NamEndedAllen
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Posts posted by NamEndedAllen
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15 hours ago, JonS said:
Roosevelt directed his unconditional surrender demand at all three Axis powers in Jan '43, then promptly ignored it 9 months later when Italy surrendered, then it was ignored again 2 years after that when Japan surrendered. Unconditional surrender was never a pristine rose that was utterly inviolate.
I understand that Japan did formally surrender unconditionally, aboard the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945.
” the emperor, who ordered the unconditional surrender of Japan’s armed forces.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/13/vj-day-the-dangerous-illusion-of-japans-unconditional-surrender/
Although notice of unconditional surrender was given on August 10, the day after Nagasaki was destroyed. Japan agreed to the Potsdam Conference terms for unconditional surrender. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/japan-accepts-potsdam-terms-agrees-to-unconditional-surrender
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2 hours ago, billbindc said:
While surely irritating, this sort of squabbling and second guessing is both entirely normal in a large cooperative military effort and likely has little effect on the outcome. There are a lot of interests, a lot of money and a lot of people involved. It is only to be expected that some take their gripes to the media.
And the actual people in power weigh in:
Agreed. I have to say i must be out of touch though, because I thought the strategy HAS been to cut the landbridge. could these remarks somehow be several weeks out of date? Although the allocation of units themselves could reasonably be a matter of contention:
Ukraine’s grinding counteroffensive has struggled to break through entrenched Russian defenses in large part because it has too many troops, including some of its best combat units, in the wrong places, according to several American officials.
Ukrainian commanders have divided their troops roughly equally between the east and the south rather than centering firepower to sever the so-called land bridge between Russia and the occupied Crimean Peninsula — the stated goal of the offensive.
In a video teleconference this month, top Western military officials urged Ukraine’s most senior military commander, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, to focus on one main front. According to two officials briefed on the call, General Zaluzhnyi agreed. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/22/us/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-war.html
AHHH, Haiduck beat me to the quote. I’m just catching up chronologically.
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Detailed update from Sarcastosaurus. Depending upon accuracy, quite positive on balance. (It’s Tom Cooper)
https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-14-august-2023
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2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
I don't know what this is all about. There is no risk of a Russian breakthrough anywhere. The fighting in the Kupyansk area has been constant since the front solidified and the supposed big offensive the Russians launched has already demonstrably failed. The lines have largely remained static, with Russia making and losing small gains pretty regularly. Plus, when was the last time the Russians were able to exploit any sort of advance into something more than a crawl? More than a year ago.
Steve
Certainly not a breakthrough! But they do seem to be making gains towards Kupiansk. Or do you recall that the Russkies have been this close earlier this summer? I had the impression they had been slowly grinding out gains there. Despite periodic counterattacks. You and Haiduk would have a better grasp of this.
As Russia presses the main thrust of its offensive in Kharkiv Oblast closer to the city of Kupiansk, officials there are planning a mandatory civilian evacuation. Ukrainian military officials say Russian troops are now less than five miles from the city. It's a situation that, if unchecked, could impact Kyiv's ongoing counteroffensive…The evacuation plans in Kupiansk are being drawn up as the Ukrainian military says the main thrust of the Russian offensive in the region is pushing toward the city.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-kharkiv-oblast-city-planning-evacuation-as-russians-approach -
Good news!
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-m1a1-abrams-tanks-approved-for-shipment
The first batch of Abrams tanks that the U.S. is providing to Ukraine was approved for shipment over the weekend, and the tanks remain on track to arrive in Ukraine by early Fall, Army Acquisition Chief Doug Bush told reporters on Monday."The last of the set was officially accepted by the U.S. government or the production facility over the weekend. So they are done," said Bush. The 31 Abrams tanks destined for Ukraine - older M1A1 variants - had been undergoing refurbishment and preparation for shipment for months.
Though the tanks are ready, they still have to be shipped overseas and sent to Ukraine, "along with all of the things that go with them - ammunition, spare parts, fuel equipment, repair facilities," Bush said. "So it's not just the tanks."
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Damaging without a doubt.
In the fall of 2020, the National Security Agency made an alarming discovery: Chinese military hackers had compromised classified defense networks of the United States’ most important strategic ally in East Asia. Cyberspies from the People’s Liberation Army had wormed their way into Japan’s most sensitive computer systems
The hackers had deep, persistent access and appeared to be after anything they could get their hands on — plans, capabilities, assessments of military shortcomings, according to three former senior U.S. officials, who were among a dozen current and former U.S. and Japanese officials interviewed, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.
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2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
Oh for sure that's not a good sign of regime stability. It's pretty clear that the intention is to give governors, who for the most part are Putin's lapdogs, lethally armed thugs under their direct control. When a repressive regime feels the need to create yet another parallel armed organization, it's clearly a response to a lack of confidence that the other armed organizations will remain loyal to Putin specifically.
This is now the 5th official armed organization within Russian territory, not counting PMCs. There's the MoD's regular military forces, MVD (regular police), FSB, and Rosgvardiya. In theory they all have individually defined roles, but since this is a totalitarian state there is a lot of blurry lines by design and through natural outcomes.
Steve
In the event of the breakdown of central authority control across Russia, this proliferation of armed organizations would magnify opportunities for one or more of them to seize control of nuclear weapon facilities. An emerging warlord/governor could devise blackmail strategies to suppress rivals around Russia and secure their allegiance. Until another warlord succeeds in seizing nukes in their territory. Or simply looting the material for sale to highest bidders around the world. I imagine this is a low probability scenario right now. But the idea behind it cannot be entirely absent from at least some Russian entities…mafiosi…plenty of players and wannabes. Especially after the near coup or whatever it was.
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Another angle on staff training for command at the battalion and brigade levels, let alone divisional and corps or army. Apart from classrooms…it’s expensive! Or impossible. That’s in part why I think The_Capt was talking about NATO training being at the small unit level. Time, space, opportunity…not to mention money and technical means. I doubt the public has ever given a moment’s thought to how the heck do you train a person, a group of persons to actually command an army in combat? Literally.
WHERE can you train a corps size exercise, one opposed by another corps or at lest division or multiple brigades?
How do you coordinate or can even permit the assembly of such huge forces?
How often is enough? How often would even be possible?
How can you pay for the sheer scale of these exercises?
I think we realize all that, here. But they don’t at most newsrooms and many “think tanks”. Rotating through the NTC is a rare privilege, requiring not only all the above, but the standing up of the OPFOR refy to “teach” the incoming units some lessons. Gaming exercises have always been a feature of command training etc, because…it’s a lot easier and accessible. But does it stand for field exercises? Of course not. And do field exercises with all the rules, the referees and mostly (but not always) lack of live ammunition capture combat? Actual casualties and all the rest? Of course not. So how could we expect the Ukranians to have mastered the art at the first time or two?
The Allies can provide all the matériel they have, offer training outside the country, provide ISR, and moral support. And the Ukranians can provide the courage, the grit, the intelligence, the fortitude…all of it. But these sorts of large scale operations take all that, plus experience. If learning comes in large part from making mistakes, well then…
in a way, I can’t blame the bulk of the public for misunderstanding what militaries face in these regards. Let alone what Ukraine is facing, enduring right now. Very few alive really have a clue, especially given how thin on the ground veterans are. Here, we really need to resist the wailing and gnashing of teeth when reality doesn’t resemble Hollywood movies.
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2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
We do not have the experience of this war, beyond support, and so they are the ones that are collecting the lessons learned etc and translating into training.
Yes, agreed entirely. My own post and point was about Ukraine’s training and experience for large scale ops - not the West having pre-digested magic or whatever. Rather what you are saying. No magic answers, only the cycle of learning by experience, filtering back to commands, then back into the field…again and again. Historically, that’s how I understand the higher commands in past large scale wars had to achieve reliable skills in coordinating divisions, corps, armies, and army groups. And these skills are easily lost when those who learned them as teams are gone, generations without experience pass. My understanding will fall short of yours, but I think we are on the same page.
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On 7/21/2023 at 6:35 PM, The_Capt said:
I do not believe that it is a case of both the RA and UA lacking “training” because there is no training for this. Experience can only be earned over time but the UA currently has the market on contemporary conventional warfare experience, not us.
Which is why I said *both* experience and training! I think we are agreeing here about the inestimable value of experience for learning.
“Furthermore, training and experience in these doctrines at the higher command levels cannot conceivably be thick and varied. Even for WWII nations at war, it took hard experience and much time for each of the higher level command staffs to excel in the reality of combat.”
We ought not to expect miracles in relatively short time frames. And I don’t believe you are suggesting simply ignoring initial training for how to coordinate large or small operations. Both are all of a piece, along a spectrum of scale. At the scale of what is being attempted now in Ukraine, very hard, bloody experience is the teacher. Presumably, that hard-earned experience is being digested and fed back into the relevant command structures in Ukraine’s military and elsewhere: “learning.” With any luck, this is a virtuous circle.
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4 hours ago, JonS said:
The Ukrainians don’t have those competent and experienced higher level (bn, bde, and whatever they have above bde) staffs yet. Or, they do, but unevenly. This is equivalent to the position the US found themselves in at Kasserine, or the British during CRUSADER. They will get better (and are!), but it takes time, and there’s no shortcut or magic wand or uber-weapon-du-jour that will make the experiential shortfall just go away.
Ahhh…you said it better than I did! Just too early to be drawing too many conclusions about this level of command?
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12 hours ago, The_Capt said:
So to my mind either two completely separate militaries coming at the problem have both mystically failed to grasp and execute the essentials of combined arms.
We could also consider the simple fact of training in both militaries. For the Ukrainian side, we know that unit training has been compressed and truncated both within Ukraine and often at the various NATO host countries. Furthermore, training and experience in these doctrines at the higher command levels cannot conceivably be thick and varied. Even for WWII nations at war, it took hard experience and much time for each of the higher level command staffs to excel in the reality of combat. Whatever flavor - operational art, doctrines of combined arms, Air/Land/Sea - it would seem premature to draw ultimate conclusions, while Ukraine is at such an early and rushed stage.
Russia? The forum has been filled with harsh judgments about every level of organization and command, for almost every military facet. Logistics, intelligence, planning, leadership, corruption, morale…Difficult to use Russia’s performance to date as a standard by which to judge the current best contemporary doctrines and thought at the Western War Colleges.
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Indepth article from a group of military analysts who spent time recently on the front lines. Quite specific takeaways from the larger article are below, in case you don’t want to read the full piece. Perhaps not as optimistic in tone as many posts, but good grist for the mill:
Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow with the Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Center for New American Security, says after his visit to Ukraine it's clear the country is struggling with how to employ its forces.…Gady visited Ukraine with a group including Konrad Muzyka, an independent defense analyst focusing on Russia and Belarus and director of Rochan Consulting; Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Michael Kofman, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment and Principal Research Scientist, CNA.
1.) By and large this is an infantryman’s fight (squad, platoon and company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications.
1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility.
2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc.
2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense and IMO [in my opinion] is the main cause for slow progress.
3.) Ukrainian forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver.
4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space and slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is Ukraine's inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe.
5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses. Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks and months.
6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2 [command and control]/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR [information, surveillance, reconnaissance] coverage.
Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks. There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind regarding any potential tactical impact of delivery of ATACMs [U.S.-produced Army Tactical Missile System]).
Russian forces, even if severely degraded and lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated and synchronized along the broader frontline.
7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine.
8.) Russian artillery rationing is real and happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses.
9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration.
Ukraine will have to better synchronize and adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tactically decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the Ukrainians IMO).
10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed and will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire and maneuver at scale.
Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime.
Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st Russian minefield.
11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines.
12.) So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks.
13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying and tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian command and control.
14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent and morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied and older men called up for service now.
15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal and is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting and exercising command on the frontline.
16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition and hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains. But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination between units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. ... and Russians putting up stiff resistance.
We asked Gady to drill a little deeper into a couple of the points he made.
On Tuesday, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley told reporters that the U.S. and allies have trained 17 brigade combat teams - 63,000 Ukrainian troops - in combined arms maneuver. More are in the pipeline.
But Ukraine is having trouble on the battlefield executing those coordinated maneuvers on a large scale because of the compressed training timelines while facing off against “one of the world’s most powerful militaries,” Gady told us.
Ukraine “is probably doing a lot of combined arms operations at smaller-unit levels, but I think it needs to scale this up,” he said.
The U.S. is "probably expecting some sort of results with all the aid and the military hardware that it has provided," said Gady. "The basic idea here was to train Western-equipped mechanized arms brigades in combined arms maneuver. I think this approach has had some setbacks. I'm not sure that it has been a failure across the board. I think it just requires a more concerted effort."
Gady however was quick to emphasize that “no Western type of military can really do this sort of combined arms operations at scale, with the exception of the United States. But even the United States Armed Forces would have a very difficult time breaking through these defensive layers because no Western military in the world currently has any experience in breaching the types of defenses in depth that the Russians put up, in the south and east of Ukraine.”
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1 hour ago, kevinkin said:
Over at War Zone this afternoon:
Prig de-fanged?
Just posted this above, 2 hours ago. Carolus replied that the “unused” weapon systems may not amount to a significant amount, although individually still potentially lethal. His point about crews though might not be on point considering that any Wagners may well have accepted the order to fold into the MOD forces.
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Unexpected resupply of weapons for the Russkies?
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In the latest example of 'unconventional' improvised Ukrainian weapons, we now have video of the contraption made of half a dozen AK-74 assault rifles in action. This follows footage released two days ago which showed the same weapon, but did not depict it firing. It is now one of a variety of improvised small arms solutions — some more relevant than others — that have been pressed into service as counter-drone weapons by Ukrainian forces.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/watch-six-ak-74s-strapped-together-as-a-ukrainian-anti-drone-gun-in-action -
Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile that was donated by the United Kingdom to Ukraine has reportedly fallen into Russian hands in a partially intact state.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/crashed-storm-shadow-missile-falls-into-russian-hands -
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6 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:
There was F-16 pilot funding passed 6 months ago. The government chose newer to use it
Never happened. Only the House passed it, or tried to. Never came up in the Senate. So, no money, and no further action on it.
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As part of an unholy deal promised elsewhere in the forum, I bought the bundle on Day One. Now I only lack CMA and CMFI. Likely not for long!
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10 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:
Now it has been revealed that the real puppet masters are really in Ukraine and the United States government are really the puppets.
No no no! Fake news!! Great Britain is the REAL puppet master. And they are of course giant lizards disguised by alien tech. Everyone knows that.
https://www.express.co.uk/news/weird/768800/David-Icke-queen-shape-shifting-lizard -
1 minute ago, benpark said:
Of course! The original. Over-engineered, for engineering.
I'm just surprised in view of the extensive use of mines across the planet *since* WWII and their danger to successive generations, that at least SOME advancement of this tech might have been tested and deployed where needed in and by some of the various countries and conflict zones. In the past 80 years or so.
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12 hours ago, benpark said:
This remote deminer is the only thing I've found that looks beyond a prototype, which could be in some form of production beyond what is seen in the attached press images:
https://www.military.com/equipment/m160-remote-controlled-mine-clearance-system
Far from being a new concept, remote controlled de-mining vehicles were designed and widely use last century. While reading and rereading various accounts about Kursk, I came across a vehicle I’d not seen before. Numerous sources discuss the German use of such equipment. There are even model kits of one of these! https://www.walthers.com/military-german-army-wwii-remote-control-mine-resin-kit-springer-radio-guided-medium-tracked-carrier-pkg-2
This is from a more extensive article at https://www.historynet.com/arms-men-german-remote-controlled-vehicles-world-war-ii/ More references follow at bottom of the excerpt.The Germans issued a more refined model, the B.IV, to various Funklenkpanzer battalions and separate companies in April 1942. The steel-hulled B.IV was not intended to be expendable: It carried a 450- kilogram explosive charge in a detachable bin mounted on its front. It had a driver’s compartment, enabling an operator to drive the B.IV like a tank for a considerable distance before dismounting and activating its radio control.
Once radio control was initiated, an operator in a command tank, typically a Panzerkampfwagen Mark III or Tiger tank or a Sturmgeschütz III assault gun, steered the B.IV to its target. Using radio controls, the operator detonated explosive bolts securing the demolitions bin to the B.IV, depositing the bin on or near its target. After the vehicle made good its escape, the operator also detonated the charge by radio control. Borgward built 1,181 B.IVs before its Bremen factory was bombed out in October 1944.
After testing Kégresse’s recovered prototype in late 1940, the Wehrmacht directed Borgward to design a “light load carrier.” The result was the Goliath, which the Germans began issuing to armored engineer and assault engineer units in the spring of 1942. Unlike the B.IV, the wire-guided Goliaths were designed to be expendable, a species of caterpillar-tracked mobile mine. An operator controlled the vehicle via a telephone cable spooling out from the rear of the Goliath to a joystick control box. As the electric motors used in early-model Goliaths were expensive and their battery life was short, a later model was powered by a gasoline engine. Borgward produced 7,579 Goliaths, counting both versions.
For vehicles whose operations were typically conducted with utmost secrecy, B.IV and Goliath-equipped units nevertheless saw considerable action on every front where the Wehrmacht fought.
H
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borgward_IVher
Here is a model
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Yes, and even stronger than that. Because today Putin and Russia ALSO celebrated their 80th anniversary commemorating their victory at Kursk. Coincidence?
https://gazette.com/news/wex/putin-beams-at-war-memorial-gala-as-wagner-chief-prigozhin-dies-in-plane-crash/article_6f7d740a-cc6f-59fd-9f10-ca73f329138f.html