Russian Artillery - long time to arrive

[JulianJ]

I don't know how well NATO militaries would perform against Russians, especially with their recent combat experience in Syria, but last year I went to a British Army show, for reservists (the TA as was), and I was astounded at the junk they were equipped with: unarmoured WMIK land rovers, computers that looked like they ran Windows 95, 105mm arty towed by a tiny truck that obviously couldn't carry many rounds. They did a set-piece battle with the landrovers against "terrorists", which of course they won, and I was just thinking TOWs, Airbursts, massive IEDs....I suspect this will not be a popular view, but Britain's military (Army, Navy & RAF) has probably dropped down several leagues.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

46 minutes ago, IICptMillerII said:

Quick background, the Iraqi military had a lot of hardware in 1991. Not only did they have the 4th largest army by manpower in the world at the time, but they had the hardware (tanks, artillery, both tube and rocket) to back up that manpower. Many Coalition commanders were worried that entire battalions would be annihilated by Iraqi artillery concentrations, and is part of the reason why anticipated casualty figures were so high. 
However in practice, while the Iraqi's had the hardware, they lacked the training to properly employ the hardware. Much of the Iraqi artillery was destroyed by aircraft and counter battery fires, and the Iraqi artillery that was able to fire generally failed to hit anything. Again, this was not a fault of the hardware, or amount of hardware they had, but a fault of poor training (this includes tactics, techniques, procedures, all that).

IMHO the single biggest factor that must be considered is that Iraq did not have the benefit of a truly comprehensive integrated A2AD network, thus it just wasn't a peer opponent.

Edited April 20, 2019 by Sgt.Squarehead

[Haiduk]

36 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

I fear that after the Kiev loyalist efforts to first encircle then split away the separatist forces via application of ad-hoc division/corps structures made out of brigades failed the Ukrainian (and not only Ukrainian) military thinkers made the wrong conclusion, that smaller formations would work better in such a war. However in my opinion it has shown the contrary - that the ad-hoc division/corps formations Ukraine had were insufficiently large, did not have the proper C4ISR, did not have the means (fires, remotely deployed minefields etc) to cover the spaces between the units, their flanks and rear.

Emmm..... What division/corps? In 2014 no one brigade did not operate in full order. Combined groups of several army unints and National Guard/volunteerrs is formed. Whole length of Russian-Ukrainian border, where our troops took main positions (Kumachove-Izvarino sector) is 140 km. This space should have been taken and held only 5 BTGs (two of them was airmobile without tanks) of three different brigades, two artillery batteries of corps level, Special Forces detachment (equal to mech.company ), combined group of National Guard equal to battalion and different border guard units also equal to battalion. Only since 2016 we got brigades properly equipped with personnel. Maneuvers of last two yeras shows brigade and combined forces training, not BTGs only. 

[ikalugin]

22 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Emmm..... What division/corps? In 2014 no one brigade did not operate in full order. Combined groups of several army unints and National Guard/volunteerrs is formed. Whole length of Russian-Ukrainian border, where our troops took main positions (Kumachove-Izvarino sector) is 140 km. This space should have been taken and held only 5 BTGs (two of them was airmobile without tanks) of three different brigades, two artillery batteries of corps level, Special Forces detachment (equal to mech.company ), combined group of National Guard equal to battalion and different border guard units also equal to battalion. Only since 2016 we got brigades properly equipped with personnel. Maneuvers of last two yeras shows brigade and combined forces training, not BTGs only. 

You are describing that ad-hoc division/corps level formation built out of incomplete brigades above, as well as decribe the problems it had.

If Ukraine is traing to fight the battle with full sized brigades acting as part of a larger force then Ukraine is on the right path I would say. While Vostok-2018 was played out mostly with commands and their staffs and so on (instead of life units), it may still provide an interesting insight into the scale of any potential "big" operation in Ukraine.

Edited April 20, 2019 by ikalugin

[Chibot Mk IX]

5 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Not agree with this. BTG/RTG is a basemant of tactic. WWII style battles "division on division" already impossible. 

"The tip of the spear", BTG/RTG was already a concept of WW II warfare. One BTG with whole division support lead the way,  the other Bn either following behind or perform flank guard, rear guard duty.  But one key point of this concept is how many support the BTG can have. The BTG leading the way can will attract all the spotlight, while people may forgot how many support the leading BTG can have

4 hours ago, ikalugin said:

For example if you build your brigades to generate (be split into) self sufficient BTGs (or divisions generate brigades, etc) instead of fighting them as a unified force you loose the synergy unified forces offer and the internal flexibility on each level. As such, in my opinion, it is much better to build brigades to generate mission orientated task forces (forward detachment, flanking detachment etc) in their interest or in the interest of the above level than to build brigades to generate (be split into) self sufficient BTGs or other such groupings below their level.

I agree most of this. The current independent BTG concept is best suit for.... current situation in Donbass.  The BTG can enjoy a lot of Arty, EW support that usually keep at Corps level.  With so many support , the objective of the BTG is a very limit one:  capture a village 5km away, or counter attack and push the enemy back to where they started.  

 In a "big" war the independent BTG will become combat inefficient after suffering some casualty. Even assuming it can achieve its objective without suffering too much casualty, human being and machine need rest/maintenance. There should be another Bn bypass it and carry on the attack, all the support should be transferred to this fresh Bn, forming up a new BTG .  

[ikalugin]

I think it is important to diffirentiate between the standard practice of using the units to generate BTGs (essentially splitting them apart in wartime into independent commands) vs generating temporary mission orientated task forces or detachments, such as forward detachment, flanking detachment, forward guard, etc, which operate within the overall mission and intent of their parent unit or formation.

p.s. the idea of forward detachment is not knew, it was used not only in WW2 but before then, as you always could use a force to secure key points or routes in advance of the main forces, to fix defending enemy forces until the main forces arrive (or bypass) etc.

Edited April 20, 2019 by ikalugin

[DougPhresh]

5 hours ago, JulianJ said:

105mm arty towed by a tiny truck that obviously couldn't carry many rounds.

A 155mm round is about 100lbs compared to the 30ish lbs of a 105mm. In the early 2000's a lot of NATO planners assumed artillery would be standardized to 155mm but operational experience has shown that cheap, light, mobile guns are valuable. I'd rather have a 105mm on call than a 155mm tied up supporting other units. More tubes are generally better than fewer state of the art tubes with precision rounds.  I think the Russian way of war is on the right track in that regard.

See also the return of 60, 81 and 120mm mortars to NATO after all those theorists thought precision CAS would replace organic fires.

When I joined the military as a field artilleryman, even at the school staff were bemoaning the End of Artillery because everybody was reading about how armed UAVs, small diameter bombs on CAS, land-based CIWS, Hell even tactical lasers had made artillery obsolete. I think NATO thinkers get tied up in the latest and greatest until the next conflict. Look at all the loony ideas before Vietnam, or even throughout the 70's and 80's.

Edited April 21, 2019 by DougPhresh

[Michael Emrys]

9 hours ago, IICptMillerII said:

Partly because the idea of small special forces teams wiping out entire armies "Commando" style has been so romanticized, and partly because many nations are seeking further ways to reduce defense spending while still clinging to the idea that their tiny military can still hold it's own in a real fight. The fact remains that the most important "force multiplier" is mass.

Hear hear!

Michael

[ikalugin]

5 hours ago, DougPhresh said:

A 155mm round is about 100lbs compared to the 30ish lbs of a 105mm. In the early 2000's a lot of NATO planners assumed artillery would be standardized to 155mm but operational experience has shown that cheap, light, mobile guns are valuable. I'd rather have a 105mm on call than a 155mm tied up supporting other units. More tubes are generally better than fewer state of the art tubes with precision rounds.  I think the Russian way of war is on the right track in that regard.

See also the return of 60, 81 and 120mm mortars to NATO after all those theorists thought precision CAS would replace organic fires.

When I joined the military as a field artilleryman, even at the school staff were bemoaning the End of Artillery because everybody was reading about how armed UAVs, small diameter bombs on CAS, land-based CIWS, Hell even tactical lasers had made artillery obsolete. I think NATO thinkers get tied up in the latest and greatest until the next conflict. Look at all the loony ideas before Vietnam, or even throughout the 70's and 80's.

To be honest through going for the 120mm gun-mortars (Nona derivatives) we are getting the 152mm class bang down to battalion level if this wasn't already done by allocating full sized, if old (2S3) 152mm guns.

An interesting fact - the 2S3 152mm gun has the performance of the ML-20, which was considered сorps-army level asset when it was developed.

[DougPhresh]

10 hours ago, ikalugin said:

To be honest through going for the 120mm gun-mortars (Nona derivatives) we are getting the 152mm class bang down to battalion level if this wasn't already done by allocating full sized, if old (2S3) 152mm guns.

An interesting fact - the 2S3 152mm gun has the performance of the ML-20, which was considered сorps-army level asset when it was developed.

Without reigniting the BTG discussion, you can lavishly equip units with organic fires on a small scale but that wouldn't be sustainable for generating a larger force.

 

[IICptMillerII]

On 4/20/2019 at 1:56 PM, JulianJ said:

I don't know how well NATO militaries would perform against Russians, especially with their recent combat experience in Syria, but last year I went to a British Army show, for reservists (the TA as was), and I was astounded at the junk they were equipped with: unarmoured WMIK land rovers, computers that looked like they ran Windows 95, 105mm arty towed by a tiny truck that obviously couldn't carry many rounds. They did a set-piece battle with the landrovers against "terrorists", which of course they won, and I was just thinking TOWs, Airbursts, massive IEDs....I suspect this will not be a popular view, but Britain's military (Army, Navy & RAF) has probably dropped down several leagues.

I'm not going to touch the state of the British army, or other European armies. This thread has remained civil and I do not want to be the reason it turns sour. I will say to this point that regardless of the current size/capabilities of European military's, the US is still expected to do the majority of the work. This is not just fighting, but the transportation and logistics. It's been this way all through the Cold War and remains today. The US does something close to 75% of all logistics tasks in Europe. 

On 4/20/2019 at 2:06 PM, Sgt.Squarehead said:

IMHO the single biggest factor that must be considered is that Iraq did not have the benefit of a truly comprehensive integrated A2AD network, thus it just wasn't a peer opponent.

Agreed. The Iraqi military failed on all levels to properly train and integrate their various commands/assets. Not to say they were a push over, they weren't despite the end results, but they were certainly far from reaching the capabilities of the Soviets or even other Warsaw Pact nations at the time. 

23 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Emmm..... What division/corps? In 2014 no one brigade did not operate in full order. Combined groups of several army unints and National Guard/volunteerrs is formed. Whole length of Russian-Ukrainian border, where our troops took main positions (Kumachove-Izvarino sector) is 140 km. This space should have been taken and held only 5 BTGs (two of them was airmobile without tanks) of three different brigades, two artillery batteries of corps level, Special Forces detachment (equal to mech.company ), combined group of National Guard equal to battalion and different border guard units also equal to battalion. Only since 2016 we got brigades properly equipped with personnel. Maneuvers of last two yeras shows brigade and combined forces training, not BTGs only. 

And this is the problem. The idea that 3 brigades can hold 140km of territory is absurd. The standard combat width of a division is 10-30km on average (obviously this can vary based on terrain and what the division is up against). If the Ukrainian military hopes to hold its own, or reclaim territory against the threats it is up against, it will need to increase in size and improve its training standards. Granted, this has been happening to some degree since 2014 with all of the NATO partnerships and missions in Ukraine, so it is taking a step in the right direction. However, learning the wrong lessons helps no one.

On 4/20/2019 at 7:28 PM, DougPhresh said:

A 155mm round is about 100lbs compared to the 30ish lbs of a 105mm. In the early 2000's a lot of NATO planners assumed artillery would be standardized to 155mm but operational experience has shown that cheap, light, mobile guns are valuable. I'd rather have a 105mm on call than a 155mm tied up supporting other units. More tubes are generally better than fewer state of the art tubes with precision rounds.  I think the Russian way of war is on the right track in that regard.

Agreed. The versatility of the 105mm round keeps it relevant in both small scale conflicts and possible peer to peer conflicts of the near future and beyond. That said, it is important to remember that, in the US Army at least, 155mm has been standardized because the time on target and accuracy is largely the same as the 105mm. The 105mm is more useful nowadays with light units, such as airborne and air assault where weight is the primary concern. Again though I agree that generally speaking it is much better to have more of something that is adequate than a handful of high level, expensive and limited precision rounds.

On 4/20/2019 at 7:28 PM, DougPhresh said:

When I joined the military as a field artilleryman, even at the school staff were bemoaning the End of Artillery because everybody was reading about how armed UAVs, small diameter bombs on CAS, land-based CIWS, Hell even tactical lasers had made artillery obsolete. I think NATO thinkers get tied up in the latest and greatest until the next conflict. Look at all the loony ideas before Vietnam, or even throughout the 70's and 80's.

Dark times indeed. Though not unexpected. Unfortunately those smarter than us tend to believe that we have entered into the age where the infantry, or the field artillery, or the tank, or the [insert main weapon of war here] has been made obsolete by new technology, or the nature of war itself changing. In the end these views are proven to be hilariously false, and then the cycle repeats. Frustrating, but everyone always says that history repeats itself. 

12 hours ago, DougPhresh said:

Without reigniting the BTG discussion, you can lavishly equip units with organic fires on a small scale but that wouldn't be sustainable for generating a larger force.

 

On the battalion level I agree. You are better off giving units at this scale priority of fires of brigade level assets and higher instead of overloading the Bn with too many of its own organic fires. However, on the Brigade level and above, I tend to think that more organic fires of conventional tube artillery is a good thing, and in the case of the US Army, sorely needed. 18 guns to a brigade just isn't enough. Its an issue that the Field Artillery have been rather vocal about, but there doesn't appear to be a fix on the horizon in the near future sadly.  

[ikalugin]

There are several problems.

First is that US, much like during Cold War is overseas from Europe and say a large scale war in Ukraine would require a significant (above a division) scale intervetion to change the balance of forces on the ground. Out of the European majors and please correct me if I am wrong, UK has 1 MRD equivalent, France and Germany have 2 each (strangely enough Poland is the more capable partner there) which creates a concern for their ability to rapidly deploy a force above a division into such an area as Ukraine in a quickly paced crisis.

The second is that while it was possible and sensible to forward deploy significant forces in Europe during the Cold War doing so now may provoke security dilema (imagine 2 full US corps in Poland or worse still Baltics).

The third is that in certain contingencies, say a large scale war in Ukraine, it would be possible for Russia through posturing and deception measures (such as creating a false threat to the Baltics) to draw away possible reinforcements.

Edited April 22, 2019 by ikalugin

[Sgt.Squarehead]

2 hours ago, ikalugin said:

The third is that in certain contingencies, say a large scale war in Ukraine, it would be possible for Russia through posturing and deception measures (such as creating a false threat to the Baltics) to draw away possible reinforcements

Hey, why not Alaska? 

CM:AW (Arctic Warfare) anyone?

Edited April 22, 2019 by Sgt.Squarehead

[ikalugin]

That is too exotic for me and is not going to pull relevant forces and means away from reinforcing Ukraine.

[A Canadian Cat]

8 hours ago, IICptMillerII said:

Frustrating, but everyone always says that history repeats itself. 

And in the case of [insert weapon system X here] will be obsolete, the repeating is repeating itself.

[Vanir Ausf B]

8 hours ago, ikalugin said:

Out of the European majors and please correct me if I am wrong, UK has 1 MRD equivalent, France and Germany have 2 each (strangely enough Poland is the more capable partner there) which creates a concern for their ability to rapidly deploy a force above a division into such an area as Ukraine in a quickly paced crisis.

Something to keep in mind is that total force size and deployable forces are quite different due to logistics and readiness levels. For example, the British army is roughly:

"...two tank brigades, two mechanized brigades, six infantry brigades, a parachute brigade and 15 helicopter and drone squadrons, each with around 15 aircraft... the two tank brigades would share just 148 tanks."

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/british-army-planning-upgrade-just-148-its-227-challenger-2-tanks-53587

But in a real war in eastern Europe would be limited to about a brigade.

British Army Conclusions

• The British Army can provide an armored task force within 30 days and would require 30 and 90 days to scale up to a full armored brigade.
• Britain should be able to sustain at least one armored brigade indefinitely, although there are lingering doubts associated with the undermanned nature of the Adaptive Force, which will be called upon to provide units to relieve the units of the Reactive Force.

French Army Conclusions

• France can probably field one medium or heavy battalion task force within a week. Generating the equivalent of a full armored brigade probably would take several weeks to a month.
• The toll of France's ongoing operations — especially Operation Sentinelle — on French Army readiness introduces a significant degree of uncertainty regarding France's capacity to sustain a brigade and that brigade's proficiency. This uncertainty will linger until France finds a way to lighten the load currently carried by its ground forces, particularly in the army's homeland security role, while also growing the overall size of the force.

German Army Conclusions

• The German Army most likely would require a week or more to mobilize an armored battalion; a full brigade probably would take a month.
• Because the Germans will have to strip other units of equipment to provide for an armored brigade, they will have a hard time fielding a larger force or engaging in other operations until equipment shortages are addressed.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1629.html

 

 

Edited April 22, 2019 by Vanir Ausf B

[ikalugin]

I was beeing generous to the European NATO majors, I am well aware of their issues.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

20 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

The British Army can provide an armored task force within 30 days and would require 30 and 90 days to scale up to a full armored brigade.

Armoured Infantry Brigade.....You'll have @Combatintman after you! 

[GloriousRuse]

Russian artillery has gone in a very interesting direction, organizationally.

On the higher (read, division to corps equivalent) end, they've basically copied the US concept of a JAGIC cell - a dedicated hunting element who's job it is to use special purpose forces, drones, electronic detection and so forth to direct massive firepower onto prime targets via rockets and missiles, usually armed with cluster munitions and thermobarics. Depending on who's observations you take as accurate, the response time from detection to shooting is from 10-20 minutes. That is accomplished by directly linking the observer (manned or otherwise) to a command group of artillery types who in turn have direct links (both in terms of communications and organization authorities) to the biggest shooters. Then they flatten the area with a truly prodigious amount indirect fire - think on the scale of 70-80k submunitions dispersed over square kilometers. This is where the famous strike that caught two Ukranian BNs in their assembly areas came out of.

But it is well outside the scope of Combat Mission. Scenario wise, fires like that happened before the Russian player/commander ever got into the fight. Its why he only has to fight one company with a little bit of Blue artillery today, it isn't something he has on call. If he tried to get it on call, it would be a process of 45 minutes or more just to snake through the system according to the unclass US estimates. And it would probably be disapproved because once in a major powers shooting war, every time a major asset fires the other side is trying to eradicate it and both sides are pinging like mad with counterbattery radar. So your Russian player is unlikely to benefit from this largesse "in scenario."

As you go down to the BTG level, a BTG is usually plussed up with a lot of division equivalent support and retains its own internal artillery, lots of it.   In general, a first class BTG will have two or three organic battalions of artillery depending on spending postures for the district,, and possibly a battalion of rockets, and then another three to six battalions pushed to it in support. This is a copious amount of artillery by western standards. However, the reality of coordinating that much artillery weighs heavily on Russian HQs at this level. Rather than serve as acentrla processing authority for lower units (more below), the BTG forms its own fire plans or directly hunts and shoots using BTG level sensors and scouts.  Ukranians report receiving fire in "as little as ten to fifteen minutes" after being observed, that is usually from what most western analysts think are BTG HQ controlled observation platforms that have direct links back to the BTG HQ. This one is impossible to actually build in Combat Mission, because those UAVs and special observers are often sending information directly back to the BTG, who decides to shoot or begins a conversation with the battalion level element - meaning"the player" would only receive the benefit of these fast reaction times if he lost a great deal of his own autonomous control of the UAVs and observers present. Unfortunately, this is not within the scope of the game engine, but it does suggest that anything 152mm and higher would be at least a ten minute delay since that is how fast direct sensor-shooter link is processing Russian fires in optimal situations these days.

And finally we are at the "player" level of a battalion commander or lower. Russian attempts to emulate the western call for fire system, where ground commanders call up to a coordinating HQ who then divvies out fire in according to priority, has not been nearly as successful as their direct data-link has. See the part where the poor Russian artillery officers are trying to keep a hold of up nine battalions of guns and rockets moving around, shooting, and getting resupplied.  Basically, the BN commander has a much long lag time in this situation than his western equivalent. Exact numbers are unknown, but it remains substantially higher than western formations, so likely in the twenty plus minute range for CM purposes. Since that is pretty unacceptable, the Russians use artillery at this level as either pre-planned fire or as direct attachments to the ground unit. When attached, as a poster previously noted, the attached battery actually sends it own special officer(s) forward to coordinate the fire serving as the link between the guns and line units. Which leads to a dilemma - the guy actually making this happen is basically trying to execute a pre-determined fire plan that the battalion commander told him to do. In CM terms, turn one prepped fires or preplanned targets. Or he is waiting for a sufficiently high authority to tell him to shift off that plan - which is NOT a squad leader or lieutenant making an on the fly call ala a western force. Most people think it is a company commander minimum (though he can delegate that authority) and then only for guns assigned to him, not the force as a whole. Meaning that attempts to use the artillery in a "see it, smash it" manner get substantially delayed by command authorities...unless you drive right up and use direct fire, hence the Russian preference for that as a quick reaction doctrinally. In a weird way, it is actually faster for Russians to deliver high level artillery than low level because of these dynamics. Which means, if anything, CM is probably being too generous in the response times available to the player. 

[ikalugin]

Quote

On the higher (read, division to corps equivalent) end, they've basically copied the US concept of a JAGIC cell - a dedicated hunting element who's job it is to use special purpose forces, drones, electronic detection and so forth to direct massive firepower onto prime targets via rockets and missiles, usually armed with cluster munitions and thermobarics.

(Emphasis mine)

Are you familiar with the Soviet concepts of recon-fire complex and recon-strike complex?

 

Edited May 2, 2019 by ikalugin

[GloriousRuse]

Somewhat. To be clearer, it is less a "the US had this brilliant idea for deep shooting", which we see hinted at in the 30s by Soviet theorists, and then talked about in the 70s and 80s again, as it is "the US managed to put together the joint communications package, appropriate staff officers, right authorities, and tied it all to correct technology to make the day to day execution of it in quick turn arounds a reality" as opposed to having a substantially longer delay limited by either technological - or organizational - issues.  

[ikalugin]

8 hours ago, GloriousRuse said:

Somewhat. To be clearer, it is less a "the US had this brilliant idea for deep shooting", which we see hinted at in the 30s by Soviet theorists, and then talked about in the 70s and 80s again, as it is "the US managed to put together the joint communications package, appropriate staff officers, right authorities, and tied it all to correct technology to make the day to day execution of it in quick turn arounds a reality" as opposed to having a substantially longer delay limited by either technological - or organizational - issues.  

How familiar are you with Soviet (and Russian) artillery (and general purpose) C4?

Recon-fire and to lesser extend recon-strike complexes were not just ideas in 1980s, they were a reality with the new C4ISR being deployed in the time period, the organisational measures implemented.

Edited May 3, 2019 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

Soviets had deployed a system of systems of automation complexes. For the combined arms ground forces there was the Manever (later Manevr-M) system built for the Front-Army/Corps and Division-battalion level, down to the battalion level CPs. Interfacing with it were specialised systems for air defense, etc from peer formations (ie air defense corps). Subordinate to it were specialised complexes (ie those for artillery and air defense units subordinate to that combined arms command).

The process of command and control was automated (from now on I am not going to separate automated and automatic means but you can inquire further), comunications were both automated and datalinked. All of this was powered by computerisation. The overall layout of Division and below can be seen here:

The overall layout of the Front-Army level could be seen here:

Sadly I do not have a diagram for the in (Soviet) period 1V12 or other such complex for automation of an artillery battalion on hand as an example of those subordinate automation complexes, so I would substitute it with a more modern one, which keeps the same organisation:

Edited May 3, 2019 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

Incidentally your whole view on the organisation of fire support in Russian service appears to be wrong an bizzarre to me, I think this was discussed in the other thread. This is concerning as if you are using modern documents discussing the modern employment of Russian artillery then the whole establishment that produces them seems to be incompetent.
To that end I would suggest reading one of the better writers on topic - Grau, for example this article:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329933979_The_Russian_Reconnaissance_Fire_Complex_Comes_of_Age
or this book for the bigger picture (it is sadly a bit outdated now):
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329934215_The_Russian_Way_of_War_Force_Structure_Tactics_and_Modernization_of_the_Russian_Ground_Forces

For example if an artillery battalion was to be allocated to direct support of a tactical unit (or if an artillery group was formed for that same purpose) then the artillery commander of that battalion would move and be co-located with the tactical unit he supports and would be the one drawing up artillery employment plans and would have direct voice and data link to his subordinate HQ in the rear, with the artillery battalion itself.
This method, while not being the only one, is the one imbeded into the organisational structure of the artillery units and their automation complexes, such as the one you could see above. For the older (than present day) automation complexes (such as the one depicted above) the time within which is processes the calls is 50s I seem to recall.

Edited May 3, 2019 by ikalugin

[Erwin]

Have been out of touch for a while and just got back and found this thread very useful and interesting.  Thanks guys.  Keep it up!

Question:  Does the above imply that designers should ensure that the Red forces have enuff artillery so it can emulate the pre-planned bombardment tactics described? 

It often feels that the Red forces in CM2 scenarios have inadequate artillery to conduct such fires in sufficient mass - and that is when we players start to try and use Red artillery as if we were playing with western Blue forces.