NamEndedAllen
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Posts posted by NamEndedAllen
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Appropriate to the earlier discussion about Russia escalating its asymmetric warfare, cyber in particular. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-hackers-targeted-us-nuclear-scientists-2023-01-06/
“LONDON/WASHINGTON, Jan 6 (Reuters) - A Russian hacking team known as Cold River targeted three nuclear research laboratories in the United States this past summer, according to internet records reviewed by Reuters and five cyber security experts.
Reuters was unable to determine why the labs were targeted or if any attempted intrusion was successful. A BNL spokesperson declined to comment. LLNL did not respond to a request for comment. An ANL spokesperson referred questions to the U.S. Department of Energy, which declined to comment.Cold River has escalated its hacking campaign against Kyiv's allies since the invasion of Ukraine, according to cybersecurity researchers and western government officials. The digital blitz against the U.S. labs occurred as U.N. experts entered Russian-controlled Ukrainian territory to inspect Europe's biggest atomic power plant and assess the risk of what both sides said could be a devastating radiation disaster amid heavy shelling nearby.”
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1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:
in bullet points:
Thanks for this summary. Nice work!
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4 hours ago, The_Capt said:
Your faith in the intelligence community and scenario analysis is actually refreshing
Family values.
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5 hours ago, The_Capt said:
Glad you found some int academics that seem agree with you and would love to somehow reduce warfare down to nice clean percentages - shocking. A lot of these articles are out of date and come from the 00’s when we had become enamoured by EBO and RMA. Back then we were convinced we could “maths” our way through warfare and spent a lot of money trying to do it.
First, thanks for the detailed discussion. It clarified for me how we seemed so much at odds. I’ve inadvertently muddied the discussion by not clearly distinguishing events within warfare from speculations about what follows. I certainly don’t pretend to have your expertise in the war fighting realm that you have so well described, and don’t dispute your characterization of assessing potential events in warfare. My initial post concerned what might be the state of Russia and Ukraine following the *end* of hostilities - how the hostilities play out we don’t know, certainly there exist a range of possibilities. But of great interest is what Russia looks like especially in the case of losing, one way or another. Regime change, collapse, fragmentation, non-collapse with a heavily militarized society, diplomacy challenges in all that, etc. These sorts of scenarios and many others are the stuff of estimates such as what USA National Intelligence Estimates traditionally address, among much else. Those come with the community’s degrees of confidence in their predictions and assessments, at least in the past when I read them - the 90’s, Oughts and early teens. The scales vary, can be in six term style ranging from “remote, unlikely…to very likely, almost certainly”. Or in percentages, sometimes fairly specific depending on the subject. And yes, NIEs also used broad confidence levels of high, medium and low. Where relevant, time frames are included. So allow me to bow to your knowledge here on war, and that my mentioning different ways hostilities might end overstepped into that territory. While I maintain the methods of my non-war forecasting and estimates.
The NIEs cover practically every threat we can imagine, and so can be of interest beyond war topics. They often overlapped with my own career, often for strategic and scenario planning. Yes, partly in academia but also for the second largest broadcast network. Included in those realms (but obviously not limited to) were time frames and confidence levels, besides all the rest of the necessary rigamarole of planning.. There was no getting around them.
Without getting into an overblown game of references, time frames and probabilities can be seen in a representative NIE or two. Here you will see time frames and such very early in the doc. This from 2021 https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and_National_Security.pdf
And the famous Iran NIE on Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, from back in my time of interest, using the six step probability scale “unlikely” to “almost certainly”:
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports and Pubs/20071203_release.pdf
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9 hours ago, The_Capt said:
You want that for a shooting war? Look up Dunning-Kruger and then maybe have a cup of tea. I am not sure what military operations you have been on or what generals you have served under but I would be fascinated to hear how you applied “percentage or a set of narrative labels defined by percentage ranges” to an active combat AO.
You do realize we are talking about managed chaos here? The land of tacit knowledge and old fashion instinct? In fact you missed “consequences” from your likelihood framework - ie “how important is this particular event, and then how likely is it to happen”, which is only one way to conduct a forecast assessment.
Well this was fun but time to move on.
We are speaking about predictions and scenarios, yes? About regime change, about collapse, the outcome of the war. It’s surreal to be debating whether essentially intelligence estimates do or don’t include time frames and probability or uncertainty! And there have been some predictions in the forum that indeed do include a specific time frame. Some have included a probability estimate such as “not likely”, or 50/50, or “very likely”. Now you seem allergic to the very idea. I read open source estimates and yes, analysts do routinely include these. Otherwise their assessments are fairly useless to decision makers. Because simply saying, “Well, this could happen.” Or, “Here are a bunch of very well described possible outcomes, sir. No idea about their likelihood though.” We *always* want to know how likely something is! In diplomacy and war, extraordinary efforts are made to suss that out. Intelligence estimates, clearly included.
Consequences? I wasn’t posting a paper on the entire art of forecasting! Just a note on what often seems not present. I don’t believe you are arguing for stripping out assessments of “within a month “, or “before the ground freezes.” Or in terms of a collapse, “this year “, or “spring”. Or accompanying those with one’s rating, whether 75/25, or high likely…whatever standardized form one is accustomed to in practice. The obvious flaw is that asserting that a major event will happen “some day” is near useless.
But yes, please do let us cease. We are talking at cross purposes and not constructively for the forum. In Washington, it was always clear that firing down wasn’t a good look. And for the record, I do prefer coffee.
For reference::“There is a critical need to produce actual figures (10%, 20%, 60% etc.) for our probability predictions in order to be able to check past performances. Obscure notions such as ‘low probability’ are not enough for lessons to be learned and might fail us in trying to achieve a genuine communication with the decision makers that have to use our Intelligence estimations.” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02684520801977238 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228488886_The_Complexity_of_Intelligence_Estimates
A stripped down layout of scenarios with key column “Rough Probability” https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~aldous/157/Papers/Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence.pdf
Appendix. NIE 11–18–90, The Deepening Crisis in the USSR, p.ivFigure 1. Scenarios for the Next Year.
What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language
https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2007/nie_terror-threat_2007-07.htm Intelligence judgments pertaining to likelihood are intended to reflect the Community's sense of the probability of a development or event. Assigning precise numerical ratings to such judgments would imply more rigor than we intend. The chart below provides a rough idea of the relationship of terms to each other.Many many more examples at least from the USA are available on line and often in various workplaces.
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14 minutes ago, kevinkin said:
The writer tries to simplify the endgame decisions for the West into a binary choice:
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3795699-theres-a-way-to-end-putin-for-good/
Thanks for this link. Well worth the read. Both are scenarios we’ve pondered and discussed here. Would be strengthened were the ticking clock aspect been included, with an indication of which one they think is favored by it. Clearly a stark argument for their preferred outcome - the forced restoration of all occupied Ukraine. And a chilling warning against failure.
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4 hours ago, womble said:
I was thinking this, too. How long can they keep their bombers flying and their missiles rolling off production lines once sanctions get tightened and the loopholes they're currently using are closed down?
That’s the Big Question!
When or whether the inflection point of a falling Russian capability curve clearly, irretrievably cross a rising Ukrainian curve? From the Russian perspective? Assumption being that nothing changes these curves directions. -
4 hours ago, The_Capt said:
But we are notoriously weak on assessing the outcome of this war here, I can only hope smarter people than me are on it.
Hah hah hah! Well played. However please do recognize that proper forecasting assessments must apply likelihood; whether by percentage or a set of narrative labels defined by percentage ranges. They should be specific, include the dependent assumptions, and time frames - not indefinite. Think of this as a scenario’s meta data, not its story line. Otherwise they become the prognostications we see in popular columnists and cable news talking heads brigade. To me, we seem understandably stronger in well-formed forecasting of battlefield events, than in the murky long term outcome of this war.
PS Another element is keeping score, in order to refine forecasts. Steve does this pretty routinely, referring to past predictions and whether they have come to pass, and an assessment of how close a hit or miss was. The media columnists and talking heads rarely do this!
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4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
With that much they probably could
Steve
Hah! And in that scenario, it’s highly plausible that NATO, the EU, etc would quickly all step in to bring it to an end, a la the USA and Soviet Union repeatedly bringing Israel to a cease fire and negotiations each time Israel began threatening Damascus, and taking the Sinai. Could be a decent landing pad for the war?
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7 hours ago, The_Capt said:
Your original post that started this discussion read as “we can only see victory as driving the Russians out by force from all of Ukraine”.
I can’t find that quote from me in this discussion. I do see what you’ve said as *a* scenario for forcing a party to the negotiation table, and that it appears to be Ukraine’s current position as stated by its President. But I have said repeatedly that there is a large range of possible outcomes for this war. I don’t think I can be clearer than that. I also have stressed separating the possibilities from our preferences. We agree on this, yes? I didn’t assign probabilities here because that is a different topic. Here is what I first said 21 hours ago:
“We’ve seen a range of possible outcomes from (improbable) total Ukraine defeat to some sort of fairy tale Russian change of heart, staying intact and playing nice with both Ukraine and the West under a new rational government
AND:
Other realistic but negative outcomes are a debilitating stalemate with continued agony, death and destruction; or a slackening of Western resolve coupled to strengthened ties for Russia and other outlaw nations like Iran and North Korea to deliver more weapons and matériel …
AND 20 hours ago:
“To be clear, I am looking for a range of outcomes, not one prediction that must happen. Not absolutes. I assume that the extreme on either end of most or least preferred outcomes tend to be the least likely ( kind of like life!). So I seek examples of outcomes along the spectrum of possibilities, always keeping in mind the difference between what I prefer and the squishy probabilities of what could happen”
You were put off by my use of “weaker” in discussing end of war scenarios. By that I don’t mean their content, but their overall assessments. They are not being laid out clearly by how probable each scenario may be, and even more so in breaking down each step in individual scenarios. So these scenarios appear to be typified more by how much we prefer them. In my reading, there is more care in assessing the likelihood of specific next moves in each phase of the war fighting, separate from our preferences. If you don’t agree, that’s fine. That’s been my impression and I may be wrong.
Lastly, you said:“There are many variations on these visions, even in the political signalling going on. I think maximalist positions are dangerous and may do more harm than good but obviously others disagree.”
In this we are in total agreement! You’ve said “maximalist”, I’ve said “extreme”, and suggested they can be laid out along a spectrum of probabilities- and that *ordering* could be debated by the fine minds here, eventually distilling a best estimation and a rough group prediction. You’ve just elaborated a Russian defeat and how bad it may be. I wonder what percentages you would assign to several notches of just how bad?
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8 hours ago, The_Capt said:
There are many roads to victory or defeat in this war, as well as negotiating an end-state, just because you cannot see them or “believe” does not mean they do not exist.
I’ve been stressing this for a while. It’s my primary perspective. Repeated very recently in this discussion:
11 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:To be clear, I am looking for a range of outcomes, not one prediction that must happen. Not absolutes. I assume that the extreme on either end of most or least preferred outcomes tend to be the least likely ( kind of like life!). So I seek examples of outcomes along the spectrum of possibilities, always keeping in mind the difference between what I prefer and the squishy probabilities of what could happen. So I prefer a Ukrainian victory, but recognize that it could take various shapes. Only one is as the Capt prefers, and only another one is as I prefer. There are quite a few. Lengthy stalemate is a possibility, also a grinding back and forth prolonged war. All these are possible, besides total defeat of Ukraine and total collapse of Russia and a new government there that pays reparations and embraces peace with Ukraine.
8 hours ago, The_Capt said:We have avoided detailed predictions, and frankly when we have made them we have been a lot more accurate than the mainstream - Fall offensive anyone?
Maybe a different topic? I was musing on the ways the entire war itself might end. I’ve already said I realize and respect the scenario you have elaborated on. I believe it is along the lines of a negotiation without bloody battles in Crimea and the Donbas. Instead for them to be administered by an (unspecified) international body for perhaps ten years, followed by them voting on their status. Also, deals with Russia to pay reparations, install a more rational if still evil dictator, and respect the borders. For this they receive restored trading with the West. It’s pretty detailed! Do I have it fairly correct? I’m sketching it from memory of your earlier posts. It’s a good scenario. You’ve been selling it pretty consistently. I do think it’s a bit of a stretch though. And I’m skeptical that Ukrainians would embrace it warmly. No idea how the Russians would read it. There are a lot of moving parts to achieve. But I’m not dismissing it! It is one of many scenarios, regardless of our opinions.
You find your.scenario reasonable, and I suggest a nastier one may be more probable, where the force of arms drives one of the parties to believe it has no better choice than to sit down and accept terms. Or another scenario perhaps more likely, Russia largely retreats but without negotiating, in hopes of fighting another day. A messy conclusion with Russia a heavily militarized state, fuming and resentful. Rather like a far larger North Korea.. Unclear why those don’t seem even faintly possible. Iirc, neither Vietnam’s war, nor the Syrian civil war ended by negotiation. Somebody won, and somebody lost. The Korean War still isn’t over. Sure, some major conflicts end by negotiation! But certainly not all of them. We don’t know how this one will end.
Most people here would cheer if NATO somehow agreed to bring Ukraine in while the war is raging. But It isn’t unreasonable to see this as a not high probability event. We should entertain lots of scenarios. I think it wise to rate them for probability. Separately from our personal preference. I think that has worked well here for speculating on what might happen next as events on the battlefield unfold - just as you mentioned . I think we are weaker when it comes to assessing the outcome of the war itself, and even being able to discuss it.
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It will be interesting to watch how much Russian military has learned, and to what effect this year: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/03/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-war.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
With Heightened Anxiety, Putin Prepares Russians for Long Fight Ahead“American officials have said they see the Kremlin finally beginning to learn from its mistakes on the battlefield. Russia is improving its defenses and pushing more soldiers to the front lines, and has put a single general in charge of the war who was able to organize a retreat from the Ukrainian city of Kherson with minimal casualties in November.Russian commanders are also publicly reining in their ambitions. Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov, the head of the Russian general staff, said on Dec. 22 that Russia’s current focus was limited to trying to capture the rest of the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine”
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To be clear, I am looking for a range of outcomes, not one prediction that must happen. Not absolutes. I assume that the extreme on either end of most or least preferred outcomes tend to be the least likely ( kind of like life!). So I seek examples of outcomes along the spectrum of possibilities, always keeping in mind the difference between what I prefer and the squishy probabilities of what could happen. So I prefer a Ukrainian victory, but recognize that it could take various shapes. Only one is as the Capt prefers, and only another one is as I prefer. There are quite a few. Lengthy stalemate is a possibility, also a grinding back and forth prolonged war. All these are possible, besides total defeat of Ukraine and total collapse of Russia and a new government there that pays reparations and embraces peace with Ukraine.
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35 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Wow, a lot of absolutes there. I would offer it is nowhere near that cut and dry. Victory is a pretty squishy concept and hard tying it to lines on a map is a good way to get people killed for nothing.
Pre-2014 borders are not a pre-requisite for NATO membership, it is a political body that makes up the rules as it goes. We could simply redraw the borders and allow Ukraine to enter. What we do need is for the shooting to stop because no one wants an article 5 on signing day.
As to Russian withdraw, well a political collapse back home would definitely work, has before. Or they could get pushed back to Feb 24 lines, when I suspect the pressure to end this thing will increase. I mean seriously the risks of retaking some of these areas is not small.
In the end “decision of force of arms” sounds good and plays well in movies but the reality is that at some point people are going to get tired of dying and some sort of negotiable end state will be put forward. In that package the real dealing can start on reparations, warcrimes and possible renormalization with Russia. Or Russia can choose the way of pain and drive off a cliff, at which point we will feel good for about 12 seconds and then have a whole other set of world ending problems.
Yah, I’ve been seeing a lot of absolutes tossed about. So am looking for the more likely in-between states for outcomes. Absolutes about Russia will take Kyiv in three days, then the Russian army will collapse *last* year in May, then in June, then in August. Then the Russian government will collapse. Then either or both will collapse in Autumn. That Russia *must* lose. That Russia *already* has lost. So I remain skeptical of any of our peanut gallery predictions of what *must* happen. Skeptical, not dismissive. Because these are opinions about what we think *should* happen. Often very well argued (as by Steve and the Capt).
Negotiation always seems like a nice way to end a big war. But basically, nobody seriously negotiates until the pain is extraordinary. Or there isn’t any negotiation: WWII Germany. Unconditional surrender. WWII Japan: Unconditional surrender. Russia in Afghanistan. Messier? But eventually run away. Pretty similar to the USA Afghan Adventure except after tossing tremendous mountains of taxpayer dollars into the fire.
I understand your suggestions of what *could* happen, as you just outlined. I just don’t buy that they are most likely. They keep ignoring Ukraine, almost as if it is a puppet on Western strings, as Putin intimates. But it is not. Example: “We could simply redraw the borders and allow Ukraine to enter.” Sure! But NATO has not done this and I suspect Ukraine has had quite enough of other nations wanting to change its borders, thank you very much.
Similarly, sure, NATO *could* change its rules as you’ve said a few months ago iirc. But it has not, and has not hinted at such a thing. In my opinion, the likelihood that NATO as a political body will ever vote to admit Ukraine as a member while the war is raging is akin to me becoming the Philadelphia Eagles next quarterback.
I feel almost the same about predictions that Russia will collapse. And that it will pay a penny of reparations. Maybe so. But that is far from a strategy, let alone a given.
My *opinion*, which is all it is, is that Ukraine will decide whether and when it is tired of its casualties, whether it wishes to give up Crimea or the Donbas. Likewise for Russia. So far, all the progress or lack of it is what has happened on the battlefield. I may well be wrong, but I think for Ukraine’s POV clear, unmistakable battlefield defeat of Russia is what precedes any sort of negotiations to wrap the hostilities up. I suspect Ukrainians sense it is now or *never* to liberate Crimea and the Donbas.
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10 hours ago, Holien said:
we have talked about how the war won't end until Ukraine says so but even if Russia is pushed back to their own borders they could continue to launch attacks on Ukraine.
That is both true and probable. But once all Ukraine’s borders are its own again, without salients let alone Oblasts under the invaders’ control, Ukraine could become NATO membership eligible.
We’ve seen a range of possible outcomes from (improbable) total Ukraine defeat to some sort of fairy tale Russian change of heart, staying intact and playing nice with both Ukraine and the West under a new rational government - no matter how attractive and rational that may be in the abstract. But neither extreme seem anywhere near the real world - too many improbable steps must occur in lock step and with no failures of the necessary steps. In my brilliant, far seeing and worth less than what you are paying for it opinion, the best outcome we can realistically hope for is the means for NATO protection for Ukraine. This requires no magical “better” Russian dictator, no decision by Russia to withdraw and become peaceful, no magical change in Russian control of their internal media and propaganda. It only requires victory on the battlefield by Ukraine. And that requires not only continued military aid, but ramped up aid that permits inexorable step by step battlefield exhaustion, defeat, and retreat by Russia.
Other realistic but negative outcomes are a debilitating stalemate with continued agony, death and destruction; or a slackening of Western resolve coupled to strengthened ties for Russia and other outlaw nations like Iran and North Korea to deliver more weapons and matériel - leading to renewed gains of Ukrainian territory. Which leads into a spiral of weakening Western political and public resolve. Ominously, in my (literally) priceless opinion, these outcomes increase in probability as time goes on without Ukrainian victory. Thus the importance of hastening Russian defeat on the battlefield.
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More new tech for HIMARS coming to Ukraine:
The U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC) at the Aberdeen Proving Ground last month put out a 'Sources Sought' notification for possible future delivery of International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (IFATDS) to Ukraine, as well as Taiwan and Latvia. The international export version of the Army's Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), IFATDS would increase HIMARS lethality by providing a secure communications system stitching together incoming information from various sources across the battlefield for a better common operating picture and greater situational awareness. This would give HIMARS operators a much better idea of where to fire the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) munitions that have already been used to devastating effect by Ukraine https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-pentagon-may-give-kyiv-advanced-himars-fire-control-system
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2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
If you are an American and you are reading this thread, you should be outraged. Not at me for pointing out that pro-Putin propaganda is being broadcast on America's most viewed cable news network, but because it is there to be pointed at in the first place.
I am, and I am.
Imbibing his swill is the equivalent to the act of aligning with Tokyo Rose in WWII. Except he isn’t funny. -
2 hours ago, sross112 said:
And what @The_Capt and you point out also puts relevance as to why the majority of the conscription is from the lesser populated, poorer, rural areas and not Moscow and St. Petersburg. Not even a million people in Buryatia, so even if 3 out of 5 in each family were wounded and killed and the whole province rose up, Moscow doesn't care that much. 10,000 casualties out of one of the big cities would have a lot more effect on their power base than 100,000 spread out in the rural areas.
With the talk of them changing the draft age from 18-27 to 21-30, if you look at the demographics of Russia there are about twice as many 30 year olds than 18 year olds. So the change allows them to grab out of a larger portion of the population. Kinda stupid though as the average 30 year old is going to possess a lot more skills and be more valuable to your society and economy than the average 18 year old. So that should further compound their internal problems. Plus it is taking husbands and fathers out so you open up resistance from not just mothers but wives and children as well.
It seems that the only gun that Russia won't run out of ammo for is the one they are using to shoot themselves in the foot with.
Concerning the use of casualties in attempting to predict victory or defeat - Cap laid out the complexity of the many confounding variables in rather a lot of detail. However, I think we can set this method aside using the analytic method of Face Validity alone. Consider just one more example. Having seen how miserably the metric of body counts worked out (not!) in the Vietnam War, I would suggest that these attempts are fool’s errands. It isn’t a sports game with a scoreboard and a set number of time periods (quarters, innings, etc) that end the game with a final score determining the winner, all neat and tidy.
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President Zelensky. From the front line at Bakhmut to the Congress of the USA. References to Americans desperately fighting the Nazis on Christmas Eve in Battle of the Bulge. To the turning point in the American War for Independence: The Battle of Saratoga. Not asking for American soldiers fighting in Ukraine, assuring instead, Ukrainians can definitely fly American jets and drive American tanks (!).
But the two simple words that should ring out, should be THE message to everyone, everywhere:
”ONLY VICTORY”
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1 hour ago, akd said:
I’m beginning to think there might be something wrong with this country…
Wait! His motivation is actually rather sane, at least it’s tied to reality!! Might not be the wisest decision with regard to a cost/benefit analysis, but still…assuming of course he HAS a daughter.
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1 hour ago, sburke said:
I think that is why you see different tools as well. Have heard that from another user.
Thanks! Somewhat better than even more evidence my brain is turning into grey goo and oatmeal. Or worse.
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5 hours ago, Zeleban said:
Imagine how the Poles are angry with the words "Glory to Ukraine, glory to the heroes" After all, this is a greeting from the OUN-UPA. Moreover, these words are increasingly spoken by leading world politicians and international figures.
“The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.”
-Faulkner
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12 hours ago, Huba said:
Also "paste as plain text" from browser context menu ( or Ctrl+SHift+V instead of Ctrl+V) allows you to drop the external formatting and instead displays forum's standard font - much easier on the eyes in general
Thanks! Those would be keyboard commands, yes? I’m using a tablet - no keyboard- which might be why the options are fewer. But thanks! Might be some alternative, although I can always just copy, paste and use quotes to indicate. Like I have been doing. But definitely not as slick looking.
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12 hours ago, Pete Wenman said:
Use the quote tool
P
Thanks Pete. I would do exactly that, except I never see the quote tool selection. Looking even now, I see the U underline button, and next to it on the right is the link button. I also don’t have those font opytions you have. Must be a full or abbreviated tool choice in Settings, that I’ve never noticed?
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Might that dream, or the restoration of the Soviet Empire version be shared by many more than Putin? If broadly shared in Russia, a sort of national ethos? Then efforts to do so may strike a strong chord in a society so pervasively propagandized to always view so much if the world as dangerously and permanently “against them”. What does Russia stand for, in the minds of Russians?