will also get a spot, but it has to do the job by itself.

Edited February 5, 2020 by Bulletpoint

[Bulletpoint]

42 minutes ago, DougPhresh said:

In pure game terms the reason I think changes are important is pretty straight forward: For the Russians moving forward into Fire and Rubble and any hypothetical Afrika Korps title with Italians, those nations are suffering from C2 over distance being limited to radio.

I think they are supposed to suffer from that. It's part of what makes them different to play I guess.

[DougPhresh]

3 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I think they are supposed to suffer from that. It's part of what makes them different to play I guess.

Italy, sure. Of course Italy had problems top to bottom.

The Soviet Forces in 1945 were perhaps the most powerful force in military history. If nothing else, Battalions were able to exercise C2 across their assigned frontage which they presently cannot do.

Edited February 5, 2020 by DougPhresh

[General Jack Ripper]

You can actually use runners in this game. Detach a team possessing some C2 information you want to pass along, and move it into close proximity to a unit you want to have it, or a unit equipped with a radio. The information will then be shared.

@MOS:96B2P Made a thread about C2 and information sharing some time ago.

 

 

[Erwin]

10 minutes ago, General Jack Ripper said:

You can actually use runners in this game. Detach a team possessing some C2 information you want to pass along, and move it into close proximity to a unit you want to have it, or a unit equipped with a radio.

Why need a runner when one has a unit spotting a target and a 2nd unit is literally on top of the first unit and cannot spot even after several minutes?   This seems like a C2 problem in the game.  

The other thing I noticed is that my scouts and HQ units had no problem spotting enemy (tanks in this case).  But, the ATGM's and FO's had a very hard time spotting the same enemy, even when I had the ATGM and FO units switch positions with the Scouts and HQ's.  I tried this several times with same results.

Feels like something needs adjusting in the game re spotting ability of the ATGM and FO teams.  Note however, that I was trying to finish a campaign using CMSF1.  So, plz tell me if this issue was addressed for the later releases.