C2 & Information Sharing (REDUX)

[Erwin]

Good to know.  Thanks...

[NeoOhm]

Hi, i from the future, still no CM2 in sight here, or did September and Demo before that meant something else back at your time?

Edited October 9, 2018 by NeoOhm

[Kaunitz]

This topic deserves to stay up high in the list of topics (no sticky topics here?)! So I thought I could add an interesting account I've come upon, cited from Joseph Klein, Fallschirmjäger. Piniere der 1. Fallschrimjägerdivision im Italienkrieg", p. 89 (poor translation by myelf ^^). The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".

Context: He and his men stumbled into 4 Churchills when they peeked over a sharp ridge. The clostest tank was only at a distance of 50m and the tanks had to be taken out quickly as they were overlooking the path of approach of their unsuspecting fellow platoons. The author also mentions that they had no Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck ("Ofenrohre") with them. They had captured enemy AT guns, but were reluctant to use them as they had no experience with them. They also couldn't knock the tank out with grenade bundles ("geballte Ladungen") as there was no cover to approach the tanks safely. However, the company of the author was supported by StuGs. His platoon also had a StuG (of some short-barreled variant) at hand, which had to do the job: 

"Due to its inflexibility, our StuG was at a disadvantage against the British tanks. It had no turret, so the whole vehicle had to be turned in order to aim. Also, the short-barreled gun posed some problems*. We hurriedly discussed our options with the StuG-crew. [The author goes on to assert the truth of the incredible story, he also points out that the StuG crewmen - of the 16th tank division - were veterans from the eastern front and their StuG's two (?!) gunbarrels were marked with 8-10 rings, indicating the number of their kills] First, we directed our StuG to the left side of the road which offered better concealment. Then one guy went to peek over the ridge to spot the enemy tank and indicate the line of collimation/direction to the target to another guy, who acted as a grain on which the StuG could orient itself. Finally our StuG was ready. It would need drive up the ridge in a straight line. The StuG's low silhouette was handy in this situation, as only ca. 50cm would need to be exposed to the enemy tank-gunner. As they had also considered the angle to their target, the StuG's crew had depressed their gun to the maximum - it looked as if it would fire into the ground. One of our squad-machine guns and some riflemen would trigger the action by abruptly opening fire at the vision slits in order to dazzle the enemy tank. [details about the position of the MG and riflemen...]

Then we got started: Shortly after the MG started to bark, and rifles and machine-pistols started to fire, the StuG's engine roared as it made its short approach to the crest of the ridge, followed by the dry "bang" of the StuG's gun. The Churchill tank was ablaze. It had been taken totally by surprise. As planned, its crew had been distracted by the machine gun and rifle fire, so they were unaware of the more serious threat. But I can't rule out that perhaps the machine gun and rifle fire had also had some effect on the crew inside the tank. We all rejoiced and were so excited that we almost forgot about the second enemy tank and threw our arms up in the air. [the StuG had withdrawn back behind the crest immediately after its shot] 

 

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* "...wobei die kurzen Stummelrohre ihrer Kanone nur wenig Ausschlag und Richtungsmöglichkeiten auf das Ziel geben konnten" ???

Edited May 27, 2019 by Kaunitz

[domfluff]

One thing that really strikes me about the above (and similar accounts) is how long this would take to set up.

It's likely only minutes, but in a world where we have one minute turns and infinite time to think in between them, I think there's a natural tendency to expect an awful lot to happen in those sixty seconds.

It's also pretty interesting as a response to many spotting questions in general - an entire platoon with attached AFV was able to manouvre within six action spots of a Churchill platoon, presumably sight unseen, since they've taken them by surprise.

Also, the thought occurs that the logic behind shoot and scoot is that you can break the connection between spotting contact and your vehicle, meaning that moving to a secondary firing position against a stationary known enemy should give you the advantage in reacquisition time.

 

Edited May 27, 2019 by domfluff

[MOS:96B2P]

32 minutes ago, Kaunitz said:

The author - who was a platoon leader in the parachute-engineer ("Fallschirmjägerpionier") battalion -  narrates his encounter with a troop of Churchill tanks at Termoli in early October 1943. I found it interesting as it is an example of both "info sharing" and "shoot and scoot".

+1  Interesting read.  The book is probably only printed in German?  Thanks for sharing. 

[Kaunitz]

7 hours ago, domfluff said:

One thing that really strikes me about the above (and similar accounts) is how long this would take to set up.

It's likely only minutes, but in a world where we have one minute turns and infinite time to think in between them, I think there's a natural tendency to expect an awful lot to happen in those sixty seconds.

It's also pretty interesting as a response to many spotting questions in general - an entire platoon with attached AFV was able to manouvre within six action spots of a Churchill platoon, presumably sight unseen, since they've taken them by surprise.

Also, the thought occurs that the logic behind shoot and scoot is that you can break the connection between spotting contact and your vehicle, meaning that moving to a secondary firing position against a stationary known enemy should give you the advantage in reacquisition time.

 

I also thought that if the Churchill was only 50 meters away, the crew must have heard the StuG? But then we don't know if the Churchill's engine was running, too? And then obsiovusly the Churchill crew must have been waiting, expecting to ambush any enemy vehicle that showed itself on the ridge. The decisive difference was obviously that the Churchills lacked infantry support. 

The StuG did not reposition to a secondary position, it just withdrew back behind the ridge to be safe from the other Churchills. So no proper shoot and scoot according to your definition, I'm afraid. How the other three Churchills were knocked out (the one close by by the StuG of another platoon; two others were a further 200 meters away, turrets pointing in another direction) is not described in detail. 

7 hours ago, MOS:96B2P said:

+1  Interesting read.  The book is probably only printed in German?  Thanks for sharing. 

It's only in German and rather complicated to acquire via the Monte Cassino Foundation. Some of the book's contents (not the accounts of the actual action) strike me as uncritical/ideologically affirmative, as the author seems to have been a "proud" paratrooper, convinced of what he was doing. But on the plus side, the proceeds of the book's sale benefit the Monte Cassino Foundation. I became aware of the book during my research for my COII Catania/Primosole bridge scenario (https://forums.lnlpublishing.com/p/30089).

Edited May 28, 2019 by Kaunitz

[Bil Hardenberger]

Thanks for posting that @Kaunitz.. I think that description shows that this unit did not rush into an engagement, but took their time and set up "the play"... this paid off for them and it can do the same in game.  Excellent example of information disparity between opponents, distraction (MG fire) and hammer (Stug) against an enemy that obviously had little situational awareness.

It could/should be used as a lesson to players of CM to take their time, ensure you have all your pieces in place before jumping into any action and to increase your chances of success by being smart and deliberate with your actions.  The tactic shown in this narrative could be used in CM, many of us have probably fired at a tank with an MG or riflemen in order to distract it and then moved a tank (or AT team) into position to deal the blow...

I love these types of tactical descriptions.  Thanks again for sharing.

Bil

[BornGinger]

If you send up a team with radio which is keeping an eye on the enemy for a while (5 to 10 minutes) and reports this to the HQ and the enemy doesn't move from that position during that time, how come the HQ can't use that info to call in artillery to the position? The reason is most likely one of the limitations put on the game and requires the HQ to have a visual on the target themselves. But wouldn't it, in theory, be possible for a HQ to request an artillery barrage based on someone else's observations?

The scout teams I used in my test never showed any of the communication icons in the panel. I expected to see at least "eye contact" considering that they were sneaking around among enemies and shouldn't shout to each other (although the game maybe doesn't bother about teams avoiding voice contact when they are close to the enemy).

[MOS:96B2P]

1 hour ago, BornGinger said:

If you send up a team with radio which is keeping an eye on the enemy 

But wouldn't it, in theory, be possible for a HQ to request an artillery barrage based on someone else's observations?

If this team with the radio has artillery call privileges they can call in artillery.

In theory probably.  In the CM WW2 titles it would take a Target Reference Point (TRP).    

 

1 hour ago, BornGinger said:

The scout teams I used in my test never showed any of the communication icons in the panel. I expected to see at least "eye contact" considering that they were sneaking around among enemies and shouldn't shout to each other (although the game maybe doesn't bother about teams avoiding voice contact when they are close to the enemy).

I may not be understanding what you're saying on this one.  The C2 panel shows if there is any communication to higher and what type.  If the C2 panel is empty the scouts don't have contact with their platoon HQ or higher HQ.  And this is often the case (in the WW2 titles) because scouts are off scouting ahead with no C2.  If they come across an enemy tank then they return to C2 range and report the tank.  This Spot report then enters the C2 system.    

[BornGinger]

One of the scout teams was close enough to the HQ support team and I thought they might be able to communicate with them from a short distance to make the support team call the Platoon HQ.

That didn't work because the scout team needs to report the findings to the Platoon HQ themselves, just as you said, so later on I moved the support team to see the enemies themselves to find out if their contact to the Platoon HQ would make sure that the Platoon HQ could use the info from the support team to call in artillery.

I was in doubt that it would work but wanted to try anyway.

Edited November 10, 2019 by BornGinger

[MOS:96B2P]

4 hours ago, BornGinger said:

One of the scout teams was close enough to the HQ support team and I thought they might be able to communicate with them from a short distance to make the support team call the Platoon HQ.

That didn't work because the scout team needs to report the findings to the Platoon HQ themselves,

There are two ways for information to pass through the C2 system, Vertical and Horizontal.  Vertical is displayed in the C2 panel.  A HQ Support team (I'm assuming it was a company or Battalion Support/2IC/XO team) is not in the vertical chain of command unless the Company or Battalion Commanding Officer is KIA.  So your 2 man scout team would not show C2 with a support/2IC/XO team and vertically provide information. 

However the scout team can still provide information to the support/2IC/XO team via horizontal information sharing.  Horizontal information sharing does not appear in the C2 panel.  If the scouts are within four action spots (about 32 meters) from any other team (even a team from a different battalion) they can pass on the contact information.  When the support/2IC/XO team receives the information horizontally from the scouts a tentative contact icon of the enemy unit will appear when the support/2IC/XO team is selected.  This tentative contact icon indicates that the support team has knowledge of the enemy location. 

Below is a link to a section on page #1 where it might be explained a little better.  

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/126005-c2-information-sharing-redux/?do=findComment&comment=1729432        

 

[AlanSA]

Busy playing the 'Gateway to Palermo' scenario. About half an hour in and my units are no longer sharing spotting intel. Neither up through the chain of command nor horizontally despite being in contact for over 10 minutes. Could it be they are sharing the intel but the icons are not updating? A graphic bug rather than communication issue.

I reloaded the scenario to test and the units successfully shared intel. Icons were also updated when new intel was provided by units in contact.  

 

[BornGinger]

I decided to read through this thread again just to remind myself of this in-game feature.

As I understand the C2 info sharing is not only about giving and receiving information about what's happening on the battlefield but also about keeping the morale high among the troops as when in C2 they get a morale bonus and don't break as easily when under fire or taking casualties.

But while reading this I began to wonder about what happens when a squad is under fire and maybe even have casualties and their platoon leader has -1 or -2 in leadership.

Is a squad in such a situation and with such a platoon leader still getting a morale bonus just because they're in C2 or do their morale suffer from having a -1 or -2 platoon leader?

[domfluff]

Based on Josey Wales' testing, he didn't see a difference in the recovery from suppression based on the formation HQ's leadership value - in that sense it didn't make a difference, and the results are a binary "in C2" and "not in C2" thing.

If that is the case, that doesn't mean it's not important. Suppression of the HQ unit will break C2, so a higher leadership HQ unit will stay unsuppressed for longer over the course of a firefight, and therefore maintain C2 for the rest of the formation.

You could avoid this by keeping the HQ unit out of the fight, but since information is shared in steps up and down the formation, the most efficient way to get information to a squad that needs it is for the HQ to get the spot. So the price of a bad platoon leader is that they will either engage and be suppressed, breaking C2, or they will hang back and avoid the fight, which will slow the transfer of information.

[BornGinger]

Allright @domfluffthanks for the information. So if a C2 connection is maximum eight action squares long, while not in hiding, it's maybe better to keep platoon leaders around that distance from the squads he's leading if things might get hot.

[domfluff]

Eight squares would assume no radios and voice distance, but sure - visual distance is longer than that, and is still "in C2", albeit to a worse level.

There's a trade-off, was my point - you spot faster with shared spotting information, and the fastest way to share spotting information would be for the HQ to have the spots (a leader recon). Therefore, for the unit to fight at maximum efficiency, you'd want an HQ up front and spotting things (possibly with a short arc to not engage themselves).

The trade-off is that putting the HQ in a position where they can spot things means that they are in danger of being suppressed, directly or from nearby HE, etc. At that point, the Leadership and other soft factors of the HQ start mattering, so a better Leadership HQ unit will have an effect on the cohesion and suppression of the unit, just not directly, and only if you're using them in a position where that will be tested.

[Peregrine]

Not as important for modern modules but for the WWII titles simple things like the presence or absence binoculars have a bearing for the initial spots of pretty much everything at longer ranges . These aren't necessarily present in every squad.

If you are playing scenarios where AT guns are a menace having HQs with binocs and radios in good and sometimes prominent spotting positions is important to respond quickly to new threats.

[domfluff]

Yup. They're also the ones with the radios in WW2 titles, if anyone does.

I often use my HQs quite aggressively, spotting with them, running them back and forth between units to share spotting contacts, etc. It's a risk, obviously, but I think there's a lot you can gain from that.

[chuckdyke]

Just now, domfluff said:

Yup. They're also the ones with the radios in WW2 titles, if anyone does.

I often use my HQs quite aggressively, spotting with them, running them back and forth between units to share spotting contacts, etc. It's a risk, obviously, but I think there's a lot you can gain from that.

Here is an interesting link for you. They discuss leader's recon. TC 3-21x76 FINAL WEB.pdf (army.mil)

[Sgt.Squarehead]

On 1/13/2021 at 11:12 AM, domfluff said:

Yup. They're also the ones with the radios in WW2 titles, if anyone does.

This really grinds my gears!

How come the Germans are given platoon level radios in WWII when they just did not have them (or had so few as to be utterly insignificant)? 

Game balance is not an acceptable excuse.

[MOS:96B2P]

@ratdeath this is the new version of the C2 post without the vandalism from photobucket.  You would have to go back to the first page of this topic for the information.  Thought you might find it interesting since you were looking at the older/original topic on C2 & Information Sharing. 

[ratdeath]

2 hours ago, MOS:96B2P said:

@ratdeath this is the new version of the C2 post without the vandalism from photobucket.  You would have to go back to the first page of this topic for the information.  Thought you might find it interesting since you were looking at the older/original topic on C2 & Information Sharing.

I found this one shortly after, I was about to conduct my own C2 tests when I decided to make a search and found the first version.

My problem/question was how to share information between formations which I know have confirmed is done horizontally, so I group the HQ's together for sharing information.

Thank you :)

[JoMac]

On 1/14/2021 at 9:08 AM, Sgt.Squarehead said:

This really grinds my gears!

How come the Germans are given platoon level radios in WWII when they just did not have them (or had so few as to be utterly insignificant)? 

Game balance is not an acceptable excuse.

I agree, Germ Infantry don't have Radio's , but unfortunately, it's built into the Game Mechanics that ALL HQ's do for the most part (for such things as C&C, Moral, etc). 

Edited February 14, 2021 by JoMac

[LukeFF]

On 2/14/2021 at 11:43 AM, JoMac said:

I agree, Germ Infantry don't have Radio's , but unfortunately, it's built into the Game Mechanics that ALL HQ's do for the most part (for such things as C&C, Moral, etc). 

It's to simulate them having field telephones.

[BornGinger]

If the different troops are quite a bit away from each other, motorcycle messagers to deliver tentative contacts could have helped to spread the information horizontally a bit quicker. But I doubt there will be any of those in the game.

Edited October 14, 2021 by BornGinger