The (Un)Official Bocage Defense Thread

[LongLeftFlank]

.... aka, how to defend bocage on a shoestring with understrength German infantry units.

The purpose of this thread is to invite contributions and discussion on the best (and preferably, most realistic) way for the Germans to defend large but well compartmented frontages of bocage using small numbers of battered but experienced, well dug-in and well-supported (primarily with mortars) infantry. I am both interested in what was done in the real deal and what works best in the game -- hopefully the two align somewhat.

For argument's sake, I'd say we're talking about using no more than a squad (7-10 landser) to defend a given field of moderate size.

"Defend" defined as being able to bloody and pin down an attacking US platoon (~30 GIs) for about 15-20 minutes -- long enough for (a) the 81mm to range in ( reserves to reinforce the defensive line and maybe even counterattack.

[LongLeftFlank]

So first, some context. In his monograph Michael Doubler gives the following example of a German defensive position defending a large field:

Problem is, this ideal defense commits what, the entire heavy weapons complement for a German Fusilier Kompanie? So what's left over to defend the adjoining fields?* I suppose 300 yards / 275m is a theoretical company frontage. But by late June 1944 the battered and depleted German formations had to spread their forces across much larger frontages -- probably more like 600-1000m per Kompanie

* Let's assume that the fields aren't in a regular "checkerboard" shape as shown here, and so the German dugouts aren't ideally sited to flip around and defend the fields on either side too. You might get some overlap but not perfect.

[LongLeftFlank]

For comparison, here's a captured German sketchmap showing the battalion positions defending the area between La Meauffe and the Le Carillon heights.

This is Kompanie 2, 3 and 4 of the 897 Grenadierregiment (part of KG Kentner of 266th Infantry Division, which after being badly mauled in the wetlands fighting had been tacked onto 352nd ID).

The position hinges on La Petite Ferme (not marked but right by the 3rd Co CP) and the two wings of the "V" are each about 1200 meters. So that's ~400 meters per company.

Excluding the AT guns, each company has about 9 different MG/HMG strongpoints marked. The individual fields aren't shown, but this detail from the famous Le Carillon map (that would be 2nd Co's position on the right E-W flank) shows a little more granularity. Keep in mind that not all these dugouts were occupied, and it's almost definite that the Germans didn't have anything like this many Spandaus to deploy -- seems like they'd be lucky to have a burp gunner instead.

So if the Germans leave a platoon in reserve for each Kompanie, that leaves 400 meters to be covered by 6 squads. So how do they make the most of that?

[LongLeftFlank]

So with those historical data points out of the way, here's my first attempt -- this is the German setup I playtested last night that successfully stymied 2+ US infantry squads on 5 replays.

7 landser total -- a sniper team at the near end (the MP40 was probably about as handy in this small field as the LMG), the FOO team in the middle and an LMG team at the far end. I used that trick someone discovered a while back of placing foxholes and then re-editing the map to place low bocage on top. This gives excellent protection to the defenders while allowing them LOS into the entire field.

[Broadsword56]

Great thread -- keep it coming!

As I understand it, part of this German bocage defense was the timing of their opening fire -- they would wait until the lead US units were about 1/3 of the way into the field, so they'd get pinned and it would be too late/too risky for them to run back to the safety of their starting hedgerow. Using "hide" and short cover arcs on the MGs for the first turn or so would simulate this.

The only problem with that foxhole-in-the-bocage trick in a real game is that the foxholes placed this way are so easily spotted. But maybe that's not really the problem that many people assume it is -- since you say you tested it 5 times under attack from two US infantry squads, and the defense worked every time. So that would suggest it's worth placing foxholes this way, because the defense and LOS benefits outweigh the visibility issue.

Did the US have any mortars or tank support? They would have, in normal circumstances.

I've found that foxholes -- since the last patch -- do an excellent job of cover from small arms and HE when the occupying troops are on "hide" in them. So if the US tried mortaring the MGs, they could just lay low and pop back up, being pretty safe from anything other than a direct hit.

[LongLeftFlank]

Happy New Year, Broadsword. Spending a quiet ( and teetotal) evening at home with the family to see out this holding pattern year.

It's been my experience that all Fortification types get spotted within a minute or two no matter what you do. And even when you give the AI an Ambush within x Order, they tend to Unhide and open up anyway.

In any case, do you have a source for your claim that the Germans let the Americans enter the field (kill sack) before opening up? Would that be a wise choice if the Yanks also had lots of shooters including SW and arty observers lined up in overwatch behind the hedgerow?

And that puts me in mind of something else; seems to me it's a little too easy for guys to line up behind and shoot through a high hedgerow, or at least it seems like their spotting should be impaired some. I get that guys can worm and hack mouseholes in the bush but the fields of fire would be limited especially with Kraut snipers or burp guns opposite. Hence the importance in the game of having the German mortars incoming within about 10-12min, or else the Yanks simply sit there and shoot Jerry out of his holes.

I can certainly see the sense in the MG holding fire until the Amis attack through the gap

[LongLeftFlank]

Oh, and I should also note a simple but significant math error above on my La Meauffe example: the total battalion frontage is ~2.4km, which is a whopping 800 meters per Kompanie! So 6 frontline squads averaging 7-8 effectives need to cover 130m each! Which may well include more than one field.

I'd guess that under these constraints not every field was "fully" defended by a squad or MG team even if positions had been prepared; some were mined and wired; others would have a single sniper in watch whose job was to hold up the Amis and summon reinforcements / mortars.

[LongLeftFlank]

Did the US have any mortars or tank support? They would have, in normal circumstances.

Doubler goes into that in a lot of detail as you doubtless know -- his thesis is that "busting the bocage" was mainly a matter of refining armour-infantry cooperation, which I don't entirely buy. At the end of the day, to paraphrase Wellington, it was about "that article there" -- the infantry. I'd also add a point Doubler doesn't stress enough IMHO, that the actual track record of armour support in bocage depends heavily on the specific terrain and conditions, and above all on the proximity of roads. This from the Green Book:

The tanks are no better off. They have two choices. They can go down the roads, which in this case were just mud lanes, often too narrow for a tank, often sunk four to six feet below the adjacent banks, and generally deep in mud. The Class 4 roads were decent in spots, but only for one-way traffic, with few exits to the adjacent fields.

Here too are some instructive quotes regarding effectiveness of armour support for the 137th during the Le Carillon attacks of July 11-18, which took place in rain and mud in dense hedgerow country cut by (unfordable) irrigation ditches and streams.

First a summary pamphlet whose accuracy is questionable -- the writer was some WWI vintage PR officer and I doubt he was a participant in the fighting, even rear-echelon:

Yankee ingenuity began to assert itself early as Americans became battlewise. One method used very effectively in negotiating the German Hedgerow was to place a tank destroyer behind the hedgerow and fire point-blank into the machine gun positions of the enemy, ordinarily in the corners of the field ahead. As this was being done, the infantry moved across the field and encircled the enemy positions. Then when the tank destroyer lifted its fire, the infantry liquidated the already battered machine gun nest.

That probably happened in hedgerows adjoining Route 3, the main road along the Vire.

And in sharp contrast, Buckley's The Normandy campaign 1944: sixty years on. 2/137 actually stormed the main German defenses at Le Mare-Le Carillon. That ground was marshy and broken and the approach roads were narrow and heavily mined.

On 11 and 12 July the 35th Division assaulted a most elaborate defensive position at Le Carillon. The 2/137 found the armoured support provided entirely ineffective. The tank destroyers were wrecked by mines and mortars, and of four tanks sent in, one was blown up on a mine and two became bogged in the mud. These misadventures reflect the German policy of always separating enemy armour from infantry where they could do so.

Now this thread is primarily concerned with the German defense, so I suppose the best counter is to expect that defenders in fields bordering roads will come under tank fire. So mine and shell those roads and cover them with AT guns if possible. But also have fallback positions dug out in the adjacent fields farther back from the road. I suppose I'd also heavily mine those vulnerable bordering fields. Counterattacking with tank-killer teams is risky given the US infantry.

[LongLeftFlank]

The German foxholes had been cleverly dug. Using every advantage of the hedgerow they had tunneled and bored into them from all angles so that only a direct hit from artillery could dislodge them. They were deadly elaborate in every respect. Abandoned machine guns had strings attached to the trigger so they could be fired at intervals without exposing the gunner.

Dugouts were constructed by tunneling under the hedgerow, and the entrance was covered with layers of hugs poles and dirt. The dugouts were equipped with mattresses and cooking utensils. These had been pillaged from French homes. Many of the trees were equipped with a ladder leading to a "crows nest" that was neatly camouflaged in the top of the tree for observation and sniping.

Every conceivable angle had been taken into consideration. How many more of these honeycombed hedgerows lay ahead only the Germans knew. Attacking such ingenious positions seemed futile..... Each foxhole had been dug very deep along the hedgerow, and as an extra caution, some men had tunneled back into the sides in order to avoid the shower of deadly steel shrapnel coming from tree bursts.

I am going to revise my test assault a bit to give the Yanks some artillery support and the third rifle squad (the full platoon), but swap a "sunken" German HMG bunker for the entrenched LMG.

[LongLeftFlank]

Seems to me it's a little too easy for guys to line up behind and shoot through a high hedgerow, or at least it seems like their spotting should be impaired some. I get that guys can worm and hack mouseholes in the bush but the fields of fire would be limited especially with Kraut snipers or burp guns opposite.

OK, call me a crazy old buggah, sitting here on New Years eve having a nice conversation with myself. I killed plenty of brain cells back in the day, and have no more to spare now

Here's some further corroboration that for the GIs, breasting the top of a hedgerow bank, clearing an aperture and putting a bunch of weapons on the Germans on the opposite side was anything but a straightforward matter in the real deal, unlike CMBN.

Green Books:

Usually we could not get through the hedge without hacking a way through. This of course took time, and a German machine gun can fire a lot of rounds in a very short time. Sometimes the hedges themselves were not thick. But it still took time for the infantryman to climb up the bank and scramble over, during which time he was a luscious target, and when he got over the Germans knew exactly where he was....

It was difficult to gain fire superiority when it was most needed. In the first place machine guns were almost useless in the attack.... the only way to get them in position was to set them up on top of a hedgerow bank. That was not good because the German was in the next bank and got you before you set the gun down. Anyway, it had to be laid on the bank, no tripod, just a gun barrel lying unevenly on its stomach. On the other hand the Germans could dig their guns into the banks in advance, camouflage them, and be all set to cover the roads, trails, and other bottlenecks our men had to use.

Excerpts by a monograph by the S-3 of 3/137.

The machine gun platoons following Companies I and K were of little use in this initial action mainly because of their bulk and high silhouette when mounted atop the hedgerows. The Heavy Weapons Commander decided to abandon the heavy mounts and use the guns laid across the tops of the embankments or thrust through the hedge. This proved to be successsful but costly in crews, in that whenever a gun was pushed through the brush and fired, a well-aimed burst came back, and in a few minutes a barrage of mortars would descend on the area.

The [mortar] observers in the hedgerows became casualties in attempting to spot targets....

The failure of great numbers of individual riflemen to fire at targets, target areas or likely targets (all hedgerows presented likely targets) resulted in a greater volume of enemy small arms fire and observed mortar and artillery fire than would have been possible had all riflemen fired constantly as they advanced. Well aimed and distributed small arms fire on a position will prevent the enemy from returning fire. To bring out this point, all one has to do is point to the effectiveness of the Germans' hated and respected "BURP" gun, one blast across a hedgerow was all that was needed to gain fire superiority and thereafter easily maintained.

Green book again:

The Germans, being on the defensive, profited by these minor items of the terrain. They could dig in, site their weapons to cover the approaches, and prepare tunnels and other covered exits for themselves. Then when our men appeared, laboriously working their way forward, the Germans could knock off the first one or two, cause the others to duck down behind the bank, and then call for his own mortar support. The German mortars were very, very efficient. By the time our men were ready to go after him, the German and his men and guns had obligingly retired to the next stop. If our men had rushed him instead of ducking down behind the bank, his machine gun or machine pistol would knock a number off. For our infantrymen, it was what you might call in baseball parlance, a fielder's choice. No man was very enthusiastic about it. But back in the dugout I have often heard the remark in tones of contempt and anger: "Why don't they get up and go?"

German counterattacks in the hedgerows failed largely for the same reasons our own advance was slowed. Any attack quickly loses its momentum, and then because of our artillery and fighter bombers the Germans would suffer disastrous loss. In fact we found that generally the best way to beat the Germans was to get them to counterattack- provided we had prepared to meet them.

[Broadsword56]

Here's one reference to the German tactic of waiting to open fire, although I recall reading it other places too...

GERMAN TACTICS AND ADVANTAGES

One particularly favorite German tactic was to drive an armored vehicle, such as a tank, “in front of the line, to draw fire so as to locate the enemy’s position” [Citizen Soldiers 61]. Another tactic used by the Germans was letting the allies come forward and cross the hedge, and then shoot them dead. “The Germans also pre-sited mortars and artillery on the single gaps that provided the only entrances into the fields. Behind the hedgerows, they dug rifle pits and tunneled openings for machine-gun positions in each corner” [The Victors 191].

Abrose, Steven, The Victors. Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II. New York City: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1998. 188-219.

[Broadsword56]

How are you doing the "sunken" MG bunker? Do you lock some lower elevation cells for it, or just place it normally and then put bocage over it?

The "bunker bug" in CMBN makes true bocage defenses problematic, unfortunately, because since troops get stuck in them I avoid using them at all -- even when they would have existed historically.

Have you played around at all with shell craters around bocage? I've found they depress the terrain in interesting and useful ways -- especially around the corners of buildings and ruins, where they can create almost a dugout semi-basement fighting position.

[Broadsword56]

On armor's role against bocage defenses: The Germans, on all my historical maps so far, have easily been able to prevent US forces from rolling tanks or TDs right up to the far hedgerow and laying down preliminary suppresive fire. That's because the authentic field sizes are almost always within the effective range of German 'fausts and 'schrecks. And the bocage berm in CMBN doesn't seem to give tanks much -- if any -- defensive benefit against those. So without armor to prepare the way, and with no way to get LOF for an American MMG or HMG behind a hedgerow (due to the short tripod), how do the Americans achieve the fire superiority the need in order to maneuver and advance?

Artillery and smoke are about the only things left.

[LongLeftFlank]

So without armor to prepare the way, and with no way to get LOF for an American MMG or HMG behind a hedgerow (due to the short tripod), how do the Americans achieve the fire superiority the need in order to maneuver and advance?

Artillery and smoke are about the only things left.

And that, mein freunde, is the central historical question I hope to shed some light on with this project!

Part of the answer unquestionably lies in bringing armour support to bear wherever possible, in close cooperation with infantry, using hedgerow cutters, demolitions, etc. -- the Doubler thesis.

Smart, flexible and efficient American use of artillery -- especially 60mm and 81mm mortars controlled at battalion level and below -- is probably another important piece of the solution. Tactical fire support seems to be an area where green US forces were initially very weak for a number of reasons but improved very rapidly during July. Once the MLR has been established, rain nonstop hell on it, on its supply and approach routes and above all, counterbattery fire on the German artillery positions. Unlimited ammo has a corrosive quality all its own, even in the bocage.

The last, and most important part, of course, is probably just plain old willingness of the PBI (or Bradley and his Corps commanders Corlett and Collins) to shed American blood, and keep shedding it. A well entrenched German squad backed by mortars can indeed probably stop a platoon cold for several hours, but what about two platoons? a whole company?

After a few days getting hammered in front of Le Petite Ferme and Le Carillon, 2/137 organized small assault detachments of 4 proven killers armed with tommy guns and grenade throwers who used infiltration tactics (those muddy ditches, draws and treelines again!) to flank and close assault the undermanned German positions. 60mm mortars and MGs were attached at platoon level and put right up in the front to ensure suppressive fires would be both accurate and effective, in spite of the high casualty rates that resulted.

I'll requote JasonC's 2005 magisterial observations on the brutal arithmetic of the July hedgerow fighting, as they are as good a summation as I've read anywhere on the topic.

The pre-breakout Normandy campaign is another textbook example of attrition warfare. Half a dozen German infantry divisions assigned to the area were devoured by two US corps in nasty attrition fighting, within 2 weeks.

In June the US is just going after Cherbourg. July they turn south.... Between July 11 and July 25, they chew through the whole German defense. They lose 300 men per division per day doing it, and they fire off a million and a half rounds of heavy arty (plus mortars, tanks, etc). But the Germans are the ones that run out of infantrymen. When the front is so thin the battalions are the size of platoons, several US divisions attacking at once still take two days to pick their way across the carpet bombed moonscape. But there is nothing adequate left to stop them....

It happens by battalion after battalion on day after day following this drill: One company in reserve. One company probes. One company support by fire from the start line. Reserve relieves probe company and defends anything taken, if anything is taken. Nibble. Nibble.

No serious threat in that at all, except it takes place under the barrage. 6 US IDs on on-line, with 2 corps artillery groups. That is roughly 300 105s and 200 155s firing every day, on *observed* targets, on *manned, forward* defenses.

The Germans go into crisis management mode within days of the start of the US July offensive. They send division after division into the front - some from the Brit sector, most off the march from Brittany etc as they arrive. They arrive and get thrown in and a few days later cadres are left. Lehr has 10 infantry battalions subordinate by then, and still can't man a line they are all so weak. Divisions report trench strengths of 700 men.... They had to fight off probe after probe, and every time they did so they got another helping of directed arty.

The Germans have a defensive doctrine of defense in depth, dug in MGs and registered arty, and instant counterattack. They are tigers at it. It is meant to defeat immediate breakthrough, to screen the front with modest forces (not thick arty targets) when things are quiet, and to intimidate the heck out of attackers. You are supposed to stick your fingers in there once or twice, get burned, get intimidated, and back off. The Germans have to pay a bit for each of those intimidations. But they pay, and if you back off then they stop paying any more.

The German defenses in Normandy did not need to defend every field, and in practice did not. You put a strong point in this field, and mines in that one, register arty on a third. You make a checkerboard of such positions several kilometers deep, and sortie to counterattack as isolated bits of the attacking infantry get into the defense. As a result, artillery shot into the whole area will hit empty fields a lot of the time.

In more open terrain, the same defense scheme would be readily penetrated. The enemy would rapidly detect the gaps. In the hedgerows, your dispositions are a complete mystery, everything beyond 200m is a complete guess. The defense gets away with an uneven concentration across its front.

When the GIs would climb through a hedgerow into a field, they would come under fire from German MGs hidden in the opposite hedgerow and hit the ground. Once the MGs had fixed them, mortar rounds would begin dropping on them. The longer they stayed down, the more casualties they took. Even though standing up made them more vulnerable to both mortars and MGs, it was found to be better to either withdraw back to cover or advance and capture the enemy position. The worst option of all was simply to lie there and die.

Well the US in Normandy just refused to be intimidated by it....When the line is thinned, held by OPs, company sized probes drive in the OPs. They take ground, sometimes hurt the OPs as well. That triggers doctrinal instant [German] counterattacks. Which may well succeed - like as not. But even when they do, they put the counterattackers on a known bit of ground out of their deep shelters and in contact. The place they take back blows up.

An active, aggressively counterattacking defense in depth makes very high demands on the defenders, if it is actually expected to operate daily. If it only has to work 2-3 times and the other guy gets the message and backs off, that is one thing. But if the defenders are expect to operate it every day against a superior force for weeks, they take losses. If they are very good at it, maybe they inflict even higher losses on the attackers. But they *will* bleed. And rapidly. That is what happened to the Germans opposite the US sector in July. And they flat ran out.

[LongLeftFlank]

One question I don't have any answer at all to yet: what would be the typical scale of German counterattacks, and with what forces?

If I Battalion 897th Grenadierregiment, already badly understrength, is stretched paper thin as noted above with all 3 companies on the line and battered squads and weapons teams holding 130m field frontages, then what's not sitting in the line already -- call it a reserve platoon (Zug) per Kompanie -- might be enough to scramble out to reinforce the attacked sectors and stop the American advance. But even if you have the entire platoon, this seems far too meager to mount a vigorous counterattack even against badly bloodied and exhausted GIs.

Would the counterattacking forces be drawn from a reserve battalion of the regiment or KG? If so, once the counterattack was completed, would these units then remain in the line to hold the gains, or swap places with the frontline unit? Bueller? Anyone?