Patton quote ref US advantages over Russia & why we'd beat them if we kept going

[JonS]

I found Hastings Overlord and Armageddon ... to be just as insightful & balanced ... than even Ambrose's missives.

lol. I love this quote because of the way it so elegantly sums those two authors 

Edited April 3, 2015 by JonS

[kevinkin]

Happy to see this topic remains so active. I thought the below to be very relevant and include it here instead of a link so

folks can quote it to aid in any further discussion.

Kevin

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From Liberation to Confrontation: The U.S. Army and Czechoslovakia 1945 to 1948 by Bryan J. Dickerson

Quote,

Though the likelihood of an attack against U.S. forces in Germany by any of the other occupying forces including the Soviet Union was deemed very remote, plans were prepared to defend against that possibility. In January 1946, the G-3 section of U.S. Forces in the European Theater headquarters released “Plan ‘Totality’,” a defensive plan for the American zone. The plan was very vague but called for a rapid concentration of occupation forces, delaying actions until the arrival of reinforcements, and the defense of key areas such as the Frankfurt and Nuremberg areas. The latter in particular was very important because losing it could isolate U.S. forces in Austria. Air power was vitally important to offset deficiencies in the ground forces. It was presumed that intelligence would give adequate warnings of the build-up of hostile forces. The report glumly noted that “with the limited forces at our disposal it would not be possible to maintain a defense unaided within the US Zone for any great length of time against a strongly sustained attack.” [22]

The area along the German - Czechoslovak Border was deemed to be one of the most defensible in the American zone. With its rugged and thickly wooded mountains the Border region would have been ideal for a defensive line to counter aggression from the north-east, ie. Czechoslovakia or the Saxony region of the Soviet zone. Of course as U.S. troop levels in Germany evaporated, such a defense could not have been maintained for very long and a fighting retreat would have been the best that American commanders could have hoped for. [23]

In Washington, however, senior American military leaders had no intention of conducting a fighting retreat, let alone an outright defense, in western Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. They recognized that western Europe was indefensible because of the weakness of American forces and the refusal of the Truman Administration and Congress to provide sufficient funds for adequate military, naval and air forces. Therefore, the Pincher series of war plans drafted in 1946 for war against the Soviet Union called for the abandonment of western Europe in the face of unstoppable Soviet land forces. More significantly, the Pincher plans called for neither a “Overlord II” return to Europe nor the use of atomic weapons. Instead, Pincher placed the highest priority on retaining the petroleum fields of the Middle East, and the use of conventional air power to reduce Soviet war making capabilities. Eventually American and Allied forces would invade the southern Soviet Union across the Black Sea to seize Soviet petroleum fields in the Caucusus. [24]

The Pincher Plans were superseded by the Broiler, Charioteer, Frolic, Bushwhacker, and Crankshaft Plans which were drafted in 1947 and 1948. Like Pincher, these plans called for the immediate abandonment of western Europe and counter-offensives elsewhere. Unlike Pincher, these plans relied heavily upon atomic weapons and strategic air power for cripple Soviet warmaking capabilities and force a favorable conclusion to the war. Despite the fact that American atomic capabilities were extremely limited, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no choice but to rely upon them. They simply did not have any other forces available to inflict significant destruction upon the Soviet war machine. They also had too many places to defend and not enough forces to do so. [25]

End Quote

22]. U.S. Forces in the European Theater. Headquarters. G-3 (Operations) Section. “Plan ‘Totality’: Alert Plan for Defense in the Event of Aggression.” Germany: 22 January 1946. USAMHI Library.

[23]. Ibid.

[24]. Steven T. Ross, American War Plans 1945-1950, (London: Frank Cass, 1996). In his book, Ross examines the development of American war plans against Soviet invasions. For the Pincher Plans, see Chapter Two.

[25]. See Chapter Three of American War Plans.

[John Kettler]

kevinkin,

 

Most interesting and disturbing info, but not really on point regarding what Patton said. Patton said what he did when the US forces were still in the field, en masse and not gutted by the sum total of what subsequently befell the US military in Europe. 

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

[kevinkin]

I did not see a date for the Patton quote supplied. But anyway. Were the correlation of forces that different between May 45 and Jan 46? The initial plan was drawn up prior to Jan 46. The report glumly noted that “with the limited forces at our disposal it would not be possible to maintain a defense unaided within the US Zone for any great length of time against a strongly sustained attack.” (Not sure where the aid was coming from). So US High Command must have extrapolated out 6 months to a year as to the forces available to both side after VE day. If they could not defend, the US and allies could not conventionally attack the Soviets. My opinion is Patton was irrational in his view and it would appear the US government at the time would have agreed. I have not found a reference to a US offensive plan after the war like Patton seemed to fancy. And it just looks like the US only planned to abandon Western Europe, drop available atomic bombs and move to the Mediterranean.

Kevin

[Sublime]

Lisse, i actually avoid Ambrose like

The plague. Ill do Beevor but.not Ambrose who more or less had been proven to have simply made **** up

[Sublime]

Well Patton was dead by the end of '45 iirc. However Id say very strong US forces were present to June/July when both points.for demobilization and movement or gear ups to movement to.the PTO took their toll. In fact the most likely scenario of war before the `48 Berlin Blockade seems to be the meeting of opposing forces in April/May 45 with mistaken identity skirmishes or local idiocy on some battalion commander would begin a chain reaction leading to fighting along the line. This actually was what Glantz postulated in a book of about fifty what if scenarios involving Axis victory, though in Glantzs' version the politicians sort things out within several days of combat thats not even full scale..

I need to read more abt Op Pincher but it seems a compelete allied evacuation with no fight besifes perhaps.rear guards would be devastating to western credibility and greatly embolden the Soviets. It seems that a staggered defense focussed on.the rivers as major defensive lines and.urban.centers until at risk of being cut off could.drastically slow a Soviet advance.and a super heavy transportation plan evtually halt the Soviets before the channel. Even if WestGermany and France were deemed undefendable then why not a Western alpine redoubt in.Austria and the Italian alps. i think.airfields in the Po river valley would be damned near priceless..

Edited April 4, 2015 by Sublime

[ASL Veteran]

I did not see a date for the Patton quote supplied. But anyway. Were the correlation of forces that different between May 45 and Jan 46? The initial plan was drawn up prior to Jan 46. The report glumly noted that “with the limited forces at our disposal it would not be possible to maintain a defense unaided within the US Zone for any great length of time against a strongly sustained attack.” (Not sure where the aid was coming from). So US High Command must have extrapolated out 6 months to a year as to the forces available to both side after VE day. If they could not defend, the US and allies could not conventionally attack the Soviets. My opinion is Patton was irrational in his view and it would appear the US government at the time would have agreed. I have not found a reference to a US offensive plan after the war like Patton seemed to fancy. And it just looks like the US only planned to abandon Western Europe, drop available atomic bombs and move to the Mediterranean.

Kevin

Yes, the correlation of forces would be different.  Unlike today, back then the US military was demobilized rapidly because having a large standing army isn't really an American tradition prior to the 1950s.  I think that part of Patton's idea was to put German formations into the field as well and the possibility of doing that would rapidly evaporate as formations surrendered and equipment was scrapped.  If Patton's dream was going to come about it probably would have had to be done prior to the Japanese surrender in the Pacific at a minimum and it would probably have had to be done before units began to transfer from the European theater of operations to the Pacific theater of operations.  So I'm guessing he would have to have his 'incident' with Soviet forces no later than May or June 1945 in order for it to work.  The quote above also refers to 'occupation forces' and I don't think anyone in the western allied chain of command expected that the 'occupation forces' would consist of every allied formation in the European theater of operations that were present in April of 1945.  Obviously the occupation forces would consist of a small fraction of those forces.

 

Having said all that, I seriously doubt that even if Patton was able to engineer an 'incident' between allied and Soviet forces I doubt that it would have led to all out war between the two sides.  I doubt that anyone on either side had much of an appetite for more warfare with a brand new enemy. 

[Vanir Ausf B]

Therefore, the Pincher series of war plans drafted in 1946 for war against the Soviet Union called for the abandonment of western Europe in the face of unstoppable Soviet land forces. More significantly, the Pincher plans called for neither a “Overlord II” return to Europe nor the use of atomic weapons. Instead, Pincher placed the highest priority on retaining the petroleum fields of the Middle East, and the use of conventional air power to reduce Soviet war making capabilities. Eventually American and Allied forces would invade the southern Soviet Union across the Black Sea to seize Soviet petroleum fields in the Caucusus.

Perfect. Combat Mission Black Sea 2

Come on, BFC, you know you want to do it!

[kevinkin]

I had to chuckle at the mention of Black Sea too.

It's remarkable that after the cost of taking western Europe the US was resigned to abandonment and would rely of atomic

warfare to stop the Soviets after transferring troops out for theater. I guess a window existed for both sides just after VE in the summer of 45 when the US had the bomb and the Soviets only one in the making. Like to find a war game to sim this.

Kevin

[John Kettler]

I found the date, May, 1945, of the Patton quote which forms the basis of this thread. Quoted from John Stafford article regarding the Patton's Nightmare Timeline portion of an AP game scenario book and counter set. For which I shall not be providing a link. The nightmare? The scenario begins in 1947!

 

"General George S. Patton, Jr., held the communist way of life in low regard. He studied history, and firmly grasped the culture of his nominal Soviet “allies” throughout the course of the war. In Europe the immediately after the war he observed the Soviet consolidation and later pillage of the territories under their control, along with the destruction of Germany and the exhaustion of France and Britain. He feared that time and the weakness of the European Allies would allow the USSR to create a hegemony that would bring communism to all Europe. One telling quote from General Patton: A Soldier's Life (2002) by Stanley P. Hirshson, reveals Patton’s stance in August 1945:

 

The difficulty in understanding the Russians is that we do not take cognizance of the fact that he is not a European, but an Asiatic, and therefore thinks deviously. We can no more understand a Russian than a Chinaman or a Japanese, and from what I have seen of them, I have no particular desire to understand them, except to ascertain how much lead or iron it takes to kill them. In addition to his other Asiatic characteristics, the Russian has no regard for human life and is an all out son of bitch, barbarian, and chronic drunk.

 

Earlier, in May 1945 General Patton noted in his diary:

 

In my opinion, the American Army as it now exists could beat the Russians with the greatest of ease, because, while the Russians have good infantry, they are lacking in artillery, air, tanks, and in the knowledge of the use of the combined arms, whereas we excel in all three of these. If it should be necessary to fight the Russians, the sooner we do it the better.

 

Sooner was better because he also knew that in the immediate postwar period, the Soviet armed forces were correcting some of those deficiencies, especially their logistics, while the Americans and Europeans were quickly drawing down their forces and level of readiness. Patton feared having to fight the revamped Soviet Army with a scratch force of poorly trained troops."

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

Edited April 6, 2015 by John Kettler

[Sublime]

Yeah 1947 would probably be a bad time for the West to fight the Russians.  Its interesting to note the casual racism and whatnot that was used and acceptable at the time.  'The Russian is an asiatic and therefore thinks deviously' etc.  Im actually somewhat surprised at Pattons ignorance and general stereotyping of millions of people precisely because he was a student of history and had a great love of previous military historical commanders some of whom most  certainly were not white or European. I wonder, was that a public speech, or a private comment.  Theres a great difference between the two with Patton.  Sometimes I really do wonder if the conspiracy theory regarding Patton being assassinated by truck is true...  In the end I doubt it however. Its very hard to assassinate someone with a car accident when he could have been shot and the blame laid on Nazi werewolves or something.  And then theres the fact the US gov't simply could have reassigned him to say East Bumfu*k USA to govern PoW camps or train troops;.

[John Kettler]

Sublime,

 

I don't know know whether you're aware of this, but Patton was from the landed gentry of Virginia. He was so well off that during his time in the service, he kept a stable of polo ponies with him at his own expense. Racial attitudes in the period were awful, and the haughty Patton was no exception.

 

" General George S. Patton, Jr., in a letter to his wife, wrote that ‘a colored soldier cannot think fast enough to fight in armor.’"

 

Patton wised up, though, after watching the 761st Tank Battalion operate during maneuvers.

 

"The tankers received a welcome from the Third Army commander, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., who had observed the 761st conducting training maneuvers in the States: ‘Men, you’re the first Negro tankers to ever fight in the American Army. I would never have asked for you if you weren’t good. I have nothing but the best in my Army. I don’t care what color you are as long as you go up there and kill those Kraut sons of bitches. Everyone has their eyes on you and is expecting great things from you. Most of all your race is looking forward to you. Don’t let them down and damn you, don’t let me down!’ "

 

Patton was very much the product of his class, his time and a very real American xenophobia. This was after all, the nation that put its own citizens into internment camps and robbed them blind, too. Equally, as a military man, Patton would've been thoroughly conversant with the deception practices of the Huns and the Mongols. It turns out that during the GPW the Russians used the Mongols as a model for OPDEC. See 17 and 18 here in Russian Deception Operations.

 

As for your wonderings, I shall not be commenting upon them. 

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

[ASL Veteran]

Of course, the Russ is thought to be the name given to Vikings by the Slavic inhabitants of Russia and Ukraine because Russ is some sort of description of 'rowers' or something like that if memory serves.  Rowers being a description of Vikings rowing their boats down the numerous rivers that crisscross Russia.  The city of Kiev was founded by Vikings.  So Russia is perhaps 'Land of the Vikings'.  We are wandering pretty far afield here though.

Edited April 7, 2015 by ASL Veteran

[Apocal]

Patton was also a fairly vocal anti-Semite.

[Sublime]

You know some of the most famous US generals of that era either were all around pretty great men i.e. Eisenhower, or whilst excellent generals were prwtty much bat$hit crazy rascists, like Patton, or men of mixed.generalship abilities who were just nuts. Like MacArthur who imo is vastly overrated. I think the Phillipines campaign was actually fairly pointless. Inchon I.ll give him, the debacle that same fall with the Chinese is unforgivable and his handling of it, insubordination, crazy ideas and demands to create a nuclear no mans land in Manchuria, and.blame laying on everyone but himself was really sort of sad really. Just my opinion. General Ridgeways impressions on taking command in Korea initially are a damning indictment to the leadership and handling of the US Army that winter. The blame imo must be with the command, if it was not then why did Ridgeways superb command have such an incredible effect on combat operations, morale, and even general appearance of US troops?