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Nakidka thermal/IR/radar camouflage for russian vehicules


antaress73

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Like I said in other threads... the biggest advantage of that camo would be to significantly reduce the effectiveness of the javelin ... making it less the wonder weapon it is right now.

I am not sure Nakidka is meant to play a very important role at the tactical level. It does look quite unwieldly, and I wonder how long it would take to it to degrade under fire or to just fall off the vehicle as this maneuvers off-road.

What I do see is that equipment like this does indeed have a massive effect at the strategic and operational level, and makes more sense in the context of the "traditional" Russian operational-strategic theory and practice. Which revolves around the maskirovka - or the active misleading of opponents or hiding of one's force to obtain surprise.

The capabilities of this thing seem to me more than able to render very ineffective passive theater-level recon assets, such as satellites, or active, like JSTARS. Which are invaluable assets and a major trump card in NATO sleeve.

Of course, those can be negated with either obtaining air superiority - chancey, expensive and not a given - and ECM - and I am not sure what kind of ECM would be able to shut down JSTARS sensors, other than a continuous series of high-altitude kiloton nukes going off at regular intervals over the battlefield.

I think that Russia is here borrowing a page from the Serbs tactics - camouflage and deception - during the bombing campaign over Kosovo in 1999, rather than from Red Storm Rising or Popular Mechanics. The idea is to negate the standoff capability of strategic NATO assets, as cheaply and effectively as possible, preventing NATO from preempting any offesnive operation by the obvious expedient of bombing the bejesus out of the staging area of the attacking force (if you can see the tanks, then you know where to look for the fuel dumps, and if you find them, you can pretty much strangle an offensive in its cradle).

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I agree with BletchleyGeek, this type of equipment plays a role in the buildup, you don't want your enemy to know your intensions so deception is very important. Once the gloves are off and the tanks are rolling the importance of Nakidka is very small on the tactical level. If you have achieved surprise and have logistical and numerical advantage you will most certainly win the initial attack even if the enemy is considered more advanced technically. If you have read German accounts from WWII they often claim that Soviet soldiers were experts at camouflage, they were apparently able to construct advanced hidden positions in very short amount of time. I believe this deception culture is still present within the Russian Army as has been displayed recently in Crimea and also in the Eastern Ukraine.

As BletchleyGeek said the Serbs showed the importance of hide and seek during the NATO air campaign in 1999. Serbian army had no chance against NATO and they never tried to do anything outside their comfort zone. The Serbian army in Kosovo was able to withdraw mostly intact thanks to the deception tactics developed and utilized during the air campaign. As the battle assessment showed not many Serbian tanks or APCs were found destroyed, those that did were mostly old models like T-55 while only few of more "modern" M-84 (T-72) were found burned out.

The Serbs built dummies of tanks, bridges and aircrafts in order to provide NATO planes with "valid" targets. What was mostly impressing was the ability of the Serbian integrated air defense system to survive and remain in operation during the entire air conflict. This was achieved by utilizing school book examples of operating SAMs and Radars by moving constantly, something that is REALLY IMPORTANT on the modern battlefield. The Arabs never learned this lesson during their wars with Israel and US/NATO. All this was achieved with pretty obsolete Russian technology, after all the Serbs had been under strict sanctions for 9 years up to that point. Most of their IAD equipment originated from 70s. By not being able to knock out the IAD completely NATO planes had to stay high in order to minimize the risk, something that limited their ability to operate successfully. In the end it was the bombing of the bridges, factories and government buildings that made the Serbs to wave the white flag. These were not originally intended targets but NATO planners switched their approach once they figured that they couldn't shut down the Serbian air defense properly. Hiding your infrastructure is not easy. At the end the political goal was achieved and that’s what mattered for NATO…. :)

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I am not sure Nakidka is meant to play a very important role at the tactical level. It does look quite unwieldly, and I wonder how long it would take to it to degrade under fire or to just fall off the vehicle as this maneuvers off-road.

What I do see is that equipment like this does indeed have a massive effect at the strategic and operational level, and makes more sense in the context of the "traditional" Russian operational-strategic theory and practice. Which revolves around the maskirovka - or the active misleading of opponents or hiding of one's force to obtain surprise.

The capabilities of this thing seem to me more than able to render very ineffective passive theater-level recon assets, such as satellites, or active, like JSTARS. Which are invaluable assets and a major trump card in NATO sleeve.

Of course, those can be negated with either obtaining air superiority - chancey, expensive and not a given - and ECM - and I am not sure what kind of ECM would be able to shut down JSTARS sensors, other than a continuous series of high-altitude kiloton nukes going off at regular intervals over the battlefield.

I think that Russia is here borrowing a page from the Serbs tactics - camouflage and deception - during the bombing campaign over Kosovo in 1999, rather than from Red Storm Rising or Popular Mechanics. The idea is to negate the standoff capability of strategic NATO assets, as cheaply and effectively as possible, preventing NATO from preempting any offesnive operation by the obvious expedient of bombing the bejesus out of the staging area of the attacking force (if you can see the tanks, then you know where to look for the fuel dumps, and if you find them, you can pretty much strangle an offensive in its cradle).

It is very effective at confusing thermal imaging systems. However it degrades fast by getting dirty. If it gets dirty then its thermal properties fail. The gathered dirt (from charging about in your tank) then starts to give off its own thermal signature and mitigates the effectiveness of the system.

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BletchleyGeek has it.

Any thermal damping system will fail once it becomes "heat soaked". The heat will escape. It is just a matter of where or when. Think of a person in a wrap suit. They dump the same amount heat, but in a more concentrated form from a smaller area. These blankets could not be used for any length of time on a running vehicle.

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