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US troops training former Warsaw Packed forces in the use of BMPs. How strange the world is now.

They teach mostly of tactic. This is useful for platoon/ company commanders and sergeants. Type of vehicles not to matter. US instructors also say Ukrainian soldiers give them value experience of fighting in conditions of intensive enemy artillery work and heavy EW opposition. 

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They teach mostly of tactic. This is useful for platoon/ company commanders and sergeants. Type of vehicles not to matter. US instructors also say Ukrainian soldiers give them value experience of fighting in conditions of intensive enemy artillery work and heavy EW opposition. 

The type of vehicle matters a lot in my opinion.

As usual I hope that someone we all know about hops in the thread and clarifies this, but I belive the type of vehicle changes what a platoon of mechanized infantry can and cannot do. The BMP-1 or 2 has a given amount of internal space, a given position of soldiers carried inside, a specific weaponry. Different assets mean different conditions of the fight.

You can learn how to fire a generic rifle, but training with one, specific rifle is another thing.

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They teach mostly of tactic. This is useful for platoon/ company commanders and sergeants. Type of vehicles not to matter. US instructors also say Ukrainian soldiers give them value experience of fighting in conditions of intensive enemy artillery work and heavy EW opposition. 

This.  One of the worst things about a Soviet legacy is poor small unit leadership training.  This is not exactly a condemnation of the Soviet model, but it was a system that relied on being the Soviet Army (with the larger mass, massive artillery arm and great number of Battalion level maneuver units).  More training in small unit leadership and tactics, with the associated greater initiative of Company-Platoon-Squad* leadership should allow for more mileage out of what the various post Soviet military forces have (as, after all the Ukraine would struggle to field the sort of force required to make the Soviet model work).

So in that regard the training is not "this is how to conduct a platoon level mechanized infantry attack against an enemy rifle squad" it is "this is how you, the platoon leader build a plan to accomplish a mission and you the squad leaders fit into the process.  We are using a mechanized infantry mission because you guys are mech infantry and already know how to do that much"

It doesn't translate as well outside of the military simply because so much of what we as wargamers do ignores the planning/human element.  3rd platoon moves because we tell it to.  We did not have to conduct rock drills and a mission briefing to give 3rd platoon enough information and confidence to accomplish the base mission, let alone react to a changing battlefield, its just taken for granted our pixeltruppen junior officers and NCOs did their jobs before SP.  But this kind of thing is a pretty big deal, and as such it is much less relevant what vehicles are used, and more relevant that you're working with motivated, educated troops (which thanks to Russian belligerence, the first is rather handily taken care of,  and the Ukrainians are well educated enough as a country to allow for a good selection of leaders).  

Re: Training the Trainers

Any good training mission is a two way exchange of information.  However Russian artillery and electronic warfare assets deployed to the Ukraine are of marginal importance, and are not especially well exercised.  

Edited by panzersaurkrautwerfer
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You should be nicknamed "The Truth".  We as wargamers think its all about the hardware.  The only soft factors are the basic "experience", "morale", etc.  Even with my limited understanding of sqaud/company-level planning that has to happen before any operation, I am astounded by how much has to happen.  We as wargamers don't give enough credit to the above mentioned human factors.  Instead, someone wants to rage against the ROF or range of a SMG.  But not whether the soldier knows his role and the plan.  This is validated by people saying you can't train someone in tactics if they don't use the same hardware.

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It doesn't translate as well outside of the military simply because so much of what we as wargamers do ignores the planning/human element.  3rd platoon moves because we tell it to.  We did not have to conduct rock drills and a mission briefing to give 3rd platoon enough information and confidence to accomplish the base mission, let alone react to a changing battlefield, its just taken for granted our pixeltruppen junior officers and NCOs did their jobs before SP.  But this kind of thing is a pretty big deal, and as such it is much less relevant what vehicles are used, and more relevant that you're working with motivated, educated troops (which thanks to Russian belligerence, the first is rather handily taken care of,  and the Ukrainians are well educated enough as a country to allow for a good selection of leaders).  

Excellent little paragraph there.  Everyone should read and absorb that.  LOL who am I kidding :)

You should be nicknamed "The Truth".  We as wargamers think its all about the hardware.  The only soft factors are the basic "experience", "morale", etc.  Even with my limited understanding of sqaud/company-level planning that has to happen before any operation, I am astounded by how much has to happen.  We as wargamers don't give enough credit to the above mentioned human factors.  Instead, someone wants to rage against the ROF or range of a SMG.  But not whether the soldier knows his role and the plan.  This is validated by people saying you can't train someone in tactics if they don't use the same hardware.

+1

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Any good training mission is a two way exchange of information.  However Russian artillery and electronic warfare assets deployed to the Ukraine are of marginal importance, and are not especially well exercised.  

Probably I said not exactly correct. Russian artillery is not only Russian army, but also their proxies - forces of DPR/LPR. Overall enemy artillery/MLRS group is just little less than Ukranian. Russian artillery played decisive role in defeat of Ukrainain battalion tactical groups in Border battle (Russians name it "South pocket"). Then UKR forces lost almost all heavy vehicles and artillery, when almost during month guarded the border and tried completely to cut separatists from supply from Russia. Whole month Russian artillery from east and separatists artillety from west shelled our troops, but we couldn't fire on Russia territory, though our soldiers visually observrd enemy battaries. 

Second big operation, combined with artillery, EW ans PsyOps was Russian invasion 23.08.2014. Three day before enemy SIGINT/ELINT units uncovered sector HQ place and hit it with long-range MLRS systems. HQ several times changed positions but each tymes was again uncovered and shelled. Additionally, enemy switch on all EW jammers and almost completely paralized control of HQ under subordinated units. Among just mobilized poor armed territorial defense battalions, which covered calm sectors of the border, enemy shared SMS and rumors as if from their neighbours "we are shelled, commanders fled, fly immediately!" etc. So, when 23-24 Aug enemy invaded, Ukrainian forces, which have no control and being mostly demoralized fled after first artillery shells or talks about Russians appearing. Almost all sector D troops gathered near Ilovaisk and were surrounded. Further you know - Ilovaisk massacre...

Debaltseve bulge battle also showed combined usage by Russians own artillery and EW. But in this time Russian artillery mostly acts for counter-battery fire, main work did artillery of separatists. But after 15th Feb after enemy suddenly attacked our troops since several hours after Minsk-2 agreement, Russians again used own EW stations and almost completely destroyed our radio communications, that allow themto disrupt control, but in that time we have plan B and could retreat with not big losses... So, this is mistake to say about marginal importance of arty and EW in this war...  

Look at tis satellite photo. This is "checkpoint 31" after several days of "marginal importance" artillery work. CH31 was captured by separatists 22 Jan 2015 - this was just common local engagement.

47926_900.jpg

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Re: The Truth

I'm not the most knowledgeable person on here, I'm just one that has a fair bit of knowledge, and is sufficiently underemployed these days to write long winded replies.  I'm always surprised to find on here a not small number of folks who've done seen things and been places.  

If Battlefront found itself looking for a junior analyst and commentator though, I think you'll find my rates are quite reasonable (I accept product and tacos as payment).  

 

Look at tis satellite photo. This is "checkpoint 31" after several days of "marginal importance" artillery work. CH31 was captured by separatists 22 Jan 2015 - this was just common local engagement.

You mistake my meaning.  It is not "marginal importance" to the battle but marginal importance in terms of novelty and tactics.  Russian employment of fires has not effectively been any different than we expected them to be.  Russian EW is interesting, but it is not working against the sort of communications systems we employ, much of it is hardened against what we have seen so far.

So for the Ukrainians, certainly not marginal.  For lessons learned, interesting but not likely how the Russians would choose to fight against NATO.  Some of the capabilities are interesting in giving hard numbers vs best estimates though.  

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For lessons learned, interesting but not likely how the Russians would choose to fight against NATO.  

Hmmm... 

http://documents.tips/documents/lessons-learned-from-the-russo-ukraine-war.html

From what I've read, the western observers where kind of surprised by the Russian capability of conducting artillery precession strikes and the use of UAVs for the atry observation. Not that they didn't know about those capabilities but the scale and effectiveness were a surprise.

 

Take a look at the linked document. It's really interesting. In regards to the technology in the Donbas War it touches four subjects:

-ubiquitous presence of UAVs

-increased lethality of indirect fires

-ATGM and armor's counter-revolution

-declining survivability of light infantry vehicles

 

Edited by Ivanov
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Second big operation, combined with artillery, EW ans PsyOps was Russian invasion 23.08.2014. Three day before enemy SIGINT/ELINT units uncovered sector HQ place and hit it with long-range MLRS systems. HQ several times changed positions but each tymes was again uncovered and shelled. Additionally, enemy switch on all EW jammers and almost completely paralized control of HQ under subordinated units. Among just mobilized poor armed territorial defense battalions, which covered calm sectors of the border, enemy shared SMS and rumors as if from their neighbours "we are shelled, commanders fled, fly immediately!" etc. So, when 23-24 Aug enemy invaded, Ukrainian forces, which have no control and being mostly demoralized fled after first artillery shells or talks about Russians appearing. Almost all sector D troops gathered near Ilovaisk and were surrounded. Further you know - Ilovaisk massacre...

 It is a pretty incredible statement how the Russians grasp and successfully apply the synergy between high tech and psychology on the battlefield. Thanks for sharing this.

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From what I've read, the western observers where kind of surprised by the Russian capability of conducting artillery precession strikes and the use of UAVs for the atry observation. Not that they didn't know about those capabilities but the scale and effectiveness were a surprise.

Again it's added metrics and reality to capabilities.  The capabilities themselves, or the Russian intentions to use them were never in doubt.  Now we better understand however what they can and cannot do.  

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