Was the USSR set to attack Germany before Operation Barbarossa??

[JonS]

I sincerely hope that this is not the kind of thing that the US military needed his help to figure out?

Well, apparently Kettler was one of their analysts ...

[John Kettler]

76 mm,

I never said he was a genius. I've never heard or read anything to that effect. He was a pro at what he did and hurt NATO badly in consequence. He had deep insight from his enormous array of military experiences that no one else did; at a time when the Cold War was on the verge of becoming very hot and when Russian military power was probably at/near its peak in terms of force mismatch. Had they moved against us then, not to put too fine a point on it, we could've been in fatally deep kimchee, for they could kill us, but we couldn't kill them, and they had the numbers. The Russians put DU ammo into service in 1982! Don't know if you realize it, but when Hackett (veteran of the Desert War and Arnhem) wrote Third World War August 1985, the West lost. HM the Queen personally intervened to cause Hackett to rewrite the book as a call to arms; as a cautionary tale of what Wellington would've termed a near run thing, one in which the West barely stopped Russia from winning.

The extraordinary and massive (thousands of planes) forward basing is but part of his argument that Stalin had his forces offensively postured. Suvorov goes into such details as logistics, fortifications, mine barrier positioning and removal. You might want to take careful note of who published The Chief Culprit Here in the States and what a Russian, who grew up under two different dictators and got to write a very long review in the Times about the book, has to say in his review. Am pretty sure you won't like it, but you'll probably learn something--despite the dyspepsia. The Naval Institute Press is a very serious place, and it's a big deal to have it publish your book.

http://www.richardsorge.com/literature/books/suvorov_navrozov_review.pdf

This blogger has made it his business to track down online sites with Suvorov's books, but he has also embedded a Polish doc (English subtitles) on Suvorov's thesis that Stalin fully intended to attack Hitler, but Hitler got there first. The embedded 6 part doc, of which I've watched the entire thing, is a tremendous look at the context in which events unfolded, replete with what Stalin was saying about destroying the West (not letting it rot away on its own) in the 1930s, with one quote from 1931! The interviews with Russians who were growing up back then are real eye-openers, and the pictures and footage, inter alia, of the extent of Russian preparedness, military and civilian, for chemical warfare are both astounding and blood curdling. Note also the across the board militarization of society, and at a time when people are dying from famine and also being murdered by the millions and people were eating corpses (Solzhenitsyn reports a case of a butcher who made sausages from same, but was eventually discovered and executed), the Russians are going flat out on military production, including building hundreds of four engine Tupolev bombers. The Russians were building a million man Airborne force in that same period. Ladies could buy no panties, but the Russians bought vast quantities of silk to make parachutes from China. Dictatorships always need enemies, and the Russians planned to wage war against their foes--on the foes' territory, not in Russia. This was the official and widely promulgated Party line. From a threat analysis perspective, that is known as declaratory policy and forms a vital element of assessing whether a nation, group or individual is indeed a credible threat. At 5:52 et seq in part 4, Suvorov lays out his central argument and shows how Stalin knowingly and willingly provided Hitler with the resources to attack Poland and France, noting well the cascading effects Stalin knew would occur in consequence. Hitler was to tear up Europe, and while he was busy going after Britain, Stalin could pounce from behind. Per part 6, at 6:30 in, on June 20, the 56th Division was at the border on full war alert! The troops were instructed NOT to make the first move, so that Germany was seen as the aggressor, not Russia. Another Russian reports he went on alert in April 1941. "We didn't know it was coming" sounds rather fishy, given such as these: a Russian to German phrasebook (approved May 29, 1941), exactly the sort of thing the Alilies provided their--wait for it--invading troops, with such gems as "Cease transmitting or I'll shoot." German survivors of the war report, on-camera, the wholesale absence of any kind of defenses at all where they attacked, also attested to by Russians interviewed. This doesn't sound like defense in depth to me, or even any kind of coherent linear defense. It does sound like a nation with its units staged forward for offensive warfare. I have to say, too, that I find Suvorov's juxtaposition of 4000 amphibious tanks alone vs the entire, smaller, Panzer force, to be damning--to Stalin. I agree with Suvorov. Amphibious tanks are weapons of attack, and such a stupendous tank park in that category alone gives away the game.

http://americangoy.blogspot.com/2012/05/suvorov-icebreaker.html

Regards,

John Kettler

[Oddball_E8]

Well, just for fun, these questions are seriously supposed to lead one to conclude that the Sovs were preparing to launch a preemptive attack on Germany??

Well... no.

Like I said (repeatedly, I think), Stalin wouldn't launch a preemtive attack on germany. If anything, he was simply waiting for germany to either exhaust their resources taking over europe, or to start losing the war against france/britain.

As someone else pointed out, Stalin wasn't the type to start a fair fight.

As has been repeated over and over and over, the Soviets always envisioned a very "offensive" defense which involved large-scale counter-attacks. That by no means proves (or disproves) that they were planning a preemptive attack.

Regarding the tanks, I suspect that they developed the best tanks that they could--if they were only trying to outclass the Germans, they could have stopped far short of the T34...

Far short of the T-34?

So... the BT-7 was outclassing the Germans then?

Because there wasn't all that much between what they had and the T-34 when it comes to tank models.

But the point here is that Stalin was gearing up for a fight. And an offensive one at that.

EDIT: Oh and just to be clear here, I am in no way condoning any of Hitlers actions. If I could, I would shoot them both like the rabid dogs they were, but I'm simply discussing the question of whether or not Stalin was gearing up to attack germany or not.

One doesn't have to be a nazi apologist to do that. That's like saying you have to hate all muslims if you don't like ISIS.

[76mm]

If anything, he was simply waiting for germany to either exhaust their resources taking over europe, or to start losing the war against france/britain.

Maybe we're arguing about semantics here, I don't disagree with what you say above, although I would still call its pre-emptive attack.

Far short of the T-34?

So... the BT-7 was outclassing the Germans then?

Because there wasn't all that much between what they had and the T-34 when it comes to tank models.

Let's face it, most of the German tanks in 1941 crap--but my point is that if they were trying to develop tanks to match the Germans, they'd probably have come up with something like the T-70, which presumably was cheaper to build than a T34. I guess they built the T34 simply because it was the best design they came up, regardless of what the Germans were doing.

[dsf]

... I have to say, too, that I find Suvorov's juxtaposition of 4000 amphibious tanks alone vs the entire, smaller, Panzer force, to be damning--to Stalin. I agree with Suvorov. Amphibious tanks are weapons of attack, and such a stupendous tank park in that category alone gives away the game.

Seriously? It would serve you well to confirm what Suvorov alleges before taking him too seriously.

4000 amphibious tanks is a gross exaggeration, especially considering serviceability. As important, none of them were armed with more than a machinegun.

On 1 June, 1941, the Red Army tank park contained the following amphibious tanks:

The data is broken down by serviceability.

Category 1 tanks are ready for combat.

Category 2 require minor repair.

Category 3 require major repair.

Category 4 require complete overhaul. Neither of the last two categories are considered combatworthy.

T-37A (line): 94(1); 1109(2); 355(3); 367(4). Total 1925.

T-37A (radio): 18(1); 246(2); 67(3); 48(4). Total 379.

T-37A (chemical): 0(1); 9(2); 1(3); 0(4). Total 10.

T-38 (line): 99(1); 576(2); 161(3); 210(4). Total 1046.

T-38 (radio): 5(1); 70(2); 18(3); 4(4). Total 97.

T-40 (line): 100(1); 13(2); 0(3); 0(4). Total 113.

T-40 (radio): 14(1); 2(2); 1(3); 0(4). Total 16.

T-40 (training): 0(1); 2(2(); 0(3); 0(4). Total 2.

So.

Of 2314 T-37A, 1461 (63%) were listed as serviceable and ready for combat. These formidable offensive weapons were armed with a single 7.62mm DT machinegun.

Of 1143 T-38, 646 (56%) were listed as serviceable. These, too, were armed with a single DT mg. It is worth noting that many of the T-37A and T-38 were no longer seaworthy and this is not reflected in the data. .

Of 131 new T-40s, only one required major repair. They all floated. They were also much more formidable, armed with a single 12.5mm DShK mg.

To summarize, between 1931 and 1941, the USSR manufactured 3588 amphibious tanks, apart from prototypes. Of that number, 2237 were serviceable on 1 June 1941. Of that 2237, only 131 were armed with more than a light machinegun. the T-40 had a heavy machinegun.

Details like these are where Suvorov's story falls apart. There were never 4000 amphibious tanks, not even close considering the poor mechanical condition most were in. The ones that there were cannot be considered as "a stupendous tank park", especially since not all of them even floated. Given their armament, neither can they be considered "weapons of attack". If you look at their deployment, for which I can provide details, they were distributed in small quantities across very many companies and divisions, contained within their reconnaissance echelons. They were, after all, designed and built for reconnaissance, despite Suvorov's insinuations.

Regards

Scott Fraser

Data from "Чудо-оружие" Сталина — Плавающие танки Великой Отечественной; Maksim Kolomiets, Moscow 2011 (Yauza).

[ASL Veteran]

As far as the large army 'forward deployed' goes, my personal opinion is that what the Soviets were doing in 1941 was consistent with what they did during the entire cold war. For one thing all the territories acquired by Stalin through the Non Aggression Pact were previously part of Russia in 1914. In Stalin's mind he was simply getting back what was once theirs. However, most of the people who lived in those territories probably weren't thrilled about the return of Soviet / Russian troops so you could probably classify those territories as occupied territories.

From a Soviet perspective then, if you were thinking of the territories occupied through the Non Aggression Pact as a buffer zone in the same manner as Soviet troops were forward deployed in Eastern Europe during the cold war then forward deployment makes plenty of sense. For one thing the presence of the Soviet Army would help to keep the populations of the occupied territories from trying anything 'disruptive' and for another it establishes a buffer zone between potential enemies and your homeland territories.

[Erwin]

Weren't a large number of German tanks in Barbarossa PzII's etc with MG's? Am presuming that back then tanks with MG's were considered useful.

[YankeeDog]

Weren't a large number of German tanks in Barbarossa PzII's etc with MG's? Am presuming that back then tanks with MG's were considered useful.

The PzII models deployed in Barbarossa had a 20mm autocannon main gun, which was sufficient against the BT-7 and T-26 that made up the bulk of the 1941 Soviet tank force. The PzII was considered second rate by Summer of 1941; they were still in service but rapidly being replaced by PzIII and IV in the front line Panzer formations.

The PzI was the only German tank of WWII deployed in significant numbers armed with only 7.92mm MGs (it had two in the turret). While some PzIs were still in service in Barbarossa (~400), they were definitely considered second line at best by this point, and many were used for non-combat duties like command and liason. The PzI had always been intended primarily as a training tank to be used until better AFVs could be constructed; it was only pressed into combat service in 1939-1941 to make up for a shortfall in more advanced designs.

The most common tank type in the German forces committed to Barbarossa was the PzIII, most of which had the 50mm L/42 gun at this time -- More than sufficient against the T-26 and BT types, but quite insufficient against the few T-34 and KV-1s that actually managed to engage the Germans in 1941 -- substantial numbers of the T-34s and especially KV-1s broke down or were abandoned due to lack of fuel or other causes before ever engaging, due to poorly trained crews and incompetent logistics.

[Hellas]

David Glantz delivered a very effective rebuttal to Suvorov's assertions in Stumbling Colossus.

The more it is repeated doesn't make it any more true, although propaganda works that way. Glantz could not only not refute Suvorov, but after he could no longer ignore it, he even had to support Suvorov's findings!

For decades Glantz was spreading the official Western propaganda and then the Soviet archives are opened, people like Suvorov or Falin appear, and the whole story that has been tought for decades, comes crashing down!

But the spirit was out of the bottle and so Glantz does the old disinfo trick: what you can't deny, turn upside down in your conclusions. 1+1 is 3, not 2.

It is understandabe that Authors like Glantz, who for their whole life have been supporting the official propaganda and working for the establishment and who suddenly look like amateurs, to say the least, begin to attack the messengers. They begin to write books aimed against them as if attacking the messenger makes the facts disappear.

It's noteworthy to mention that there were also some historians in the Western establishment, who had the character to admit, after the Soviet archives were opened and they studied some of the the new papers, that they had tought a made up history and had been fooled for their whole life as academics. But as soon as they did it, suddenly they were no longer "well respected".

Old retired men can be dangerous. They have no career and family to lose anymore.

Several aspects are turned upside down by Glantz. And it can easily be prooved by his own argumentation.

I had named already the hard numbers that are proove the Red Army was not (at least not in this world) defensively deployed in the huge soviet Union, but that doesn't matter, because the author claims something that even is in contradiction to his own data:

He claims that the losses of the Red Army in '41 were the best proove the Red Army was not prepared.

But following this argumentation, the Red Army was also not prepared for the attack on Finland because of it's losses, too. Anyone who disputes that the Red Army attacked Finland?

Did the Red Army not sent whole waves of infantry into tactical attacks without weapons on the field, because they should take their weapons from the fallen ones in front? Was the Red Army not prepared in that cases, too?

Were in Operation Bagration, the Red Army's losses not almost as double as high as the German losses and therefore the Red Army not prepared?

In Stalingrad - a desaster for the Wehrmacht, but several times more losses for the Red Army? Not prepared.

Wherever someone looks at the Red Army in WWII, even outnumbering the Germans 10:1, the Red Army shows significantly higher losses. Even in encirclement pockets, where the Germans ran out of absolutely everything and fought to the last bullet.

Not prepared!

An author, that uses such an embarassing logical strawman to defend the status quo?

And contrary to Glantz Suvorov not only presented courageously the world long withheld data and documents, but his conclusions are - contrary to Glantz - in accordance with political and military logic.

Suvorovs findings are not comfortable. And sadly most people prefer a comfortable lie over an uncomfortable truth.

[sburke]

Somebody has been drinking a bit too much kool-aid served up by Herr Goebbels.

[TheVulture]

1. Study how Russia defeated Napoleon. You will recognize that defense in depth is nothing really new.

Especially not for big countries. That brings me to:

2. Look at a map and try to find Sovietrussia and then France. Maybe you will discover a few differences of strategic importance?

3. Look at the deployment of the French army. You could even take the Maginot-line into your considerations and what effect this defense had.

It's a real stretch to call anything in the Napoleonic war 'defense in depth'. I don't recall any long fronts being held by screening forces with large mobile reserves in the operational rear ready to seal off any penetration of the front lines in that campaign. The armies of that era moved as (more or les) single large blobs, and maneouvered around to try and engage each other in the best circumstances they could. The only way the size of Russia was relevant there was that it gave the Russian army a lot of space to play with while avoiding battle with a superior force; they could keep buying time until they got as far as something important (Moscow), and meanwhile Napoleon suffered constant attrition.

That has absolutely nothing at all to say about how armies deployed for offense and defense in 1941; railways, motorisation and the experiences of the first world war had completely changed the paradigm since then.

As for the rest of it, I don't see the relevance. The French army was deployed mostly along the border, and that didn't work out too well for them. That's not news to anyone. As YankeeDog already mentioned, while the Red Army had developed a very good doctrine of modern mobile warfare between the wars, most of that was ignored (thanks in large part to Stalin's purges). The twelve months from the fall of France to operation Barbarossa is simply not enough time to change the defensive doctrine of the Soviet Union.

It simply isn't anything to do with reality to expect Soviet forces in 1941 to be deployed according to late war or post war doctrines. With organisational inertia, they were deployed in a pre-war mindset which owed more the WWI than anything else.

Besides, even a modern defense in depth isn't going to be thousands of kilometers deep. You mention 3 million soviet POWs in the first six weeks. During that time, the Axis forces advanced over 400 km. Now having reserves in depth is good, but having them more than 400 km to the rear doesn't provide a whole lot of benefit. You'd want probably the bulk of your forces within 400 km of the national border you want to defend against invasion...

(And I find your statements about Glantz as some western myth propogandist bizarre. If anything he is the western writer who has done the most to overthrow the view of the war that dominated in the west during the cold war era, which was dominated by the views of the German officers when it came to the war on the east front. Glantz was the main western military historian to use the Soviet archives to present the Soviets as considerably more sophisticated and capable than the german sources did, and to show the war from the Soviet side. He's probably done more to demolish the prevailing western mindset than any other single person.)

[LukeFF]

2000 destroyed soviet aircraft in the first 24(!) hours.

That's because the Soviet Air Force was in the process of modernization, and so the airfields were packed with older planes being phased out (I-16, I-153, etc.) and the more modern types (Yaks, LaGGs, etc.) meant to take the former's place.

[ASL Veteran]

Somebody has been drinking a bit too much kool-aid served up by Herr Goebbels.

Not necessarily. There is a strong reason for Russians to be supportive of a viewpoint that the Soviets were lined up and ready to attack. If the Soviet Army was planning to attack Nazi Germany before Nazi Germany attacked it, then that certainly pours cold water on any idea that Stalin was a collaborator or friendly with Hitler. After all that happened there probably were / are some very strong views about Nazis and Germans in general and if Stalin himself is seen as being a Nazi collaborator well that can cause some issues to become less 'black and white' so to speak. Once you subscribe to the theory that the Soviet Union was planning an attack on Nazi Germany well then that makes the collaborator label magically disappear because - well you see Stalin was planning to attack Hitler all along anyway. So you see, it is actually in the interests of both sides to claim that the Soviet Union was prepared to attack Nazi Germany.

[Hellas]

It's a real stretch to call anything in the Napoleonic war 'defense in depth'. I don't recall any long fronts being held by screening forces with large mobile reserves in the operational rear ready to seal off any penetration of the front lines in that campaign. The armies of that era moved as (more or les) single large blobs, and maneouvered around to try and engage each other in the best circumstances they could. The only way the size of Russia was relevant there was that it gave the Russian army a lot of space to play with while avoiding battle with a superior force;

Napoleon was defeated by the size of the country, the Russian winter and scorched earth. And the same happened to the Germans in '41. No that much had changed.

For a defense depth is always positive. Do you agree? The more depth a defender has available, the better.

Therefore Russia has always been defended in depth. The more room the defender can give up, the longer the lines of the attacker become, the better for the defender.

Nobody defends a huge country like Russia only at the borders like Germany or France are almost forced to do it (compared to the depth available for Sovietrussia).

The same authors that claim the Red Army in this huge Soviet Union was deployed defensively with an offensive deployment , a huge concentration at the borders think their readers are as dumb, that they do not question why have 3.5 million soldiers at the border at all? Where there are no barracks. Why the airfoce was being placed on provisional airfieds and not securely in depth where they really can protect the country?

The same authors that repeat these Nurmeberg fairy tales on the other hand claim, that the comparatively small Germany should have been defended in depth and that there was no need for a preemptive strike at all! What are around 300 Soviet divisions being deployed at it's eastern borders, new demands from the Soviet Union to give up Rumania and several other signs of the historically always peaceful communist paradise of the workers.

The French army was deployed mostly along the border, and that didn't work out too well for them.

France had a line, which it believed was not penetrateable.

If there is a castle, ofcourse the forces are also placed behind the walls.

But if there is no castle but open land, the forces are stationed in depth.

And that also was done in France according to it's size and where it believed Germany could attack and where not. The majority of French troops was not placed at the borders although it even had the Maginot line.

Anyway, the German moves were deep enough, compared with the size of France, that a resistance any longer would have been suicide and devastated the country without any remaining chance. There was no reason because the Germans did not demand an unconditional surrender or other dishonourable gestures although France had begun the war without any reason. Interestingly even one third of France was not occupied by Hitler. France could also keep it's navy and was only asked if it would want to join the war on Germany's side. And although really needed by Germany against the British Navy, France could keep it's ships.

But if France would have deployed it's forces similar to Sovietrussia, then they would have been stationed in a line along the border. They were not. Because France was not preparing to attack Germany, when Germany attacked.

As YankeeDog already mentioned, while the Red Army had developed a very good doctrine of modern mobile warfare between the wars, most of that was ignored (thanks in large part to Stalin's purges). The twelve months from the fall of France to operation Barbarossa is simply not enough time to change the defensive doctrine of the Soviet Union.

Defensive doctrine of the Soviet Union? For that statement you probably would have been shot. "The Red Army is an offensive army! The most offensive army in the world! Even retreat means attack!" How that?

WORLD REVOLUTION, a WORLD REPUBLIC was the official political goal of the Soviet Union! And the Red Army was it's official tool for world revolution.

How is it possible that a historian is irgnoring these facts of utmost historical importance?

I find it fascinating how a globalist regime like the Soviet Union, that openly, formally and officially followed the goal to conquer the world and destroy the established cultures (striking similarities to today's globalists with their NWO, their fight against traditional values or the traditional family) is portrayed as peaceful, although it had attacked one country after the other since it's establishment, although it had not the international law on it's side, i.e. like being the protective power of a nation - like Germany was for the German minorities under Polish occupation.

Do readers not think?

I am wondering who of Glantz readers knows, that Hitler started the biggest repatriation campaign to move hundreds of thousands of Germans back into the Reich? The opposite of the Lebensraum-propaganda from Nuremberg.

Everybody repeats the propaganda, although on one hand the nationalist German government did what nationalists prefer according to their ideology: it supported the solution of ethnic problems where Germans were the minority by moving them to Germany and create ethnic homogenous areas.

The Red Army was the tool for Communist world revolution. In many European countries the Communist parties were preparing for it and were instructed, what to do in the case when the Red Army would begin to roll over Europe.

Glantz only repeats the Nuremberg propaganda of the peaceful Soviet Union and the defensive, unprepared Red Army and so keeps his readers in complete darkness about the bigger picture.

During that time, the Axis forces advanced over 400 km. Now having reserves in depth is good, but having them more than 400 km to the rear doesn't provide a whole lot of benefit.

The pocket battles were fought closer to the borders and as I mentioned the Soviet airforce even could be reached on airfields, so close to the border, that they were provisional ones.

You'd want probably the bulk of your forces within 400 km of the national border you want to defend against invasion...

In Germany or France. But in a Soviet Union? Or the USA? Or China? Never.

Do you really believe Putin will place the whole Russian army at the borders of Ukraine when he expects an attack of the NATO?! Do you believe that?

Do you recognize now what Glantz is trying to sell you?

(And I find your statements about Glantz as some western myth propogandist bizarre. If anything he is the western writer who has done the most to overthrow the view of the war that dominated in the west during the cold war era, which was dominated by the views of the German officers when it came to the war on the east front.

Did you ever hear about Nuremberg? Surely. There the Western Alliies dictated with the Soviet Union the history of WW2. David Irving has written an excellent book about the tribunal. People believe it was a normal trial. But I don't know what is the bigger scandal: this farce or that such a farce can be sold in our times as a model for justice.

The Western Alliies in Nuremberg rejected the German claims, that it was a preemtive strike. They forbid them to refute the allegations. Then they killed German soldiers for planning an attack war.

Since when did the Western Alliies distance themselfes from Nuremberg?!

In my opinion things were much more complex: in the US army were forces - just like in the whole USA - that did NOT support these lies against Germany. The most prominent is probably general Patton. But also the average US soldier had personal experiences that differed from what the newsreels claimed.

Additionally the US wanted the German experience for their confrontation with Stalin, just like they started operation Paperclip to get the German engineers. So while the lies from Nuremberg were established, they tried to attract Germans before the Soviets would - or before they simply would kidnap them.

But the tactic to attract collaborators has nothing to do with the Western propagand view of WW2. Show me the West-german or US newsreels that discuss facts that support that Germany led a preemptive war against the soviet Union. Show me the schoolbooks.

Ofcourse the German soldiers ofcourse always knew about it. They fought it! But this view has not been accepted and is contrary to the Nuremberg propaganda, which is the "official" story the USA follows since.

Glantz was the main western military historian to use the Soviet archives to present the Soviets as considerably more sophisticated and capable than the german sources did, and to show the war from the Soviet side. He's probably done more to demolish the prevailing western mindset than any other single person.)

Glantz claims he was doing his job in Soviet archives. But how is it possible that he didn't discover anything of importance? That for example he didn't notice the complete lack of maps of Soviet territory for the Soviet artillery units in '41?! How is it possible that the Soviet artillery had hundreds of thousands of maps of Germany and no maps of the own country, when it would have been deployed in a defensive role?

[John Kettler]

First, I'm six chapters into "Icebreaker," and it's a tremendous read. Over and over again Suvorov hangs Stalin et al. with their own words, their propaganda, their ever intensifying glorification of the creation of new republics to the west, of advancing 300 km west, when Russia was already against the German border; when Russia had removed almost every country between it and Germany. Had Russia been concerned with defense, it would've postured itself differently, but it didn't, and he cites the bafflement of Russians who were there as fortifications weren't built, mines were not laid, camouflage was not installed and a host of other indicators of hostile intent.There's also Stalin's gleeful comment after signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov--"I have deceived him. I have deceived Hitler." Suvorov deems that Germany lost the war then and there, but it took years to actually finish the job. Over and over again Suvorov quotes Stalin to the effect his game plan is to let all the capitalists destroy each other, then move to liberate Europe (from the Nazis he so expertly and cunningly nurtured).

As for the amphibious tanks, I'm not exactly the world's expert on pre WW II Russian amphibious tanks, but I am very much a student of warfare. LIke it or not, amphibious vehicles are used to attack: Sherman DD, LVT, Terrapin, BMP, BTR, PT-76, DUKW, amphibious jeep, Schwimmwagen, LVTP7, Type 61 Ka-Mi, to name but some. The innocuous recon role is about as innocuous a Patton's notorious "rock soup" method for advancing by putting patrols over the river. And the river after. And the river after that. All while under orders not to advance. The amphibious tanks are designed to probe the defenses, if any, find the weak spots, or simply bull through a disorganized (if even present) defense, in turn resulting in an assault or admin river crossing as the attackers relentlessly advance. It has been established many times over that a tank, any tank, is terrifying to infantry as a general rule. How much more, then, is one that spits fire like some dragon as it swims the river to help create a beachhead? And what spearheaded the entire assault crossing that kicked off the Battle of Berlin? Amphibious jeeps carrying Scouts armed with bazookas and MGs! Their job? Secure a bridgehead and hold it so that follow-on forces could cross.

Clearly, the quantities are way off, but the operating principle remains the same. Additionally, I would note that at close range 7.62 mm AP MG fire is capable of doing a lot of-fatal damage to light armor (see MG-34/42 vs US HTs as a case in point), and is completely lethal to any vehicle not armored. I would further note that many nations started the war with MG only armed tanks or carriers ( 7TPdw, Vickers light tank, Bren carrier, Carden-Loyd 4-ton light tank, FT-31, AMR, CV-33, CV-35, Tankette 35M), to name but some. Recall, too, that the US .50 caliber MG was water cooled and was a triple threat weapon: antiaircraft, antipersonnel and antitank. Recall further that the Dushka was then, and still very much is a weapon able to defeat numerous target classes. It is easy to deride Stalin's huge amphibious tank fleet as being of no military consequence, but that is, in my view, an assertion born of not really understanding the problem.

Stalin, for example, had more amphibious tanks than the Poles had total AFVs at the time Poland was invaded. 2237 amphibious tanks vs. 1140 Polish AFVs, almost twice as many!

http://ww2-weapons.com/polish-armed-forces/

In that same period, 5 PD had no less than 137 Panzer I and 137 Panzer IIs assigned, of a total tank strength of 304.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5th_Panzer_Division_(Wehrmacht)

Stalin also had far more amphibious tanks operational than did the Germans Panzer I in their total tank inventory, 2237 vs 1445.

These sorts of numbers are hardly inconsequential, and this video gives some idea of how extensive and expensive was Russian work on amphibious tank development. Even the worst protected of the early models had a minimum of 4 mm of armor, and the T-40 being laughed at in this thread had a minimum of 13 and a max of 30 mm. To put that into perspective Panzer III D,E,F and G had a max armor protection of 30 mm, and earlier models had only 15! So the "backward" Russians had an amphibious tank with the same protection level, in many places, as the German MBT of the period!

Shall have more on this, but YT has pretty much imploded and refuses to cooperate.

Update

YT finally cleared, and I can now present a very up close look at one of the few surviving T-37A amphibious tanks. Kubinka has it, and it's a runner, despite its considerable age!

Regards,

John Kettler

[LukeFF]

Steiner, Steiner?

[76mm]

But if France would have deployed it's forces similar to Sovietrussia, then they would have been stationed in a line along the border. They were not. Because France was not preparing to attack Germany, when Germany attacked.

Unfortunately I don't have time to respond to all of your points in detail, but I did want to point out that Soviet troops were hardly "stationed in a line along the border". I'm reading a lot about the South-Western Front now, and its main strike forces were stationed 200-240 km from the border.

In fact, while the initial deployment was not great, the real problem arose when all the Sov units were ordered to attack in the initial days of the war, putting them further into harm's way.

I'm also fascinated by some people's fixation on amphibious tanks (and characterization of DUKWs, amphib jeeps, and schwimmwagens as offensive weapons). And John, citation please for the claim that amphibious jeeps led the way in the "Battle of Berlin" to secure a bridgehead...

I really don't understand why the fact that the Sov military had an offensive mindset is taken as proof that they intended to attack Hitler in 1941??

[dsf]

Unfortunately I don't have time to respond to all of your points in detail, but I did want to point out that Soviet troops were hardly "stationed in a line along the border". I'm reading a lot about the South-Western Front now, and its main strike forces were stationed 200-240 km from the border.

In fact, while the initial deployment was not great, the real problem arose when all the Sov units were ordered to attack in the initial days of the war, putting them further into harm's way.

I'm also fascinated by some people's fixation on amphibious tanks (and characterization of DUKWs, amphib jeeps, and schwimmwagens as offensive weapons). And John, citation please for the claim that amphibious jeeps led the way in the "Battle of Berlin" to secure a bridgehead...

I really don't understand why the fact that the Sov military had an offensive mindset is taken as proof that they intended to attack Hitler in 1941??

People believe what they want to believe, especially when someone like Suvorov comes along. After all, Suvorov built a very successful career for himself telling people what they wanted to hear. For people of that mindset, it's hard to concede there may be another reality, especially after so many decades of Cold War propaganda. Many people — most people are not interested in relearning history, especially if it contradicts the history they grew up with. Just wait until you try and tell someone that Kursk was NOT the largest tank battle of the war! LOL!

As you no doubt know, there are numerous books on the SW Front in 1941. Three that I have enjoyed are Aleksei Isaev's 2009 book Дубно 1941 г., reprinted in 2012 by Yauza/Eksmo as Величайшее танеовое сражкеие 1941 г. The original has out of print for several years. Another good book that continues the story is Ilya Moshchansky's 1941 - Битва за Киев (2008). There were also three monographs from Voennaya Letopis' (2003) by T. Abashidze describing the fall of Kiev. The second volume (Киевская стратегическая оборонительная операция ч.2) is entitled Окружение Юго-Западного фронта. The only one of these that is still in print is the reprint of Isaev's book, but I have these (any many others) in pdf format if you are interested.

Regards

Scott Fraser

[76mm]

dsf, thanks for the book titles. I just finished Solonin's book (Июнь 41-ого--яуза-пресс, 2014) (not bad) and just started Vladimirsky's book (На Киевском Направлении--Воениздат, 1989). Vladimirsky's book in particular looks good, his writing style seems better than many other Russian authors.

I've also got Martirosyan's book (22 июня--детальная анатомия предательства), but it seems to be some kind of diatribe (I guess the title should have tipped me off), not clear about what...

Thanks for the offers for the pdfs, but I live around the corner from one of Moscow's biggest bookstores (Biblioglobus) and from an Ozon.ru delivery point (for used books), so I typically try to pick up hard copies--let me know if you need anything. I hadn't seen Isaev's book, so will look for it.

[John Kettler]

76mm,

They're offensive in that they are used either directly in the attack or as support forces for the attack, as in bringing in troops and supplies after the primary assault. As for the Battle of Berlin matter, please see part 2 at link shortly before 8 minutes. Shows removal of camouflage, mounting of amphib jeeps, assault crossing of Oder by amphib jeeps (one's laying commo wire) and debarking of MG and bazooka armed Scouts/Spetsnaz on the far shore to obtain a lodgment.

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=39426&highlight=amphibious+jeeps%2C+berlin

This Made in the USSR episode shows quite clearly the role of amphibious tanks, as expressed in the story of the PT-76, an amphib tank built on WW II experience with the same basic gun as what the T-34/76 and ZIS-3 had. Over and over again, we see these tanks on the attack. Assault river crossings, firing guns while in the water, then emerging and charging into the attack OR swimming across the river with tankodesantniki aboard OR driving out and speeding ashore from LST type craft as part of an amphibious invasion. Attack. Attack. Attack. The official Russian footage shows not a single instance of the tank in a defensive position, which says it all, as far as I'm concerned. Also of interest, though I don't speak Russian, is the explicit linkage of the tank to the problems of getting armor across rivers, shown in a mad effort to get a pontoon bridge up so that T-34/85s could cross and an even wilder Post War one in which a big set of pontoons is mounted on a tank. That same sequence also shows tanks snorkeling and presumably discusses the problems with that, too.

Concerning your last item, I emphatically commend "Icebreaker" to your attention. Suvorov puts together a meticulous indictment of how Stalin deliberately set up and implemented his plan to "liberate" Europe from the very situations and policies he created and helped flourish. In order to do that, he had to be ready to go when the opportunity presented itself, and with Germany the only direction he could expand westward (all the propaganda exhorted moving that direction, by military action, no less) and acquiring new republics, the only reasonable conclusion is that Germany was the target.

In support of this, Suvorov shows the Russian Army was preparing for its invasion of Germany by issuing German-Russian/Russian-German language guides. Except for the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty period, Russian propaganda was always antiGerman. Germany was the Main Enemy, just as the US was during the Cold War, and this was even reflected in Sergei Eisenstein's "Alexander Nevsky," in which the protagonist declares the way to defend is in the enemy's territory! If you preach world revolution, the destruction of the capitalists, war as not only permissible, but necessary; if you make an across the board, almost entirely successful effort (Finland) to destroy the buffer zone preventing invasion into Germany; if you systematically build up transport routes, bridges and other means to advance, while destroying your own defenses and not building others to replace them, how can you argue anything but intent to attack, no matter how artful the rhetoric, expert the spinning and thorough the burial of the evidence? Suvorov mercilessly skewers the supposedly innocent neutral Russians who allegedly never started anything, never attacked anyone, yet massively expanded their country to the tune of 16 new republics. If this is neutrality, I assuredly don't want to see ill will and attack! I say again. Read the book. If you do, I'm pretty sure you'll never look at World War II the same way again. And if I may return to something Hellas said about maps, you might be interested to know that during the Cold War, intel analysts poring over Russian military exercise maps noticed something disturbing. The maps bore no resemblance to the exercise area in Russia, but were a feature for feature match with Minden, West Germany, which lay smack in the storied Fulda Gap, right in the path of the greatly feared Red Army juggernaut!

Amphibious forces are weapons of attack, as history going clear back to the Classical Age shows. Be it Greeks at Troy, the Romans at Carthage or any number of nations and battles since. Likewise, there's a reason that Russian bridging units were explicitly included in conventional arms reduction talks late in the Cold War, for these were the means of rapidly crossing the frequent rivers in order to "liberate" Europe from its capitalist yoke had WW II broken out. Russian assault bridging equipment was so good we copied the PMP-1 outright.

The Schwimmwagen was used by German recce units and was developed to cross water obstacles in situations where the bridges were either destroyed by enemy action or still enemy held. It went into service in 1941, when the Germans were pretty much attacking everywhere, making it an amphibious offensive weapon. The Germans built over 15,000 of them. They were mobile enough to keep up with motorcycle troops and apparently ultimately supplanted the Kubelwagen.

Model review with great info

http://www.miniatures.de/hasegawa-MT13-schwimmwagen.html

Regards,

John Kettler

[dsf]

First, I'm six chapters into "Icebreaker," and it's a tremendous read. Over and over again Suvorov hangs Stalin et al. with their own words... There's also Stalin's gleeful comment after signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov--"I have deceived him. I have deceived Hitler." ...

A question: Just how is Rezun to know what Stalin thought or said? Rezun/Suvorov was a low-ranking GRU officer stationed far away from Moscow. He was not around in WW2 and had no direct access to sensitive, classified documents dating from that period. After he defected to start his career as a novelist, his access was nil. The very best he could do was repeat hearsay.

As for the amphibious tanks, I'm not exactly the world's expert on pre WW II Russian amphibious tanks, but I am very much a student of warfare.

Well, I am a student of Soviet armour, multilingual, with a pretty decent library of maybe 1500 books, mostly Russian/Soviet publications. I am trained in the discipline of history and have the appropriate respect for source documents. Professionally, I worked between two worlds, Soviet and Canadian, as a representative for Canadian industry. I am depressingly familiar with the Soviet mindset, their obsession with paperwork, their tedious bureaucracy, queues, bad food and worse accommodations. I am also a modeller. A few years ago, I began gathering information in preparation for writing a book on the T-34. At this point in time, I know quite a bit about the Red Army, particularly their equipment.

So, I say frankly, any suggestion that the RKKA had 4000 amphibious tanks ready to launch in a general attack on Nazi Germany is sheer lunacy. But that's Suvorov.

... All while under orders not to advance.

Orders? What orders? If there were orders to launch an attack on Germany, where are they? The RKKA was a very large organization. Attacking Germany would be a very large undertaking. If, as Suvorov suggests, there were preparations to launch an attack and invade Germany, there would be a pile of paperwork reaching halfway to the moon.

Instead, there is nothing. Nothing at all, save one penciled document, the outline of Plan Grom. Vasilevsky wrote the document, dated 15 May 1941. In a 1965 interview, Zhukov stated that Stalin axed it immediately when he heard of it and repeated his instructions that the Germans must not be provoked*.

Soviet defense policy was always that the first echelon absorb the initial attack, the second echelon would defeat the invaders, and the third echelon would then (and only then) counterattack. They were to cross the border near L'vov and drive west as far as Krakow and Katowice, with the objective of depriving Germany of Silesian coal and forcing Germany to the table. If one looks at the disposition of Soviet forces on the eve of Barbarossa, almost all the new tanks were located in the Kiev Special Military District, pursuant to that strategy.

The amphibious tanks are designed to probe the defenses, if any, find the weak spots, or simply bull through a disorganized (if even present) defense, in turn resulting in an assault or admin river crossing as the attackers relentlessly advance. It has been established many times over that a tank, any tank, is terrifying to infantry as a general rule. How much more, then, is one that spits fire like some dragon as it swims the river to help create a beachhead?

Amphibious tanks are also used for the defense, to scout neighbouring enemy forces. That aside, you greatly overestimate the capabilities of the older tanks. The T-37A was very thin-skinned — up to 10mm on the sides. The PzB 39 could defeat it easily, as could the Flak 38 or Pak 38. They were also very worn, obsolescent, small and hopelessly unreliable, to the point where the T-38 was hurried into production. The T-38 wasn't much better. Both had two man crews, were armed with a single 7.62mm machinegun and you can see from the data how many had radios.

Clearly, the quantities are way off...

Correct. So is everything else when Suvorov's claims are put under close scrutiny. That's the whole point.

Stalin, for example, had more amphibious tanks than the Poles had total AFVs...

Obviously. The Red Army was the largest army in the world, by an order of magnitude. The USSR was also the largest country in the world, with enemies at both ends. All of its neighbours had attacked at one point or another, so it hardly surprising that Stalin went overboard. That really has no bearing on the question. Far more significant is the disposition of all those tanks, i.e. how many of them were based in the Military Districts facing the Germans and their overall state of readiness. That data has been available for a long time.

I will put this extract from Прелюдия к Барбароссе (M.Kolomiets, M.Makarov; 2001) up for perusal. Pardon the formatting, but it Microsoft HTML I just converted from Word. It is in Russian, but the tables are fairly self explanatory. It contains chapter and verse regarding Red Army force deployments in June 1941. Tables 16 and 17 detail the tank forces assigned to the border MDs.

http://moto.hobby-site.com/junk/Прелюдия_к_Барбароссе.htm

YT finally cleared, and I can now present a very up close look at one of the few surviving T-37A amphibious tanks. Kubinka has it, and it's a runner, despite its considerable age!

Interesting. AFAIK, it is the only survivor. (There are five T-38s.) I didn't know it was a runner. Quite the deathtrap, eh? Probably the only AFV that a Pz.Kpfw.I could knock out. Here is a walkaround of the same vehicle. http://legion-afv.narod.ru/T-37_Kubinka.html

Regards

Scott Fraser

* quoted in Veremeev, Krasnaya Armia v nachale Vtoroi mirovoi, p.260 ff.

[Hellas]

All of its neighbours had attacked at one point or another

Wow.

Now I understand better why you ignore the opening of the archives in 1989 and focus to defend the Soviet Nuremberg propaganda.

[Melchior]

Their is a lot more of this revisionist nonsense these days after the relative quiet of the 90s and 2000s. Lots of resurgent fascist movements in Europe now who conspicuously jump back and forth between either saying the Nazis were super bad and they aren't like them, or how the Nazis were just misunderstood and really trying to save Europe from Bolshevism!

One thing will never change about fascism, they'd lie about the color of the sky if it would suit their interests.

Wow.

Now I understand better why you ignore the opening of the archives in 1989 and focus to defend the Soviet Nuremberg propaganda.

We have a fascinating example of Goebbels-esque stuff right here folks. I argue keep him around for just a little bit more so we can study him.

[Erwin]

"the Nazis were just misunderstood"

New research shows that all they were trying to was better market the nutritional advantages of pork sausages to Europe and it got out of hand when dealing with the non-pork enthusiasts and damned vegetarians and vegans like the French (crepe-lovers), gays (too into health) commies, gypsies, Jews, Slavs etc. The real reason that Britain wasn't invaded was that the Germans realized that pork sausages were were (and are - altho not nearly as good these days) a Brit staple.

[ASL Veteran]

"the Nazis were just misunderstood"

New research shows that all they were trying to was better market the nutritional advantages of pork sausages to Europe and it got out of hand when dealing with the non-pork enthusiasts and damned vegetarians and vegans like the French (crepe-lovers), gays (too into health) commies, gypsies, Jews, Slavs etc. The real reason that Britain wasn't invaded was that the Germans realized that pork sausages were were (and are - altho not nearly as good these days) a Brit staple.

I realize this is in jest, but you might want to reconsider some of your assumptions since Hitler was a vegetarian, Nazis were environmentalists, and much of the leadership of the SA were homosexual. Just sayin'.

I think the best indicator of whether or not Hitler wanted to invade the Soviet Union comes from the book he wrote. I believe the title of that book is 'Mein Kampf' and a quick glance through that should quell any doubts. For one thing Hitler equated Marxism with Jews and it is common knowledge what Hitler thought about Jews. In fact he states that Marxism is a Jewish creation - which perhaps is understandable to a degree since Karl Marx was himself Jewish by the standards of the day. Further he describes Bismark's failed attempts to stop Marxism and goes on to state that the nation of Germany could only survive by destroying Marxism. How accurate his version of events is I can't say. He finally goes on to imply that Germany lost WW1 because the German people were stabbed in the back by .... yeah, you guessed it ... the Jews.

Hitler grew up German in the Austro Hungarian Empire. According to Hitler, at the time there were political movements afoot to make the Austro Hungarian Empire more 'Slavic' as opposed to more Germanic since Austria dominated the Empire. He even states that he initially thought that the Archduke was shot by a German since the Archduke was a leading reformer in shifting Austria Hungary from more Germanic to more Slavic. He then claims to have been amused by the irony of a Slave shooting the Archduke since he was their biggest benefactor. The long and the short of it is that Hitler ... well he didn't like 'Slavs' too much either. He also felt that WW1 was the inevitable result of the conflict between German and Slav both within and outside of the Austro Hungarian Empire. He also draws the conclusion that when conflict is 'inevitable' it is better to just get on with it than to pussy foot around hoping for peace. According to Hitler, hoping for peace just strengthens your enemies.

So to sum up, Hitler didn't like Jews very much and he associated Jews with Marxism. Hitler didn't like Slavs very much either because he seemed to feel that conflict between German and Slav was inevitable based on his experience in the Austro Hungarian Empire. He also believed that when a conflict was inevitable it is better to get the conflict started sooner rather than later since delay only strengthens your enemies. Any guesses as to what nation in Europe might embody all of those things? I have a few ideas .