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Generally speaking, historians seem to frequently allude to a pre-1914 German fear about a vastly superior Russia by 1917. Some themes mentioned are improved strategic RR system that would significantly reduce mobilization of Russian forces into Poland, improvements in artillery, increased number of army divisions, and a larger modern fleet. However, are the possible alternatives of 1917 only about Russia? Has anyone uncovered other programs with Russia or any other combatant's armed forces that might have been developed had hostilities not begun until 1917? I'm interested in general strategic thoughts for an alternate 1917 WWI start.

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It's an interesting concept and I'll keep my eye open for anything relevant.

Changes in personnel at the top might have had the biggest impact, especially if the Russian General Staff and commanders were no longer divided into two competing factions.

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Thanks, Bill. I'm trying to visualize what drove the Germans so crazy with nightmares about Russia in 1917. Norman Stone's excellent book on the war in the east alludes to these fears and excited my curiosity, but I wonder what the second order effects might have been. It seems easy to plus up the Russians and begin the war in the summer of 1917, but would the increase in Russian strength have led to a rethinking of German warplans? Would the emphasis swing back to the east and defense in the west as Moltke the Elder wanted? I haven't found any detailed force projections for Russia, but I'd bet it would have begun a debate in the German General Staff. It may have impacted the Navy's funding plans in order to plus up the Army in order to stick with the Schlieffen Plan. Given the perception of Russian superiority in 1917, there's the possibility of an official break with Italy and a swinging of Ottoman Turkey towards Britain and France since Germany had already been losing prestige in Romania and Greece. I'd like any thoughts I can get before launching down the road with this diversion so I don't get too far off the path of reality.

PP

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Part of the story is that Germans believed the Entente was implementing a strategy of encirclement - it's a psychology that's cropped up a few times in history, especially for revisionist powers who feel excluded and contained by other powers (Russia and Iran at the moment fit the bill). The 'place in the sun' stuff fits has to be taken in that context, as well as the familiar idea that "Germany was excluded because they had to turn up late" idea.

Through the 19th century Russia's legacy of having fought into France in 1814 was also carried with her, and she was seen as a potential threat to all the continental powers because of the sheer size of her army. After all it was Russian forces who led the defeat of Napoleon. I expect that this legacy, as well as the prospect of fighting in the sheer vastness of Russia and the memory of the ill-fated campaign of 1812 influenced German thinking about a war on their eastern border.

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I was wondering the same Peter yesterday about whether German planning would have been significantly different in such a situation.

One book I have been thinking of reading is Terence Zuber's The Real German War Plan 1904-1914. I don't know if anyone on here has read it and could let us know if it offers any insights to this question?

Balkan politics is also an important factor, because both sides had hopes of getting Romania and Bulgaria onto their side. What if one or the other had joined earlier or joined a different side to what it did historically? The passage of three years could have led to such a situation, especially given that Romania did have grievances with Austria-Hungary over the treatment of Romanian's in the Empire's territory.

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Bill, if you haven't yet you should read some reviews about Zuber's book. See one at http://www.warbooksreview.com/war-books-review/2011/02/the-real-german-war-plan-1904-14.html. Zuber is apparently pushing a personal agenda concerning the Schlieffen plan and German war guilt. He believes that the Schlieffen plan is a creation of historians after the war to push blame for defeat on the pre-war general staff, and so German war guilt is not supported in his opinion. Anyway his conclusions are challenged often; however, he's nit making everything up, so just be mindful of the reviews before reading it. It reminds me of Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War and the controversy he stirred up, but I liked that one a lot because of the details he provided on the British cabinet discussions.

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Bill, another book you may be interested in for this period is "Helmuth von Moltke and the origins of the First World War" By Annika Mombauer.

You can read free excerpts at google books:

http://books.google.com/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&pg=PA74&lpg=PA74&dq=helmuth+moltke+two+front+war&source=bl&ots=hbKQCMlBdd&sig=dRVyP3LO9XznfbHjGm2RUPAG8Kg&hl=en&ei=USXzTP7-BMaAlAe_nLDvDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CFUQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q&f=false

She critiques Zuber in footnote 126 at bottom of p74 for confusing terms because technically Schlieffen left a memorandum, not an operational plan per se; however, she asserts that the general staff would have objected to Zuber's assertion since they definitely knew they were implementing Schlieffen's strategy, which was his life's work.

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See a review of Mombauer's book at http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5010847407

Moltke the Younger felt intense pressure for a conflict given increasing French/Russian strength during his tenure. Besides an intense fear of being overtaken by superior enemies, German prestige in Europe was decreasing with time and smaller nations, like Romania, started looking towards the Entenete for their future interests.

Another interesting scenario might be an earlier start to the war soon after Russian defeat in 1905 war with Japan, and thought it might seem too complicated, it would be based on what was available in reality; especially before the start of Russia's Great Program. Anyway, an earlier start means less tinkering with Schlieffen's plan by Moltke.

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Thanks for the information Peter. I am aware of Terence Zuber's controversial status. I first came across him when looking at his book the Myth of Mons.

I find this sort of thing quite interesting, because it's always good to reassess the evidence to see if our assumptions are correct.

I've looked at his book on German war planning on amazon and the good thing is that it does appear to discuss the various ideas, including French war planning, so it might be interesting just to have a more in depth study of war plans. For that reason I'll take a look at Mombauer's book too.

Back to the subject of a war starting in 1917, could it be possible that the Berlin-Baghdad railway could have been much nearer completion by then? If so, then its strategic implications could be quite important in the near east, and at the very least it would make a British campaign in Mesopotamia a rather difficult operation indeed.

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Another aspect is that if the general perception is that Russia is strong enough to defeat Germany then Britain is likely to behave less cordial with the Entente. Perhaps Britain will remain in the neutral camp longer given a potentially significant change to the balance of power. Any crisis involving A-H and Russia may gain British interest against Russia to thwart any possible gains for Russia in the meditteranean. So, a 1917 start may find a neutral Britain that could go either way. Thoughts?

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I've been reading today in James Joll's The Origins of the First World War (3rd edition) about how the UK felt that if they were neutral in a continental conflict involving Russia, then if Russia were on the winning side it was thought that it would make claims on the Persian Gulf, and this would directly affect British interests in the area. This factor made the British unlikely to remain neutral in such a conflict.

The other interesting snippet, is that in 1910 Russia stated that they would like the Berlin-Baghdad railway to be extended to Tehran in Persia, along with a line connecting it to the Baku oilfields. This would have been to enable exports to the Persian Gulf, cutting transport costs, so it would presumably have included a line south from either Baghdad or Tehran to the sea.

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