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FancyCat

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Everything posted by FancyCat

  1. How do we mesh with the need for infantry to take measures that might leave it vulnerable once contact is established and the need for states to preserve manpower due to political and societal concerns? Sure, toss in tons of infantry, some will get through, but clearly Ukraine cannot for a variety of reasons just equip their manpower with ATGMs and throw them at Russia else this war might have have been different. Note, that Ukraine has relied heavily upon deeply entrenched personnel and fortifications in defending the Donbas and it looks like it worked out well enough.
  2. Recall that the proposals for avoiding the invasion, floated by France and Germany at least were to declare Ukraine off limits to NATO membership. Now I'm not opposed to the idea, I think it was worthwhile in the name of peace, but it has been clearly and consistently established NATO will not intervene in Ukraine. Instead of a scenario preinvasion where NATO underlined to Russia that invasion of Ukraine would result in NATO forces annihilating Russian forces in Ukraine, and taking a proactive stance of saying "Ukraine is off limits" the West took the stance of "Ukraine will not be defended by Western blood". To expect Ukraine and Ukrainians to accept a piece of paper saying "we will defend you now your country is in ruins, when you join NATO and EU assuming you meet all the requirements and all memberstates approve, just agree to this ceasefire which will let Russia restrengthen, and oh, if you don't, the aid for your country dries up" is not going to lead to Ukraine becoming this mecca of Europe, if it just agrees to lop off a arm. Lop off the arm, Ukraine just becomes a wounded animal, left for dead, reliant on aid from a alliance that has repeatedly announced it will not shed blood for it. Ukrainians won't trust it, Russians will be assured of their dominance in Europe, and the West will be forced to handle a concurrent refugee crisis and economic disaster while Russia gets to rearm on the sidelines while prodding and keeping Ukraine from economically recovering.
  3. I can't think of a better way to empower extremist elements in Ukrainian society than the West throwing up it's arms and allowing Russia to hold control over some part of Ukraine. It is extremely unlikely that Ukraine will be able to join the EU or NATO without regaining full territorial control over its de jure borders. (You can shout about the collapse of The Russian conventional power, but the nuclear power still drives headlines and worldwide attention) It's extremely unlikely Ukrainian society would accept being forced to rewrite the de jure borders to pave the way for EU or NATO membership without at the very least, the strongest of guarantees to enter, which again unlikely to occur. Without EU or NATO membership, Ukraine remains extremely vulnerable to Russian forces, and being constrained by the West means some sort of military and civilian aid withdrawal, leaving it severely in trouble in the future. Russia clearly, clearly isn't out of the war, and the elements of Russian society affected so far have refused to rise up and seek a change in course. Relying on them to suddenly change course and force Russia to reconcile with the West looks to be foolish. China has decided to stay away from supporting Russia, probably cause it finds the West and it's relations to be more useful and the West's newfound resilience has it worried for associating too closely with Russia, leaving Ukraine unable to recover economically and politically will not reinforce that view. (And yes, international capital will not reinvest in Ukraine without EU or NATO membership or the restoration of it's territory at least)
  4. I appreciate the willingness of the IAEA to act like human shields and prevent funny business by Russia at any nuclear plants. A good step towards pushing international oversight of nuclear facilities during hostilities.
  5. So...assuming if true, I would rate it more likely Ukraine is marshalling reserves and waiting for Russian forces to be completely exhausted, if this isn't propaganda, before launching further offensives. Makes sense, if Russia is intent on offensive operations cause the Kremlin has lost their mind, why launch a offensive and force them into defensive actions that allow them to conserve resources vs bashing their head on Ukrainian defenses.
  6. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-debt-freeze-western-creditors/ As it stands, the country is at risk the longer the war goes on, of entering territory of astronomical debt and loans that will deplete any relief or aid given unless agreements are struck to relieve Ukraine of this burden. Note, the Marshall Plan consisted of 80% grants and the rest loans. Ukraine is paying blood for the protection of Europe and the vanquishing of our foe, the least we can do is military and civilian aid, but in order to ensure a stable, postwar state that will be the vanguard of NATO's eastern flank, ensuring it can stand without being crippled with debt is essential for security of Europe.
  7. Debt forgiveness for Ukraine. Keep the country from going under postwar once the aid dries up, which it will and make it easier for post war aid to not be turned into debt servicing payments. Edit: changed relief to forgiveness to underline the debt must be cleared by the debt holders.
  8. Not surprising but very sad and bad for Ukraine.
  9. A reminder Russia has little regard for International Humanitarian Law.
  10. A nitpick, the U.S confirmed personnel monitoring weapon shipments are in Ukraine.
  11. I'm unsure we can afford to think on short term sustainment only. I think the chances of Russia being knocked out in the short term are dimming, both from a sustainment politically and militarily.
  12. I'm referring to Belarusian manpower as well on the front lines. A reminder about how unreliable the MoD is.
  13. Forcing Belarus to enter the war and invade Ukraine is definitely a option below nuclear escalation. Is it stupid? Yes, extremely so but still a option.
  14. Hey, maybe Germany might announce it once the 2nd mobilization is announced. Also, good point noted here, Russia is showing no sign of de-escalation or diplomatic overtures or anything to even hit Scholz on for "gunning ahead" and threatening Russia.
  15. https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-germany-us-battle-tanks-ukraine-war/ I want to emphasize the contrast between Merkel and Scholz by bringing up Merkel's response to the refugee crisis, and then compare it to Macron's response. https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2021/sep/21/refugee-crisis-two-myths-angela-merkel Macron, heavily criticized for being partial to Putin and Russia, nethertheless is able to make improvements with standings with Ukraine with concrete actions, the past is forgiven, the actions of the present outweigh the past. Frustrating to see Macron improve but not Germany. Merkel's record on the refugee crisis is deeply mixed, but her speech was effective in casting a positive image of the idea Germany invited refugees to it, despite the record being quite mixed.
  16. I'm interested in how western equipment fares vs Soviet equipment in survivability. I've seen western MRAPs be praised by Ukrainians for keeping their crews alive. We know reports have come in stating Ukraine has lost lots of veterans in the summer dealing with Russian artillery superiority. The earlier we could have sent more heavy equipment, the easier it would protect Ukrainian soldiers. But definitely this depends on how the stuff fares vs what Ukraine has and so far I haven't seen any data to suggest Soviet and western are on par, only hearsay and anadotes largely praising western equipment.
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