Photo of destroyed Iraqui M1A1M

[Alexey K]

An interesting photo of destroyed Iraqui M1A1M: http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/imp_navigator/17993765/280115/280115_900.jpg

 

Interesting thing is that turret is blown off and lies several meters away. That puzzles me. Previously I thought that this is possible only if ammunition is stored inside turret, but Abrams has it's ammunition is stored in special compartment.

Another possibility is IED, but it kicks whole tank upwards, not only turret.

 

Any explanation?

[Melchior]

Their isn't much to really go on here except a picture of a turret. Do we know the wreckage in the background is what it came from? What if wasn't blown off but just removed for salvage or something? 

 

If it was a turret blowout maybe the crew just wasn't following proper anti-flash procedures. 

[Alexey K]

Their isn't much to really go on here except a picture of a turret. Do we know the wreckage in the background is what it came from? What if wasn't blown off but just removed for salvage or something? 

 

If it was a turret blowout maybe the crew just wasn't following proper anti-flash procedures. 

 

Yes, that is possibility.

Is it possible to lose turret simply by not not closing doors of ammunition compartment?

[c3k]

Or by using the fire extinguisher to block the door track so the rounds are all accessible. Sure, those doors are meant to be closed and protect the crew, but it's much more convenient to prop the extinguisher there...

[Kieme(ITA)]

Possible that the tank was blown up intentionally by placing a heavy explosive on the turret floor and detonating it?

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

The Iraqis shouldn't be allowed to use tanks.  It's simple as that.  In terms of behavior that might lead to a turret blow off:

 

1. Iraqis frequently disabled or turned off the armored doors to the ammunition compartment because it "slowed them down"

 

2. Iraqis almost always stored several rounds inside the troop compartment.

 

3. The short of it is it's rather likely it was abandoned, and then blown up by ISIS.  

 

There's nothing like the the carousel autoloader, or the hull stored ammunition that historically leads to turret flippy floppy behaviors.  Fuel burns, vs catastrophic explosion usually.  There's nothing in the Abrams hull when combat loaded that should cause the turret to blow off.  And in the event of Iraqi operated turrets, even with the armored doors disabled the explosion will still vent upwards, the amount of force required to blow the blowout panels, and the hatches etc clean off, while the downward force is still largely reflected by the bottom of the turret.

 

 Given the distance and lack of other apparent damage I'd say it was filled full of explosives and blown in place for whatever reasons ISIS deemed fit (might have been beyond their ability to repurpose, or they simply want the world to be superscared of them or something).  Looking at the hull in the background it's really hard to pin much on it, but it's clear stuff has been also manipulated after the explosion (the front skirts are clearly propped up against each other off to the right).  

[Vanir Ausf B]

Was probably hit by a US airstrike.

Iraqi troops abandoned dozens of U.S military vehicles, including tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery pieces when they fled Islamic State fighters in Ramadi on Sunday, the Pentagon said Tuesday.

A Pentagon spokesman, Col. Steve Warren, estimated that a half dozen tanks were abandoned, a similar number of artillery pieces, a larger number of armored personnel carriers and about 100 wheeled vehicles like Humvees. He said some of the vehicles were in working condition; others were not because they had not been moved for months.

This repeats a pattern in which defeated Iraq security forces have, over the past year, left behind U.S.-supplied military equipment, prompting the U.S. to destroy them in subsequent airstrikes against Islamic State forces.

There's our tax dollars at work.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

 

 

This repeats a pattern in which defeated Iraq security forces have, over the past year, left behind U.S.-supplied military equipment, prompting the U.S. to destroy them in subsequent airstrikes against Islamic State forces.

 

I swear to god simply burning every dollar, ounce of construction material, all military equipment given to the Iraqis in a giant pit would be a less wasteful use than what the Iraqis have done with it. 

[Kieme(ITA)]

But weren't they trained by US personnel?

[LukeFF]

But weren't they trained by US personnel?

 

Where are you going with that question?

[Bil Hardenberger]

Where are you going with that question?

I think I took it the same way you did.     

[Kieme(ITA)]

I was wondering about this because, from my side, I have little knowledge of the "training", and everything related to it, that the US provided to the new Iraqi army. Maybe US people got a lot of information about it during the years, here in Europe the process was never really described or studied deeply (even though also Italian troops in Iraq were described as training local police forces).

[Splinty]

I didn't train Iraqi Army troops, but I did train Iraqi Police and in many ways they were worthless. Institutionally they were entirely corrupt and individually they were unmotivated and unknowledgeable about even the most basic police and security procedures. If the Iraqi Army of today is anything like that, they are worthless. I did work with some Iraqi Army in 2007 and for the most part they were decent enough guys, but lousy soldiers. Same goes for the police actually.

[Vanir Ausf B]

But weren't they trained by US personnel?

Pentagon planners understand the deficiencies of the Iraqi Army. It is disorganized, poorly led, politicized, corrupt, and plagued by sectarian and ethnic divisions. But, where they go wrong is to imagine that these problems can be corrected with better leadership, training, and a policy of inclusiveness towards disaffected Sunnis and Kurds.

In fact, the problems of the Iraqi Army reflect the problems of Iraq where Shiites and Sunnis don’t agree on what it means to be Iraqi and where the Kurds unanimously don’t want to be Iraqi at all. The deficiencies of the army cannot be corrected because they reflect the realities of the society.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/04/can-we-just-give-up-on-the-iraqi-army.html

[gunnersman]

We can hope they get heavy metal poisoning...

 

What is an M1A1M? Do you mean the M1A1 AIM? or the M1A1? I'm not seeing anything about an m1A1M except for some forum posts about it...which I suspect are a typo. 

[Badger73]

Consensus seems that training didn't take.

No surprises there.

 

But weren't they trained by US personnel?

[Kieme(ITA)]

Looks like that it's not really possible to instillate training where there are too many lacking basic features and requirements. 

 

This brings up the can of Worms of giving advanced weapons to untrained hands.

[Alexey K]

So, basicly it turns out that ordinary ammunition storage inside Abrams could not blow turret off tank, right?

Edited May 20, 2015 by Alexey K

[Alexey K]

Looks like that it's not really possible to instillate training where there are too many lacking basic features and requirements. 

 

This brings up the can of Worms of giving advanced weapons to untrained hands.

 

I think it was politically motivated measure. US needed Iraq army to takeover after they pulled out, so they had to train and equip it.

Visibility of functioning army was needed more than actually functional army.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Re: US Training

 

It took sometimes.  The Iraqi Army of 2010 was not good, but it could handle the expected COIN type missions well enough.  Again do not think this means they were very good, could hold their own all the time, but again in terms of manning checkpoints, and entering and searching possibly hostile buildings, they got a C+.  Just when we left any semblance of equal treatment went out the window, a lot of experienced Sunni even Shia and Kurdish leaders were fired to make room for some Shia politician/religious dude's retarded third cousin because that's what counts more than competence in Iraq, which pretty much gutted what limited capabilities that "stuck."

 

Even before that, working with Iraqis....like even thinking about it gets me mad.  They will refuse to take even modest suggestions because their way is "better" despite the fact their way just got their asses handed to them.  They'll blame anything that goes wrong on anything but Iraqi failure to achieve mission.

 

 

I think it was politically motivated measure. US needed Iraq army to takeover after they pulled out, so they had to train and equip it.

Visibility of functioning army was needed more than actually functional army.

 

More complex.  The US plan was always "....and then leave a stable functional state without US troops remaining."  A key part of this was an Iraqi military.  Speaking as someone who saw the Iraqis on the way out the door, they were at least somewhat functional, but then Iraqi inability to have nice things dismantled what little that worked we'd left behind, and replaced it with the same terribad they've been doing all along.  It's the folly of nation building, unless you're there to keep it in place at bayonet point, you'll be hard pressed to actually change anything the population isn't already doing for themselves.

 

 

 

So, basicly it turns out that ordinary ammunition storage inside Abrams could not blow turret off tank, right?

 

Yeah pretty much.  Explosion wouldn't vent down like that to give the turret "lift," it'd vent forward if the armored doors were open, and up through the blowout panels.  And there's nothing to blow "up" in normal operations.

 

Re: M1A1M

 

It's a pretty commonly accepted way to refer to the various M1 export models.  They're not all the same at all, the Australian ones are only the DU mesh inserts away from being the same as the remaining US active duty, and National Guard M1A1SAs, The Egyptian and Iraqi ones though are about on par with not quite as good as 1985 (pre-DU armor) editions of the tank though, and that's worth keeping in mind when you see either of those go up.  

 

 

 

This brings up the can of Worms of giving advanced weapons to untrained hands.

 

 

It's a common thing to deal with that many military forces and cultures mistake weapons for capability.  The Iraqis constantly blamed their short fallings on a lack of US equipment, while ignoring that it wasn't the inability of their rifles to shoot straight, it was the fact their soldiers didn't attempt to aim.  Time and time again we'd get requests for equipment that wasn't much better than what the Iraqis had, except it was newer, while they'd constantly turn down, not show up to, or not take seriously efforts to get them to address their actual performance issues.  

[Alexey K]

More complex.  The US plan was always "....and then leave a stable functional state without US troops remaining."  A key part of this was an Iraqi military.  Speaking as someone who saw the Iraqis on the way out the door, they were at least somewhat functional, but then Iraqi inability to have nice things dismantled what little that worked we'd left behind, and replaced it with the same terribad they've been doing all along.  It's the folly of nation building, unless you're there to keep it in place at bayonet point, you'll be hard pressed to actually change anything the population isn't already doing for themselves.

 

I've read an article that said that old cadre of Hussein's army was dismissed and many of them have found their way to ISIS ranks, which created two interconnected problems: good experienced soldiers fighting against new Iraqui army and lack of competence in army. Is it right?

[Sgt Joch]

re: the current Iraqi Army, Col. T. Reese wrote an unusually blunt memo in 2009 that should have made it clear that the new Army was a disaster waiting to happen, but it was widely ignored by the Obama administration.

 

 

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

 

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

 

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

 

b -Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

 

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

 

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

 

e) Laziness is endemic

 

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

 

g) Lack of initiative is legion

 

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

 

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

 

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

 

3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:

 

a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions

 

b- They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties

 

c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result

 

d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards

 

e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism

 

f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process

 

g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

 

 

full text here:

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/world/middleeast/31advtext.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Edited May 20, 2015 by Sgt Joch

[Los]

Bottom line training is perishable and requires constant upkeep. Not signing a Status of forces agreement and pulling out completely for several years did NOT HELP the IA. Until a culture of continuous training , introspection and improvement takes hold in an army.,any training you give a unit is as good as that unit stays together, then when everyone transfers out or gets out of the army and you fall below a critical mass of trained individuals the units readiness declines. You can train reasonably proficient infantry quickly,  logistical and support forces,...longer. I it take a lot longer to inculcate an ethos of continuous development and improvement in any force. And frankly, through large amounts of personal experience in these matters, I have observed that the general ethos of arabs works against them at every step in these matters.  I know we are not supposed to bring up national differences here in combat mission land, but if you've spent any time over there you know what I'm saying.

 

Los

[LukeFF]

And frankly, through large amounts of personal experience in these matters, I have observed that the general ethos of arabs works against them at every step in these matters.  I know we are not supposed to bring up national differences here in combat mission land, but if you've spent any time over there you know what I'm saying.

 

Yep, and on a related note: Why Arabs Lose Wars.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Re: Saddam's army

Here's more or less how the cycle went:

US military plans on having Iraqi army and police intact to help maintain security.

Bremmer half reads a book on occupying Germany. Decides zero baathists are to be in new government, and being baathist is pretty much something that happened if you bought a pack of gum this is bad.

All the people with guns and idea how to use them and a mild antipathy to Shi'a and US are now unemployed. Results predictable.

Actual sunni militants show up. Start killing lots of everyone. Former saddam era police and military have second thoughts. Start killing sunni militants.

US military starts finding dead terrorists. Puts two and two together. Offers to pay these former sunni terrorists to kill present terrorists. Results are actually pretty great. Goodwill between former terrorists and US restored.

US gets ready to leave. Offers to continue paying former terrorists but through Iraqi government. Hashes out deal to find employment or job training for former terrorists.

Iraqi government pockets the money. Arrests former terrorists more or less at random. Won't hire the ones it was supposed to.

Sunnis become re alienated and turn to anyone who offers to put shia heads on pikes. Enter ISIS.

Basically these former Saddam guys were more or less bought off. Basically tigers in a zoo, dangerous, but not so much as long as you fed them and kept the gates closed. Iraqi shia government ate the tiger food and sold the gate in turkey to pay for gay porn. Results predictable.

Ref: COL Reese

I was on the ground when he wrote that. His status reports were all like that just most of them didn't have distro off of SIPR. we used to read the really funny ones out loud.

Hes totally right top to bottom left to right. But even as broken as the Iraqi army was in 2010, if it just kept being that level of broken in 2014 it'd have been okay.

But yeah. Iraqis are the sorts to prove that you were wrong about having hit rock bottom.

Edited May 20, 2015 by panzersaurkrautwerfer