Recent presentation about Nozh ERA

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, IMHO said:

What is the source of the table? Is it official reporting of Ukrainian military? The table looks really strange if we check it against lostarmor.

This is not official information, just OSINT and I have said it is possibly 2015 year early version. For example now we know that number of T-90A of 136th brigade was about company, not battalion and two platoons participated in Luhansk airport assault. There is now more exact data exists, but I didn't find it specially. I posted this table only for example that Russian BTG had one artillery unit in supoprt. 

And I completely didn't understand your scepticism and methods of your counting by losses and comparison with DNR/LNR. There are no direct fightings "battalion vs. battalion", when armor losses count could go on dozen vehicles. Artillery strikes and advances only. Just in Sector A were several fierce clashes. Russians invaded in mass on 23rd August (first units crossed the border on 18th) and withdrew on 3rd of September. Most of them didn't have direct contact with UKR troops. For example in battle for Heorhiivka no one from two Russian companies didn't use BTR-D and even companies themeselve advanced in 2/3 of own strength, using BMD-2 only. 

If you want to see number of separ's armor in 2014, their number already counted up to 95%

48 minutes ago, IMHO said:

To say they were fighting against all Russian Army.

Well, since 23th and to 31st of August UKR troops were mostly in contact with Russians BTGs. Or you claim 6-8 BTGs with suport - 9200 men by the table is ALL Russian Army? There is np any fantasticsal, that from most airborne unint was created per one-two combined battalions to participate in the war for gaining expirience in real combat environment. As well as to Debaltsevo bulge was moved the battalion (really only one company participated in actions) of 5th tank brigade from distant Buriatia

Edited February 2, 2020 by Haiduk

[IMHO]

15 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I posted this table only for example that Russian BTG had one artillery unit in supoprt.

Yeah, I understand that it was just an example in the BTG composition discussion. It's just the table was interesting so I started digging

17 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Most of them didn't have direct contact with UKR troops.

Yeah it seems that's more like a list of Russian Army units redeployed to Ukrainian border that were a potential threat to Ukrainian forces. But since it's an outdated information let's not make a big discussion out of it

I'd rather ask your opinion on why the Ukrainian losses were so heavy? It's like 4.6:1 in all armored vehicles, 2:1 in tanks, 5:1 in SPG, 7:1 in APC/IFV.

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, IMHO said:

I'd rather ask your opinion on why the Ukrainian losses were so heavy? It's like 4.6:1 in all armored vehicles, 2:1 in tanks, 5:1 in SPG, 7:1 in APC/IFV.

If we say about 2014 summer campaign.

1. Month under endless artillery/MLRS shellings through the border - most of losses in vehicles are from the border area.

2. Mines and ambushes

3.  Incompetence of commanders of almost all levels (direct attacks w/o any information about the ememy) and poor motivation of big part of mobilized troops - there were many happens, when crews were abandoning own vehicles even it took light damages. 

4. Bad conditions of vehicles and poor quality of repair works.

If we say about Autumn 2014 - winter 2015 campaign:

1. Position of president Poroshenko, which didn't allow army to fight in full strenght and timely to respond on anemy actions ("We have a peaceful plan"). When on 15th of Jan separs tanks and MLRS shot out control tower and terminals in Donetsk airport, he said "I'm president of peace, not war". He sanctioned "single time operation" only on 17th Jan, when already was too late. Debaltsevo it's also his guilt. He liked to speak about Russian agression and "Ukraine at war", but he didn't want to fight against enemy. There is ridiculos, when he and his followers, which during his rule cried "There is no alternative to Minsk! Do you want to offence?! Do you want hundreds of killed again?" now are calling for "the war to the victory end against capitulation". Pharissees.

2. Mistakes in operations planning. 

Edited February 2, 2020 by Haiduk

[IMHO]

10 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Unlike this in Sector A UKR troops fought against Russians very tough and have foiled their attempts to eliminate Sector A troops. Alas, even in our ATO history much more attention payed to defeat near Ilovaisk than to the fierce fights in Sector A, which showed Russian army are not Terminators and we can successfully fight with them. But instead we continously hearing from TV "we can't fight with Russia! Do you want another Ilovaisk?" 

I have a decent exposure to Ukrainian TV now (and it's been 12 years since I ever watched Russian TV last time ) and I have a feeling there's a good chance the situation is slowly creeping to a repetition of Georgia conflict. There's no question Ukrainian Army is much stronger than it was during the 2014 conflict. But it looks like it creates a false feeling of an overmatch. Ukrainian leadership falsely believed in 2014 that Russia would just watch helplessly as Ukrainian Army bomb and overrun L/DNR forces. They didn't really believe Russia may escalate. And it seems just like in 2014 the current popular feeling in Ukrainian is Russia will not escalate further than what was in 2014. And since the Ukrainian Army is clearly prepared for the repetition of 2014 there may be a popular urge to try a military scenario again.

What do you think?

[Haiduk]

On 2/3/2020 at 12:17 AM, IMHO said:

What do you think?

All will depend from Russian goals and level of involvement. If they will repeat "north wind"  in August 2014 style only on Donbas, UKR troops are capable to repulse them. If this will be invasion throughout whole bored line including Crimea and possibly Belarus and will use guided and ballistic missiles, aviation, fleet etc. But again all will depend from the cost which Kremlin will be able to pay for political benefits of such large-scale attack. One matter to force Ukraine to something, other - to conquer all to the Zbruch river and be able to keep all this.

Edited February 4, 2020 by Haiduk

[IMHO]

On 2/4/2020 at 9:33 PM, Haiduk said:

All will depend from Russian goals and level of involvement [...] One matter to force Ukraine to something, other - to conquer all to the Zbruch river and be able to keep all this.

IMO the only imaginable scenario of a restart of hostilities today is if Ukraine decides to bomb out and overrun L/DNR forces. But observing ongoing discussion in Ukrainian society it seems to be too real.

On 2/4/2020 at 9:33 PM, Haiduk said:

If they will repeat "north wind"  in August 2014 style only on Donbas, UKR troops are capable to repulse them. If this will be invasion throughout whole bored line including Crimea and possibly Belarus and will use guided and ballistic missiles, aviation, fleet etc.

In terms of geography I believe it will hardly extend much beyond current L/DNR area. But in terms of systems employed IMO it may be a repetition of Georgia - tactical ballistic and cruise missiles, heavy air campaign etc. Ukraine has limited Air Force - like ten times smaller than Russian - and severely outdated however significant AA defense. After a proper SEAD campaign Ukrainian Forces will be left defenseless. Why do you think Ukrainian popular opinion is slowly drifting into the "military solution"?

[Haiduk]

11 minutes ago, IMHO said:

Why do you think Ukrainian popular opinion is slowly drifting into the "military solution"?

Hm... Pollings are showing standard +/- 20 % for military solution during last two years. I can't say that it is drifting. Here the dynamics since Aug 2017. Red color - military solution, dark green - to freeze conflict and recognize territories temporary occupied, light green - to give "special status" or authonomy, light gray - "I don't know", blue - to allow them join to Russia/ to be independent/ to expel from Ukraine

 

But this conflict can not be neither frozen, nor have diplomacy solution and early or later will come to active phase again. Philistines, which vote for "peace solution" just contradict themeselves. Because according to the same polls  56 % of population is not support "special status" for occupied part of Donbas (26 % - support). Also most of population don't support possible concessions to Russia in change to stopping the war: 63 % don't support federative status (17 % support). 59 % don't support full amnesty for separs (18 % support), 59 % don't suport rejection of Eurointegration (19 % support), 56 % don't support the status of Russian langauge as second static (29 % support), 54 % don't suport rejection of NATO membership (25 % suport). Thus, most of population from the both parts "active" and "philistines" don't suport main demands of Russia to Ukraine and in case of Ukrainian leaders will cross these "red lines" there is will be mass street actions. Untill Russian political goals will not be achieved, the war will go on. So, diplomacy solution is impossible. 

[IMHO]

@Haiduk, I've seen the poll results - you're right to correct me. My comment about "popular opinion" was based on Ukrainian TV. It seems to me the military solution point of view became more widespread in TV now. Is it really so or it's just a random bias of my channel-hopping?

PS Again Zelensky was somehow persuaded to backtrack on full disengagement.

[Haiduk]

Just now, IMHO said:

@Haiduk, I've seen the poll results - you're right to correct me. My comment about "popular opinion" was based on Ukrainian TV. It seems to me the military solution point of view became more widespread in TV now. Is it really so or it's just a random bias of my channel-hopping?

PS Again Zelensky was somehow persuaded to backtrack on full disengagement.

I almost don't watch TV, so can't say anythinng. I doubt that Inter TV (pro-russian opposition controlled)or Ukraina TV (Akhmetov-controlled) or even 1UA (government-controlled) are throwing military solution messages. 

Full disangagement is impossible,  it is not apropriate neither for us, not for separs. In this case both sides will lose direct control over important points. Zelenskyi oneself recognized this can take years, but he initially said "we have a year not more to stop the war". I beleieve he really want to finish the war, but he is just naive libertarian, whichis  thinking he can find compromise with Putin. Dangerous games. And I see that his position already is slightly changing. Recently he said "former authorities didn't anything to stop the war", but now he is saying "only Putin can withdraw own forces from Donbas and stop the war"

[IMHO]

58 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

In this case both sides will lose direct control over important points.

They can always be discussed or traded.

58 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Full disangagement is impossible,  it is not apropriate neither for us, not for separs.

As Zagorodnyuk - the Ukrainian Minister of Defense - said full disengagement is not in Ukrainian interests as it will freeze the conflict and after the cessation of armed hostilities the conflict will disappear from political radars of Western powers.

58 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I doubt that Inter TV (pro-russian opposition controlled)or Ukraina TV (Akhmetov-controlled) or even 1UA (government-controlled) are throwing military solution messages. 

I'm ashamed but I don't exactly keep track of channel names My wife speaks fluent Ukrainian and she prefers Ukranian series to Russian so I kinda tag along

Let's put off the discussion a bit lest it becomes pure politics. I'll collect a list of programs and get back to get your view.

Edited February 6, 2020 by IMHO

[ikalugin]

As to the Russian options - the General Staff seems to be preparing for a broad range of contigencies if the political leadership would desire to select any of them.
The 080808 weights heavy on the General Staff as the predominant narrative about the 080808 war is about insufficient preparation for it.
So far this resulted in formation of a division behind the LDPRs, division on the flank of CTO forces, a bunch of other formations in the area to deal with broader options.

Militarily speaking I do not see a path to Kiev loyalist victory through the strength of arms as Russia can flexibly escalate to win.
But in this context generating deep strike means to go after the key logistics nodes would make sense, as it would create a degree of TMA isolation,
something that Georgians did not go for (they did not try to seak the Roky tunnel).