Vulnerability of Hanomag halftrack gunners..

[ASL Veteran]

Thus, there *is* a battle role for SPWs - to get infantry through barrages and light MG fire etc, within the defended zone, if and only if the heavy AT network has already been smashed by the tanks - and to bus infantry to the defended zone, so the tanks can have dismounts where they need them (e.g. around large bodies of cover, stream crossings, etc). But the actual fighting, within range and sight of the enemy, is done by the tanks themselves, or by dismounts.

So the SPW is an armored bus and nothing more.

And until you show me not training anything but actual combat reports - with matching accounts from the defending side, not limited to own-side claims - in which SPWs were fought against and mattered as fighting platforms, I will continue to believe all your rear echelon you know whater doctrinal dream stories are about as credible as French advice on decisive use of the bayonet.

Until someone shows actual combat reports it’s just a bus and no MG was ever fired from a Hanomag in anger. It seems like you are the one who is taking a ridiculous extreme position here.

George MC - yes, I agree there are SPW examples east front, especially larger formation directly behind armor, occasionally larger formations more on their own or with light armor (a full panzer recce battalion e.g., or a tank battalion with SPW mounted panzergrenadier battalion trailing it closely), that saw actual combat, especially against pure rifle forces in open steppe terrain (where armor of any kind is trump vs rifle forces), or penetrating a smashed AT network (leading tanks having done the smashing).

Whoa, what’s this? You actually know that SPWs are used in actual combat, but you just don’t think they were ever used ‘when it mattered’? So what’s the definition of when it matters because that seems to be the point where you disagree with your opposite numbers. I suppose you are the one who defines ‘when it matters’ for this discussion though, and since you are the one who is defining ‘when it matters’ then you can never be wrong can you?

But all of those are distinct from every SPW on the force being used routinely as an infantry fighting vehicle in tactical range of visible enemies, using its MG armament (perhaps along with mounted fire), as direct fire support of the infantry at close ranges.

The only person claiming this is you from what I can tell, and you only claim that this is what you are arguing against because it’s the perfect foil for your own ridiculous initial position. I don’t think anyone in this thread claimed that every SPW on the force was being used routinely at all times as an IFV so this seems like it is a classic straw man to me. The problem here is that you put out a ridiculous position whereby no Hanomag ever fired a shot in anger. This was countered by showing German doctrine in their usage. You claim the doctrine is wrong and that you are right because of loss statistics. However, we are now further along in the thread and you actually now admit that Hanomags fired shots in anger, but just not when it mattered. Now we can have pages and pages of discussion about ‘when it matters’, thus the merri go round continues because you have taken upon yourself the mantle of deciding what the definition of ‘when it matters’ is. Since you are the only one who decides what ‘when it matters’ means, then you are the only one who can decide that the discussion has reached a resolution. The only acceptable resolution that can be reached though is one in which you are proven to be correct and until everyone bows to the inevitable the discussion will never end.

I suppose that this then ties to Combat Mission in the sense that you feel that everytime a Hanomag is used in a Combat Mission game it’s being used ‘when it matters’. Since Hanomags were never used during times ‘when it matters’ (by your own definition of course) then Hanomags should never be seen on a Combat Mission battlefield. Of course this ignores the fact that Combat Mission is a game and if Hanomags fired a single MG burst in anger then it’s perfectly valid for the game to simulate it. How the players choose to play the game is up to them.

[womble]

...Combat Mission is a game and if Hanomags fired a single MG burst in anger then it’s perfectly valid for the game to simulate it. How the players choose to play the game is up to them.

Very true, and very germane. However, they shouldn't piss and moan when their ersatz IFVs get smoked, and their gunners perforated, since that was the general consequence of such use, hence the rarity of the application of the doctrine-from-on-high. Sure, use them as fire support, or assault wagons when you have a good idea it's safe, but recognise that you, the player, have a much better idea of when that is than any commander on the ground in RL would have had.

[kensal]

This is quite a famous description of elements of 2nd Panzer attacking towards St Denisiere during the Mortain counterattack, observed by an American officer. He describes 3 parallel columns consisting of 2-3 tanks accompanied by sp guns and probably half-tracks:

http://mceacsc.archive.org/stream/1944-12IntelligenceBulletinVol03No04/1944-12%20Intelligence%20Bulletin%20Vol%2003%20No%2004_djvu.txt

Scroll down to page 57 of the report.

"For a period of 36 hours in the last days of July (1944), an officer of an Allied army group staff had an excellent opportunity of observing German tanks and infantry of the 2nd Panzer Division attacking an Allied force in France. The following notes, which are based on this report, describe the tactics that the Germans employed.

The general situation was fluid at the time of the attack. The Germans advanced westward in three parallel columns, each consisting of tanks accompanied by infantry. The center column followed a main road, firing rapidly and moving at a brisk rate. It went from hill to hill, with the accompanying infantry dog-trotting through the fields on each side of the road and over the hedgerows. The infantry was employed over no more than the width of a single field on each side. The center column had a total of only eight tracked vehicles. At least three of these were tanks, one or two probably were self-propelled guns, and the remainder probably were half-tracked personnel carriers.

Although the total German strength which had been sent to capture and hold an important crossroads at St. Denisiere consisted of two companies of infantry and probably not more than ten tanks, the Allied officer observed only the tracked vehicles previously mentioned and possibly a platoon of infantry. (Actually about 20 tanks and 2 companies of Panzergrenadiers in half-tracks (Sd. Kfz. 251) from Panzergrenadier Regiment 304 plus some forward observers)

The Infantrymen Moved Fast

The leading tank fired its 75 rapidly, getting both graze and air bursts, while its machine guns, supplemented by those of the vehicles behind it, sprayed the top of every hedgerow. The noise was terrific, and the bursts in the shrubbery and the tops of trees and hedgerows were certainly impressive. Even before the shock of the guns discharged at close range and the garden hose spray of machine gun bullets, had taken full effect, German infantrymen were over the hedgerow and into the field and were advancing toward the next field with determination and courage. They knew where they were going and went there fast.

At night the Germans reacted forcefully with fire and limited movement, whenever they detected any sign of an Allied approach. The German tanks moved slowly, and made very little noise. Immediately after firing, each tank moved to a new position 25 to 50 meters away. It should be emphasized that the noise discipline of the German tank crews and the accompanying infantry was superior. There was no talking or shouting except for machine gun and cannon fire and the starting of motor, no sound carried farther then 100 yards.

On the other hand, the approach of US tanks and the passing of most US motor convoys was rapidly identifiable by the loud shouting, talking and issuing of orders by the US troops who approached or passed the general vicinity of a German position. The propensity of US tank drivers to "gun" their motors was a dead give-away, whereas the Germans always eased their tanks forward, traveled in low gear and were remarkably quiet in all operations except the firing. They used long bursts of their rapid-firing machine guns to discourage guests. If pressed at all, they sent up flares to obtain German artillery and mortar fire on their flanks. The way they handled their tanks was bold and sure. They acted as if they knew exactly what their destination was and by which route they wished to proceed.

A U.S. Tank "Got the Works"

At 0230, the darkest part of the night, a German tank moved out and headed toward the northernmost German column, making as little noise as possible. Later it turned out that a lone US tank on reconnaissance had pushed up against the nose of the ridge that the German tanks had organized, and the Germans were quietly laying plans to place a terrific amount of fire on it. Before long, it got the works.

Because there were so few German infantrymen and because they were interested only in reaching and holding the team's objective, their mopping-up activities were negligible. Thus, of the Allied troops overrun in this fashion, a large percentage was neither killed, wounded, captured, or missing during the first two or three days. (The Germans claimed inflicting heavy losses on the Americans and the destruction of 25 American tanks). The ease and rapidity with which this small attacking force made its penetration, reached its objective, sat on the objective and cut traffic on an important road is of more than ordinary interest. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the Germans will employ small groups for similar missions in the future.

[kensal]

There are a number of fascinating things about this passage, apart from the eye witness account of half tracks in a fire support role. The most interesting I think is the impression that the Germans effected a penetration of the front line by an intimidatory display of firepower. The witness suggests that the situation was fluid so the strength of the US forces opposing this movement may have been limited initially. The description suggests that the Germans maintained a momentum by firing as they went, the infantry moving from field to field quite quickly. The purpose of the fire seems to have been to discourage opposition to the movement ie area fire in hedgerows. The US troops are described as having been overrun but not suffering significant casualties due to lack of mopping up following forces. All of this seems to suggest that a sizeable German force used a show of firepower to push on to their objective while the US forces in the area may have moved out of their way or lain doggo while the attack passed by, thereby avoiding a confrontation (which they may not have been strong enough to win initially). It only seems later, in the night, that US armour / motorised columns arrive, in response to the German advance.

[Apocal]

The problem here is that you put out a ridiculous position whereby no Hanomag ever fired a shot in anger.

What? He never argued that.

There are a few exceptions, to be sure. They were sometimes used in "coup de main" descents, where the idea was to get infantry into a large body of cover / objective in a short period of time, across some distance of open ground (without a covered approach for dismounts etc). A typical case is pushing into a lightly defended village. Another would be night use in "raids", effectively.

The second main exception is when operating in a comparatively large formation directly behind a strong panzer spearhead (a battalion to an entire regiment of tanks, not one company), with the expectation that the panzers would completely smash the heavy AT weapon "network" before the trailing SPWs reached the effective range of those weapons. Then the SPWs might be used - along with mounted fire, even - to mop up behind the tanks, dropping dismounts only here or there to surround bypassed infantry enemies, that were already deprived of all larger (gun or armor) support, by the panzers having already killed all that stuff and passed on.

Even in that case, however, the primary roles of the SPW was transport, getting the infantry around already weakened and isolated infantry elements. The protection from small arms they provided was critical in that case, the firepower of the 'tracks themselves much less important. You can certainly find occasional uses like this on the Russian front, particularly in open steppe terrain against unsupported rifle force opponents.

George MC - yes, I agree there are SPW examples east front, especially larger formation directly behind armor, occasionally larger formations more on their own or with light armor (a full panzer recce battalion e.g., or a tank battalion with SPW mounted panzergrenadier battalion trailing it closely), that saw actual combat, especially against pure rifle forces in open steppe terrain (where armor of any kind is trump vs rifle forces), or penetrating a smashed AT network (leading tanks having done the smashing).

I tried to mention all of those uses I know of from actual battle AARs, above. (Night raids another, and tactical "lifts" of infantry into a city interior or across one area of open, up to a ridge or wood etc).

Most of those uses focus on the transport use and keeping infantry up with tanks. A few are just using light armor as "poor man's tanks" against weak infantry enemies, especially in the open.

But all of those are distinct from every SPW on the force being used routinely as an infantry fighting vehicle in tactical range of visible enemies, using its MG armament (perhaps along with mounted fire), as direct fire support of the infantry at close ranges (for MGs, say 400 yards and under). Against typical enemies (all arms, normal densities) I just don't find them doing it very often. Not in their own side losses, and especially not in the enemy side tactical accounts.

[womble]

There are a number of fascinating things about this passage, apart from the eye witness account of half tracks in a fire support role. The most interesting I think is the impression that the Germans effected a penetration of the front line by an intimidatory display of firepower. The witness suggests that the situation was fluid so the strength of the US forces opposing this movement may have been limited initially. The description suggests that the Germans maintained a momentum by firing as they went, the infantry moving from field to field quite quickly. The purpose of the fire seems to have been to discourage opposition to the movement ie area fire in hedgerows

It's also hardly conclusive, since there were plenty of half track chassis that were not APCs, and the author only says "probably...personnel carriers".

[kensal]

It's also hardly conclusive, since there were plenty of half track chassis that were not APCs, and the author only says "probably...personnel carriers".

I am happy to go along with the author's perception that they were probably personnel carriers, given that he was apparently in the position of watching the attack but not actually being subjected to it. He was able to distinguish PCs from sp guns, which could also have been half tracks

[zhivago]

Test #5

01) 40KIA

02) ok

03) ok

04) 03KIA

05) ok

06) ok

07) ok

08) ok

09) 33KIA

10) 49KIA

11) ok

12) 49KIA

13) 47KIA

14) 40KIA

15) 51KIA, 38KIA

16) 39KIA, 25KIA

17) ok

18) ok

19) 35KIA, 01KIA

20) ok

So, not counting the driver secondary kills, that's 46 / 100 gunners killed in the first minute of firing - and the bulk of these are in the first 20 seconds which suggests it's before they can suppress the enemy effectively.

Compared with the 100% survival rate amongst gunners who didn't fire, it means that pulling the trigger is practically a death sentence

Next up : US Halftracks.

Great work dude, indeed there's something wrong with hanomag gunners, I hope the developers will pay attention to it.

[dieseltaylor]

Apocal - I am surprised that you dismiss ASL' post so out of hand and then quote misleadingly a fragment of his post solely to highlight it against some of Jason's more considered posts.

Perhaps you might do the same for Jason dismissing the German manuals which say precisely what his new position is now. The introduction of the Kursk figures was not helpful to the discussion unless JC tied it into the fact that the Germans were following their doctrine and using the Hannomags wisely by NOT using them in a very heavily defended locality. This quote below illustrates JC having a pop and being wrong in bolstering his argument in reverse to the way he thought.

Originally Posted by JasonC

Dt - they had better, they had enough front line experience to tell the manuals writers in the rear to stuff it. Entire SS panzer divisions didn't lose only 3 SPWs in two weeks fighting through multiple layered PAK fronts by "charging" every enemy antitank gun they located.

Next you will cite French 1914 field manuals to prove how decisive the bayonet was during WW I...

[Apocal]

Apocal - I am surprised that you dismiss ASL' post so out of hand and then quote misleadingly a fragment of his post solely to highlight it against some of Jason's more considered posts.

The first quote was Jason's first post on the subject of their actual (as opposed to doctrinal) employment.

Perhaps you might do the same for Jason dismissing the German manuals which say precisely what his new position is now.

Are you talking about this?: "24. Every enemy antitank weapon has superiority over you because it is always ready to fire. Compensate for this superiority by rapid travel, by utilizing the terrain, making short stops to fire, and by actively concentrating your shots. When you have located an antitank gun close to you, charge it while firing and destroy it."

OK.

The introduction of the Kursk figures was not helpful to the discussion unless JC tied it into the fact that the Germans were following their doctrine and using the Hannomags wisely by NOT using them in a very heavily defended locality. This quote below illustrates JC having a pop and being wrong in bolstering his argument in reverse to the way he thought.

OK then, Kursk is a bad example. He also brought up, essentially, every major German armored attack in NWE. Nobody was claiming to have killed Hanomags with direct fire and the Germans weren't claiming they lost them to direct fire, where and when are they being used?

[dieseltaylor]

Good post Kensal. Very nice to be able to quote the action which looks textbook. I have been reading the relevant Lone Sentry reprints.

There were 23 variants of the 251 [or 22 depending on your books] the odds would strongly suggest APC rather than " a half-track". I think we can rule out non-armoured and those without weapons.

[dieseltaylor]

Apocal - You did just take one point of a constructed argument that in isolation was silly without showing how the point was being juxtaposed for the total argument.

The point you highlight and Jason jumped on was really just taking part of a whole and then making a point that was unjustified. Of course in certain circumstances the advice is hugely sensible. If we break it down:

When you have located an antitank gun close to you, charge it while firing and destroy it."

How close is close? If it was 50 yards dead in front of you and you were already at speed how many of us would think to stop or reverse? I have instances of an 88mm missing a Churchill on a causeway twice head on at small hundreds of yards ..... and we all know how slow a Churchill is. It eventually lumbered up an settled its hash.

The Germans always end up saying the commander has to make decisions and all of their tactical advice is based on the idea that there are possibilities. It may be in the single ATG example they could have gone into reaction times, how fast an ATG loads, and morale state to justify the advice but that really is not much help when action is the primary importance.

Returning to the quote it does not say you have located many ATG's charge forward - it requires commonsense - and presumably felt it unnecessary to mention not charging Pakfronts it in print.

Incidentally the halftracks are interesting as they actually had three reverse gears!

[Apocal]

Apocal - You did just take one point of a constructed argument that in isolation was silly without showing how the point was being juxtaposed for the total argument.

Yes, I did. If you'd like, I could provide a different quote: "Until someone shows actual combat reports it’s just a bus and no MG was ever fired from a Hanomag in anger. It seems like you are the one who is taking a ridiculous extreme position here."

The point you highlight and Jason jumped on was really just taking part of a whole and then making a point that was unjustified. Of course in certain circumstances the advice is hugely sensible. If we break it down:

How close is close? If it was 50 yards dead in front of you and you were already at speed how many of us would think to stop or reverse? I have instances of an 88mm missing a Churchill on a causeway twice head on at small hundreds of yards ..... and we all know how slow a Churchill is. It eventually lumbered up an settled its hash.

The Germans always end up saying the commander has to make decisions and all of their tactical advice is based on the idea that there are possibilities. It may be in the single ATG example they could have gone into reaction times, how fast an ATG loads, and morale state to justify the advice but that really is not much help when action is the primary importance.

Returning to the quote it does not say you have located many ATG's charge forward - it requires commonsense - and presumably felt it unnecessary to mention not charging Pakfronts it in print.

Incidentally the halftracks are interesting as they actually had three reverse gears!

The point is that in NWE, the halftracks were almost never in a position to even attempt to do the things described as doctrine. They were left far behind, out of the direct fire-fight. It isn't even hard to imagine why, with every American infantry division having around 40-50 active medium tanks attached on an average day and bazookas being issued in considerable numbers.

[Childress]

The point is that in NWE, the halftracks were almost never in a position to even attempt to do the things described as doctrine. They were left far behind, out of the direct fire-fight. It isn't even hard to imagine why, with every American infantry division having around 40-50 active medium tanks attached on an average day and bazookas being issued in considerable numbers.

... and prowling jabos.

BF may have already fixed this small bug in time for Gustav Line- if it's a bug. This one doesn't approach the complexities presented by the MG/suppression issues.

[$Pec5]

So, without wanting to read all 138 posts, who can answer this question. In real life, were halftrack personell carriers used in a fire support role?

[George MC]

So, without wanting to read all 138 posts, who can answer this question. In real life, were halftrack personell carriers used in a fire support role?

YES - although less commonly so on the western front or more particularly Normandy

[c3k]

And less so as the war progressed. Although, later models were equipped with a 15mm aircraft cannon rather than an MG42. (Obviously not for fire support. /sarcasm off)

[JasonC]

I like Kensal's contribution because it is an actual AAR, and because it believeably shows a real use of both the vehicles being discussed, and their role in the combined arms mix. Beyond that I don't know that it says what he may be trying to imply it says, but to be charitable he was fairly careful about the conclusions to draw from it.

I note the following points -

(1) the description refers to at least 3 distinct passages of combat, an initial movement by the German force in daylight, later night fighting, and "mop up" results to American forces bypassed by the initial movement.

(2) the discussion of SPWs is limited to the first of these, the movement forward to the crossroads

(3) there is no description at all of defenders against that first movement. It is described as a penetration, which implies some defense somewhere, perhaps earlier than the described movement, perhaps during it, but there is no detail. There is in particular not one word about any actual fire directed at the German formation described, *during* the movement described, or anything about a two way firefight.

(4) The dominant features of that movement are (1) narrow axis, (2) dismounts closely accompanying the vehicles, not a mounted movement (3) recon by fire, hosing everything, not waiting for spots, full tank leading that (4) there is MG fire described coming from the "trailing vehicles" as a supplement to the tank fire (5) whole group moves rapidly, infantry closely following the fire and moving by field "bounds".

Notice, there isn't any description of the force being checked at any point in that movement. Of waiting to outshoot a defender force. Of whether the infantry rush or firepower gets anyone out of the way - beyond a possible implication of the infantry being "right behind" the MG hosing, as meaning "before anyone could recover".

(5) the lack of mop up description suggests there are Americans bypassed by the movement - how many right along the road, not clear. Also the description focuses on the action along the road (presumably as what he could see), but the full attack may have involved a considerably wider front with infantry leading, across routes that vehicles could not negotiate. But even so, lack of mop up and low American side casualties among the bypassed do not suggest a wide sweep by a line, nor heavy defense along the road axis.

(6) the description is clearly intended to be normative and laudatory, not just descriptive. The end achieved, however, is to push a force to an objective - a crossroads - and then defend there. It is not e.g. to destroy an enemy force, surround anything, etc. Get there, then hold, is the object. Clearly the Americans on either side of the penetration could just get back (go around, wait for dark perhaps - no mop up).

(7) the night fighting stresses noise discipline, not fire support by light armor etc. It is frankly an afterthought about a secondary normative point (be quieter at night), not related to our subject.

I think the above description partially fits the SPW use I described as coup de main descent. Only partially because they still fight the infantry dismounted, to give the armor "essence of infantry" at the point of attack (clearing the hedgerows, deterring zooks, etc), where a pure coup de main might remain mounted and rely on sheer speed and surprise on the same task.

My problem with it as an example of use of SPWs as fire support in front line fighting is, where is the fighting? I see a description of outgoing recon by fire to support a rapid offensive movement. Perhaps the observer just could not see any defenders or their fire, but there were both, directly in the German's path and at the moments he is describing, not earlier - we don't know. At any rate there is no description of any fire directed back at the tanks, other vehicles, or accompanying infantry.

Maybe that is because there were defenders there, but they were simply suppressed or intimidate by the recon by fire, and got out of the column's way. In that case it would be an example of a meaningful use of SPWs for a form of fire support in front line combat, just doing their job by scaring the enemy rather than hitting him - still counts. Possible, maybe even likely, but we don't know, because the defender description is just too thin to tell.

FWIW...

[kensal]

I like Kensal's contribution because it is an actual AAR, and because it believeably shows a real use of both the vehicles being discussed, and their role in the combined arms mix. Beyond that I don't know that it says what he may be trying to imply it says, but to be charitable he was fairly careful about the conclusions to draw from it.

I note the following points -

(1) the description refers to at least 3 distinct passages of combat, an initial movement by the German force in daylight, later night fighting, and "mop up" results to American forces bypassed by the initial movement.

(2) the discussion of SPWs is limited to the first of these, the movement forward to the crossroads

(3) there is no description at all of defenders against that first movement. It is described as a penetration, which implies some defense somewhere, perhaps earlier than the described movement, perhaps during it, but there is no detail. There is in particular not one word about any actual fire directed at the German formation described, *during* the movement described, or anything about a two way firefight.

(4) The dominant features of that movement are (1) narrow axis, (2) dismounts closely accompanying the vehicles, not a mounted movement (3) recon by fire, hosing everything, not waiting for spots, full tank leading that (4) there is MG fire described coming from the "trailing vehicles" as a supplement to the tank fire (5) whole group moves rapidly, infantry closely following the fire and moving by field "bounds".

Notice, there isn't any description of the force being checked at any point in that movement. Of waiting to outshoot a defender force. Of whether the infantry rush or firepower gets anyone out of the way - beyond a possible implication of the infantry being "right behind" the MG hosing, as meaning "before anyone could recover".

(5) the lack of mop up description suggests there are Americans bypassed by the movement - how many right along the road, not clear. Also the description focuses on the action along the road (presumably as what he could see), but the full attack may have involved a considerably wider front with infantry leading, across routes that vehicles could not negotiate. But even so, lack of mop up and low American side casualties among the bypassed do not suggest a wide sweep by a line, nor heavy defense along the road axis.

(6) the description is clearly intended to be normative and laudatory, not just descriptive. The end achieved, however, is to push a force to an objective - a crossroads - and then defend there. It is not e.g. to destroy an enemy force, surround anything, etc. Get there, then hold, is the object. Clearly the Americans on either side of the penetration could just get back (go around, wait for dark perhaps - no mop up).

(7) the night fighting stresses noise discipline, not fire support by light armor etc. It is frankly an afterthought about a secondary normative point (be quieter at night), not related to our subject.

I think the above description partially fits the SPW use I described as coup de main descent. Only partially because they still fight the infantry dismounted, to give the armor "essence of infantry" at the point of attack (clearing the hedgerows, deterring zooks, etc), where a pure coup de main might remain mounted and rely on sheer speed and surprise on the same task.

My problem with it as an example of use of SPWs as fire support in front line fighting is, where is the fighting? I see a description of outgoing recon by fire to support a rapid offensive movement. Perhaps the observer just could not see any defenders or their fire, but there were both, directly in the German's path and at the moments he is describing, not earlier - we don't know. At any rate there is no description of any fire directed back at the tanks, other vehicles, or accompanying infantry.

Maybe that is because there were defenders there, but they were simply suppressed or intimidate by the recon by fire, and got out of the column's way. In that case it would be an example of a meaningful use of SPWs for a form of fire support in front line combat, just doing their job by scaring the enemy rather than hitting him - still counts. Possible, maybe even likely, but we don't know, because the defender description is just too thin to tell.

FWIW...

I don't disagree with your comments - the description of the defence is absent but the suggestion is that some sort of front was penetrated, and I think the point is that the attackers clearly were anticipating the possibility of defence and were using, probably, SPWs, amongst other vehicles, to suppress any response. If there was a defence in fact, or, had there been a defence, the SPWs would have been engaged, rather than tucked away in the rear.

[MikeyD]

The nice thing about CM is this is where doctrine and practice merge. CM is the testing ground. Instead of arguing the game engine is somehow broke if putting tactical theory into practice is getting your men killed, perhaps the fault lies with the theory, or perhaps your interpretation of it on CM scale. Sound tactical reasoning on the division level sort'a falls apart when its just two HTs and a couple platoons on a stretch of dirt road. Part of any large scale tactical doctrine involves bypassing pockets of resistance and reducing them at your liesure. Something we can't afford to do on a 400x400m map with a 'capture' objective.

[dieseltaylor]

(7) the night fighting stresses noise discipline, not fire support by light armor etc. It is frankly an afterthought about a secondary normative point (be quieter at night), not related to our subject.

The Germans were being quiet during the day also according to troops in North Africa contained in US reports. AFAIR it is noted in "Tanks in Tunisia"

[My problem with it as an example of use of SPWs as fire support in front line fighting is, where is the fighting? I see a description of outgoing recon by fire to support a rapid offensive movement. Perhaps the observer just could not see any defenders or their fire, but there were both, directly in the German's path and at the moments he is describing, not earlier - we don't know. At any rate there is no description of any fire directed back at the tanks, other vehicles, or accompanying infantry.

/QUOTE]

Do you at one time work for the tobacco industry? : )

In any event there is an implication that US troops were in the area. We can also REASONABLY assume that in the event that some resistance had occurred the Germans would have used all available firepower from the vehicles. This was textbook usage.

However I am pleased to support your conclusions in the final paragraph

Incidentally if you search the UK Google, and possibly the US, for "St. Denisiere" you can read a small excerpt from one Balkoski's books for an American view on what happened.

[dieseltaylor]

http://ia600701.us.archive.org/6/items/1943-07IntelligenceBulletinVol01No11/1943-07%20Intelligence%20Bulletin%20Vol%2001%20No%2011.pdf

Pages 4-6

In this operation (see fig. 1) the enemy attacked with his infantry and was successful in getting some of his infantry onto A Company's position. In the rear of the position, A Company had half-track vehicles. These were immediately used to launch a counterattack: the .3O-caliber gun mounted on the half-track provided fire, and the track itself was employed to run over the enemy's personnel and his light machine-gun positions. The use of these half-tracks in a counterattack to regain a position proved highly effective.

Obviously this illustrates a US attack. The principle seems the same.

[kensal]

http://ia600701.us.archive.org/6/items/1943-07IntelligenceBulletinVol01No11/1943-07%20Intelligence%20Bulletin%20Vol%2001%20No%2011.pdf

Pages 4-6

Obviously this illustrates a US attack. The principle seems the same.

There is, at page 78 of this bulletin, a discussion about British practices for removing wounded from trees.

...

Is this modelled in the game?

[Merkin Muffley]

There is, at page 78 of this bulletin, a discussion about British practices for removing wounded from trees.

...

Is this modelled in the game?

Presumably place a cup of tea near the trunk and they get down under their own steam.

Thus the phrase - "dropping in for tea".

[Michael Emrys]

Haven't seen you in years, Merkin. Where ya been hiding?

Michael