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Strategic and tactical realities in CMBS


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Bydax,

 

The reporter's willingness to potentially play Humpty Dumpty on that BTR--one bump away from terrible fall--is impressive, for he doesn't seem to skip a beat no matter what he's doing. The gun shield on the rooftop 12.7 Kords is new to me. I think, though the last bit is a put up job. Simple logic says that if the M16s are gray with pulverized oncrete dust, then so also should be the cartridges lying with them, yet they're not. They look as though they just came out of the ammo crate. 

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

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Have you seens flag scene?

So what? Should I go back through the last year and count how many Russian flags and uniform insignia I have seen?

 

Probably there are more then one polak where in this video.

Who cares! There are probably 10,000+ Russian citizens who have/are fighting illegally in Ukraine fighting against the legitimate government of Ukraine. So what if the Ukrainian government has 1, 2, 200 Poles fighting for it? Not that pro-separatist propaganda has ever show more than just 1 or 2, which nobody denies are there.

So again, I ask you... what is your point?

 

27K are the internal troops only. They numbered separatly from the army and they are not part of the army's 800k.

You are getting confused because there's really nothing that needs discussing. I know the difference and I am not talking about internal troops at all.

Steve

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Ok, on the overall operational-strategic concept. As I have said earlier the objectives of Russian Armed Forces in that operation would be:

- destroying the Ukrainian Armed Forces/CTO Forces east of Dnepr.

- securing the pro Russian territories.

- doing so ASAP.

 

The overall idea I have is that the Russian Armed Forces would be advancing on 4 different operational-strategic axis at the same time. Those would be:

- Kursk-Kiev decoy attack to draw final Ukrainian reserves elsewhere.

- Belgorod-Kharkov-Dnepropetrovsk to secure Dnepr crossings and isolate the CTO Forces from the north.

- Dzhankoi-Zaporozhie to secure Dnepr crossings and isolate the CTO forces from the west.

- Crimea-Kherson-Odessa to secure those territories and cut of any possibility of supplies/reinforcements by sea.

 

I assume initial airborne landings/air lifts/special forces attacks/amphib landings on those points:

- Kiev, Borispol airfield (special forces company-battalion sized force).

- Kiev, Zhulyany airfield (VDV BTG with special forces support).

- Zaporozhie (VDV BTG with special forces support).

- Dnepropetrovsk (VDV BTG with special forces support).

- Odessa/Nikolaev (the Naval Infantry BDe goes there).

 

Attack on the first axis is conducted primarily by a mechanized grouping, with objective of making a lot of noise, but it doesn't have to reach Kiev, just threaten it. That grouping also poses as if the second axis grouping has Kiev in mind and not the CTO Forces, thus providing a degree of doubt as to where that force is going.

 

Attack on the second axis is conducted primarily by a mechanized grouping, with air assaults to secure it's flanks on primary road crossings/chocke points. Those air assault groupings are later reinforced by the AT/engineer blocking detachments. Originally those security forces operate on the internal ring of the encirclement (precluding immediate breakout of the CTO Forces out of their area of operations), then shift to the external ring of encirclement while the 2nd and 3rd groupings reduce the CTO Forces as to preclude the external attempts to aid the CTO Forces should they come to be (which they won't in my opinion as those troops would be pre occupied else where).

 

Attack on the third axis is conducted in a similar fashion to that of the 2nd grouping, only that the economy of forces troops are later directed to reinforces the bridgeheads and to provide security for the 4th grouping.

 

Attack on the 4th axis is conducted by Naval Infantry troops with light mechanized support from the VDV and possibly some minor key armoured support (by a tnk BTG for example) and seeks to secure the bridgeheads at Kherson and to secure Odessa/Nikolaev region.

 

 

During the 2nd operational phase the bulk of Russian Forces would be reducing those of the CTO Forces, which would be operating in an encircled position. As far as I know those troops are primarily supplied from outside of that region and are not known to have extensive reserves of munitions/supplies in their immediate area (in fact Russian Armed Forces would be probably sitting on their munitions/supplies).

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I see no disagreement here.  I'm not trying to argue the real life politics here, simply analyzing the story as it's given in this game, which says that NATO does get involved and we do land Marines in Odessa to counter a Russian push out of Crimea.

Correct. I also do not see direct NATO involvement in Ukraine as a real possibility. Direct support, especially with lethal aid? That is one step away from happening at any time now. Something Putin is very, very aware of and is very certain to not want. Javelin would be a very unwelcome addition to the Ukrainian capabilities. Very.

Steve

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Side note about the current airport battle. Time after time the separatists have claimed they have, or are about to, take the airport. Always wrong up to, and including, the recent attacks. Someday they might actually kick the Ukrainians out, however until someone more independent verifies it I'm not going to believe it. The separatists and Russian media have "cried wolf" too many times to be taken seriously.

The recent attacks were, by all accounts, pretty big and they did get close to overrunning the Ukrainian positions. Seems Ukraine has now run out of patience for the separatists' utter lack of compliance with the ceasefire. Ukraine launched the largest military operation since the ceasefire went into effect and they appear to have increased access to the airport. But that battle is still ongoing and I don't know if they intend to do much more.

Steve

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Side note about the current airport battle. Time after time the separatists have claimed they have, or are about to, take the airport. Always wrong up to, and including, the recent attacks. Someday they might actually kick the Ukrainians out, however until someone more independent verifies it I'm not going to believe it. The separatists and Russian media have "cried wolf" too many times to be taken seriously.

The recent attacks were, by all accounts, pretty big and they did get close to overrunning the Ukrainian positions. Seems Ukraine has now run out of patience for the separatists' utter lack of compliance with the ceasefire. Ukraine launched the largest military operation since the ceasefire went into effect and they appear to have increased access to the airport. But that battle is still ongoing and I don't know if they intend to do much more.

Steve

I think a clarification is in order:

Both sides control parts of the airfield. Thus the impression that the Ukrainian loyalists control the entire airfield is wrong.

 

According to the joint Russia-Ukraine team regulating the ceasefire, both sides are responsible for violating it:

http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/135211

Hence blaming the separatists exclusively for cease fire violations is again faulty. If you are interested I could look for more statistics on that topic from that source.

 

I would also note that the recent events (the Ukrainian Armed Forces operations around the Donetsk airfield) show poor coordination between the various CTO Forces' groupings, an example would be the refusal of volunteer units to attack with the Army units.

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I think a clarification is in order:

Both sides control parts of the airfield. Thus the impression that the Ukrainian loyalists control the entire airfield is wrong.

For quite a while now the definition of who has the airport is who has control of the new terminal. When both sides claim they control the airport, that is what they speak of.

 

According to the joint Russia-Ukraine team regulating the ceasefire, both sides are responsible for violating it:

http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/135211

Hence blaming the separatists exclusively for cease fire violations is again faulty. If you are interested I could look for more statistics on that topic from that source.

I never said that the separatists are exclusively breaking the ceasefire. For sure Ukraine is using artillery proactively against separatist concentrations, though I would argue it's because the separatists keep attacking Ukrainian positions in those areas.

The point is that only the separatists have been launching significant ground attacks since September. Ukraine has not. So yes, I do consider near battalion sized separatist ground assaults with tanks and backed by artillery against a position held by Ukrainians prior to September 5th to be in a different category than small patrols and artillery exchanges.

Not that it means anything. The ceasefire has always been a bit of a joke with both sides.

Steve

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Airport is by definition the sum of all it's elements. When talking about capturing it, it provides a false impression to the people who did not follow the situation closely. The reason why "holding new terminal" and "holding the airport" terms are related is because the new terminal is the primary point that loyalists manage to hold, capturing it would essentially give the separatists overall control of the airport.

 

The airport area is (was) by it's nature contested, from what I remember it was not clearly market as Ukrainian on the demarkation maps.

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Should I go back through the last year and count how many Russian flags and uniform insignia I have seen?

 

Do you think UA army have a lot of ethnic poles?

In the video one of the soldiers siad "we dont have stuff like that" when merk shown them some of his gear.

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The airport area is (was) by it's nature contested

 

True, but it holds by far more value contested to the Ukrainians, than it does contested to the Russians.  It's asymmetrical objectives, the Russians need the airport captured and somewhat functional to help establish legitimacy, the Ukrainians just need the Russians to not control the airport to deny that legitimacy, and present a viable face of resistance.  If there was just one rambolike Ukrainian Soldier that defied killing and shot up stuff regularly as to make the airport appear not entirely under control, the UA short term objectives would still be met.  The Russians need to clear the airport and demonstrate the airport is clear before they'll "win."

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I think some one asked about the -special forces war- aspect of the war.

 

In that OOB I have 1 VDV Special Forces BDe and 4 Ground Forces Special Forces BDes (probably more actually). While the VDV would go into the Kiev air drops/lifts (and related operations), 2 Specnas brigades would be available for the injection into Ukrainian rear (ie west of Dnepr), the other two would be availiable for the usage as shock troops or for COIN type duties.

After the crisis resolution those troops could be used to form the bulk of Russian presence east of Dnepr, conducting the COIN operations there.

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Steve,

 

Was doing some research and started following links of interest on Russia, which is how I wound up encountering a one day-old purported opinion piece (okay, essay) over on Pravda. The title of this (insert adjective) think piece The "Impending" Russian Maidan, authored by one Tony Cartalucci--not to be confused with the US's Anthony Carlucci. The piece allegedly quotes the US sedition manual, argues that what was done in Ukraine was but the springboard for overthrowing the Russian government and asserts the US has already identified and begun to fund Russian student groups to use a means to foment "homegrown" subversion to justify subsequent intervention to protect the "legitimate interests of the Russian people."  It also claims Russian politicians and businessmen are involved. Since there's no way something like this article would ever be allowed to see the light of day unless Putin desired it, this has to reflect one or more of: what Putin believes, what he wants believed, as justification for something else he plans, perhaps to generate a reaction in opposing circles of power, or maybe just he's indulging in political posturing to ensure support for his regime by conjuring up enemies. Regardless, I thought you'd find it an intriguing piece. Whatever its true purpose, I believe it speaks volumes on Putin's perception of things. Also, I think it offers some unusual options for scenario writers, who could do boatloads of things predicated on a kind of alternate history inverse Crimea operation. I believe Russia understands full well that what it did to Ukraine could be done to it, and there are far more cracks in which to drive wedges there than in Ukraine. I provide this as background to the ongoing discussion of Russia and how flawed perceptions shaped events which form the basis for the war postulated in CMBS. 

 

Regards,

 

John Kettler

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I think some one asked about the -special forces war- aspect of the war.

 

In that OOB I have 1 VDV Special Forces BDe and 4 Ground Forces Special Forces BDes (probably more actually). While the VDV would go into the Kiev air drops/lifts (and related operations), 2 Specnas brigades would be available for the injection into Ukrainian rear (ie west of Dnepr), the other two would be availiable for the usage as shock troops or for COIN type duties.

After the crisis resolution those troops could be used to form the bulk of Russian presence east of Dnepr, conducting the COIN operations there.

 

And what a hell of a coin operation that would be eh. Haha.

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Russia did conduct a purge of local non system opposition (regional nationalists and islamists), some of which did receive funding via NGOs from foreign parties.

 

Political opposition is very weak, there is little to no popular support to those movements.

The informational part of the system is very robust, so in short-medium term we should not see any change in this respect.

 

While there is some internal friction within the regime, it is still solid under Putin, regardless of sanctions.

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And what a hell of a coin operation that would be eh. Haha.

Bulk of the work would be conducted by either the forces raised from the locals, or from the Donbas area, or from Crimea, or from the ex Berkut troops. Russian special forces would be there primarily in supporting role. Considering the local mentality (lack of blood feund stuff, passive population) I doubt that the insurgency would be very extensive.

 

One could look at the current crisis and see that most of diversions/bombings appear on Ukrainian territory and not within the People's republics. Considering the common ethnic/cultural make up of the region, I doubt that in other areas that would differ a lot (except in areas such as Dnepropetrovsk - there situation would depend on the kind of deal made with the local elites).

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Bulk of the work would be conducted by either the forces raised from the locals, or from the Donbas area, or from Crimea, or from the ex Berkut troops. Russian special forces would be there primarily in supporting role. Considering the local mentality (lack of blood feund stuff, passive population) I doubt that the insurgency would be very extensive.

 

One could look at the current crisis and see that most of diversions/bombings appear on Ukrainian territory and not within the People's republics. Considering the common ethnic/cultural make up of the region, I doubt that in other areas that would differ a lot (except in areas such as Dnepropetrovsk - there situation would depend on the kind of deal made with the local elites).

 

I would doubt the population would be so passive Ikalugin. It would attract even more fighters from western Ukraine and the rest of the world. The west would also ply support to the insurgents at an even more fierce rate than we already are - probably lethal aid.

They would not be able to use force indiscriminately as they did in past campaigns to win combat superiority over the insurgents as they have extensively relied upon in their past two coin campaigns in the past twenty years.

It would cost the Russian armed forces dearly to invade and occupy Ukraine.

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Hence why I was referring to the local population (ie the population within the area I was talking about).

 

I don't think that the participation of the western/central Ukraine population would increase, as current informational climate is about as supportive of such participation as it gets (evil Russians invading, glorious Ukrainian troops defeating wiping them out all the time at the Airport and so on), yet there is a very small (proportionally) involvement of population in such activities.

 

While I do not doubt that there would be some casualties in said invasion (and later partial occupation), I do not think that they would be comparable to those of Chechen wars.

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If the russians "publicly" invaded ukraine and occupied the contested areas, you can damn well bet media coverage would increase.

There is nowhere to increase to - this is what Ukrainian media says all the time (about Russian open/public invasion).

 

It would increase the coverage in Western media, which would probably lead to a later political fallout.

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There is nowhere to increase to - this is what Ukrainian media says all the time (about Russian open/public invasion).

 

It would increase the coverage in Western media, which would probably lead to a later political fallout.

 

The latter exactly. Coverage in western media would prompt a more hardline western response - i.e lethal aid provision to insurgents.

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