Backstory events sliding toward Nonfiction

[Sublime]

Plus if the Russians invaded the Baltic states or expanded the war to other parts of Europe it could have a huge morale effect on the European powers of NATO, with the soldiers families being killed, expansion of the war, civilian opinion, eftc

Edited February 10, 2015 by Sublime

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Plus if the Russians invaded the Baltic states or expanded the war to other parts of Europe it could have a huge morale effect on the European powers of NATO, with the soldiers families being killed, expansion of the war, civilian opinion, eftc

 

Indeed it could. It would scare the hell out of the Poles who would feel ha they were directly threatened with a Russian invasion. And they could be right. An invasion from the Baltic States which had just, in this scenrio, beem brutally occupied by Russia would be a very real threat even if the Russians, like Saddam Hussein after his occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 had no intention of moving on into Saudi Arabia. The Russin army is far more competant than the Iraqis and logisically they are clearly far more capable. And, since such a move wold disrut NATP#s supply lies this woulsd be a threat that would have to be tken seriously, requiring the redeployment of forces hat might have bbeen sent to Ukraine to defend the Polish border instead.

 

Militarily the Baltic Variant would be an efffective diversion on top of the other miliary and political effects. Hence it is certainly an  option Russian military and political leaders would be likely to consider seriously. And when planning the invasion of Ukraiine it would have been planned as a contingency.

 

Indeed Putin is reported to have made actual threats to invade the Baltic States and Poland

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11106195/Putin-privately-threatened-to-invade-Poland-Romania-and-the-Baltic-states.html

 

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russias-growing-threat-after-ukraine-fears-grow-that-baltic-states-could-be-vladimir-putins-next-targets-10032378.html

 

For this reason, in our 2017 scenario NATO can be expected to start reinforcing the Baltic States withi the first few days of the war. Which means that Russia will have to move fast in order fo an invasion of the Baltic States to succeed.

 

With the current US forces TOEs we might see US Airborne/Light infantry types who are the most esilty and quickly deployed attemting to hold a position against heavy Russian Mechanized units. Later they will be reinforced with heavy forces. And with future BF expansions perhaps including Russian Airborne Units. Marines. maybe the Baltic Sates armies themselves and other NATO states the Baltic Variant can look even more interesting. Later on in the war NATO of course gets to launch a counter offensive in the Baltic States, perhaps after repelling a Russian attempt to invade Poland and certainly to liberate occupied NATO countries and to capture Kaliningrad.

 

Anyway, all of this should generate some interesting scenario ideas.  Perhaps units of 82nd Airborne or 101s Air Mobile (or perhaps 25th Light Infantry Division or 10th Mountain Division) might be tasked with the defence of Riga Airport or fighting delaying actions somewhere n Lithuania to gain time for NATO heavy armour to deploy..

[Philipp]

You can theorize as much as you want, what you describe is a full out war between NATO and Russia which is even less likely simply because Russia would have to expect to be outnumbered and outgunned something like 3 to 1.

And regardless of what you think, the scenario in the game is a limited war, limited in which troops are used and where it is fought. So all your theries of what might happen apply to a scenario that the games assumes to no have happened.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

You can theorize as much as you want, what you describe is a full out war between NATO and Russia which is even less likely simply because Russia would have to expect to be outnumbered and outgunned something like 3 to 1.

And regardless of what you think, the scenario in the game is a limited war, limited in which troops are used and where it is fought. So all your theries of what might happen apply to a scenario that the games assumes to no have happened.

 

The wholle 2017 waris a speculative future history. abd it is a full scalle war between NATO and Russia. In fact a lot of people would probably be referring to the conflict as World War 3 even if most of the land fighting is restyricted to Eastern Europes Much like Hackett's Third World War scenario.

 

It is true that Russia will be outnumbered once NATO have fully mobilized and NATO will have a technological edge. But NATO have to mobilise first which is why Russia will be trying to win a quick victory before that can happen. The Baltic Variant contributes significantly to that end. Please look at Google Earth and observe how a succesful Russia occupation of the Baltc States

 

1 Threatens to cut the supply routes to NATO forces fighting in Ukraine

2 Threatens Warsaw, the captal of Poland, an important NATO state in Eastern Europe

 

Indeed such an offensive could even knock Poland out of the war which means NATO could only supply the forces fighting in Ukraine via Romania. Plenty of very good military and political reasons for the Russians to mount a Baltic States offensive in this scenario. An offensive which would not widen the war significantly since Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty are almost certinly in effect anyway - remember Estonia, Latvia and Estonia are NATO members and therefore in a state of war with Russia under the terms of their treaty obligations. So Russia won't be attacking neutral states under international law.

 

Russia has territorial claims on the Baltic States and this is the only time they are likely to be able to actually enforce those claims. If they don't do it in June 2017 they won't get another chance for decades, if ever.

 

Examine this from the Russian perspective. There are excellent military and political reasons for Russi to conduct offensive operations into the Baltic States. That is even before we consider the risk, from the ussian perspective, of NATO  conducting a military buildup there. NATO might have no intention of doing so but, considering this from the Russian view, specfically their historical fear of a Barbarossa II conducted by NATO. Smething Russian generals would realise very well would be mounted from the Baltic Staes. Russian generals are not likely to be fools. They would certainly be taking action to prevent such a nightmare (for them) by pre-empting the potential NATO move.

 

We can only speculate in regard to how this war could be fought. There is a story about an argument between a US General and a senior academic arguing about how WW3 in the 1980s would actually be fought. After a lengthy debate the general, rather exasperated, says "We willjust have to fight the war and find out" The academic replies "We can't d that. It wouldn't be academically valid. We would only have one run of the experiment"

 

Hopefully you see my point here

[exsonic01]

Debaltseve pocket is closed, and rebels took Redkodub as well, the town with some important crossroads near Debaltseve. 8000~10000 UA soldiers and civilians are surrounded. UA tried counter offensive to northern side of pocket line, but failed.

 

See, how "economic sanctions" works here. Putin will never loose his grip to UA. Too sad for Ukrainians, their nation is now about to be divided like SK and NK.

Edited February 11, 2015 by exsonic01

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Debaltseve pocket is closed, and rebels took Redkodub as well, the town with some important crossroads near Debaltseve. 8000~10000 UA soldiers and civilians are surrounded. UA tried counter offensive to northern side of pocket line, but failed.

 

See, how "economic sanctions" works here. Putin will never loose his grip to UA. Too sad for Ukrainians, there nation is now about to be divided like SK and NK.

 

Question is he extet of Putin's ambitions. Is he going to be satisfied with just Eastern Ukraine or do his intentions extend further to the rest of Ukraine, the Baltic States or beyond. Consider his Eurasian Union project. Is it a limited political and economic project? Or is he trying to rebuild the ld Tsarist Russian Empitre or the Soviet Union under a new brand?

[Philipp]

Maybe I am worng but remember reading that Battlefront wrote about the game representing a limited conflict between Russia and NATO in the Ukraine. Looking through the manual and the web page I cant find that statement anywhere, but I always was assuming this is not a WW3 setting but rather a "heated" proxy war in which regular troops are fighting on both sides.

Maybe it is the optimist in me that assumes nobody would let a conflict escalate to that kind of level.

And I stick to the opinion that a conflict limited to Ukraine geographically is much more likely. It does not make sense from a military point of view, but politically NATO can argue that defending the freedom of Ukraine is necessary. Russia on the other side would try to avoid triggering Article 4 or 5 to avoid starting a war that is very hard for them to win. Russian leadership is not stupid. The know that they can win east and south Ukraine without having to go to full scale war.

In respect to what is really happening, the reaction that happened in the game, sending regular US troops, is pretty unlikely as long as Obama is in power. By 2017, who know what is going to happen.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Maybe I am worng but remember reading that Battlefront wrote about the game representing a limited conflict between Russia and NATO in the Ukraine. Looking through the manual and the web page I cant find that statement anywhere, but I always was assuming this is not a WW3 setting but rather a "heated" proxy war in which regular troops are fighting on both sides.

Maybe it is the optimist in me that assumes nobody would let a conflict escalate to that kind of level.

And I stick to the opinion that a conflict limited to Ukraine geographically is much more likely. It does not make sense from a military point of view, but politically NATO can argue that defending the freedom of Ukraine is necessary. Russia on the other side would try to avoid triggering Article 4 or 5 to avoid starting a war that is very hard for them to win. Russian leadership is not stupid. The know that they can win east and south Ukraine without having to go to full scale war.

In respect to what is really happening, the reaction that happened in the game, sending regular US troops, is pretty unlikely as long as Obama is in power. By 2017, who know what is going to happen.

 

I see the Baltic Sates as being a part of the Ukraine theatre. As for Articles 4 and 5 Russia probably triggered that as soon as the first clash with NATO occurred in Ukraine.

 

I have a feeling that NATO moved into Ukraine, not for the purpose of fighting a war with Russia, but to deter them, stop the Russian advance and then work out a political solution. But somthing went wrong// I call this the "Camlann Scenario" thinking of the way te ffinal battle of Arthurian legend started. It may well be that Ruussian forces, moving into a locality thinking they were opposed by Ukranian forces. Unkown to the tctical Russian commander US forces had also moved into the vicinty. Someone. probaby a Russian, misidentified US forces as Ukranian. possibly because Ukranian forces were being, or were about to be engaged by Russia. This quickly developed into a full scale battle. Before anybody in the senior chain of command could do abything Russiaand NATO forces were engaging all along the line. In short the outbreak of war between Russia and the USA was a horrible misake.

 

But both sides accuse the other of "starting it" and both have "blood in their eyes" so it is too late to stop and get a ceasefire, prticularly with Washington and Moscow engaging in a mutual blame game. The US calls a meeting f the NATO Security Council a and invokes Articles 4 and 5 claiming, quite likely with justification, that their troops were attacked first.

 

Hence it is too late for Russia to avoid triggering Articles 4 and 5 so they have to act under war plans for full scale war in Eastern Europe. Kind of like he August 1914 situation except compressed nto a few hours once U\S and Russian troops clash.

 

In retrospect the US Presidennt probably ets pilloried in the press and may well facre impeachment proceedings (an impeachable offence is whatever Congress says i is) for taking a foolhardy political decision to oder US forces into Ukraine. NATO leaders who joined in at that pont are likely going to be in some serious post war political trouble afterwards given the unpopularity of the conflict and the casualties.

 

Many people on the street might well be calling it WW3 because it involves two of the world#'s great powers. While most, if not all of the ground fighting will happen in Eastern Europe (a considerable amount of it but by no means all in Ukraine there ill certainly be air and naval combat elsewhere. A Third Battle of the Atlantic would be inevitable - the Russians are not going to let convoys of reinforcements from the US just sail over without a serious attempt at interdiction. A Russian attempt on Iceland might bee considered but s likely to be too difficult to implement so just air and naval interdiction. Long range Russian bombers would be hitting targets in Western Europe together with missile strikes. Possibly the Russians might even attempt to bomb the US in retaliation for NAO air and mmissile bombrdmet of Russia. Naval actions in the Medditerranean between NATO forces including 6th Fleet and Russia's Black Sea Fleet and Medditerranean Squadron are also probablr as US Marines will be using hat route for their amphibious landing in Crimea. Naval and air combat between US 7th Fleet and Russian forces would also be likely lthough engagement in the Far East would be limited, particularly if Japan declares neutrality. In the Far East North Korea may ty to take advantage of the European War although a full scale invasion of South Korea might not happen. On top of that operations against Islamic State are likely to be continuing in 2017 - I don't see that ending any time soon. All this would amount to World War proportions even if little or nothing happens in the Far East/. So yes, the 2017 War might well be termedWorld War 3 by historians as well as the media and the public.

[Philipp]

And again, all you wtite makes sense in a full scale war. But what is decribed in the manual and this forum does not sound like this is what Battlefront envisioned the setting to be. Anyway, everyone can play the game the wsy he wants and envision his own backstory and setting for his own battles.

[Battlefront.com]

Correct. The backstory is sufficient to explain a war limited to conflict within Ukraine. Anything beyond that and we're talking about unfun scenarios. Nukes definitely in play.

Realistically, Russia can not conduct military operations on multiple fronts with any degree of certainty. It is actually uncertain if it can conduct sustained military operations in even one place. There's certainly some evidence that the post 2008 Georgian reforms have not fundamentally changed Russia's strategic capabilities. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that they have been harmed.

Russia used to be structured for a major war against NATO with sufficient time to build up forces. It was ill prepared for small scale, complex operations like the one attempted in Georgia. Yet history has shown than Russia had more practical use for competency in smaller scale actions and less practical need for large scale capabilities. The 2008-2014 reforms were specifically aimed at fundamental change from large scale, long term war to that of small scale, short term war.

The operation in Crimea shows that Russia has, by and large, been quite successful with the reforms. However, the war in Ukraine has also shown it perhaps went too far in that direction.

The point of saying this is, realistically, Russia can not invade the Baltics and/or Poland while it is heavily engaged in Ukraine. Or perhaps more accurately, it can not conduct operations in both areas successfully. Most likely the general rule of divided effort producing bad results would apply. And that is trying for too much means getting nothing instead of something.

Steve

[Philipp]

I'm curious: What is the official reasoning (for the game) that keeps NATO in check. You say Russia simple can't fight a more widespread war but NATO certainly could (after some build up).

Do you assume NATO holds back for political reasons? Does Russia threaten nuclear retiliation for attacks on Russian soil? Does NATO simply react too slow?

And how are these reasonings actually reflected in what happens in the real world?

Edited February 11, 2015 by Philipp

[LUCASWILLEN05]

And again, all you wtite makes sense in a full scale war. But what is decribed in the manual and this forum does not sound like this is what Battlefront envisioned the setting to be. Anyway, everyone can play the game the wsy he wants and envision his own backstory and setting for his own battles.

Phillipp I speajk as a History and Politics Grad (majoring on the politics side in International politics) it is actually a full scale war.

 

You need to look at this scenario from the RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE  taking into account the perceptions and fears from their own history.

 

Do you seriously think that the Russians are going to allow US reinforcements to simply sai accrioss the Atlantic from the United States without doing a thing to stop it.?Same goes for the US Marines tha we know go to Crimea.. Of course the Russians are going to do everything n their power to stop that. ~Because if they don;t in a month or two the US are going to reinforce Europe witha couple of corps, which, combined with a fully mobilised NATO are going to roll over the Russians. And logistically his would be very achieveable.

 

Which brings us very neatly to the second point. What the Russians fear most of all is a Barbarossa Mark II.

 

The US and NATO may have no intention of doing this but, considering their history (reference in particular WW2, WW1, Napoleon's invasion of 1812, the Swedish and Polish invasions of the 17th and 18th Centuries the Russians are (and will be) scared stiff of the US/NATO doing the same thing.

 

From the RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE the only way they can preven this is for them to win the war fast once it starts. And that means rapid and decisive action to occupy the Baltic States to keep and maintain the initiative and to disrupt or prrevent the buildp of NATO forces in Ukraine. The Russians saw what the US did to Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991 and in 2003. They know that, if they let the US build up there is every chance that the same thing will hapen to them. And, as the Russians see it this could very well be Barbarossa II with the US ad NATO really marching on Moscow

[Battlefront.com]

I'm curious: What is the official reasoning (for the game) that keeps NATO in check. You say Russia simple can't fight a more widespread war but NATO certainly could (after some build up).

Do you assume NATO holds back for political reasons? Does Russia threaten nuclear retiliation for attacks on Russian soil? Does NATO simply react too slow?

And how are these reasonings actually reflected in what happens in the real world?

Russia is ALREADY threatening nuclear war, both in words and in deeds, right now. So it's not a matter of if. For sure Russia would draw a redline and say "if so much as one set of Size 7 1/2 NATO boots steps onto Russian soil, something is going to have a mushroom planted on it". Therefore, under no proactive scenario would NATO attack Russian soil even if it thought there was a need. But in fact there is no need.

NATO doesn't need to hit factories or bases within Russia's borders to win a war. It only needs to destroy Russia's standing military. That can be done anywhere Russia chooses to commit it. Almost by definition that place would be outside of Russia's borders. In our story's case, that is Ukraine. Who cares if Russian air bases in Rostov are in perfect working order if anything that flies into Ukraine is shot down?

From the Russian perspective, there is absolutely a desire to expand into the Baltics (at a minimum), but doing so would mean starting a SECOND front outside of its borders. A second front that it can't possibly support logistically or militarily. A second place for NATO to bottle up and destroy Russian military forces. Therefore, attacking into the Baltics would be military suicide. It's possible that even suggesting this could spur a coup.

As for spreading the war to the seas and other airspaces, Russia once again is at a massive disadvantage in numbers and capabilities. A hot war at sea would simply mean more Russian power destroyed for little gain. The desire to use it would certainly be there, but I don't think it would be.

The bottom line here is that Russia already understands that it has to be very careful about poking NATO into a direct confrontation because it knows it can not win. Even with nukes. Because I do not view the current Russian leadership as suicidal, I think Russia would do everything it could to keep the conflict as limited as possible.

Steve

[agusto]

Steve, do you think that wars like WW2, with millions and millions of men under arms fighting for half a decade are still possible? Or does the expenisveness of modern warfare make this impossible? Economically, the US were far from fully mobilized during the wars in Iraq and Afgahnistan. Russia is currently far from beeing fully economically and socially mobilized as well.

[Philipp]

So despite what LUCASWILLEN05 sees how this conflict would go, and he has any right to envision it any way he wants to, what I described in some earlier posts is closer to what Battlefront envisions the scenario to be. To summarize:

1. Acts of war limited to Ukrainian soil and air space enforced by NATO ROE to avoid triggering nuclear retaliation. Maybe some naval conflict in the black sea.

2. Russia can freely use AA and artillery based on Russian soil, giving it a slight advantage over a full scale conflict.

3. No Articel 4 or 5, NATO forces act together but by choice, not becauce they are forced by treaty. That would probably leave Germany out of the conflict...

4. Both sides have short term war goals that do not aim at total destruction of their enemy. NATO wants an "independent" Ukraine, Russia wants a "Russian Protectorate" Ukraine. Armies are used to create facts and destroy possibilities while the politicians keep talking. That is pretty much what is happening already right now...

LUCASWILLEN05, your are free to question the likelyhood of this scenario, but I agree with Steve that this makes for a much nicer game than total anhilation. And no reason to go all red and underline, I read the other things you wrote and did not need additional emphasis to pay attention to what you write.

[Battlefront.com]

The US' primary post Cold War deterrence is a military that can effectively destroy almost any country's military power within a short period of time without breaking a sweat doing it. China is pretty much the only exception. Russia is not.

This reality means that any country that wishes to go to war with the US, directly, must be prepared to lose and lose big in terms of military power and/or infrastructure. I think most countries, even the less well educated ones, are well aware of this. Unconventional war, on the other hand, is where the US has repeatedly "lost". But again, when the US loses it's not like the other country really wins. It's more often the case that the US ceases military activity and the country goes into turmoil because of a power vacuum.

Militaristic regimes usually exist primarily for their own power. A nation with a powerful military in local terms knows that going to war with the US means losing that military. That more than likely means losing power. They don't want to lose power so they don't want to go to war with the US. Even Saddam knew this, but he was not smart enough to avoid war. Other despots have taken notice of this, for sure.

OK, so if generally speaking nobody is able to fight a war against the US' current (or slightly beefed up) military, then what condition would necessitate a full US mobilization? None that I can see. A war with China would likely be over faster than full mobilization could happen. Double that with Russia.

So I do think we're beyond the age of full mobilization for war. The force lethality and economics simply don't lend themselves to this sort of warfare any more.

Steve

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Russia is ALREADY threatening nuclear war, both in words and in deeds, right now. So it's not a matter of if. For sure Russia would draw a redline and say "if so much as one set of Size 7 1/2 NATO boots steps onto Russian soil, something is going to have a mushroom planted on it". Therefore, under no proactive scenario would NATO attack Russian soil even if it thought there was a need. But in fact there is no need.

NATO doesn't need to hit factories or bases within Russia's borders to win a war. It only needs to destroy Russia's standing military. That can be done anywhere Russia chooses to commit it. Almost by definition that place would be outside of Russia's borders. In our story's case, that is Ukraine. Who cares if Russian air bases in Rostov are in perfect working order if anything that flies into Ukraine is shot down?

From the Russian perspective, there is absolutely a desire to expand into the Baltics (at a minimum), but doing so would mean starting a SECOND front outside of its borders. A second front that it can't possibly support logistically or militarily. A second place for NATO to bottle up and destroy Russian military forces. Therefore, attacking into the Baltics would be military suicide. It's possible that even suggesting this could spur a coup.

As for spreading the war to the seas and other airspaces, Russia once again is at a massive disadvantage in numbers and capabilities. A hot war at sea would simply mean more Russian power destroyed for little gain. The desire to use it would certainly be there, but I don't think it would be.

The bottom line here is that Russia already understands that it has to be very careful about poking NATO into a direct confrontation because it knows it can not win. Even with nukes. Because I do not view the current Russian leadership as suicidal, I think Russia would do everything it could to keep the conflict as limited as possible.

Steve

Russia coud only effectively use air power and submarine attack on the North Atlantic convoys. Antisubmarine warfare is notoriously difficult because of the stealthy nature of this weapons system. in a 21st  Century 3rd Battle of Atlantic the Russians would impose damage and delay on the reinforcement convoys. This is a battle the Russians would lose. But, if they can achieve their objectives on land defeat in the Third Battle of the Atlantic and in the Medditterranean would not matter greatly to them.

 

And if Russia is going to have any chance of winning it must be a quick victory or it must be a stalemate resulting from heavy NATO losses and loss of will to continue the fighting. That means capturing territory, perhaps in the Baltic States as well as in Ukraine before NAO can mobilize and US Heavy reinforcements arrive to launch the cunter offensive. Aftwer that the very best the Russians can hope fr is a stalemate.

 

NATO would need to attack Russian air bases within Russia itself and it would need to conduct air interdiction to restrict the flow of supplies and reinforcements to Ukraine and h Balic States assuming the Russians invaded them as already discussed. Other installations within Russia might also be attacked such as government/military buildings, media centres, power stations/electrical grid. Much as was dne durig he two Gulf Wars, the Kossovo Campign and the on-going bombing of Islamic State. General civillian tagets pobably would not be delibertely bombed althoug collatoral damage is likely unvoidanle,

 

Regarding Russian ground forces. There may well be a situation late in the war where Russian ground forces have been defeated on the battlefield but they my be pulling back into Russia but may also still control parts of Ukraine or the Baltic States if the Russians have selected that varint. In this situation NATO ground forces may have a contincency for a limited ground operation into Russia either to sufficiently destroy the Russian military or to occupy territory that can be negotiated back in return for further political concessions and/or returmn of any territry still occupied by Russia when there is a ceasefire.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

So despite what LUCASWILLEN05 sees how this conflict would go, and he has any right to envision it any way he wants to, what I described in some earlier posts is closer to what Battlefront envisions the scenario to be. To summarize:

1. Acts of war limited to Ukrainian soil and air space enforced by NATO ROE to avoid triggering nuclear retaliation. Maybe some naval conflict in the black sea.

2. Russia can freely use AA and artillery based on Russian soil, giving it a slight advantage over a full scale conflict.

3. No Articel 4 or 5, NATO forces act together but by choice, not becauce they are forced by treaty. That would probably leave Germany out of the conflict...

4. Both sides have short term war goals that do not aim at total destruction of their enemy. NATO wants an "independent" Ukraine, Russia wants a "Russian Protectorate" Ukraine. Armies are used to create facts and destroy possibilities while the politicians keep talking. That is pretty much what is happening already right now...

LUCASWILLEN05, your are free to question the likelyhood of this scenario, but I agree with Steve that this makes for a much nicer game than total anhilation. And no reason to go all red and underline, I read the other things you wrote and did not need additional emphasis to pay attention to what you write.

 

Phillip "War is the extension of Politics by other means" (Clauswitz) Again you need to look at this from the RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE. You need to consider factors including

 

1 Russian History with particular reference to Operation Barbarossa. Note we are not talking about actual NATO intentions here. We are talking about Russian FEARS AND PARANOIA in regard to what those intentions are.

 

2 Russia's operational and strategic quandries. Steve and I both agree that Russia cannot win once NATO is fully mobilised and US reinforcements arrive in strength from theContinental United States. That is going to take several weeks in order to build up the force strength and logistics for a couner offensive. You seem to assume that Putin is going to be as stupid as Saddam Hussein was in August and September 1990. The Russian generals and indeed Putin (not to mention everybody else saw what happened.

 

Putin and the Russian General Staff are no fools. They re not going to sit back and watch NATO and US forces mobilise and put the logistics in plaace becaudse they know they will get the "Mother of All Thrashings" if they wait and do nothing.

 

Having begun the war they are going to learn the lessons of whhat happened to Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Milosovic's Serbia. They are going to have to press the offensive in order to hand the West a fait accomplli even if that actually means simply occupation of much of Ukraine and all or part of the Baltic States at the end of hostilities. At that point they can offer a ceasefire, perhaps accompanied by some nuclear blackmail (ie threats about using nukes. This, accompanied by hgh NATO casualties and battlefield defeats woul, the Russians would hope, be enough to bring NATO to the negotiatin table. Then the Russians extract evwery political concession they can get (eg Ukraine won;t join NATO, Kalingrad returned if lost, Russian speaking areas of Ukraine and Baltic States ceded to Russia. in excahange fo r which Western Ukraine stays independent with Russian troops withdrawing from terriories not ceded to Russia. A Russian victory in the 2017 would result in a political settlement looking something like that.

 

Remember you need to consider this from the RUSSIAN point of view takng into account what they could reasonably achieve militarily and politically.

 

How much of this can actuaklly be achieved depends n what hapens on the battlefield and, just as important, on wewhat happens POLITICALLY as a result of the fighting. I remind you again of Clauswitz' famous remark I qouted art the start of this post.

 

Oh, and your assumption about Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty are ridiculous to say the least. I am bot sue you have eben read the relevant articles.Article 6 is also very relevant n tis instance, I specifically refer you to |Article 6:which specifically refer to an attack on the forces of NATO member tp be an attack on a NATO state Note such an attack is highlly likely to have occurred in our June 2017 scensrio

 

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .

Article 6 (1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

 

• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
• on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

And here is the link to the official NATO website directly to the link summarising the protocols odf the Noth Atlantixc Treaty. You should definately take the ime to read this! http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

[Battlefront.com]

2 Russia's operational and strategic quandries. Steve and I both agree that Russia cannot win once NATO is fully mobilised and US reinforcements arrive in strength from theContinental United States.

Actually, I don't think Russia could win a war against the United States (not to mention US and NATO) even with the NATO's present state of mobilization. The US also wouldn't need to fully mobilize, just redeploy what it has. Which, I might add, is already happening. The US is prepositioning Abrams and Bradleys in Europe already, though the exact location for their storage is yet to be determined. My guess is Poland.

 

Putin and the Russian General Staff are no fools. They re not going to sit back and watch NATO and US forces mobilise and put the logistics in plaace becaudse they know they will get the "Mother of All Thrashings" if they wait and do nothing.

This is where we have to make a judgement call on Putin and the Russian General Staff's grasp of reality. If they think they can win a limited war, but not a broad war, then they will *not* do anything to increase hostilities beyond the confines of the limited war scenario. That means no attacking US submarines or shipping outside of the immediate battle zone. It means no attacking NATO countries. Etc.

If the Russians believe that they can win both a limited and a broad war, then all bets are off. The war goes hot world wide and things get very bad very quickly.

If the Russians believe that they can win NEITHER a limited or a broad war then they will basically fight a limited war until they can negotiate an acceptable cease fire, which no doubt would be fairly quickly agreed to by all parties.

My money is on the Russians knowing that they can not win any sort of direct military confrontation with the West, therefore they will push as hard and long as they can up to the point of military conflict.

BTW, I do agree that if a couple of NATO countries get into a direct military conflict with Russia then Article 5 will be invoked. Article 4 has already been invoked many months ago, in case anybody here missed that.

Steve

[Philipp]

This is the last time I will react to your highly repetitive postings LUCASWILLEN05: I don't doubt your assessments on a full scale war scenario. Just saying this game assumes a different scenario.

Your assessment of the situation seems very stuck in cold war thinking. Open up a bit and look what is happening, the Russian leadership seems to have left some of the cold war thinking behind (not all of it though). They are in the real world having a conflict that they seem to win (or at least on the score board they have the Crimean, NATO has zero). A limited, hybrid war including propaganda and cyberwarfare campaigns. This is not our fathers cold war gone hot anymore, they think and most importantly act different.

As I see it the game is one way that NATO could react to this. In the game we see that it would be very bloody, not mass murder like WW3 but even such a limited war would mean huge loss of life and a lot of destruction.

I am no expert in treaty law so I will not claim to say anything definite about the NATO treaty. As I understand it article 4 and 5 only apply if a country is attacked. Maybe you should study the manual which clearly states that the conflict breaks out before Ukraine actually joins NATO. And just shooting at US troops in a Non-NATO country certainly does not trigger the NATO treaty.

[Philipp]

I indeed missed that Lithuania invoked article 4.

[Battlefront.com]

Your assessment of the situation seems very stuck in cold war thinking. Open up a bit and look what is happening, the Russian leadership seems to have left some of the cold war thinking behind (not all of it though). They are in the real world having a conflict that they seem to win (or at least on the score board they have the Crimean, NATO has zero). A limited, hybrid war including propaganda and cyberwarfare campaigns. This is not our fathers cold war gone hot anymore, they think and most importantly act different.

Yes, this absolutely must be kept in mind. Russia has not been developing hybrid warfare over the past 20+ years because it's fun. They have developed it out of necessity because direct military conflict is no longer a viable option except for self defense. They know it, the West knows it. Russia has had a lot of success with it up until Ukraine. By any reasonable standard of evaluation, the war has produced very little of value for Russia at great cost. This was no Georgia where Russia came out with its immediate war aims satisfied without much (apparent) harm. But hybrid warfare is like anything... it can be countered. Ukraine is proving that every day.

Steve

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Yes, this absolutely must be kept in mind. Russia has not been developing hybrid warfare over the past 20+ years because it's fun. They have developed it out of necessity because direct military conflict is no longer a viable option except for self defense. They know it, the West knows it. Russia has had a lot of success with it up until Ukraine. By any reasonable standard of evaluation, the war has produced very little of value for Russia at great cost. This was no Georgia where Russia came out with its immediate war aims satisfied without much (apparent) harm. But hybrid warfare is like anything... it can be countered. Ukraine is proving that every day.

Steve

 

Here is a question about the scenario in June 2017. Once war breaks out between Russia and Ukraine

1 Why did the US and NATO send forces into Ukraine? In the first instance I very much doubt te intention was to fight a war with Russia?

2 More likely the terms of the NATO operation (most likely this would be carried out under NATO command and auspices) were to "daw  line on the Dnieper" to halt the Russian advance under the principle of deterrance. This would be followed by a negtiated Russian withdrawl/

 

But something went wrong and fighting, perhaps initiated by the Russians either deliberately or more likely by mistake and the situation escalated out f control before anyone knew what was happening. The Russians may well have fired first but few believe them. In other words the war is a ghstly mistake.

 

Would you agree these assumptions best fit the circumstances of the scenario? If you do then the North Atlantic Treaty very likely ca be invoked under Articles 4, 5 and 6. Even more likely if the original move into Ukraine was under NATO auspices and command - which would make a lo of sense gven the region and the circumstancesof the crisis.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

This is the last time I will react to your highly repetitive postings LUCASWILLEN05: I don't doubt your assessments on a full scale war scenario. Just saying this game assumes a different scenario.

Your assessment of the situation seems very stuck in cold war thinking. Open up a bit and look what is happening, the Russian leadership seems to have left some of the cold war thinking behind (not all of it though). They are in the real world having a conflict that they seem to win (or at least on the score board they have the Crimean, NATO has zero). A limited, hybrid war including propaganda and cyberwarfare campaigns. This is not our fathers cold war gone hot anymore, they think and most importantly act different.

As I see it the game is one way that NATO could react to this. In the game we see that it would be very bloody, not mass murder like WW3 but even such a limited war would mean huge loss of life and a lot of destruction.

I am no expert in treaty law so I will not claim to say anything definite about the NATO treaty. As I understand it article 4 and 5 only apply if a country is attacked. Maybe you should study the manual which clearly states that the conflict breaks out before Ukraine actually joins NATO. And just shooting at US troops in a Non-NATO country certainly does not trigger the NATO treaty.

 

Phillip The point is that the armed forces of a NATO country were attacked. It is highly unlikely that the US and other NATO forces would have entered Ukraine under the auspices of the NATO Council to give poltical, lefgal and military cover to the mission. And it is unlikely that the intent f the mission was to fight Russia.

 

But something went badly wrong and, perjhps hrough a misunderstdig Russian Forces attacked the forces of a NATO State. That couuld well result in the invokking of Articles 4, 5 and 6 by the US whoose forces were probably involved. he USA woulld of course have to go back to the NATO Council and invoke Article 5. Historically this has oly happened once after the 9/11 terrorist ttack on he WTC.

 

In our Ukraine case the situation may be less clear cut. But if the US was operating as part of a NATO force when the first atack took place and fighting is on going the North Atlantic Treaty is highly likely to apply.

 

The Russians understan this and they understand, for the reasns outlined above that they don't have much timeto act being now art war with the US ad in every probabilty with NATO  as wel. If they wait ad let NAO mobilise hey will meet the same fayte Saddam Hussein did during the First Gulf War (1990 - 1) To sand any chance of victory he Russians must act quickly and aggresvely. They must press the attack uin Ukraine, they must attack th Baltic States and they must undertake air and naval action in the North Atlantic and the Meditteranean

 

Now you may regard that as Cld War thinking but you need to remember hat Russia's strategic problem in 2017 is exactly the same as it would have been during the 1980s and so is the problem fr the US. In both cases US reinfcements will have to deploy to Europe and Russia will have to delay them and attrite them while they are crossing the Atlantic. And Russia, as a continental (i.e. land) power must try to win the war quicckly before those fresh forces can be deployed. Effectively this is the race.

 

And don't forget both the Russian and NATO leadership (political and military) will have had the formtive experiences of their careers during the 1980s, the final decade of the Cld War. Don't forget Putin is a former KGB officer. The senior Russian generals in 2017 will have been junir or middle ranking officeers during the 1980s. Much the same can be said for Western military and politicl leaders. Sure, there will be 21st Century features to the war such as cyberwar s Philllipp mentions. But that does not chage the fundamental strategic premises unde which the war will be fought. The geography  is the same and it will affec war strtegy in exacly the same way as rthe Cold War. There will be new and untried weapons, technologies and tactics. As in 1914 and 1939 both sides will make many mistkes in the opening days. And, as in 1914 both sides will be pretty even at the start. Fighting will very likely be hard and bloody as portrayed in the game.It could very well become a vicious armoured slugfest.

 

If you cannot understand this /I can only conclude that you do not understabnd the strateegic and logistical issues or the politcal issues

[Stagler]

Seems alot was agreed last night.

 

Lets hope it stays that way till the end of march at least.